
## Consensus Mechanisms

By Peter Van Valkenburgh Director of Research at Coin Center



# Why Crypto?



# Goal:

Take centralized service providers and turn their services into peer-to-peer internet protocols (aka decentralized apps).

# Goal:




## blockchain-crypto-magic®

## **AKA**:

- 1. P2P Networks
- 2. Consensus Mechanisms




## Decentralized App: Money



#### Accounting Recordkeeping, e.g. ning the Blockchain. 3/25/18 12:33:22 LITC: Allo 3/25/18 11:30:16 UTC: Jane se 3/25/18 11:18:15 UTC: Clareng 5/18 12:33:22 UTC: Alice sends 1 dollar to Bob 5/18 11:30:16 UTC: Jane sends 2 dollar to Frances 3/25/18 10:55:48 UR 5/18 11:18:15 LITC: Clarence sends 1 dollar to Alice Alice 💲 goes to Bob 3/25/18 12:33:22 LITC: Alice sends 1 dollar to Rob 3/25/18 12:33:22 LTC: Alice sends 1 dollar to Rob 3/25/18 11:30:16 UTC: Jane sends 2 dollar to Frances 3/25/18 11:18:15 UTC: Clarence sends 1 dollar to Alice 3/25/18 10:55:48 UTC: Domingo sengs 4 dollar to Bob 3/25/18 10:55:48 UTC: Domingquends 4 dollar to Bob sends \$ 3/25/18 12:33:22 UTC: Alice sends 1 dollar to Bob 3/25/18 11:30:16 UTC: Jane sends 2 dollar to France 3/25/18 11:30:10 UTC: Clarence sends 1 dollar to Alice 3/25/18 11:36:15 UTC: Clarence sends 1 dollar to Alice 3/25/18 10:55:48 UTC: Domingo sends 4 dollar to Bob Etc. (as of March 2018 – 300 million transactions total) 3/25/18 12:33:22 UTC: Alice sends 1 dollar to Bo 3/25/18 11:30:16 UTC: Jane sends 2 dollar to Fra 3/25/18 11:18:15 UTC: Clarence sends 1 dollar 3/25/18 10:55:48 UTC: Domingo sends 4 dollar Etc. (as of March 2018 #300# /3C/10 13/23/23 LITC: Alleg conde 1 dollar to Doll /25/18 11:30:16 UTC: Jane sends 2 dollar to France 25/18 11:18:15 UTC: Clarence sends 1 dollar to Alice ngo segds 4 dollar to Bob 5/18 10-55-48 LITC: Do LEDGER 3/25/18 12:33:22 UTC: Alice sends 1 bit coin to Bob 3/25/18 11:30:16 UTC: Jane sends 2 bitcoin to Frances 3/25/18 11:18:15 UTC: Clarence sends 1 bitcoin to Alice 3/25/18 10:55:48 UTC: Domingo sends 4 bitcoin to Bob Etc. (as of March 2018 ~300 million transactions total)

#### Accounting Recordkeeping, e.g. Keeping the Blockchain.





## User Onboarding Authentication e.g. Public Key Crypto

Hi Josh!

Here are your Bitcoin addresses:

1FfmbHfnp...

Bc1qq4ypc...

V Vlad Dodger sends 10 dollar to Zooko

Josh sends 8 dollar to Antonie Jerry sends 6 dollar to Neeraj Block 516,455

Hash of 516,454

1DWLS3 bitcoin to 1Nvwx....[sig]

14XP2 14 bitcoin to 1al46.....[sig]

18gB4 10 bit coin to 1xtO3.....[sig]

1Ffmb 8 bitcoin to 1Favyr......[sig]

1S4mX 6 bitcoin to 1x8zU.....[sig]

Taueel Selius 3 uoliai to 10011

Tracey sends 12 dollar to Sibille Petras sends 2 dollar to Ingrid Sedat sends 6 dollar to Paula Hi Antonie!

Here are your Bitcoin addresses:

1FavyrdAw...

Generate New?

Clarence sends 1 dollar to Alice Domingo sends 4 dollar to Bob Charley sends 12 dollar to Mary

## User Onboarding Authentication e.g. Public Key Crypto

Hi Josh!

Here are your Bitcoin addresses:

1FfmbHfnp...

Bc1qq4ypc...

Dodger sends 10 dollar to Zooko Josh sends 8 dollar to Antonie Jerry sends 6 dollar to Neeraj Block 516,455 Hash of 516,454

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1S4mX 6 bitcoin to 1x8zU.....[sig]

Hadeel sends 3 dollar to yoon

Tracey sends 12 dollar to Sibille Petras sends 2 dollar to Ingrid Sedat sends 6 dollar to Paula Hi Antonie!

Here are your Bitcoin addresses:

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Generate New?

Clarence sends 1 dollar to Alice Domingo sends 4 dollar to Bob Charley sends 12 dollar to Mary

## User Onboarding Authentication e.g. Public Key Crypto



Block 516,455
Hash of 516,454
1DWLS3 bitcoin to 1Nvwx....[sig]
14XP2 14 bitcoin to 1al46......[sig]
18gB4 10 bitcoin to 1xtO3.....[sig]
1Ffmb 8 bitcoin to 1Favyr.......[sig]
1S4mX 6 bitcoin to 1x8zU......[sig]

g]

Block 516,456
Hash of 516,454
1DWLS3 bitcoin to 1Nvwx....[sig]
14XP2 14 bitcoin to 1al46.....[sig]
18gB4 10 bitcoin to 1xtO3.....[sig]
1Ffmb 8 bitcoin to 1Favyr.......[sig]
1S4mX 6 bitcoin to 1x8zU......[sig]

Block 516,457
Hash of 516,454
1DWLS3 bitcoin to 1Nvwx....[sig]
14XP2 14 bitcoin to 1al46......[sig]
18gB4 10 bitcoin to 1xtO3.....[sig]
1Ffmb 8 bitcoin to 1Favyr.......[sig]
1S4mX 6 bitcoin to 1x8zU......[sig]




## Why do all the work?


Block 516,458 Hash of 516,457

1DWLS...3 bitcoin to 1Nvwx...[sig] ree goes to miner]
14XP2...14 bitcoin to 1al46...[sig] ree goes to miner]
18gB4...10 bitcoin to 1xtO3...[sig] ree goes to miner]
1Ffmb...8 bitcoin to 1Favyr...[sig] ree goes to miner]


12.5 bitcoin to 1x8zU (miner's address)

#### Proof of Work Consensus Mechanisms are Open







#### Proof of Work Consensus Mechanisms are Open




### Proof of Work Consensus has Adjustable Difficulty



### Proof of Work Consensus has Adjustable Difficulty






If blocks have been coming around faster on average, the difficulty increases and vice versa.

# Mining Hardware and "ASIC Resistance"



without redoing the work. As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block would include redoing all the blocks after it.



The proof-of-work also solves the problem of determining representation in majority decision making. If the majority were based on one-IP-address-one-vote, it could be subverted by anyone able to allocate many IPs. Proof-of-work is essentially one-CPU-one-vote. The majority decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested in it. If a majority of CPU power is controlled by honest nodes, the honest chain will grow the fastest and outpace any competing chains. To modify a past block, an attacker would have to redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with and surpass the work of the honest nodes. We will show later that the probability of a slower attacker catching up diminishes exponentially as subsequent blocks are added.

To compensate for increasing hardware speed and varying interest in running nodes over time, the proof-of-work difficulty is determined by a moving average targeting an average number of blocks per hour. If they're generated too fast, the difficulty increases.


5 Notreel











## 51% Attacks?

Still not a major threat to cryptocurrencies with competitive mining because of the tremendous costs involved.

Real threat to poorly-capitalized cryptocurrencies that share a mining algorithm with a larger cryptocurrency.






## **Proof of Stake**




How do you get a lottery ticket in order to have a chance to participate?

#### Proof of Stake: How do you get a ticket?




#### Proof of Stake: Nothing at Stake?





### Proof of Stake: Checkpoints to stop "nothing at stake"



# But who does the checkpointing?



Or some subset of stakers? E.g. 2/ 3 of validators in Ethereum's Casper Protocol

## Finality in PoS vs PoW

Block 516,455

Hash of 516,454

1DWLS3 coin to 1Nvwx....[sig]
14XP2 14 coin to 1al46......[sig]
18gB4 10 coin to 1xtO3.....[sig]
1Ffmb 8 coin to 1Favyr......[sig]
50 coin to 1U5c3 (miner fee)

Block 516,455
Hash of 516,454
1xtO3 staked 95 coins.......[sig]
14XP2 14 coin to 1al46......[sig]
18gB4 10 coin to 1xtO3.....[sig]
1Ffmb 8 coin to 1Favyr.......[sig]
50 coin to 1U5c3 (miner fee)

Block 516,456
Hash of 516,455
1xtO3 95 coin to 1Favy.....[sig]
14XP2 14 coin to 1al46.....[sig]
18gB4 10 coin to 1xtO3.....[sig]
1Ffmb 8 coin to 1Favyr......[sig]
50 coin to 1U5c3 (miner fee)

Block 516,457

Hash of 516,454

1DWLS3 coin to 1Nvwx....[sig]
14XP2 14 coin to 1al46.....[sig]
18gB4 10 coin to 1xtO3.....[sig]
1Ffmb 8 coin to 1Favyr......[sig]
50 coin to 1X523 (miner fee)

Proof of stake: wait until transaction is in a block prior to an accepted checkpoint.

```
Block 516,455
Hash of 516,454
1DWLS3 bitcoin to 1Nvwx....[sig]
14XP2 14 bitcoin to 1al46.....[sig]
18gB4 10 bitcoin to 1xtO3....[sig]
1Ffmb 8 bitcoin to 1Favyr......[sig]
1S4mX 6 bitcoin to 1x8zU.....[sig]
```

Block 516,456
Hash of 516,454
1DWLS3 bitcoin to 1Nvwx....[sig]
14XP2 14 bitcoin to 1al46......[sig]
18gB4 10 bitcoin to 1xtO3.....[sig]
1Ffmb 8 bitcoin to 1Favyr.......[sig]
1S4mX 6 bitcoin to 1x8zU......[sig]

Block 516,457
Hash of 516,454
1DWLS3 bitcoin to 1Nvwx....[sig]
14XP2 14 bitcoin to 1al46.....[sig]
18gB4 10 bitcoin to 1xtO3.....[sig]
1Ffmb 8 bitcoin to 1Favyr......[sig]
1S4mX 6 bitcoin to 1x8zU......[sig]

Proof of work: wait until transaction is in a block old enough that computing effort to recreate chain since is cost-prohibitive.

## Forks?

- Consensus mechanisms are designed to prevent forks among participants who WANT to stay together.
  - Forks and reorganizations can happen but they should be short-lived and only involve a small number of blocks.
- If a group within the community fundamentally disagrees with the rest and no longer wish to stay together, then they may fork by breaking compatibility, i.e. altering the consensus rules that they follow.
  - Forks will be long-lived but two distinct assets will result.

- PoS vs. Pow?
  - Generally not relevant —just another way of building a provably fair lottery for block creation.
  - May impact best practices for finality.
     PoS: Checkpointing vs. PoW: Computational Infeasibility
  - Take-away: Institutional participants should have documented procedures for how risks around finality will be mitigated.

- 51% Attacks?
  - Not a major risk for well-capitalized cryptos.
  - Major risk for poorly-capitalized cryptos that share common mining algo with larger crypto.
  - Takeaway: Institutional participants should be wary of poorly-capitalized cryptos that share a mining algo with larger cryptos.

#### Forks?

- Well-specified PoW and PoS systems may have occasional unintentional forks but they will not persist or involve deep block reorganizations.
- Takeaway: Have prudent and well-documented procedures over finality; procedures to pause trading during forks.

#### Forks?

- When a subset of community members reach intractable disagreements with the rest of the community, they may choose to alter the consensus rules and permanently fork.
- Takeaway: Institutional participants should have well-documented procedures describing how they will determine which fork to honor, and what to do with any windfalls from the other fork.

## Questions?

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