NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission,

Plaintiff,

V.

Cory Williams, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-17-01325-PHX-JJT

ORDER

On July 21, 2017 Plaintiff U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("Plaintiff," "CFTC," or "Commission") filed a Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, Permanent Injunction, Civil Monetary Penalty, and Other Equitable Relief against Defendants Cory Williams ("Williams") and Williams Advisory Group, LLC ("WAG") (collectively, "Defendants") (Doc. 29). The Court granted the Motion in its March 6, 2018 Order (Doc. 36). The Court affirms its Order (Doc. 36) regarding the Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, Permanent Injunction, Civil Monetary Penalty, and Other Equitable Relief against Defendants and supplements it as follows:

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. On May 3, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief and for Civil Monetary Penalties for violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (the "Act"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (2012), and Commission Regulations ("Regulations"), 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-190.10 (2016). ("Complaint" or "Compl.," Doc. 1).

- 2. On May 8, 2017, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2)(A), Plaintiff's process server personally served Williams with the Summons, the Complaint, and all associated papers at his residence in Gilbert, Arizona. (Proof of Service executed by Sarah Zirakim, dated May 8, 2017, Doc. 15).
- 3. Also on May 8, 2017, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1)(B), Plaintiff's process server served WAG with the Summons, the Complaint, and all associated papers by providing them to Williams, an officer of WAG who is "authorized to accept service" on behalf of WAG. (Proof of Service executed by Sarah Zirakim, dated May 8, 2017, Doc. 16).
- 4. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1)(A)(i) and 6(a)(1)(C), all Defendants were required to answer or move against the Complaint within 21 days of service, or by May 30, 2017. Defendants failed to appear in the action, plead, or otherwise respond to the Complaint.
- 5. On May 31, 2017, Plaintiff submitted Applications for Entry of Default Against Defendants (the "Applications") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) (Docs. 19, 20), which the Clerk of the Court granted on June 1, 2017.
- 6. Also on June 1, 2017, the Court conducted a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Preliminary Injunction. (Doc. 13). Neither Defendant responded to Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Preliminary Injunction or appeared at the hearing. (Doc. 22).
- 7. On June 8, 2017, this Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 23), and thereafter Plaintiff served the Defendants with a copy of the Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
- 8. The only pleading filed on behalf of any Defendant was Defendant Williams' letter motion dated June 8, 2017, to vacate the preliminary injunction and to stay the proceedings (Doc. 24), which this Court denied on June 19, 2017 (Doc. 25). The Court also ordered Defendant WAG, a corporate entity, to enter an appearance in this case through counsel within 30 days of issuance of the Order. (Doc. 25). Neither

Defendant has pled, responded to the Compliant, or otherwise defended the action. Further, Defendant WAG has failed to file a notice of appearance with the Court, in violation of the Court's June 19, 2017 Order. Plaintiff's instant motion followed.

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II. **FINDINGS OF FACT**

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The Parties A.

- 9. Plaintiff United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission is an independent federal regulatory agency charged by Congress with the administration and enforcement of the Act and Regulations. The CFTC maintains its principal office at 1155 21st Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20581.
- Defendant Williams Advisory Group, LLC ("WAG") is an Arizona limited liability company formed on September 27, 2010, with its principal place of business at 2484 E. Lodgepole Drive, Gilbert, Arizona 85298. WAG has never been registered in any capacity with the CFTC.
- Defendant Cory Williams is an individual residing in Gilbert, Arizona. 11. Williams is the founder, president and agent of WAG. Williams has never been registered in any capacity with the CFTC.

Defendants' Fraudulent Scheme В.

- 12. From at least April 2014 through December 2016 ("Relevant Period"), Williams, individually and as agent and officer of WAG, fraudulently solicited and directly accepted \$13,131,390 million from at least 40 individuals and/or entities ("pool participants" or "participants") to participate in a pooled investment vehicle for the purported purpose of trading commodity futures contracts.
- Williams traded significant volumes of E-Mini S&P 500 futures contracts in his personal trading accounts using participants' funds and consistently suffered heavy trading losses. Williams' trading for his own benefit in his personal accounts resulted in losses of more than \$8.3 million. Williams lost money every single month he traded from April 2014 through and including December 2016, all while falsely representing to participants that he was profitably trading on their behalf.

- 14. Williams returned \$3,406,373 million of the original \$13,131,390 in participant funds to certain participants as withdrawals of principal or as purported trading "profits" in furtherance of Defendants' fraudulent scheme. However, the majority of participants were unable to obtain a return of their funds.
- 15. Williams used the remaining \$1.3 million of \$13,131,390 originally received from participants to pay for his personal expenses throughout the Relevant Period on such items as jewelry, charitable donations in his name, and living expenses.
- 16. At no time did Williams operate the pool as a legal entity separate from that of the pool operator, nor did Williams ever open a pooled trading account for the benefit of participants. Instead, Williams misappropriated pool participants' funds and diverted them for Defendants' own use by: transferring pool participants' funds to personal bank accounts held in the name of Williams and/or the names of Williams and his wife, Brittany Williams, and/or WAG; funding trading accounts held in the name of, and for the benefit of, Williams; and, paying for Williams' personal expenses. Williams further misappropriated pool participants' funds by diverting a portion to other participants as withdrawals of principal or purported profits in the form of a "Ponzi" scheme.
- 17. Williams, individually and as agent and officer of WAG, made misrepresentations of material facts to participants, including but not limited to, falsely claiming to have profitably traded on behalf of participants, when in fact Williams knew that he was consistently losing money trading participants' funds.
- 18. Williams, individually and as agent and officer of WAG, also omitted material facts in his communications with participants, including but not limited to failing to disclose: Williams' misappropriation of participants' funds; Williams' failure to register as a commodity pool operator ("CPO") as required by the Act; Williams' failure to operate the pool as a separate legally cognizable entity in violation of the Regulations; Williams' commingling of funds in violation of the Regulations; and Williams' failure to accept funds in the name of the pool in violation of the Regulations.

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19. To perpetuate Defendants' fraudulent scheme and to solicit additional pool participants, Williams also sent text messages to participants containing fabricated weekly profits. These text messages falsely represented that trading on behalf of participants had occurred, and that participants' investments had increased in value as a result of profitable futures trading by Williams. In reality, pool participants accrued no profits and suffered total or near total losses of their deposits.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. **Jurisdiction and Venue**

- 20. This Court possesses jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a) (2012), which authorizes the CFTC to seek injunctive and other relief in a United States district court against any person whenever it appears to the CFTC that such person has violated the Act or Regulations. The Court possesses personal jurisdiction over Williams because he resides in this District and committed the acts alleged in the Complaint within this District, and over WAG because it conducted business in this District and maintained an address in this District.
- 21. Venue properly lies with this Court pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(e) (2012), because Defendants' acts and practices in violation of the Act and Regulations occurred within this District.

В. Default Judgment Is Warranted Against Williams and WAG

- 22. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) authorizes litigants to seek, and the Court to enter, default judgment against a party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b).
- Where a court possesses personal and subject-matter jurisdiction, the decision to enter default judgment is left to the court's sound discretion.
- 24. In exercising discretion to enter default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), courts in the Ninth Circuit consider seven "Eitel" factors. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The Eitel factors are identified in the order in which they are addressed herein:

- (1) the sufficiency of the complaint;
- (2) the substantive merits of plaintiff's claims;
- (3) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts;
- (4) whether default resulted from excusable neglect;
- (5) the prejudice to plaintiff if the motion is denied;
- (6) the strong policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits; and
- (7) the amount of money at stake.

1. All Four Causes of Action in the Complaint Are Sufficiently Alleged and Have Substantive Merit (*Eitel* Factors 1 and 2)

25. In considering a motion for default judgment, the Court treats "factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages . . . as true." *TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing *Geddes v. United Fin. Group*, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)). The first two Eitel factors are (1) the merits of Plaintiff's substantive claim and (2) the sufficiency of the complaint. These factors require that a plaintiff "state a claim on which the [plaintiff] may recover." *Philip Morris, USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods, Inc.*, 219 F.R.D. 494, 499 (C.D. Cal. 2003); *see also Danning v. Lavine*, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). As described below, the Complaint has adequately pled all four asserted causes of action.

a. Defendants Violated 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2012) (Fraud in Connection with Commodity Futures Contracts – Complaint Count I)

26. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2012), it is unlawful for any person, in or in connection with any order to make, or the making of, a futures contract on or subject to the rules of a designated contract market to: (A) cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud another person; (B) willfully to make or cause to be made to the other person any false report or statement or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for the other person any false record; or (C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any means whatsoever in connection with such contract.

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27. Plaintiff can establish a violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2012) by showing that Defendants made a material misrepresentation, misleading statement, or deceptive omission with scienter. CFTC v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., 310 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2002); CFTC v. Rosenberg, 85 F. Supp. 2d 424, 446-47 (D.N.J. 2000). Scienter exists if Defendants "knew the representations [they made] were false and were calculated to cause harm" or "were made with a reckless disregard for their truth or falsity." CFTC v. Nat'l Invest. Consultants, Inc., No. C 05-02641, 2005 WL 2072105, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2005). The CFTC must demonstrate only that Defendants' actions were "intentional as opposed to accidental." Lawrence v. CFTC, 759 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1985). A statement or omission is material if "it is substantially likely that a reasonable investor would consider the matter important in making an investment decision." CFTC v. Weinberg, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting CFTC v. Noble Wealth Data Info. Services, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 676, 686 (D. Md. 2000)). Topics such as "the likelihood of profit, [and] the risk of loss" are material. CFTC v. Emerald Worldwide Holdings, Inc., No. CV03-8339AHM, 2005 WL 1130588, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2005).

i. Material Misrepresentations and Omissions

- 28. The facts of the Complaint, which the Court takes as true for purposes of the instant motion, sufficiently allege that Williams, individually and as agent and principal of WAG, made the following material misrepresentations during the Relevant Period, among others: (i) pool participant funds would be pooled to trade commodity futures and returns would be derived from the pool's trading profits; (ii) Williams was a successful and profitable trader; and (iii) Williams' trading was consistently profitable during the Relevant Period. These material misrepresentations violated 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2012).
- 29. The Complaint also sufficiently alleges that Williams, individually and as agent and principal of WAG, intentionally omitted material information from pool participants in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(1)(A) and (C) (2012), including that: (i)

pool operator; (ii) no trading on behalf of the pool took place; (iii) Williams misappropriated pool participants' funds for his own use; (iv) Williams was not registered with the CFTC as a CPO as required by the Act and was operating the pool without the required CPO registration; (v) Williams commingled participants' funds with his own funds and WAG's funds in violation of federal law; and (vi) purported "returns" or withdrawals of principal paid to some pool participants were in fact the principal deposits of other pool participants and were not generated by profitable futures trading.

Williams never set up the pool as an entity cognizable as a legal entity separate from the

ii. Material Misrepresentations and Omissions

- 30. The Complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendants violated 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(1)(A) and (C) (2012) by misappropriating pool participants' funds. Misappropriation of customer funds is "willful and blatant fraudulent activity' that clearly violates [7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)]." *Weinberg*, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (quoting *Noble Wealth*, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 687).
- 31. As the Complaint alleges, Williams misappropriated pool participants' funds by: (i) using pool participants' funds to pay the personal expenses of Williams; (ii) depositing pool participants' funds into bank and trading accounts in the name of Williams; and (iii) returning pool participants' funds as purported "profits" in the manner of a "Ponzi" scheme.

iii. False Reports and Statements

32. The Complaint sufficiently alleges that during the Relevant Period, Williams sent text messages to participants containing fabricated weekly profits in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(1)(B) (2012). These text messages falsely represented that trading on behalf of participants had occurred, and that participants' investments had increased in value as a result of profitable futures trading by Williams. In reality, pool participants accrued no profits and suffered total or near total losses of their deposits. Williams fabricated these records to falsely reflect trading profits and account balances that did not exist, to conceal misappropriation, and to solicit additional pool participants.

In so doing, Williams violated 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)(1)(B) (2012) by making and disseminating these fabricated weekly profits. *See* Driver, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 978 (CFTC prevailed on fraud claims where defendant fabricated account statements reflecting illusory trading profits); *see also CFTC v. Crombie*, No. C 11–4577 CW, 2013 WL 3957506, at *23, *28 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2013) (use of sham account statements violated 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a)).

b. Defendant Williams Violated 7 U.S.C. § 60(1)(A) and (B) (2012) (Fraud by a Commodity Pool Operator – Complaint Count II)

33. In relevant part, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(11) (2012) defines a commodity pool operator ("CPO") as:

any person – (i) engaged in a business that is of the nature of a commodity pool, investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of enterprise, and who, in connection therewith, solicits, accepts, or receives from others, funds, securities, or property . . . for the purpose of trading in any commodity interests, including any – (I) commodity for future delivery, . . .; (II) agreement, contract or transaction described in [7 U.S.C. $\S 2(c)(2)(C)(i)$] . . .

- 34. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. \S 6o(1) (2012), it is unlawful for a CPO to use the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to: (A) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any prospective or existing pool participant; or (B) engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business that operates as a fraud or deceit upon any prospective or existing pool participant.
- 35. As alleged in the Complaint, during the Relevant Period Williams acted as a CPO by soliciting, accepting, or receiving funds from the public while engaged in a business that is of the nature of an investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of enterprise, for the purpose of, among other things, trading in commodity futures contracts.
- 36. As alleged in the Complaint, during the Relevant Period Williams violated 7 U.S.C. § 6*o*(1)(A) and (B) (2012) by using interstate commerce to fraudulently solicit and pool funds for a commodity pool purporting to trade in commodity futures contracts.

c. Defendant Williams Violated 17 C.F.R. § 4.20(a)(1), (b), and (c) (2016) (Prohibited Activities by a Commodity Pool Operator – Complaint Count III)

- 37. Pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 4.20(a)(1) (2016), "a commodity pool operator must operate its pool as an entity cognizable as a legal entity separate from that of the pool operator."
- 38. The Complaint sufficiently alleges that during the Relevant Period Williams violated 17 C.F.R. § 4.20(a)(1) (2016) by maintaining no distinction between himself and the pool and by failing to establish the pool as a separate legal entity.
- 39. Pursuant to 17 C.F.R. § 4.20(b) (2016), "[a]ll funds, securities or other property received by a commodity pool operator from an existing or prospective pool participant for the purchase of an interest or as an assessment . . . on an interest in a pool that it operates or that it intends to operate must be received in the pool's name."
- 40. The Complaint sufficiently alleges that during the Relevant Period Williams violated 17 C.F.R. § 4.20(b) (2016) by operating an investment trust, syndicate, or similar form of enterprise for the purpose of, among other things, trading in commodity futures contracts, and receiving funds, securities or other property from existing or prospective pool participants for the purchase of an interest in the pool, and not in the pool's name.
- 41. 17 C.F.R. § 4.20(c) (2016) provides, "[n]o commodity pool operator may commingle the property of any pool that it operates or that it intends to operate with the property of any other person."
- 42. The Complaint sufficiently alleges that during the Relevant Period Williams violated 17 C.F.R. § 4.20(c) (2016) by failing to maintain pool funds separately from Williams' own funds and WAG's funds; commingling pool funds with the personal funds of Williams and Brittany Williams and the funds of WAG; and, placing pool funds into the personal bank and trading accounts of Williams.

d. Defendant Williams Violated 7 U.S.C. § 6m(1) (2012) (Failure to Register as a CPO – Complaint Count IV

- 43. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 6m(1) (2012), a CPO is prohibited, unless registered as such with the CFTC, from making use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in connection with its business as a CPO.
- 44. The Complaint sufficiently alleges that during the Relevant Period Williams violated 7 U.S.C. § 6m(1) (2012) by soliciting and accepting funds from pool participants for the purported purpose of trading commodity futures without registering with the CFTC as a CPO. Williams routinely used instrumentalities of interstate commerce in connection with his business as a CPO by utilizing emails, texts and/or phone calls in his communications with participants.

e. Principal-Agent and Control Person Liability

- 45. The Complaint sufficiently alleges that Williams at all times controlled WAG and did not act in good faith and knowingly induced WAG to violate the Act and Regulations. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13c(b) (2012), the Court finds Williams liable for WAG's violations of the Act and Regulations.
- 46. The Court also finds that Williams acted within the course and scope of his employment, agency, or office with WAG. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) (2012) and 17 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2016), WAG is therefore liable for Williams' violations of the Act and Regulations.

2. Default Judgment is Proper Under the Remaining *Eitel* Factors

47. The Court finds that there is no possibility of a dispute concerning material facts (*Eitel* factor 3) because Defendants have conceded all allegations in the Complaint, which must be taken as true for purposes of this Motion. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); *see also Sky Billiards, Inc. v. Loong Star, Inc.*, EDCV 14–921, 2016 WL 6661175, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2016) (defendants' failure to respond "supports the conclusion that the possibility of a dispute as to the material facts is minimal").

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- 48. Defendants' failure to respond to the Complaint is not the result of "excusable neglect" (Eitel factor 4). All Defendants were served with the Summons and Complaint by process server (see Proofs of Service executed by Sarah Zirakim, dated May 8, 2017, Docs. 15-16). Defendants have failed to answer, plead or defend in this action. Defendant Williams appeared via a letter motion in which he acknowledged "being sued by the CFTC" (Doc. 24) and accordingly, the Court has already concluded that Williams has actual notice of this lawsuit (Doc. 25). Therefore, there is no indication that Defendants' failure to plead or respond to the Complaint is due to excusable neglect. See Bankers Ins. Co. v. Old West Bonding Co., No. CV11-1804, 2012 WL 2912912, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 16, 2012) (granting default judgment motion against a corporation that "initially attempted to appear through pro se defendant"); Halsey v. Colonial Asset Mgmt., No. 5:13-cv-02025, 2014 WL 12601015, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2014) ("Defendant was served with the summons and Complaint, but has failed to appear in this action. Therefore, there is no indication that Defendant's default is due to excusable neglect, or that the material facts are in dispute.").
- 49. Plaintiff has established that it will be prejudiced if default judgment is not entered (*Eitel* factor 5), because Plaintiff will be impeded from fulfilling its congressional mandate to enforce the Act. *See SEC v. Fortitude Group., Inc.*, C.A. No. 16-50, 2017 WL 818604, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 2017) (granting SEC's motion for default judgment because SEC would "be prejudiced by its inability to effectively enforce federal securities laws" if motion were denied). Plaintiff will be prejudiced absent entry of default judgment because it "will be deprived of the opportunity to obtain judicial resolution of its claim[s]." *Sky Billiards*, 2016 WL 6661175, at *5; *see also Halsey*, 2014 WL 12601015, at *4.
- 50. The "strong policy" favoring decisions on the merits (*Eitel* factor 6) does not justify denying default judgment here. Although public policy favors a decision on the merits, "[d]efendant's failure to answer Plaintiffs' Complaint makes a decision on the

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- In addition, entry of default judgment in this action satisfies another important policy goal — protecting the integrity of the commodity futures markets. See Stephen Bronte, Advisors, LLC v. CFTC, 90 F. App'x 251, 252 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing CFTC as "the 'statutory guardian' entrusted with the enforcement of the congressional scheme for safeguarding the public interest in the commodity futures markets") (citing *Lawrence v. CFTC*, 759 F.2d 767, 776 (9th Cir. 1985)).
- 52. The amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct does not warrant denying default judgment (Eitel factor 7). Defendants' fraudulent conduct and registration violations constitute "core" violations of the Act and Regulations that attack the integrity of the commodity markets. The relief Plaintiff seeks is reasonable, is authorized by the Act and Regulations, and is consistent with prior default judgment awards in similar CFTC enforcement actions. See, e.g., CFTC v. Am. Bullion Exch. ABEX Corp., No. SACV10-1876, 2014 WL 12603558, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2014) (entering default judgment for CFTC and ordering defendants to pay a civil monetary penalty exceeding \$14 million); CFTC v. Safevest, LLC, No. SACV08-00474, 2009 WL 2448116, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2006) (after defendants' default, Court ordered \$18.4 million in disgorgement and \$2 million in civil monetary penalties); cf. CFTC v. Schiera, No. CV05 2660 CAS, 2006 WL 4586786, at *7, *9 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2006) (entering default judgment and ordering defendants to disgorge \$3 million and pay a \$9 million civil monetary penalty).

IV. REMEDIES AND DAMAGES

Permanent Injunction A.

53. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a) (2012) authorizes the CFTC to seek, and the Court to impose, injunctive relief against any person whenever it shall appear to the CFTC that such person has engaged in any act or practice that violates the Act or Regulations.

- 54. Pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a) (2012), "[t]he CFTC is entitled to a permanent injunction upon a showing that a violation [of the Act or Regulations] has occurred and is likely to continue unless enjoined." *Driver*, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (citations omitted). As a result, "[o]nce a violation is demonstrated, the [CFTC] need show only that there is some reasonable likelihood of future violations." *CFTC v. Wilson*, No. 11CV1561, 2011 WL 6398933, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2011) (quoting *CFTC v. Hunt*, 591 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1979)).
- 55. The Court may infer a likelihood of future violations of the Act and Regulations from past unlawful conduct. *See CFTC v. Yu*, No. 12–CV–3921, 2012 WL 3283430, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012). The Court may also consider whether Defendants "have exhibited any recognition of the wrongfulness of their conduct," or have committed "willfully contumacious behavior." *CFTC v. Brockbank*, 505 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1174 (D. Utah 2007) (issuing permanent injunction), *aff'd*, 316 F. App'x 707 (10th Cir. 2008).
- 56. As described above, the well-pleaded facts of the Complaint and the evidence Plaintiff has placed before the Court through declarations establish that Defendants' unlawful conduct makes it highly likely that they will be repeat violators of the Act and Regulations unless permanently enjoined by this Court.
- 57. As alleged, Williams fraudulently solicited and misappropriated \$13,131,390 over a more than two-year period and went to great lengths to conceal his fraud, including by sending weekly text messages containing fabricated weekly profits to pool participants and by making "Ponzi" scheme-like payments to certain participants.
- 58. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the allegations of the Complaint, and the evidence Plaintiff has submitted in this action establish that:
 - (a) Defendants violated 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2012), and Defendant Williams violated 7 U.S.C. §§ 6m(1), 6o(1)(A) and (B) (2012), and 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.20(a)(1), (b), and (c) (2016); and

- (b) There is a reasonable likelihood that Defendants will continue to violate the Act and Regulations unless permanently restrained and enjoined by this Court. The intentional and egregious nature of Defendants' fraudulent conduct warrants permanent injunctive relief, including registration and trading bans.
- 59. Accordingly, Defendants and their agents, servants, employees, assigns, attorneys, holding companies, alter egos, and persons in active concert or participation with them, including any of their successors, are permanently restrained, enjoined, and prohibited from directly or indirectly:
 - (a) engaging in conduct that violates 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b(a)(1)(A)-(C), 6m(1), and 6o(1)(A) and (B) (2012); and 17 C.F.R. §§ 4.20(a)(1), (b), and (c) (2016);
 - (b) trading on or subject to the rules of any registered entity (as that term is defined in 7 U.S.C. § la(40) (2012));
 - (c) entering into any transaction involving "commodity interests" (as that term is defined in 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(yy) (2016)) for their own personal account or for any account in which they have a direct or indirect interest;
 - (d) having any commodity interests traded on their behalf;
 - (e) controlling or directing trading for or on behalf of any other person or entity, whether by power of attorney or otherwise, in any account involving commodity interests;
 - (f) soliciting, receiving, or accepting any funds from any person for the purpose of purchasing or selling any commodity interests;
 - (g) applying for registration or claiming exemption from registration with the CFTC in any capacity, and engaging in any activity requiring registration or exemption from registration with the CFTC, except as provided for in 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(9) (2016);

- (h) acting as a principal (as that term is defined in 17 C.F.R. § 3.1(a) (2016)), agent, or any other officer or employee of any person registered, exempted from registration, or required to be registered with the CFTC, except as provided for in 17 C.F.R. § 4.14(a)(9) (2016); and
- (i) engaging in any business activities related to commodity interests.

B. Restitution, Civil Monetary Penalty, and Post-Judgment Interest

1. Restitution

- 60. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d)(3)(A) (2012) authorizes the CFTC to seek, and the Court to impose, equitable remedies for violations of the Act, including "restitution to persons who have sustained losses proximately caused by such violation (in the amount of such losses)." Restitution exists to "restore the status quo" and reflects "the difference between what defendants obtained and the amount customers received back" *Driver*, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (entering default judgment and ordering restitution equal to the amount of money solicited minus the amount returned to customers). *See also CFTC v. Leighton*, No. 2:12–cv–04012, 2013 WL 4101874, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2013) (ordering restitution equal to the "net losses to pool participants"); *Emerald Worldwide*, 2005 WL 1130558, at *10 ("[t]he appropriate amount of restitution is the total amount invested by customers, less refunds made by the defendants to the customers.").
- 61. Defendants' illegal conduct caused pool participants to incur net losses totaling \$9,725,017, which reflects the total funds Williams fraudulently solicited (\$13,131,390), minus the funds he diverted from some pool participants and passed to other participants in the manner of a "Ponzi" scheme (\$3,406,373). (*See* Decl. of Patricia Gomersall, dated May 4, 2017 ("Gomersall Decl.," Doc. 13-3) ¶ 11; Decl. of Patricia Gomersall in Support of Restitution and Civil Monetary Penalty Amounts, dated July 17, 2017 ("Gomersall Decl. II") ¶ 8; Gomersall Decl. II Attachment A).
- 62. Accordingly, Defendants are ordered to pay, on a joint and several basis, restitution in the amount of \$9,725,017 (nine million seven hundred twenty-five thousand

and seventeen dollars), plus post-judgment interest thereon (the "Restitution Obligation"). Post-judgment interest shall accrue beginning on the date of entry of this Order and shall be determined pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012).

- Obligation for any payments made by them in satisfaction of any restitution amount ordered by the sentencing court in the criminal case, *United States v. Williams*, CR-17-01279-PHX-DLR (D. Ariz.). To receive credit for any payments made by Defendants in satisfaction of any restitution amount ordered in the criminal case, Defendants shall provide a copy of proof of payment to the Chief Financial Officer, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20581, and the Office of Administration, National Futures Association, 300 South Riverside Plaza, Suite 1800, Chicago, Illinois 60606, accompanied by a cover letter identifying Defendants and the name and docket number of this proceeding.
- 64. The Court appoints the National Futures Association ("NFA") as Monitor to distribute payments made against the Restitution Obligation to Defendants' pool participants. The Monitor shall collect restitution payments from Defendants and make distributions as set forth below. Because the Monitor is acting as an officer of this Court in performing these services, NFA shall not be liable for any action or inaction arising from NFA's appointment as Monitor, other than actions involving fraud.
- 65. Defendants shall make Restitution Obligation payments under this Order to the Monitor in the name "Cory Williams Restitution Fund" and shall send such payments by electronic funds transfer, or by U.S. postal money order, certified check, bank cashier's check, or bank money order, to the Office of Administration, National Futures Association, 300 South Riverside Plaza, Suite 1800, Chicago, Illinois 60606, accompanied by a cover letter identifying Defendants and the name and docket number of this proceeding. Defendants shall simultaneously transmit copies of the cover letter and the form of payment to the Chief Financial Officer, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20581.

- 66. The Monitor shall oversee the Restitution Obligation and shall have the discretion to determine the manner of distribution of such funds in an equitable fashion to Defendants' pool participants identified by the CFTC, or may defer distribution until such time as the Monitor deems appropriate. In the event that the amount of Restitution Obligation payments to the Monitor are of a *de minimis* nature such that the Monitor determines that the administrative cost of making a distribution to eligible pool participants is impractical, the Monitor may, in its discretion, treat such restitution payments as civil monetary penalty payments, which the Monitor shall forward to the CFTC pursuant to the instructions for civil monetary penalty payments set forth below.
- 67. Defendants shall cooperate with the Monitor as appropriate to provide such information as the Monitor deems necessary and appropriate to identify Defendants' pool participants to whom the Monitor, in its sole discretion, may determine to include in any plan for distribution of any Restitution Obligation payments. Defendants shall execute any documents necessary to release funds that they hold in any repository, bank, investment, or other financial institution, wherever located, in order to make partial or total payment toward the Restitution Obligation.
- 68. The Monitor shall provide the CFTC at the beginning of each calendar year with a report detailing the disbursement of funds to Defendants' pool participants during the previous year. The Monitor shall transmit this report accompanied by a cover letter identifying the name and docket number of this proceeding to the Chief Financial Officer, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20581.
- 69. The amounts payable to each pool participant shall not limit the ability of any pool participant to prove that a greater amount is owed from Defendants or any other person or entity, and nothing herein shall be construed in any way to limit or abridge the rights of any pool participant that exist under state or common law.
- 70. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71, each pool participant of Defendants who suffered a loss is explicitly made an intended third-party beneficiary of

this Order and may seek to enforce this Order to obtain satisfaction of any portion of the Restitution Obligation that has not been paid by Defendants, to ensure continued compliance with any provision of this Order, and to hold Defendants in contempt for any violations of any provision of this Order.

71. To the extent that any funds accrue to the U.S. Treasury for satisfaction of the Restitution Obligation, such funds shall be transferred to the Monitor for disbursement in accordance with the procedures set forth above.

2. Civil Monetary Penalty

- 72. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d)(1) (2012) and 17 C.F.R. § 143.8(a)(4)(iii)(B) (2016) authorize Plaintiff to seek a civil monetary penalty equal to the higher of triple Defendants' monetary gain from each violation of the Act or Regulations, or \$170,472 per violation. The Court may "fashion a civil monetary penalty appropriate to the gravity of the offense and sufficient to act as a deterrent." *CFTC v. Trimble*, No. 11–cv–02887, 2013 WL 317576, at *9 (D. Colo. Jan. 28, 2013) (citing *Miller v. CFTC*, 197 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir. 1999)).
- 73. The Court considers numerous factors in determining an appropriate civil monetary penalty for violations of the Act and Regulations, including the nature of the violations, whether defendants acted with scienter, the consequences of the violations, the financial benefits to defendants, and the harm to customers. *ABEX*, 2014 WL 3896023, at *19 (citing *CFTC v. Arrington*, 2014 WL 685331, at *22 (D. Neb. Jan. 28, 2014)).
- 74. Acting intentionally and with scienter, Williams fraudulently solicited and misappropriated \$13,131,390 during the Relevant Period and then attempted to conceal his fraud by providing text messages to participants containing fabricated weekly profits, and by tendering "Ponzi" scheme-like payments to certain pool participants. (Gomersall Decl. ¶¶ 11, 25, 31-33, 36-37; Gomersall Decl. II ¶¶ 6-7).
- 75. As a result of Williams' illegal conduct, pool participants incurred significant losses as Defendants enriched themselves. (*See* Gomersall Decl. ¶¶ 30, 33, 36,

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38; Gomersall Decl. II ¶ 8). The Court finds that these circumstances warrant imposition of a significant civil monetary penalty.

- 76. Given Williams' intentional and egregious conduct, the Court finds that a civil monetary penalty reflecting one time his monetary net gain from his fraud is appropriate under the circumstances. This penalty is authorized by 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d)(1) (2012) and 17 C.F.R. § 143.8(a)(4)(iii)(B) (2016).
- 77. Williams reaped net gains from his fraud in the amount of \$9,725,017, which reflects the total amount of funds he fraudulently solicited during the Relevant Period (\$13,131,390) minus the funds he returned to pool participants (\$3,406,373). (Gomersall Decl. ¶ 1; Gomersall Decl. II ¶¶ 6-8).
- 78. Accordingly, Defendants are ordered to pay, on a joint and several basis, a civil monetary penalty in the amount of \$9,725,017 (nine million seven hundred twentyfive thousand and seventeen dollars), plus post-judgment interest thereon ("CMP Obligation"). Post-judgment interest shall accrue on the CMP Obligation beginning on the date of entry of this Order and shall be determined pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
- 79. Defendants shall pay the CMP Obligation by electronic funds transfer, U.S. postal money order, certified check, bank cashier's check, or bank money order. If payment is to be made other than by electronic funds transfer, then the payment shall be made payable to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and sent to the address below:

Commodity Futures Trading Commission Division of Enforcement ATTN: Accounts Receivables DOT/FAA/MMAC/AMZ-341 CFTC/CPSC/SEC 6500 S. MacArthur Blvd. Oklahoma City, OK 73169 (405) 954-7262 office (405) 954-1620 fax nikki.gibson@faa.gov

80. If payment by electronic funds transfer is chosen, Defendants shall contact Nikki Gibson or her successor at the address above to receive payment instructions and

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shall fully comply with those instructions. Defendants shall accompany payment of the CMP Obligation with a cover letter identifying Defendants and the name and docket number of this proceeding. Defendants shall simultaneously transmit copies of the cover letter and the form of payment to the Chief Financial Officer, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20581.

V. **MISCELLANOUS PROVISIONS**

- 81. Partial Satisfaction: Acceptance by the CFTC or the Monitor of any partial payment of the Restitution Obligation or the CMP Obligation shall not be deemed a waiver of Defendants' obligation to make further payments pursuant to this Order, or a waiver of the CFTC's right to seek to compel payment of any remaining balance.
- 82. Injunctive and Equitable Relief Provisions: The injunctive and equitable relief provisions of this Order shall be binding upon Defendants, upon any person under their authority or control, and upon any person who receives actual notice of this Order, by personal service, email, facsimile or otherwise insofar as he or she is acting in active concert or participation with Defendants.
- 83. Continuing Jurisdiction of this Court: This Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action to ensure compliance with this Order and for all other purposes related to this action, including any motion by Defendants to modify, or for relief from, the terms of this Order.
 - 84. The Clerk of Court shall enter Judgment accordingly and close this matter. Dated this 15th day of March, 2018.

Honorable John J. Tuchi United States District Judge