I support the proposed amendments to the Commission’s rules concerning event contracts.  Before further discussion, I would like to acknowledge the tremendous work by many CFTC colleagues.  I particularly would like to thank Vince McGonagle, Nora Flood, and Grey Tanzi for all of their thorough and thoughtful work on the proposal.

Starting in 2021, there has been a significant uptick in the number of event contracts listed for trading by CFTC-registered exchanges.  To put that increase into perspective, more event contracts were listed for trading in 2021 than had been listed in the prior 15 years combined.  And that has continued to be true each year since.

Given this exponential increase, the Commission today proposes to further specify the types of event contracts that fall within the scope of CEA section 5c(c)(5)(C) and are contrary to the public interest.  The amendments will support efforts by registered entities to comply with the CEA by more clearly identifying the types of event contracts that may not be listed for trading or accepted for clearing.  These changes will support responsible and efficient market innovation, by helping registered entities and new applicants to make informed decisions with respect to product design.

Specifically, the Commission is proposing to amend Commission Regulation 40.11 to, among other things, further specify types of event contracts that fall within the scope of CEA section 5c(c)(5)(C) and are contrary to the public interest, such that they may not be listed for trading or accepted for clearing on or through a registered entity.  The proposal defines “gaming” and provides illustrative examples of gaming, including the outcome of a political contest, the outcome of an awards contest, the outcome of a game in which one or more athletes compete, or an occurrence or non-occurrence in connection with such a contest or game.

The proposal includes a determination that event contracts involving each of the Enumerated Activities in CEA section 5c(c)(5)(C) (gaming, war, terrorism, assassination, and activity that is unlawful under state law) are, as a category, contrary to the public interest and therefore may not be listed for trading or accepted for clearing through a registered entity.  The illustrative examples of gaming that I just mentioned are therefore contrary to the public interest and cannot be listed for trading.

To be clear, that means that event contracts on the outcome of a political contest such as an election could not be listed for trading or accepted for clearing under the proposed rule.  Such contracts not only fail to serve the economic purpose of the futures markets—they are illegal in several states and could potentially and impermissibly preempt State responsibilities for overseeing federal elections.  This is not a new phenomenon for the CFTC. Over the course of the last 20 years, the CFTC has remained steadfast—through many administrations—that election or political contracts should not be allowed on the US futures and options markets.

Contracts involving political events ultimately commoditize and degrade the integrity of the uniquely American experience of participating in the democratic electoral process.  Allowing these contracts would push the CFTC, a financial market regulator, into a position far beyond its Congressional mandate and expertise.  To be blunt, such contracts would put the CFTC in the role of an election cop.

The CFTC’s jurisdiction as mandated by Congress and solidified in our statute, the Commodity Exchange Act, recognizes our expertise in markets for goods, services, rights, and interests—which can include events associated with financial, commercial, or economic consequences.  We are tasked with upholding the public interest by ensuring that America’s derivatives markets provide a means for managing and assuming price risks and providing for price discovery through liquid, fair, open, transparent, and financially secure trading facilities.  Market integrity is featured so prominently within that mandate that the CFTC has civil enforcement authority when it comes to the potential for fraud, manipulation, and other abuses such as the dissemination of false information in the underlying or commodity cash markets.  Political control contracts on CFTC-regulated exchanges would push the CFTC far beyond this historical expertise and jurisdiction, and potentially place the CFTC in the position of monitoring such markets for fraud and manipulation in elections themselves.

I thank the staff for their hard work in producing this important proposal.