Federal Register, Volume 78 Issue 107 (Tuesday, June 4, 2013)[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 107 (Tuesday, June 4, 2013)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 33475-33604]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-12242]
[[Page 33475]]
Vol. 78
Tuesday,
No. 107
June 4, 2013
Part II
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
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17 CFR Part 37
Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities;
Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 78 , No. 107 / Tuesday, June 4, 2013 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 33476]]
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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 37
RIN 3038-AD18
Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities
AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission'' or
``CFTC'') is adopting new rules, guidance, and acceptable practices to
implement certain statutory provisions enacted by Title VII of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (``Dodd-Frank
Act''). The final rules, guidance, and acceptable practices, which
apply to the registration and operation of a new type of regulated
entity named a swap execution facility (``SEF''), implement the Dodd-
Frank Act's new statutory framework that, among other requirements,
adds a new section 5h to the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'' or
``Act'') concerning the registration and operation of SEFs, and adds a
new section 2(h)(8) to the CEA concerning the execution of swaps on
SEFs.
DATES: The rules will become effective August 5, 2013, with the
exception of regulation 37.3(b)(5) (17 CFR 37.3(b)(5)), which shall
become effective August 5, 2015.
Compliance date: October 2, 2013, except that: (a) From August 5,
2013 until October 2, 2014 market participants may comply with the
minimum market participant requirement in regulation 37.9(a)(3) (17 CFR
37.9(a)(3)) by transmitting a request for a quote to no less than two
market participants; and (b) each affected entity shall comply with the
warning letter requirement in regulation 37.206(f) (17 CFR 37.206(f))
no later than August 5, 2014.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Amir Zaidi, Special Counsel, 202-418-
6770, [email protected], Alexis Hall-Bugg, Special Counsel, 202-418-6711,
[email protected], or David Van Wagner, Chief Counsel, 202-418-5481,
[email protected], Division of Market Oversight; Michael Penick,
Senior Economist, 202-418-5279, [email protected], or Sayee Srinivasan,
Research Analyst, 202-418-5309, [email protected], Office of the
Chief Economist, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette
Centre, 1155 21st Street NW., Washington, DC 20581.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background
A. Swaps and Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act
B. SEF Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
II. Part 37 of the Commission's Regulations--Final Rules
A. Adoption of Regulations, Guidance, and Acceptable Practices
B. General Regulations (Subpart A)
1. Sec. 37.1--Scope
2. Sec. 37.2--Applicable Provisions
3. Sec. 37.3--Requirements for Registration
4. Sec. 37.4--Procedures for Listing Products and Implementing
Rules
5. Sec. 37.5--Information Relating to Swap Execution Facility
Compliance
6. Sec. 37.6--Enforceability
7. Sec. 37.7--Prohibited Use of Data Collected for Regulatory
Purposes
8. Sec. 37.8--Boards of Trade Operating Both a Designated
Contract Market and a Swap Execution Facility
9. Sec. 37.9--Permitted Execution Methods
10. Sec. 37.10--Swaps Made Available for Trading
11. Sec. 37.11--Identification of Non-Cleared Swaps or Swaps
Not Made Available To Trade
C. Regulations, Guidance, and Acceptable Practices for
Compliance With the Core Principles
1. Subpart B--Core Principle 1 (Compliance With Core Principles)
2. Subpart C--Core Principle 2 (Compliance With Rules)
(a) Sec. 37.200--Core Principle 2--Compliance With Rules
(b) Sec. 37.201--Operation of Swap Execution Facility and
Compliance With Rules
(c) Sec. 37.202--Access Requirements
(d) Sec. 37.203--Rule Enforcement Program
(e) Sec. 37.204--Regulatory Services Provided by a Third Party
(f) Sec. 37.205--Audit Trail
(g) Sec. 37.206--Disciplinary Procedures and Sanctions
(h) Sec. 37.207--Swaps Subject to Mandatory Clearing
3. Subpart D--Core Principle 3 (Swaps Not Readily Susceptible to
Manipulation)
4. Subpart E--Core Principle 4 (Monitoring of Trading and Trade
Processing)
(a) Sec. 37.401--General Requirements
(b) Sec. 37.402--Additional Requirements for Physical-Delivery
Swaps
(c) Sec. 37.403--Additional Requirements for Cash-Settled Swaps
(d) Sec. 37.404--Ability To Obtain Information
(e) Sec. 37.405--Risk Controls for Trading
(f) Sec. 37.406--Trade Reconstruction
(g) Sec. 37.407--Additional Rules Required
5. Subpart F--Core Principle 5 (Ability To Obtain Information)
(a) Sec. 37.501--Establish and Enforce Rules
(b) Sec. 37.502--Collection of Information
(c) Sec. 37.503--Provide Information to the Commission
(d) Sec. 37.504--Information-Sharing Agreements
6. Subpart G--Core Principle 6 (Position Limits or
Accountability)
7. Subpart H--Core Principle 7 (Financial Integrity of
Transactions)
(a) Sec. 37.701--Mandatory Clearing
(b) Sec. 37.702--General Financial Integrity
(c) Sec. 37.703--Monitoring for Financial Soundness
8. Subpart I--Core Principle 8 (Emergency Authority)
(a) Sec. 37.801--Additional Sources for Compliance
9. Subpart J--Core Principle 9 (Timely Publication of Trading
Information)
10. Subpart K--Core Principle 10 (Recordkeeping and Reporting)
11. Subpart L--Core Principle 11 (Antitrust Considerations)
12. Subpart M--Core Principle 12 (Conflicts of Interest)
13. Subpart N--Core Principle 13 (Financial Resources)
(a) Sec. 37.1301--General Requirements
(b) Sec. 37.1302--Types of Financial Resources
(c) Sec. 37.1303--Computation of Financial Resource Requirement
(d) Sec. 37.1304--Valuation of Financial Resources
(e) Sec. 37.1305--Liquidity of Financial Resources
(f) Sec. 37.1306--Reporting Requirements
14. Subpart O--Core Principle 14 (System Safeguards)
(a) Sec. 37.1401--Requirements
15. Subpart P--Core Principle 15 (Designation of Chief
Compliance Officer)
(a) Sec. 37.1501--Chief Compliance Officer
III. Related Matters
A. Regulatory Flexibility Act
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
C. Cost Benefit Considerations
1. Introduction
2. SEF Market Structure
3. Registration
4. Recordkeeping and Reporting
5. Compliance
6. Monitoring and Surveillance
7. Financial Resources
8. Emergency Operations and System Safeguards
IV. List of Commenters
V. Text of Final Regulations, Guidance, and Acceptable Practices
I. Background
A. Swaps and Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act
Historically, swaps have traded in over-the-counter (``OTC'')
markets, rather than on regulated exchanges given their exemption from
regulation.\1\ The OTC swaps market is less transparent than exchange-
traded futures and securities markets. This lack of transparency was a
major contributor to the 2008 financial crisis because regulators and
market participants lacked visibility to identify and assess the
implications of swaps market exposures and counterparty
relationships.\2\ As a result, on July 21,
[[Page 33477]]
2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act,\3\ which tasked the
Commission with overseeing a large portion of the U.S. swaps market.
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\1\ See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Public Law
106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
\2\ See The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial
Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States
(Official Government Edition), at 299, 352, 363-364, 386, 621 n. 56
(2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf. The Commission has
acknowledged, however, that the benefits of enhanced market
transparency are not boundless, particularly in swap markets with
limited liquidity. See Procedures to Establish Appropriate Minimum
Block Sizes for Large Notional Off-Facility Swaps and Block Trades,
77 FR 15460, 15466 (proposed Mar. 15, 2012). In implementing these
regulations, the Commission has taken into account the benefits and
concerns related to market transparency.
\3\ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act \4\ amended the CEA \5\ to
establish a comprehensive new regulatory framework for swaps and
security-based swaps (``SB-swaps''). A key goal of the Dodd-Frank Act
is to bring greater pre-trade and post-trade transparency to the swaps
market. Pre-trade transparency with respect to the swaps market refers
to making information about a swap available to the market, including
bid (offers to buy) and offer (offers to sell) prices, quantity
available at those prices, and other relevant information before the
execution of a transaction. Such transparency lowers costs for
investors, consumers, and businesses; lowers the risks of the swaps
market to the economy; and enhances market integrity to protect market
participants and the public. The Dodd-Frank Act also ensures that a
broader universe of market participants receive pricing and volume
information by providing such information upon the completion of every
swap transaction (i.e., post-trade transparency).\6\ By requiring the
trading of swaps on SEFs and designated contract markets (``DCMs''),
all market participants will benefit from viewing the prices of
available bids and offers and from having access to transparent and
competitive trading systems or platforms.
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\4\ Pursuant to section 701 of the Dodd-Frank Act, Title VII may
be cited as the ``Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of
2010.''
\5\ 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.
\6\ See Financial Stability Board, Implementing OTC Derivatives
Market Reforms, at 41 (Oct. 25, 2010), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf;
Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, Transparency of Structured Finance Products Final
Report, at 17, 21 (Jul. 2010), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD326.pdf.
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In addition to facilitating greater transparency and trading of
swaps on SEFs, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a
comprehensive regulatory framework, including registration, operation,
and compliance requirements for SEFs.\7\ For example, section 733 of
the Dodd-Frank Act sets forth a broad registration provision that
requires any person who operates a facility for the trading of swaps to
register as a SEF or as a DCM.\8\ In addition, section 721 of the Dodd-
Frank Act amended the CEA to define SEF as a trading platform where
multiple participants have the ability to execute swaps by accepting
bids and offers made by multiple participants in the platform.\9\
Furthermore, section 723 of the Dodd-Frank Act set forth a trade
execution requirement, which states that swap transactions subject to
the clearing requirement must be executed on a DCM or SEF, unless no
DCM or SEF makes the swap available to trade or for swap transactions
subject to the clearing exception under CEA section 2(h)(7).\10\
Section 733 of the Dodd-Frank Act provided that to be registered and
maintain registration, a SEF must comply with fifteen enumerated core
principles and any requirement that the Commission may impose by rule
or regulation.\11\
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\7\ See CEA section 5h, as enacted by section 733 of the Dodd-
Frank Act; 7 U.S.C. 7b-3. This regulatory framework includes: (i)
Registration, operation, and compliance requirements for SEFs and
(ii) fifteen core principles. Applicants and registered SEFs are
required to comply with the core principles as a condition of
obtaining and maintaining their registration as a SEF.
\8\ CEA section 5h(a)(1), as enacted by section 733 of the Dodd-
Frank Act; 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(a)(1).
\9\ CEA section 1a(50), as amended by section 721 of the Dodd-
Frank Act; 7 U.S.C. 1a(50).
\10\ CEA section 2(h)(8), as amended by section 723 of the Dodd-
Frank Act; 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(8).
\11\ CEA section 5h, as enacted by section 733 of the Dodd-Frank
Act; 7 U.S.C. 7b-3.
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B. SEF Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
The Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA to provide that, under new
section 5h, the Commission may in its discretion determine by rule or
regulation the manner in which SEFs comply with the core
principles.\12\ In consideration of both the novel nature of SEFs and
its experience in overseeing DCMs' compliance with core principles, the
Commission carefully assessed which SEF core principles would benefit
from regulations, providing legal certainty and clarity to the
marketplace, and which core principles would benefit from guidance or
acceptable practices, where flexibility is more appropriate. Based on
that evaluation, on January 7, 2011, the Commission proposed a
combination of regulations, guidance, and acceptable practices for the
registration, oversight, and regulation of SEFs (``SEF NPRM'').\13\
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\12\ CEA section 5h(f)(1); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(1).
\13\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR 1214 (proposed Jan. 7, 2011).
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The SEF NPRM provided, among other requirements, the following:
(1) Procedures for temporary and full SEF registration.\14\
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\14\ Id. at 1238.
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(2) A minimum trading functionality requirement that all SEFs must
offer,\15\ which took into account the SEF definition,\16\ the core
principles applicable to SEFs,\17\ and the goals provided in section
733 of the Dodd-Frank Act.\18\ The minimum trading functionality
required a SEF to provide a centralized electronic trading screen upon
which any market participant can post both executable and non-
executable bids and offers that are transparent to all other market
participants of the SEF.\19\ For a trader who has the ability to
execute against its customer's order or to execute two customers'
orders against each other, the SEF NPRM also required the trader be
subject to a 15 second time delay between the entry of those two
orders.\20\ In addition, the proposal allowed a Request for Quote
(``RFQ'') System \21\ that operates in conjunction with the SEF's
minimum trading functionality.\22\ Finally, the SEF NPRM stated that a
SEF may offer other functionalities in conjunction with the minimum
trading functionality, as long as those functionalities meet the SEF
definition and comply with the core principles.\23\
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\15\ Id. at 1241.
\16\ CEA section 1a(50); 7 U.S.C. 1a(50).
\17\ CEA section 5h(f); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f).
\18\ The goals of section 733 of the Dodd-Frank Act are to
promote the trading of swaps on SEFs and to promote pre-trade price
transparency in the swaps market. CEA section 5h(e); 7 U.S.C. 7b-
3(e).
\19\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1241.
\20\ Id.
\21\ Id.
\22\ By ``in conjunction with the SEF's minimum trading
functionality,'' the Commission means that the SEF NPRM required a
SEF to offer the minimum trading functionality, and if that SEF also
offered an RFQ System, it was required to communicate any bids or
offers resting on the minimum trading functionality to the RFQ
requester along with the responsive quotes. See the discussion below
regarding ``Taken Into Account and Communicated'' Language in the
RFQ System Definition under Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)--Request for Quote
System in the preamble for further details.
\23\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1220.
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(3) The classification of swap transactions into two categories:
Required Transactions (i.e., transactions subject to the trade
execution mandate under section 2(h)(8) of the CEA and not block
trades) and Permitted Transactions (i.e., transactions not
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subject to the clearing and trade execution mandates, illiquid or
bespoke swaps, or block trades).\24\ Under the SEF NPRM, Required
Transactions were required to be executed on the minimum trading
functionality, an Order Book meeting the minimum trading functionality,
or an RFQ System (in conjunction with the minimum trading
functionality).\25\ The SEF NPRM also allowed a SEF to provide
additional methods of execution for Permitted Transactions, including
Voice-Based Systems.\26\
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\24\ Id. at 1241.
\25\ Id.
\26\ Id.
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(4) Regulations, guidance, and acceptable practices to implement
the 15 core principles specified in section 5h(f) of the Act.\27\
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\27\ Id. at 1241-1253, 1256-1258.
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The initial comment period for the SEF NPRM ended on March 8, 2011.
Subsequently, the Commission reopened the comment period until June 3,
2011, as part of its global extension of comment periods for various
rulemakings implementing the Dodd-Frank Act.\28\ After the second
comment period ended, the Commission continued to accept and consider
late comments, which it did until April 30, 2013.\29\ The Commission
received approximately 107 comment letters on the SEF NPRM from members
of the public.\30\ The Chairman and Commissioners, as well as the
Commission staff, participated in numerous meetings with
representatives of single dealer platforms, interdealer brokers, DCMs,
trade associations, OTC market participants, potential SEF applicants,
and other interested parties.\31\ In addition, the Commission consulted
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC'') and international
regulators on numerous occasions.
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\28\ Reopening and Extension of Comment Periods for Rulemakings
Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, 76 FR 25274 (May 4, 2011). The Commission extended
the applicable comment periods to provide the public an additional
opportunity to comment on the proposed new regulatory framework. The
Commission also opened an additional comment period, which ended on
June 10, 2011, to provide the public an opportunity to comment on
the Commission's phased implementation of the Act, as amended,
including its implementation of section 733 of Dodd-Frank Act. Joint
Public Roundtable on Issues Related to the Schedule for Implementing
Final Rules for Swaps and Security-Based Swaps Under the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 76 FR 23221 (Apr.
26, 2011).
\29\ The Commission also held two roundtables touching on issues
related to the SEF NPRM: (1) ``Available to Trade'' Provision for
Swap Execution Facilities and Designated Contract Markets; and (2)
Proposed Regulations Implementing Core Principle 9 for Designated
Contract Markets. Transcripts are available through the Commission's
Web site at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Events/2012Events/index.htm.
\30\ A list of the full names and abbreviations of commenters to
the SEF NPRM is included in section IV at the end of this release.
The Commission notes that many commenters submitted more than one
comment letter. Additionally, all comment letters that pertain to
the SEF NPRM, including those from the additional comment periods
related to implementation of the final Dodd-Frank rules, are
contained in the SEF rulemaking comment file and are available
through the Commission's Web site at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=955.
\31\ Meeting summaries are available through the Commission's
Web site at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=955.
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II. Part 37 of the Commission's Regulations--Final Rules
A. Adoption of Regulations, Guidance, and Acceptable Practices
In this final rulemaking, the Commission is adopting many of the
proposed regulations that each SEF must meet in order to comply with
section 5h of the CEA, both initially upon registration and on an
ongoing basis, and related guidance, and acceptable practices. As a
result of the written comments received and dialogue and meetings with
the public, the Commission has revised or eliminated a number of
regulations that were proposed in the SEF NPRM, and in a number of
instances, has codified guidance and/or acceptable practices in lieu of
the proposed regulations. In determining the scope and content of the
final SEF regulations, the Commission has carefully considered the
costs and benefits for each rule with particular attention to the
public comments. Additionally, the Commission has taken into account
the concerns raised by commenters regarding the potential effects of
specific rules on SEFs offering different swap contracts and trading
systems or platforms and the importance of the statutory differences
between SEFs and DCMs. The Commission addresses these issues below in
its discussion of specific rule provisions.
The Commission also notes that the SEC has proposed rules related
to security-based SEFs (``SB-SEFs'') as required under section 763 of
the Dodd-Frank Act (``SB-SEF NPRM'').\32\ Section 712(a) of the Dodd-
Frank Act states that before commencing any rulemaking regarding swap
execution facilities, the Commission ``shall consult and coordinate to
the extent possible with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
prudential regulators for the purposes of assuring regulatory
consistency and comparability . . . .'' \33\ The Commission has also
received several comments stating that the Commission and the SEC
should harmonize their rules as much as possible.\34\
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\32\ Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR 10948 (proposed Feb. 28, 2011).
\33\ 15 U.S.C. 8302(a)(1).
\34\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 3-4 (Jun. 3, 2011); Reuters
Comment Letter 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2011); FSR Comment Letter at 10-11 (Mar.
8, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 10-11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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The Commission has coordinated with the SEC to harmonize the SEF
and SB-SEF requirements to the extent possible and has taken into
consideration the comments for greater harmonization between the SEF
and SB-SEF regulations. However, there may be appropriate differences
in the approach that each agency may take regarding the regulation of
SEFs and SB-SEFs. Cognizant of the different products and markets
regulated by the SEC and the Commission, the SEC recognized in its SB-
SEF NPRM that there may be differences in the approach that each agency
may take regarding the regulation of SEFs and SB-SEFs.\35\
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\35\ Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 10950.
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Similarly, the Commission is mindful that swaps may also trade on
DCMs. Thus, in addition to its efforts to coordinate its approach with
the SB-SEF regulations, the Commission also seeks, where possible, to
harmonize the final SEF regulations with the DCM regulations in order
to minimize regulatory differences between SEFs and DCMs in those
instances where Congress enacted similar core principles for the two
types of registered entities. In addition, some differences in the
agencies' regulatory oversight regimes may be attributed to the fact
that, unlike the SEC that is only responsible for overseeing trading in
SB-swaps, such as single-name securities and narrow-based security
indexes, the Commission is charged with the oversight of swaps trading
over a broad range of asset categories. Consequently, the Commission
has taken into account the varied characteristics of those underlying
commodities in formulating the regulatory responsibilities of SEFs.
In the preamble sections below, the Commission responds to the
substantive comments submitted in response to the SEF NPRM. The
Commission reviewed and considered all comments in adopting this final
rulemaking. Further, the final regulations include a number of
technical revisions and non-substantive changes to the proposed rule
text intended to clarify certain provisions, standardize terminology
[[Page 33479]]
within this part 37, conform terminology to that used in other parts of
the Commission's regulations, and more precisely state regulatory
standards and requirements. For example, a minimum trading
functionality requirement was in proposed Sec. 37.9, which has been
moved to the registration section under final Sec. 37.3 to clarify
that this functionality is required in order to register as a SEF. The
final regulations will become effective 60 days after their publication
in the Federal Register.
B. General Regulations (Subpart A)
The regulations in this final rulemaking are codified in subparts A
through P under part 37 of the Commission's regulations. The general
regulations consisting of Sec. Sec. 37.1 through 37.9 are codified in
subpart A, and the regulations applicable to each of the 15 core
principles are codified in subparts B through P, respectively.\36\
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\36\ Subparts B through P begin with a regulation containing the
language of the core principle in the Act.
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1. Sec. 37.1--Scope
Proposed Sec. 37.1 provided that part 37 applies to entities that
are registered SEFs, have been registered SEFs, or are applying to
become registered SEFs. The proposed rule also stated that part 37 does
not restrict the eligibility of SEFs to operate under the provisions of
parts 38 or 49 of this chapter.
(a) Commission Determination
The Commission received no comments on this section and is adopting
the provision as proposed.\37\
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\37\ The Commission has removed the phrase ``has been
registered'' from proposed Sec. 37.1 because a SEF that has been
registered is the same as a SEF that is registered.
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2. Sec. 37.2--Applicable Provisions
Proposed Sec. 37.2 listed the Commission regulations that, in
addition to part 37, will be applicable to SEFs, including regulations
that have been codified and are proposed to be codified upon the
Commission's finalization of the rulemakings implemented pursuant to
the Dodd-Frank Act.
(a) Commission Determination
Although it received no comments on this section, the Commission is
revising proposed Sec. 37.2 to generally state that SEFs shall comply
with, in addition to part 37, all applicable Commission regulations,
and to only cite those specific provisions whose applicability to SEFs
may not be apparent. The Commission notes that a separate rulemaking
adopted conforming changes to existing regulations to clarify the pre-
Dodd Frank provisions applicable to SEFs.\38\ There are, however,
certain existing regulations that will apply to SEFs that the separate
rulemaking did not address. Accordingly, for clarity purposes, the
Commission is specifically stating that Sec. 1.60 \39\ and part 9 \40\
of its regulations will apply to SEFs. These revisions will eliminate
the need for the Commission to continually update Sec. 37.2 when new
regulations with which SEFs must comply are codified.
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\38\ Adaptation of Regulations to Incorporate Swaps, 77 FR 66288
(Nov. 2, 2012). The Commission may promulgate a second phase of
conforming changes to its regulations once more rules relating to
swaps are finalized.
\39\ The term ``contract market'' used in Sec. 1.60 of the
Commission's regulations should be interpreted to include a SEF for
purposes of applying the requirements of Sec. 1.60 to a SEF. 17 CFR
1.60.
\40\ The term ``exchange'' used in part 9 of the Commission's
regulations should be interpreted to include a SEF for purposes of
applying the requirements of part 9 to a SEF. 17 CFR part 9.
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3. Sec. 37.3--Requirements for Registration \41\
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\41\ The Commission is renaming the title of this section from
``Requirements for Registration'' to ``Requirements and Procedures
for Registration'' to provide greater clarity. The Commission is
also restructuring the order of Sec. 37.3 to provide clarity.
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Proposed Sec. 37.3 established, among other procedures,
application procedures for temporary and full registration of new SEFs,
and procedures for the transfer of a registration. To assist
prospective SEF applicants, the SEF NPRM included under appendix A to
part 37 an application form titled Form SEF. Form SEF included
information that an applicant would be required to provide to the
Commission in order for the Commission to make a determination
regarding the applicant's request for SEF registration.
With respect to which entities must register as a SEF, the SEF NPRM
stated that in order for an entity to meet the SEF definition and
satisfy the SEF registration requirements, multiple parties must have
the ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made
by multiple participants.\42\ In this regard, the SEF NPRM stated that
one-to-one voice services and single dealer platforms do not satisfy
the SEF definition because multiple participants do not have the
ability to execute or trade swaps with multiple participants.\43\ In
addition, the SEF NPRM stated that entities that operate exclusively as
swap processors do not meet the SEF definition and should not be
required to register.\44\ Although the SEF NPRM stated that the
registration provision in CEA section 5h(a)(1) could be read to require
the registration of entities that solely engage in trade
processing,\45\ it stated that such entities do not meet the SEF
definition and should not be required to register as SEFs because: (1)
They do not provide the ability to execute or trade a swap as required
by the SEF definition; and (2) the SEF definition does not include the
term ``process.'' \46\
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\42\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1219.
\43\ Id.
\44\ Id.
\45\ CEA section 5h(a)(1) states that ``[n]o person may operate
a facility for the trading or processing of swaps unless the
facility is registered as a swap execution facility or designated
contract market. . . .'' 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(a)(1).
\46\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1219.
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The SEF NPRM also noted that CEA section 2(h)(8) requires that
transactions involving swaps subject to the clearing requirement be
executed on a DCM or SEF, unless no DCM or SEF makes such swaps
available to trade or such swaps qualify for the clearing exception
under CEA section 2(h)(7).\47\ In this regard, the SEF NPRM stated that
market participants may desire to avail themselves of the benefits of
trading on SEFs for swaps that are not subject to the CEA section
2(h)(8) trade execution requirement, but it also acknowledged that such
swaps are not required to be executed on a SEF or DCM.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Id. at 1221-22. CEA sections 2(h)(7) and 2(h)(8); 7 U.S.C.
2(h)(7) and 2(h)(8). See discussion below under Sec. 37.10--Swaps
Made Available for Trading in the preamble for further details
regarding this process.
\48\ Id. at 1222.
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(a) Requirements for Registration
(1) Summary of Comments
Several commenters asserted that the proposed rule is ambiguous as
to who must register as a SEF as required under CEA section 5h(a)(1)
and requested clarification.\49\ For example, UBS stated that the
Commission should clarify that ``the SEF registration requirement in
[CEA section 5h(a)(1)] only applies to platforms that meet the SEF
definition.'' \50\ In addition, Barclays
[[Page 33480]]
commented that the language of CEA section 5h(a)(1) should not be read
broadly to require SEF registration for any platform or system that
executes or processes swaps to the extent it is deemed to be a
``facility'' without considering whether such swaps are or are not
subject to the CEA section 2(h)(8) trade execution mandate.\51\
Similarly, Bloomberg noted the broad language under the CEA section
5h(a)(1) registration requirement, and stated that if Congress intended
that all swaps be traded on a SEF or DCM, then the trade execution
mandate under CEA section 2(h)(8) would be unnecessary.\52\ The
Commission also received comments and specific requests for a
Commission determination as to whether certain business models or
services must register as a SEF, including one-to-many platforms, blind
auction platforms, aggregation services or portals, portfolio
compression services, risk mitigation services, and swap processing
services.
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\49\ CEA section 5h(a)(1) states that ``[n]o person may operate
a facility for the trading or processing of swaps unless the
facility is registered as a swap execution facility or designated
contract market. . . .'' 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(a)(1). UBS Comment Letter at
1-2 (May 18, 2012); UBS Comment Letter at 2-3 (Nov. 2, 2011);
Barclays Comment Letter at 2 (Jun. 3, 2011); Deutsche Comment Letter
at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Bloomberg Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011);
State Street Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter
at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\50\ UBS Comment Letter at 1 (May 18, 2012). The Commission
notes that UBS submitted 2 comment letters on May 18, 2012.
\51\ Barclays Comment Letter at 2 (Jun. 3, 2011).
\52\ Bloomberg Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(i) One-to-Many Systems or Platforms
AFR opined that single dealer or one-to-many platforms do not meet
the SEF definition in CEA section 1a(50), which refers to a system in
which multiple parties have the ability to execute or trade swaps by
accepting bids or offers from multiple participants.\53\ Similarly,
IECA stated that SEFs should operate in a way that publicly reveals
market prices, and that preserving the ``one-to-one'' pricing model of
existing dealer systems is inconsistent with the SEF definition.\54\
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\53\ AFR Comment Letter at 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2011). JP Morgan also
commented that it agrees with the Commission that a single dealer
platform cannot qualify as a SEF because it fails to satisfy the
``multiple to multiple'' language in the SEF definition. JP Morgan
Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\54\ IECA Comment Letter at 3 (May 24, 2011).
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(ii) Blind Auction Systems or Platforms
Nodal commented that a blind auction platform should be able to
register as a SEF.\55\ Nodal contended that its blind auction platform
meets the SEF definition because multiple participants have the ability
to execute swap transactions by accepting bids and offers made by
multiple participants albeit without the pre-trade posting of bids or
offers.\56\ Nodal explained that its platform allows participants to
submit firm bids and offers without the disclosure of the terms of
those bids and offers to other participants, and that the auction
algorithmically processes the bids and offers to match participants
efficiently.\57\ Nodal further explained that auction volume is awarded
to participants at the same price and at a price equal to or better
than the participants' auction order.\58\
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\55\ Nodal Comment Letter at 2-3 (Jun. 3, 2011); Nodal Comment
Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 2011). Nodal also expressed support for blind
auction platforms in its comment letter to the Second Amendment to
July 14, 2011 Order for Swap Regulation Notice of Proposed
Amendment, 77 FR 28819 (proposed May 16, 2012).
\56\ Nodal Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\57\ Id.
\58\ Id. at 2.
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(iii) Aggregation Services or Portals
UBS and Bloomberg requested clarification whether aggregator
services are required to register as SEFs.\59\ UBS stated that an
aggregator service will provide customers with the ability to access
the best available liquidity and pricing on multiple SEFs through the
aggregator's screen so that customers will not have to connect to each
SEF individually.\60\ UBS stated that an aggregator service should not
be required to register as a SEF because the transaction is executed on
the relevant SEF's platform.\61\
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\59\ UBS Comment Letter at 1 (May 18, 2012); Meeting with UBS
dated Mar. 27, 2012; Meeting with Bloomberg dated Jan. 18, 2012. See
also UBS Comment Letter at 1 (Nov. 2, 2011).
\60\ Meeting with UBS dated Mar. 27, 2012. See also UBS Comment
Letter at 1 (Nov. 2, 2011).
\61\ Meeting with UBS dated Mar. 27, 2012.
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(iv) Services Facilitating Portfolio Compression and Risk Mitigation
Transactions
Several commenters sought clarification that portfolio compression
and risk mitigation services are not required to register as SEFs.\62\
According to TriOptima, its portfolio compression service provides a
netting mechanism that reduces the outstanding trade count and
outstanding gross notional value of swaps in participants' portfolios
by terminating or modifying existing trades.\63\ Specifically,
TriOptima stated that prospective participants may sign up for a
scheduled compression cycle and the participants must provide detailed
data about their respective portfolios and risk tolerances.\64\ Other
than to update mark-to-market values shortly before the compression
cycle is run, prospective participants have no further input into the
compression process, which is entirely controlled by the compression
algorithm.\65\ On a specified date, TriOptima runs the compression
cycle, which produces a set of proposed transactions for each
participant.\66\ The proposed transactions, if effected, would
terminate or modify participants' existing trades in order to reduce
the outstanding trade count and outstanding gross notional value of
swaps in the participants' portfolios.\67\ Each participant receives
only details of the proposed compression transactions to which it is a
party, but all of the compression transactions must be accepted in
order for the particular compression cycle to occur.\68\ If a single
participant declines to agree to the proposed compression transactions,
then the entire compression cycle fails and the pre-compression swap
transactions remain in effect.\69\ TriOptima contended that such
services do not perform the role of a trade execution venue so they
should not be regulated as a SEF.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Meeting with ICAP and TriOptima dated Sep. 6, 2012; Meeting
with ICAP dated Aug. 29, 2012; Meeting with ICE dated Jul. 25, 2012;
WMBAA Comment Letter at 3 (Jul. 18, 2011); ICAP Comment Letter at 2
(Jul. 7, 2011); TriOptima Comment Letter at 1 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\63\ TriOptima Comment Letter at 2, 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\64\ Id. at 2. The service does not place any constraints on the
number of positions or risk tolerances of prospective participants.
Id.
\65\ Id. at 3.
\66\ Id.
\67\ Id.
\68\ Id.
\69\ Id.
\70\ Id.
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ICAP stated that its bulk risk mitigation service assists market
participants in managing their risk exposures by identifying offsetting
risk requirements and executing new offsetting trades among those
participants.\71\ Specifically, ICAP stated that its risk mitigation
service sets the curve and price for all trades based on a survey of
market making entities, such as banks, or other entities that are
willing to provide quotes, as well as price quotes on DCMs.\72\ All
prospective participants in a particular risk mitigation run are first
shown the curve and prices for transactions along the curve.\73\
Subsequently, the prospective participants provide ICAP with data about
any of their positions of their choosing and their acceptable risk
tolerances.\74\ ICAP then runs a proprietary algorithm, which produces
a set of proposed transactions for each participant.\75\ The proposed
transactions, if effected, would result in new trades for the
participants that enable them to manage their exposures to market,
credit, or other sources of
[[Page 33481]]
risk.\76\ All transactions must be accepted in order for a particular
risk mitigation run to occur.\77\ If a single participant declines to
agree to the proposed risk mitigation transactions, then the entire
risk mitigation run fails and the existing swap transactions remain in
effect.\78\ While its bulk risk mitigation services result in market
participants entering into new trades, ICAP commented that such
services do not meet the SEF definition because they do not permit
participants to trade in real-time, negotiate price, or initiate
directional trades.\79\
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\71\ Meeting with ICAP dated Aug. 29, 2012; ICAP Comment Letter
at 1, 4 (Jul. 7, 2011).
\72\ Meeting with ICAP dated Aug. 29, 2012; ICAP Comment Letter
at 4 (Jul. 7, 2011).
\73\ Id.
\74\ Id. The service does not place any constraints on the
number of positions or risk tolerances of prospective participants.
Id.
\75\ Id.
\76\ Id.
\77\ Id.
\78\ Id.
\79\ ICAP Comment Letter at 2 (Jan. 16, 2013); ICAP Comment
Letter at 4 (Jul. 7, 2011).
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(v) Swap Processing Services
In its first comment letter, MarkitSERV agreed with the SEF NPRM
that entities operating exclusively as swap processors should not have
to register as SEFs because they only provide post-execution services
that facilitate clearing and settlement, not services relating to the
execution of swaps.\80\ However, in a subsequent comment letter, after
the SEC's proposed rule that would require certain providers of post-
trade services to register with the SEC as clearing agencies,
MarkitSERV recommended that the Commission regulate entities that
perform the confirmation and processing of swaps.\81\ While MarkitSERV
acknowledged that the SEC's authority under the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 to regulate swap processors as a clearing agency has no
parallel in the CEA, MarkitSERV recommended that the Commission
register such entities to avoid unnecessarily inconsistent
regulations.\82\ MarkitSERV recommended that the Commission require
swap processors to register as a sub-category of SEFs because CEA
section 5h(a)(1) references the processing of swaps.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ MarkitSERV Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\81\ MarkitSERV Comment Letter at 1-2 (Jun. 3, 2011).
\82\ Id. at 3-4.
\83\ Id. at 5.
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(2) Commission Determination
In response to commenters' requests for clarification regarding the
registration requirement, the Commission is clarifying how it
interprets the broad registration provision in section 5h(a)(1) of the
Act in coordination with the specific requirements for a SEF's
structure found in section 1a(50) of the Act and the trade execution
requirement in section 2(h)(8) of the Act. As noted in the SEF NPRM,
the Commission views the CEA section 5h(a)(1) registration requirement
\84\ as applying only to facilities that meet the SEF definition in CEA
section 1a(50).\85\ Section 1a(50) of the Act defines a SEF as ``a
trading system or platform in which multiple participants have the
ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by
multiple participants in the facility or system, through any means of
interstate commerce, including any trading facility, that--(A)
Facilitates the execution of swaps between persons; and (B) is not a
designated contract market.'' \86\ Accordingly, the Commission is
revising proposed Sec. 37.3 to clarify the scope of the registration
requirement, which states that ``[a]ny person operating a facility that
offers a trading system or platform in which more than one market
participant has the ability to execute or trade swaps with more than
one other market participant on the system or platform shall register
the facility as a swap execution facility under this part 37 or as a
designated contract market under part 38 of this chapter.'' \87\
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\84\ CEA section 5h(a)(1) states that ``[n]o person may operate
a facility for the trading or processing of swaps unless the
facility is registered as a swap execution facility or as a
designated contract market. . . .'' 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(a)(1).
\85\ See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 1219 (explaining that entities that
operate exclusively as swap processors do not meet the SEF
definition and should not be required to register as a SEF despite
the broad language in the CEA section 5h(a)(1) registration
provision).
\86\ CEA section 1a(50); 7 U.S.C. 1a(50). The Commission notes
that the Secretary of the Treasury issued a written determination
pursuant to CEA sections 1a(47)(E) and 1b that foreign exchange
swaps and foreign exchange forwards should not be regulated as swaps
under the CEA, and therefore should be exempted from the definition
of the term ``swap'' under the CEA. See Determination of Foreign
Exchange Swaps and Foreign Exchange Forwards Under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 77 FR 69694 (Nov. 20, 2012). Accordingly, if a
facility offers a trading system or platform solely for the
execution or trading of foreign exchange swaps or foreign exchange
forwards, then the facility would not be required to register as a
SEF.
\87\ The Commission is adding this new provision to Sec.
37.3(a)(1). As a result, proposed Sec. 37.3(a) is adopted as Sec.
37.3(b), proposed Sec. 37.3(b) is adopted as Sec. 37.3(c),
proposed Sec. 37.3(c) is adopted as Sec. 37.3(d), proposed Sec.
37.3(d) is adopted as Sec. 37.3(e), proposed Sec. 37.3(e) is
adopted as Sec. 37.3(f), and proposed Sec. 37.3(f) is adopted as
Sec. 37.3(g). The SEF NPRM stated that certain entities such as
one-to-one voice services and single-dealer platforms do not provide
the ability for participants to conduct multiple-to-multiple
execution or trading because they limit the provision of liquidity
to a single liquidity provider. Core Principles and Other
Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 1219.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission also clarifies that swap transactions that are not
subject to the CEA section 2(h)(8) trade execution requirement may be
executed on either a registered SEF (i.e., a facility that meets the
SEF definition) or an alternative entity that is not required to
register as a SEF (e.g., see one-to-many system or platform discussion
below).\88\ This clarification is consistent with the Commission's
acknowledgement in the SEF NPRM that swap transactions that are not
subject to the CEA section 2(h)(8) trade execution requirement would
not have to be executed on a registered SEF.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ The Commission notes that it is not tying the registration
requirement in CEA section 5h(a)(1) to the trade execution
requirement in CEA section 2(h)(8), such that only facilities
trading swaps subject to the trade execution requirement would be
required to register as a SEF. Therefore, a facility would be
required to register as a SEF if it operates in a manner that meets
the SEF definition even though it only executes or trades swaps that
are not subject to the trade execution mandate. The Commission also
notes that transactions involving swaps on SEFs that are subject to
the trade execution mandate are considered to be ``Required
Transactions'' under part 37 of the Commission's regulations,
whereas ``Permitted Transactions'' are transactions not involving
swaps that are subject to the trade execution mandate. As discussed
further below, the regulatory obligations which pertain to Permitted
Transactions differ from, and are somewhat less rigorous than, those
for Required Transactions. See discussion below regarding Permitted
Transactions under Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(iv)--Required Transactions and
Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(v)--Permitted Transactions in the preamble. See
also Process for a Designated Contract Market or Swap Execution
Facility To Make a Swap Available To Trade, 76 FR 77728 (proposed
Dec. 14, 2011) (discussing the process by which a swap is determined
to be subject to the trade execution requirement in CEA section
2(h)(8)).
\89\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1222.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes that its interpretation of the registration
provision in CEA section 5h(a)(1) is consistent with the statute and
helps further the goals provided in CEA section 5h, which are to
promote the trading of swaps on SEFs and to promote pre-trade price
transparency in the swaps market. Although the registration provision
is written in broad language and could be read to require the
registration of any facility for the trading or processing of swaps,
the Commission notes that other statutory provisions appear to narrow
the registration requirement. For example, the CEA section 2(h)(8)
trade execution requirement and CEA section 5h(d)(2), which states that
``[f]or all swaps that are not required to be executed through a swap
execution facility . . . such trades may be executed through any other
available means of interstate commerce[,]'' \90\ when read together,
contemplate alternative entities that are not required to register as
SEFs and may execute those swaps that are not
[[Page 33482]]
required to be executed on a SEF (i.e., those swaps that are not
subject to the CEA section 2(h)(8) trade execution requirement). The
Commission is interpreting the CEA section 5h(a)(1) registration
provision in a manner that is consistent with the SEF definition in CEA
section 1a(50), the trade execution requirement in CEA section 2(h)(8),
and CEA section 5h(d)(2), as discussed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ CEA section 5h(d)(2); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(d)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The following discussion is not intended to comprehensively cover
which entities are required to register as a SEF. Whether a particular
entity falls within the scope of CEA section 5h(a)(1) depends on all of
the relevant facts and circumstances of the entity's operations. The
Commission is mindful that any rule attempting to capture all of the
possible configurations of facilities that provide for the execution or
trading of swaps may be or become over-inclusive or under-inclusive in
light of technological changes and the ever evolving swaps market.\91\
However, in response to commenters' requests, the Commission is
providing examples of how it would interpret the CEA section 5h(a)(1)
registration requirement with respect to certain categories of better
understood facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ The Commission notes that entities seeking guidance
concerning their SEF registration obligations may request such
further guidance from the Division of Market Oversight (``DMO'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) One-to-Many Systems or Platforms
The Commission continues to believe that a one-to-many system or
platform on which the sponsoring entity is the counterparty to all swap
contracts executed through the system or platform would not meet the
SEF definition in section 1a(50) of the Act and, therefore, would not
be required to register as a SEF under section 5h(a)(1) of the Act. In
the Commission's view, such a system or platform does not meet the SEF
definition because it limits the provision of liquidity to a single
liquidity provider (i.e., the sponsoring entity). Accordingly, market
participants do not have the ability to conduct multiple-to-multiple
execution or trading on such a trading system or platform. The
Commission notes, however, that transactions in swaps that are subject
to the trade execution mandate, under CEA section 2(h)(8), must be
executed on a DCM or SEF and, accordingly, may not be executed on a
one-to-many system or platform.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ Transactions in swaps that are subject to the clearing
requirement in CEA section 2(h)(1) and ``made available to trade''
would be subject to the trade execution requirement. See CEA
sections 2(h)(1) and 2(h)(8); 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(1) and 2(h)(8). See also
Process for a Designated Contract Market or Swap Execution Facility
To Make a Swap Available To Trade, 76 FR 77728 (proposed Dec. 14,
2011) (discussing the process by which a swap is determined to be
subject to the trade execution requirement in CEA section 2(h)(8)).
The trade execution requirement provides an exception to the
requirement for swap transactions subject to the clearing exception
under CEA section 2(h)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Blind Auction Systems or Platforms
The Commission understands from commenters that a blind auction
system or platform, as described above, allows market participants to
submit firm bids and offers without disclosure of the terms of those
bids and offers to other participants. Such bids and offers are matched
through a pre-determined algorithm. The Commission believes that an
entity that provides such a blind auction system or platform would meet
the SEF definition in CEA section 1a(50) because more than one market
participant has the ability to execute or trade swaps with more than
one other market participant on the system or platform. Accordingly, an
entity that provides such a blind auction system or platform would have
to register as a SEF under section 5h(a)(1) of the Act.
(iii) Aggregation Services or Portals
The Commission understands that certain entities may seek to
provide their users with the ability to access multiple SEFs and the
market participants thereon, but do not provide for execution on their
aggregation services as execution occurs on one of those individual
SEFs. The Commission believes that an entity that provides such an
aggregation service would not meet the SEF definition in CEA section
1a(50) because it is only providing a portal through which its users
may access multiple SEFs and swaps are not executed or traded through
the service. Accordingly, an entity that provides such an aggregation
service or portal would not have to register as a SEF under section
5h(a)(1) of the Act.\93\ However, the Commission notes that to the
extent that an aggregation service or portal itself provides a trading
system or platform whereby more than one market participant has the
ability to execute or trade swaps with more than one other market
participant on the system or platform, the aggregation service would be
required to register as a SEF.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ The Commission notes that footnote 423 below classifies
aggregator platforms as a type of independent software vendor
(``ISV''). Therefore, other types of ISVs would not have to register
as a SEF if they only provide their users with the ability to access
multiple SEFs, but do not provide for execution or trading of swaps.
See discussion below regarding ISVs under Sec. 37.202(a)--Impartial
Access by Members and Market Participants in the preamble.
\94\ For example, some aggregation services may provide their
users with a portal to multiple SEFs and also execute swap
transactions between their multiple users. These services would have
to register as a SEF under section 5h(a)(1) of the Act. The
Commission notes that if other types of ISVs provide a system or
platform whereby more than one participant has the ability to
execute or trade swaps with more than one other participant on the
system or platform, then they would also have to register as a SEF
under section 5h(a)(1) of the Act. See discussion below regarding
ISVs under Sec. 37.202(a)--Impartial Access by Members and Market
Participants in the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iv) Services Facilitating Portfolio Compression and Risk Mitigation
Transactions
The Commission notes that portfolio compression services provide a
netting mechanism that reduces the outstanding trade count and
outstanding gross notional value of swaps in two or more swap
counterparties' portfolios.\95\ To achieve this result, a portfolio
compression service, for example, may wholly terminate or change the
notional value of some or all of the swaps submitted by the
counterparties for inclusion in the portfolio compression exercise and,
depending on the methodology employed, replace the terminated swaps
with other swaps whose combined notional value (or some other measure
of risk) is less than the combined notional value (or some other
measure of risk) of the terminated swaps in the compression
exercise.\96\ The swap counterparties' risk profiles are not materially
changed as a result of the portfolio compression exercise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ Confirmation, Portfolio Reconciliation, Portfolio
Compression, and Swap Trading Relationship Documentation
Requirements for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 77 FR
55904, 55932 (Sep. 11, 2012).
\96\ Id. at 55960.
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The Commission does not believe that a portfolio compression
service, as described above, provides for the execution or trading of
swap transactions between counterparties because the compression
service is providing a netting mechanism whereby the outstanding trade
count and outstanding gross notional value of swaps in two or more swap
counterparties' portfolios are reduced. Therefore, an entity providing
such a portfolio compression service would not meet the SEF definition
in section 1a(50) of the Act and would not have to register as a SEF
under section 5h(a)(1) of the Act.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ The Commission notes, however, that transactions in swaps
that are subject to the trade execution mandate, under CEA section
2(h)(8), must be executed on a DCM or SEF and, accordingly, may not
be executed on a portfolio compression service (unless no DCM or SEF
makes the swap available to trade or the swap transaction is
excepted or exempted from clearing under CEA section 2(h)(7) or as
otherwise provided by the Commission).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission understands from commenters that certain entities
provide
[[Page 33483]]
risk mitigation services, as described above, that operate to assist
market participants in managing their exposures to market, credit, and
other sources of risk. These risk mitigation services may redistribute
or mitigate market participants' risks, but they do not provide a
netting mechanism. To redistribute or mitigate risk, a risk mitigation
service, for example, may allow market participants to identify
elements of risk in their respective portfolios and to submit
information about these risks to the service. The risk mitigation
service may set the prices for all points along the maturity or credit
curve for all trades and the service's proprietary algorithm produces a
set of proposed transactions for each participant. If all participants
accept the proposed transactions, then the new trades are executed.
In the Commission's view, such an entity would meet the SEF
definition in CEA section 1a(50) because more than one market
participant has the ability to execute swaps with more than one other
market participant on the system or platform.\98\ In response to ICAP's
comment that such services do not meet the SEF definition because they
do not permit participants to trade in real-time, negotiate price, or
initiate directional trades, the Commission notes that the SEF
definition does not require any of these stated characteristics. As
noted above, the outcome of a successful risk mitigation run is the
execution of new trades between multiple participants at prices
accepted by those multiple participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ The Commission also notes that ICAP's Web sites for its
Reset and ReMatch risk mitigation services support the notion that
these services are executing trades between counterparties. ICAP's
Reset Web site states that ``[t]he new RESET matching engine allows
for unilateral matching with hedging. No longer is it necessary to
have an offsetting position for each trade to be executed.'' See
http://www.reset.net/aboutus.php. A press article regarding ReMatch
states that ``ReMatch addresses the problem of minimal or no exit
liquidity . . . [by] enabling market participants to exit positions
that they may otherwise have been unable to.'' See http://www.icap.com/news-events/in-the-news/news/2011/rematch-expands-service-into-us-financials.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the Commission notes that there are alternative
avenues to managing the same risks that risk mitigation services
manage, including bringing the risk mitigating orders to the open
market. For instance, a market participant could assess the various
risk elements in its portfolio using appropriate tools, and then decide
on a set of trades to mitigate these risks. The market participant
could choose to execute these trades through a risk mitigation service,
a SEF, or a DCM. In fact, in the DCM context, market participants
execute such risk mitigating trades on the DCM and not through a
separate non-DCM service. As such, risk mitigation services are
providing an alternative avenue to execute certain swap transactions
between counterparties.
Furthermore, the Commission believes that the confluence of trading
interests from a diverse range of motivations (e.g., risk mitigating
and risk taking trades) brings depth to the marketplace and helps to
build liquid markets. If the Commission did not require these risk
mitigation services to register as SEFs, then market participants would
be able to execute certain swap transactions away from the SEF, which
would hurt liquidity and also the trading of swaps on SEFs. This would
contradict one of the goals in section 5h of the Act, which is to
promote the trading of swaps on SEFs.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ CEA section 5h(e); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the reasons mentioned above, the Commission believes that an
entity that provides such a risk mitigation service would have to
register as a SEF under section 5h(a)(1) of the Act. However, the
Commission notes that such entities may not have to register as a SEF
if they only provide the analytical services that produce the proposed
risk mitigation transactions and the execution of those transactions
occurs elsewhere and, in particular, the execution of those
transactions that are subject to the trade execution mandate occurs on
a SEF.
(v) Swap Processing Services
As noted in the SEF NPRM, entities that solely engage in trade
processing would not meet the SEF definition in CEA section 1a(50)
because they do not provide the ability to execute or trade a swap as
required by the definition. Accordingly, swap processing services would
not have to register as a SEF under CEA section 5h(a)(1). Consistent
with this distinction, the Commission declines to create a sub-category
of SEFs for processing services that would be subject to some limited
subset of SEF core principles as requested by MarkitSERV.
Finally, the Commission notes that platforms seeking guidance
concerning the SEF registration obligations and its application to
their particular operations may request informal guidance from the
Division of Market Oversight (``DMO'').
(b) Sec. 37.9(b)(2)--Minimum Trading Functionality (Final Sec.
37.3(a)(2))
To further clarify what functionalities a SEF must provide if it is
required to register as a SEF, as opposed to what functionalities
trigger the registration requirement, the Commission is moving proposed
Sec. 37.9(b)(2) to final Sec. 37.3(a)(2). As discussed in the SEF
NPRM, an entity that must register as a SEF under CEA section 5h(a)(1)
must ensure that its operations comply with the minimum trading
functionality requirement.\100\ The minimum trading functionality
requirement in proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(2) provided that an applicant
seeking registration as a SEF must, at a minimum, offer trading
services to facilitate Required Transactions by providing market
participants with the ability to post both firm and indicative quotes
on a centralized electronic screen accessible to all market
participants who have access to the SEF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1219.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Summary of Comments
Several commenters stated that the minimum trading functionality is
similar to an order book, which is not required by the SEF
definition.\101\ In this regard, Commissioner Sommers offered a dissent
to the SEF NPRM, which was published as Appendix 3 to that notice.\102\
Commissioner Sommers' dissent asserted that the minimum trading
functionality requirement is not mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act.\103\
In addition, Commissioner Sommers' dissent argued for a broader
interpretation of the terms ``trading system'' and ``platform,'' which
are included in the statutory SEF definition so that SEFs can offer a
broader model for executing swaps.\104\ Many commenters also stated
that the SEF definition only requires that the facility provide
multiple participants with the ``ability'' to execute or trade swaps by
accepting bids and offers made by ``multiple participants'' and, thus,
the definition does not require making bids or offers transparent to
the entire market but rather to multiple participants.\105\ Better
Markets commented that the Commission's minimum trading
[[Page 33484]]
functionality requirement is an overly broad interpretation of the SEF
definition because it allows a SEF to be almost any type of system or
platform.\106\ Therefore, it recommended that the Commission narrowly
interpret the multiple participant to multiple participant requirement
so that the scope of acceptable execution methods has rational
boundaries.\107\
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\101\ Reuters Comment Letter at 3-4 (Dec. 12, 2011); Rosen et
al. Comment Letter at 8-9 (Apr. 5, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 4,
9 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011);
FXall Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011). Commissioner Sommers'
dissent to the SEF NPRM. See Core Principles and Other Requirements
for Swap Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 1259.
\102\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1259.
\103\ Id.
\104\ Id.
\105\ Reuters Comment Letter at 3-4 (Dec. 12, 2011); Rosen et
al. Comment Letter at 8 (Apr. 5, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at
5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 7-8 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall
Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011); Barclays Comment Letter at 5
(Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment Letter at 32-33 (Mar. 8, 2011);
WMBAA Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\106\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 6-7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\107\ Id.
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Several commenters expressed concern about the requirement to post
indicative quotes.\108\ Nodal and other commenters expressed concern
that indicative quotes could be used for manipulative purposes.\109\
Tradeweb commented that, under the proposal, SEFs operating an
anonymous order book system would be required to offer indicative
quotes due to the minimum trading functionality requirement, which
would not be suitable for anonymous order book marketplaces.\110\
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\108\ Nodal Comment Letter at 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA
Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9
(Mar. 8, 2011); ICE Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb
Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\109\ Nodal Comment Letter at 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA
Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9
(Mar. 8, 2011); ICE Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\110\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(2) Commission Determination
The Commission reiterates its view in the SEF NPRM that an entity
that must register as a SEF under CEA section 5h(a)(1) must ensure that
its operations comply with the minimum trading functionality
requirement.\111\ The Commission reaffirms that an acceptable SEF
system or platform must provide at least a minimum functionality to
allow market participants the ability to make executable bids and
offers, and to display them to all other market participants on the
SEF. The Commission is adopting a revised version of proposed Sec.
37.9(b)(2), which now requires a SEF to provide an Order Book as
defined in final Sec. 37.3(a)(3) (i.e., an electronic trading
facility, a trading facility, or a trading system or platform in which
all market participants have the ability to enter multiple bids and
offers, observe or receive bids and offers, and transact on such bids
and offers) because, as noted by several commenters, the proposed
minimum trading functionality description is similar to the proposed
definition of an Order Book.\112\ In response to comments, like the one
provided by Commissioner Sommers, that an order book is not required by
the SEF definition, the Commission believes that an Order Book, as
defined in final Sec. 37.3(a)(3), is consistent with the SEF
definition and promotes the goals provided in section 733 of the Dodd-
Frank Act.\113\ This interpretation is also consistent with the SEF
NPRM, as the Commission noted that it took into account these
requirements when proposing the minimum trading functionality
requirement.\114\
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\111\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1219.
\112\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(2) to
Sec. 37.3(a)(2).
\113\ CEA section 1a(50); 7 U.S.C. 1a(50). In section 5h(e) of
the Act, Congress provided a ``rule of construction'' to guide the
Commission's interpretation of certain SEF provisions (stating that
the goals of section 5h of the Act are to ``promote the trading of
swaps on [SEFs] and to promote pre-trade price transparency in the
swaps market''). 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(e).
\114\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1219.
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The Commission notes, however, that the final regulations provide
SEFs with additional flexibility in the execution methods for Required
Transactions by allowing SEFs to offer an RFQ System in conjunction
with an Order Book, as described below, to permit market participants
to access multiple market participants, but not necessarily the entire
market.\115\ The Commission also notes that a SEF may petition the
Commission under Sec. 13.2 of the Commission's regulations to amend
its regulations to include additional execution methods for Required
Transactions.\116\ The final regulations further allow a SEF to utilize
``any means of interstate commerce'' in providing the execution methods
in Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(i)(A) or (B) (i.e., an Order Book or an RFQ System
that operates in conjunction with an Order Book, as described
below).\117\ The Commission also notes that a SEF may provide any
method of execution for Permitted Transactions.\118\ By allowing SEFs
to offer additional methods of execution, and permitting flexible means
for executing swaps through these methods of execution, as discussed
below, the Commission is effectuating the Congressional direction to
allow multiple participants to execute swaps by accepting bids and
offers made by multiple participants through any means of interstate
commerce.\119\ The Commission notes that a DCM must operate as a
trading facility and in conjunction with that trading facility is also
permitted to utilize additional execution methods; however, those
additional execution methods are limited by the requirements set forth
in DCM Core Principle 9, for which there is no identical core principle
for SEFs.
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\115\ See discussion below under Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)--Request
for Quote System in the preamble.
\116\ See discussion below under Sec. 37.9(b)(1) and (b)(4)--
Execution Methods for Required Transactions in the preamble. Section
13.2 will allow the Commission to consider if a broader model for
executing on SEFs, consistent with the suggestion in Commissioner
Sommers' dissent, would be appropriate on a case-by-case basis, in
conformance with the CEA and the Commission's regulations. Core
Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 76
FR at 1259.
\117\ See discussion below under Sec. 37.9(b)(1) and (b)(4)--
Execution Methods for Required Transactions in the preamble.
\118\ See Sec. 37.9(c)(2).
\119\ CEA section 1a(50); 7 U.S.C. 1a(50).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, given the changes to the minimum trading functionality
requirement, the Commission notes that SEFs are not required to offer
indicative quote functionality. The Commission agrees with commenters
that indicative quotes would not be appropriate for certain trading
systems or platforms complying with the Order Book definition in final
Sec. 37.3(a)(3) (e.g., central limit order books facilitating only
anonymous trading).
(c) Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(i)--Order Book (Final Sec. 37.3(a)(3))
The Commission is also moving proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(i) to final
Sec. 37.3(a)(3) given the relocation of, and changes to, the minimum
trading functionality section as discussed above. Proposed Sec.
37.9(a)(1)(i) defined the term ``Order Book'' to mean: (A) An
electronic trading facility, as that term is defined in section 1a(16)
of the Act; \120\ (B) a trading facility, as that term is defined in
section 1a(51) of the Act; \121\ (C) a trading system or platform in
which all market participants in the trading system or platform can
enter multiple bids and offers, observe bids and offers entered by
other market participants, and choose to transact on such bids and
offers; or (D) any such
[[Page 33485]]
other trading system or platform as may be determined by the
Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ The term ``electronic trading facility'' means ``a trading
facility that--(A) operates by means of an electronic or
telecommunications network; and (B) maintains an automated audit
trail of bids, offers, and the matching of orders or the execution
of transactions on the facility.'' CEA section 1a(16); 7 U.S.C.
1a(16). The Commission notes that, under section 1a(16) of the Act,
the term ``electronic trading facility'' incorporates the definition
of ``trading facility'' as that term is defined under section 1a(51)
of the Act.
\121\ The term ``trading facility'' means ``a person or group of
persons that constitutes, maintains, or provides a physical or
electronic facility or system in which multiple participants have
the ability to execute or trade agreements, contracts, or
transactions--(i) by accepting bids or offers made by other
participants that are open to multiple participants in the facility
or system; or (ii) through the interaction of multiple bids or
multiple offers within a system with a pre-determined non-
discretionary automated trade matching and execution algorithm.''
CEA section 1a(51)(A); 7 U.S.C. 1a(51)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Summary of Comments
Better Markets commented that the definition of an ``order book''
should specify that SEF systems must operate pursuant to a best price,
first-in-time trade matching algorithm.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\122\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting the rule as proposed, subject to the
modification described below.\123\ The Commission notes that the Dodd-
Frank Act does not mandate that the Commission specify or require a
particular trade-matching algorithm for modes of execution provided by
SEFs. Therefore, a SEF has the discretion to use a matching algorithm
such as a price-time, price-size-time, or pro-rata allocation,
provided, however, that such matching algorithm is published in the
SEF's rulebook and submitted to the Commission for review and approval
as part of the registration application. The Commission is eliminating
proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(i)(D) because, as discussed in Sec. 37.9
below, a SEF may petition the Commission under Sec. 13.2 to amend
Sec. 37.9(a)(2) to include additional execution methods for Required
Transactions.\124\
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\123\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(i)
to Sec. 37.3(a)(3). The Commission is revising the definition in
proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(i)(C) by replacing the word ``can'' with
the phrase ``have the ability to'' and deleting the words ``choose
to.'' The Commission is also adding the words ``or receive'' after
the word ``observe'' so that the definition is technology neutral.
See ``Through Any Means of Interstate Commerce'' Language in the SEF
Definition discussion below under Sec. Sec. 37.9(b)(1) and (b)(4)--
Execution Methods for Required Transactions in the preamble for
further details.
\124\ See discussion below under Sec. 37.9(b)(1) and (b)(4)--
Execution Methods for Required Transactions in the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) Sec. 37.3(a)--Application Procedures \125\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ The Commission is renaming the title of this section from
``Application Procedures'' to ``Procedures for Full Registration''
to provide greater clarity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 37.3(a) set forth the application and approval
procedures for the registration of new SEFs. The proposed rule required
a SEF applicant to apply to the Commission by electronically filing the
proposed Form SEF.\126\ The proposed rule also provided that the
Commission would either approve or deny the application or, if deemed
appropriate, register the applicant as a SEF subject to conditions.
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\126\ Proposed Form SEF, as set forth in proposed appendix A to
part 37, was to be used for initial or temporary registration as a
SEF as well as for any amendments to an applicant's status otherwise
not required to be submitted under part 40 of the Commission's
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Summary of Comments
The Commission received several comments encouraging the
harmonization of the registration procedures for SEFs with the SEC's
registration procedures for SB-SEFs.\127\ In this regard, MarketAxess
recommended that the Commission allow an SEC-registered SB-SEF to
notice register with the Commission.\128\ WMBAA recommended that the
Commission and the SEC adopt a common application form, which would
provide for a smoother, timelier transition to the new regulatory
regime.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ See Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR 10948 (proposed Feb. 28, 2011). Tradeweb
Comment Letter at 3-4 (Jun. 3, 2011); MarketAxess Comment Letter at
20-21 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 14 (Mar. 8, 2011); FSR
Comment Letter at 10-11 (Mar. 8, 2011); Reuters Comment Letter at 3-
4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\128\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 20-21 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\129\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 14 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tradeweb requested that the Commission confirm that SEF applicants
do not need to file separate applications for each mode of execution
that it will offer to participants, provided that the application
clearly identifies the different features of the separate marketplaces
and that each feature is in compliance with the rules.\130\
Additionally, MarketAxess requested clarification that the Commission
does not intend proposed Sec. 37.3(a)(6) to require amendments to Form
SEF after the Commission approves an application.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 13 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\131\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 29 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.3(a) and Form SEF as proposed,
subject to certain modifications discussed below.\132\ The Commission
notes that there is no CEA provision which provides for SEF notice
registration for SB-SEFs. The Commission does note, however, that
section 5h(g) of the Act provides that the Commission ``may exempt'' a
SEF from registration if the facility is subject to comparable,
comprehensive supervision and regulation by the SEC, a prudential
regulator, or the appropriate governmental authorities in the home
country of the facility.\133\ The Commission observes that the SEC and
other regulators have not implemented comparable, comprehensive
supervision and regulation to the Commission's SEF regulatory scheme at
this time. The Commission also observes that, it must comprehensively
review and understand a SEF's proposed trading models and operations,
which will facilitate trading for a more diverse universe of financial
instruments and underlying commodities than SB-SEFs. Therefore, at this
time, the Commission is not allowing for exempt SEFs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.3(a) to
Sec. 37.3(b) and making several non-substantive revisions to this
provision and Form SEF for clarity. The Commission is also moving
proposed Sec. 37.3(a)(7) regarding delegated authority to the
Director of DMO to Sec. 37.3(h).
\133\ CEA section 5h(g); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to Tradeweb's comment about separate applications, the
Commission clarifies that a SEF applicant does not need to file
separate applications for each mode of execution that it will offer to
market participants, but its application, as noted in Exhibit Q to Form
SEF, must describe each mode of execution offered.\134\ Additionally,
in response to MarketAxess's comment about amendments to Form SEF after
the Commission registers a SEF, the Commission is revising proposed
Sec. 37.3(a)(6) \135\ and Form SEF to clarify that an amended Form SEF
is required for a SEF applicant amending a pending application for
registration or for a SEF requesting an amendment to its order of
registration. Otherwise, once registered, a SEF must file any
amendments to Form SEF as a submission under part 40 of the
Commission's regulations or as specified by the Commission (e.g., by
filing quarterly financial resources reports pursuant to Sec. 37.1306
or by filing an amended Form SEF). As stated in the SEF NPRM, the
Commission clarifies that if any information contained in Form SEF is
or becomes inaccurate for any reason, even after a SEF is registered,
the SEF must promptly make the appropriate corrections with the
Commission.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ The Commission notes that subsequent modifications to a
SEF's modes of execution or any additional SEF modes of execution
would constitute rules; therefore, the SEF must submit such rules to
the Commission for review pursuant to the procedures under part 40
of the Commission's regulations.
\135\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.3(a)(6) to
Sec. 37.3(b)(3).
\136\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1238.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is adding final Sec. 37.3(b)(5) to the rule text
that requires the Commission to review an application for registration
as a SEF pursuant to the 180-day timeframe and procedures specified in
CEA section
[[Page 33486]]
6(a).\137\ This section will be effective for SEF applicants who submit
their applications for registration as a SEF on or after two years from
the effective date of part 37. The Commission is adopting this
provision so that SEF applicants are treated comparably to DCM
applicants who currently are subject to the 180-day Commission review
period under CEA section 6(a). Although Congress did not impose a 180-
day review period for SEFs, the Commission believes that harmonization
of the review periods for DCM and SEF applicants is appropriate given
the fact that both are registered entities for the trading of swaps.
The Commission also believes that this requirement will provide greater
certainty for SEF applicants regarding the time period for the
Commission's review of their applications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\137\ CEA section 6(a); 7 U.S.C. 8(a). The Commission notes that
under CEA section 6(a), if the Commission notifies an applicant that
its application is materially incomplete and specifies the
deficiencies in the application, the running of the 180-day period
is stayed from the time of such notification. The Commission also
notes that if an applicant does not provide a complete Form SEF as
provided for under Sec. 37.3(b)(1)(i), the Commission will notify
the applicant, pursuant to Sec. 37.3(b)(4), that its application
will not be deemed to have been submitted for purposes of the
Commission's review. By ``complete'' Form SEF, the Commission means
that the SEF applicant provides appropriately responsive answers to
each of the informational and exhibit items set forth in Form SEF.
The Commission notes that if the application is not deemed to have
been submitted for purposes of the Commission's review, then the
180-day review period (when effective) will not have commenced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Commission is clarifying the standard upon which the
Commission will grant or deny registration. Proposed Sec. 37.3(a)(1)
stated that ``[t]he Commission shall approve or deny the application
or, if deemed appropriate, register the applicant as a swap execution
facility subject to conditions.'' In addition, proposed Sec.
37.3(a)(2) stated that ``[t]he application must include information
sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the core principles specified
in Section 5h of the Act.'' Consistent with these provisions, the
Commission is clarifying in final Sec. 37.3(b)(6) that: (i) The
Commission will issue an order granting registration upon a Commission
determination, in its own discretion, that the applicant has
demonstrated compliance with the Act and the Commission's regulations
applicable to swap execution facilities; (ii) if deemed appropriate,
the Commission may issue an order granting registration subject to
conditions; and (iii) the Commission may issue an order denying
registration upon a Commission determination, in its own discretion,
that the applicant has not demonstrated compliance with the Act and the
Commission's regulations applicable to swap execution facilities.
(e) Sec. 37.3(b)--Temporary Grandfather Relief From Registration \138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ The Commission is renaming the title of this section from
``Temporary Grandfather Relief from Registration'' to ``Temporary
Registration'' to provide greater clarity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 37.3(b) provided that an applicant for SEF
registration may request that the Commission grant the applicant
temporary grandfather relief from the registration requirement. The
temporary relief would allow the applicant to continue operating during
the pending application review process. Under the proposed rule, to
receive temporary relief, the applicant was required to provide the
following information to the Commission: (1) An application for SEF
registration submitted in compliance with proposed Sec. 37.3(a); (2) a
notification of its interest in operating under the temporary relief;
(3) transaction data substantiating that swaps have been traded and
continue to be traded on the applicant's trading system or platform at
the time of its application submission; and (4) a certification that
the applicant believes that it will meet the requirements of part 37 of
the Commission's regulations when it operates under temporary relief.
Under proposed Sec. 37.3(b)(2), an applicant's grant of temporary
relief would expire on the earlier of: (1) The date that the Commission
grants or denies SEF registration; or (2) the date that the Commission
rescinds the temporary relief. Proposed Sec. 37.3(b)(3) contained a
sunset date for the temporary relief provision of 365 days following
the effective date of the final SEF regulations. Finally, the
Commission proposed that the SEF rules, which include the requirements
for temporary relief, would be effective 90 days after their
publication in the Federal Register.
(1) Summary of Comments
(i) Comments on Temporary Grandfather Relief
MarketAxess commented that the phrase ``temporary grandfather
relief'' is ambiguous and recommended that the Commission rename
``temporary grandfather relief'' to ``temporary registration.'' \139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 16 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the substance of this provision, some commenters
expressed concern that the existing trading activity requirement in
proposed Sec. 37.3(b)(1)(ii) would prevent new entities from
qualifying for temporary relief.\140\ In this regard, MarketAxess
recommended that the Commission revise proposed Sec. 37.3(b)(1)(ii) to
permit SEF applicants, as an alternative to providing transaction data,
to provide materials substantiating that the applicant's system is
operational and therefore could facilitate trading in listed swaps upon
receiving temporary registration from the Commission.\141\
Further, several commenters recommended alternative certification
standards under proposed Sec. 37.3(b)(1)(iii).\142\ Bloomberg, for
example, recommended that SEFs be required to certify only that they
have implemented rules ``reasonably designed to ensure'' compliance
with part 37.\143\ Similarly, MarketAxess recommended a more flexible
certification requirement because compliance with certain core
principles will need to await the build-out functionality of third-
party regulatory service providers.\144\
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\140\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 16-17 (Mar. 8, 2011); MFA
Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\141\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 16-17 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\142\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 4 (Jun. 3, 2011); Bloomberg
Comment Letter at 5 (Jun. 3, 2011); State Street Comment Letter at
6-7 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 14-15 (Mar. 8, 2011);
Tradeweb Comment Letter at 13 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment
Letter at 17-19 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\143\ Bloomberg Comment Letter at 5 (Jun. 3, 2011).
\144\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 17-19 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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In addition, Phoenix commented that to avoid any market
disruptions, the Commission should permit SEF applicants to operate
under temporary relief while awaiting a Commission determination to
either grant or deny the temporary relief request.\145\ MarketAxess
also noted that the Commission should not ``tie its own hands'' by
imposing a fixed one-year post-effective time period for reviewing SEF
applications.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\ Phoenix Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 7, 2011).
\146\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 20 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Comments on DCM Eligibility
CME commented that if a DCM has listed cleared swaps prior to the
adoption of the final rules, then there is no reason to exclude them
from applying for temporary relief.\147\ NYSE Liffe recommended that
temporary relief remain available to DCMs either as long as it is
available to SEF applicants or on an ongoing basis so that a DCM
required under DCM Core Principle 9 to delist a futures contract at any
point in the future would be allowed to seek
[[Page 33487]]
temporary relief from registration as a SEF.\148\
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\147\ CME Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\148\ NYSE Liffe Comment Letter at 3-4 (Sep. 2, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii) Comments on 90-Day Effective Date of Regulations
Some commenters recommended a longer time period for the effective
date of the final regulations to provide applicants with additional
time to implement the large number of changes required.\149\ Nodal
commented that the short effective date will disadvantage smaller
exchanges because its supporting external parties will likely
prioritize compliance obligations in order to be responsive to the
largest exchanges first.\150\ MarketAxess and NFA recommended that the
Commission provide SEF applicants 180 days after adoption of the final
rules to comply with the final SEF regulations in light of forthcoming
operational challenges.\151\ However, SDMA supported the 90-day
effective date and urged the Commission to be vigilant in preventing
further delays that undermine the realization of the goals of the Dodd-
Frank Act.\152\
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\149\ AIMA Comment Letter at 3 (Jun. 10, 2011); Nodal Comment
Letter at 3-5 (Jun. 3, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 4-5 (Jun. 3,
2011); CME Comment Letter at 6 (Jun. 3, 2011); MarketAxess Comment
Letter at 19 (Mar. 8, 2011); NFA Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8,
2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 12-13 (Mar. 8, 2011); ICAP Comment
Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Nodal Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8,
2011).
\150\ Nodal Comment Letter at 4 (Jun. 3, 2011); Nodal Comment
Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\151\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 19 (Mar. 8, 2011); NFA
Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\152\ SDMA Comment Letter at 12 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(2) Commission Determination
(i) Temporary Grandfather Relief
The Commission agrees with MarketAxess that ``temporary
registration'' is more accurate than ``temporary grandfather relief''
and is accordingly making such change. Additionally, based on the
comments, the Commission is adopting proposed Sec. 37.3(b) as final
Sec. 37.3(c) subject to a number of modifications.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.3(b) to
Sec. 37.3(c) and making several non-substantive revisions for
clarity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission further agrees with MarketAxess and other commenters
that the trading activity requirement as proposed in Sec.
37.3(b)(1)(ii) may limit temporary registration to incumbent platforms.
Therefore, the Commission is eliminating the trading activity
requirement and will permit all SEF applicants to apply for temporary
registration if they meet the requirements under final Sec.
37.3(c)(1). The Commission views the revised temporary registration
provision as promoting competition between SEFs by providing fair
opportunities for new entities to establish trading operations in
competition with incumbents.
The Commission is deleting the certification requirement under
proposed Sec. 37.3(b)(1)(iii) because it is unnecessary. The
Commission notes, as stated in the SEF NPRM, that once a SEF applicant
is granted temporary registration it must comply with all provisions of
the Act and the Commission's regulations that are applicable to
SEFs.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1216.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is revising the temporary registration provisions to
clarify in final Sec. 37.3(c)(1) that a SEF applicant may apply for
temporary registration if it submits a complete Form SEF and a
temporary registration notice.\155\ The Commission is also revising the
temporary registration provisions to require a SEF applicant that is
already operating a swaps-trading platform, in reliance upon either an
exemption granted by the Commission or some form of no-action relief
granted by the Commission staff, to include in the temporary
registration notice a certification that it is operating pursuant to
such exemption or no-action relief. The Commission also clarifies that
a SEF applicant may submit such temporary registration application
after the final SEF regulations are published in the Federal Register
until the termination of the temporary registration provision pursuant
to final Sec. 37.3(c)(5).\156\
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\155\ The applicant must comply with all of the requirements in
final Sec. 37.3(b)(1)(i) and must submit a temporary registration
notice to the Commission to qualify for temporary registration. See
Final Sec. 37.3(c)(1) of the Commission's regulations.
\156\ The Commission notes that certain entities may continue to
operate under current exemptions while their SEF applications are
pending, as long as the entities submit a complete application
(i.e., the SEF applicant provides substantive answers to each of the
informational and exhibit items set forth in Form SEF) and temporary
registration notice before the effective date of the final SEF
regulations. See CFTC No-Action Letter 12-48 (Dec. 11, 2012).
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Pursuant to final Sec. 37.3(c)(1), the Commission notes that it
will grant a SEF applicant temporary registration upon a Commission
determination that the applicant has provided a complete Form SEF as
part of its registration application and submitted a notification
requesting that the Commission grant temporary registration. If an
applicant has not met these requirements, the Commission may deny its
request for temporary registration. By ``complete'' Form SEF, the
Commission means that the SEF applicant provides appropriately
responsive answers to each of the informational and exhibit items set
forth in Form SEF. The Commission notes that it will review a SEF
applicant's Form SEF to ensure that it is complete, and will not
conduct any substantive review of the form before granting or denying
temporary registration. The Commission notes that this temporary
registration process is similar to the notice registration process
followed by the Commission in the context of other types of
registrations.\157\ The Commission will review SEF applicants'
submissions on a rolling basis and the Commission will issue notices
either granting or denying temporary registration.\158\ The Commission
believes that providing a clear and streamlined path to temporary
registration will minimize the potential for regulatory arbitrage,
ensure a level playing field, and promote competition among SEFs.
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\157\ See discussion below regarding swap dealer and major swap
participant provisional registration rules.
\158\ The Commission is delegating to the Director of DMO, upon
consultation with the General Counsel, the authority to issue a
notice granting or denying temporary registration. See Final Sec.
37.3(h) of the Commission's regulations.
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The Commission stresses that a grant of temporary registration does
not mean that the Commission has determined that a SEF applicant is
fully compliant with the Act and Commission regulations, nor does it
guarantee that a SEF applicant will eventually be granted full SEF
registration. After granting a SEF applicant temporary registration,
the Commission will review the applicant's application to assess
whether the applicant is fully compliant with the requirements of the
Act and the Commission's regulations applicable to SEFs. During such
assessment, the Commission may request from the SEF applicant
additional information in order to make a determination whether to
issue a final order of registration.
The Commission is also revising the temporary registration
provisions to clarify in final Sec. 37.3(c)(2) that an applicant
cannot operate as a SEF under temporary registration until the
applicant receives a notice from the Commission or the Commission staff
granting temporary registration.\159\ In response to Phoenix's comment
about a SEF operating while its temporary registration is pending, the
Commission does not believe that a SEF applicant should be allowed to
operate as a SEF
[[Page 33488]]
under temporary registration before the Commission has had a chance to
review the application to ensure that it is complete. The Commission's
review is especially merited given the Commission's decision to permit
temporary registration of entities that have not previously traded
swaps.
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\159\ This provision is contained in final Sec. 37.3(c)(2) of
the Commission's regulations. This rule also states that in no case
may an applicant begin operating as a temporarily registered SEF
until the effective date of the SEF regulations.
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The Commission believes that permitting entities to operate as
temporarily registered SEFs, notwithstanding the lack of a substantive
review of the SEF's application by the Commission, is not a novel
concept and has been followed by the Commission in other contexts where
it is important to allow entities to quickly reach the market, before
an extensive Commission review. For instance, under the Commission's
swap dealer and major swap participant registration rules, provisional
registration is granted upon the filing of an application and
documentation demonstrating compliance or the ability to comply with
the CEA section 4s requirements in effect on such date--and not after
review and approval of the documentation by the National Futures
Association (``NFA''), as the Commission's delegee.\160\ On and after
the date on which NFA confirms that the applicant has demonstrated its
initial compliance with the applicable requirements, the provisional
registration of the applicant ceases and the applicant becomes
registered as an SD or an MSP, as the case may be.
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\160\ Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,
77 FR 2613 (Jan. 19, 2012).
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The Commission envisions the SEF temporary registration process as
operating in a similar fashion, with the Commission reviewing each
application for completeness alone before granting temporary
registration. Subsequently, and concurrent with the temporarily
registered SEF's early operations, the Commission would conduct a
comprehensive review of the application for compliance with all
applicable SEF requirements.
The Commission is revising proposed Sec. 37.3(b)(2) regarding the
expiration of temporary registration to remove the ability of the
Commission to rescind temporary registration. The Commission notes that
the SEF NPRM did not provide a standard for the Commission to rescind
temporary registration. Instead, in final Sec. 37.3(c)(3), the
Commission may rely on its ability to deny full registration, which
will also cause temporary registration to expire. Therefore, the
Commission believes that the ability to rescind temporary registration
is unnecessary.
The Commission is extending the 365-day sunset provision for
temporary registration to two years from the effective date of these
regulations in final Sec. 37.3(c)(5).\161\ Given that the projected
number of temporary SEF registrations may exceed 20 and the resource
constraints faced by the Commission, the Commission may not be able to
complete its registration reviews, enable SEFs to remedy any identified
deficiencies, and ultimately grant or deny full registration for all of
the SEF applicants within the proposed 365-day period. Extending the
temporary registration provision will provide the Commission with
adequate time to review the SEF registration applications while
ensuring that SEFs can continue their operations under temporary
registration, without interruption, until the Commission decides on
their application for full registration.
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\161\ This provision is contained in final Sec. 37.3(c)(5) of
the Commission's regulations.
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The Commission is also revising final Sec. 37.3(c)(5) to state
that the temporary registration provision will not terminate for an
applicant who applies for temporary registration before the termination
of the temporary registration provision and has not been granted or
denied registration under Sec. 37.3(b)(6) by the time of the
termination of the temporary registration provision. In addition, final
Sec. 37.3(c)(5) states that such an applicant may operate as a SEF
under temporary registration upon receipt of a notice from the
Commission granting temporary registration until the Commission grants
or denies full registration pursuant to Sec. 37.3(b)(6). On the
termination date of the temporary registration provision, the
Commission will review such applicant's application pursuant to the
180-day Commission review period and procedures in Sec. 37.3(b)(5).
These revisions will ensure that a temporarily registered SEF who does
not have a full registration in place by the time the temporary
registration provision terminates will not have to stop operating on
such termination date.
(ii) DCM Eligibility
The Commission is withdrawing proposed Sec. 37.3(b)(1)(ii)
regarding the existing trading activity requirement so an operational
DCM that seeks to create a new SEF would be able to qualify for
temporary SEF registration. In consideration of NYSE Liffe's comment
that temporary SEF registration for an existing DCM should not be
subject to the sunset provision, the Commission is revising proposed
Sec. 37.3(b) in final Sec. 37.3(c)(6) to allow for such an
exemption.\162\ The Commission notes that a DCM is subject to a higher
regulatory standard than a SEF such that a non-dormant DCM who seeks to
create a new SEF in order to transfer one or more of its contracts
should be able to meet many of the SEF requirements. Therefore, the
Commission believes that, on an ongoing basis, an operational DCM that
also seeks to register as a SEF in order to transfer one or more of its
contracts (whether the transfer of the contract is motivated by DCM
Core Principle 9 or another reason) may request SEF temporary
registration.
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\162\ This provision is contained in final Sec. 37.3(c)(6) of
the Commission's regulations.
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(iii) 90-Day Effective Date of Regulations
The Commission is shortening the proposed 90-day effective date to
60 days subsequent to publication in the Federal Register. In
consideration of the comments received and the availability of the
Commission staff resources, the Commission has determined to use its
discretion to establish alternative dates for the commencement of its
enforcement of regulatory provisions and is setting a general
compliance date of 120 days subsequent to Federal Register
publication.\163\ With this use of an effective date and compliance
date, a prospective SEF that is already operating a swaps-trading
platform in reliance on a Commission staff relief letter (e.g., CFTC
No-Action Letter 12-48) could submit a SEF application and receive
temporary registration before part 37's effective date so that it might
begin operating as a SEF upon that effective date.\164\ Alternatively,
if such a prospective SEF took additional time to prepare its SEF
application, it would have the option of forestalling the submission of
its application until after the effective date, so long as it submitted
its SEF application by the compliance date.
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\163\ See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
\164\ This scenario is not limited to a prospective SEF that is
already operating a swaps-trading platform in reliance on a
Commission staff relief letter. As noted above, all SEF applicants
may apply for temporary registration if they meet the requirements
under final Sec. 37.3(c)(1).
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The Commission believes that this combination of a 60-day effective
date and a 120-day compliance date subsequent to Federal Register
publication for prospective SEF applicants establishes a transition
period that appropriately balances the Commission's need to provide
regulatory certainty to potential applicants through issuance of final
SEF regulations and the Commission's statutory directives to both
promote fair
[[Page 33489]]
competition between swaps trading venues \165\ and promote the trading
of swaps on SEFs.\166\ The new transition period ensures swaps market
continuity, preserves competition between swaps trading venues, and
facilitates the orderly restructuring of the swaps market in compliance
with the Act and regulations thereunder. The Commission believes that
the 60-day effective date and the 120-day compliance date approach will
provide prospective SEF applicants with sufficient time to comply with
the final regulations and, if they choose, to prepare an application
for temporary registration.
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\165\ Section 3(b) of the Act lists the promotion of ``fair
competition among boards of trade, other markets, and market
participants'' as a purpose of the Act. 7 U.S.C. 5(b).
\166\ Section 5h(e) of the Act lists the promotion of ``the
trading of swaps on swap executive facilities'' as one goal of the
Act. 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(e).
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(f) Sec. 37.3(c)--Reinstatement of Dormant Registration
Proposed Sec. 37.3(c) provided procedures for a dormant SEF to
reinstate its registration. The Commission received no comments on this
section and is adopting Sec. 37.3(c) as proposed.\167\
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\167\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.3(c) to
Sec. 37.3(d) and making several non-substantive revisions for
clarity.
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(g) Sec. 37.3(d)--Request for Transfer of Registration
Proposed Sec. 37.3(d) provided procedures that a SEF must follow
when seeking to transfer its registration from its current legal entity
to a new legal entity as a result of a corporate event. The Commission
received no comments on this section and is adopting Sec. 37.3(d) as
proposed.\168\
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\168\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.3(d) to
Sec. 37.3(e) and making several non-substantive revisions for
clarity.
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(h) Sec. 37.3(e)--Request for Withdrawal of Application for
Registration
Proposed Sec. 37.3(e) provided that a SEF applicant may withdraw
its application for registration. The Commission received no comments
on this section and is adopting Sec. 37.3(e) as proposed.\169\
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\169\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.3(e) to
Sec. 37.3(f) and making several non-substantive revisions for
clarity.
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(i) Sec. 37.3(f)--Request for Vacation of Registration
Proposed Sec. 37.3(f) provided that a SEF may vacate its
registration. The Commission received no comments on this section and
is adopting Sec. 37.3(f) as proposed.\170\
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\170\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.3(f) to
Sec. 37.3(g) and making several non-substantive revisions for
clarity.
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4. Sec. 37.4--Procedures for Listing Products and Implementing Rules
Proposed Sec. 37.4 detailed the approval and self-certification
procedures under part 40 of the Commission's regulations that SEF
applicants and SEFs must follow to submit its products and rules to the
Commission. Proposed Sec. 37.4 also provided that a SEF may request
that the Commission consider, under the provisions of section 15(b) of
the Act,\171\ any of the SEF's rules or policies.
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\171\ CEA section 15(b) requires the Commission to take into
consideration the public interest to be protected by the antitrust
laws and endeavor to take the least anticompetitive means of
achieving the objectives of the Act, as well as the policies and
purposes of the Act. 7 U.S.C. 19(b).
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(a) Summary of Comments
WMBAA commented that SEFs should not be required to seek Commission
approval for their products and rules.\172\ WMBAA recommended that SEFs
be allowed to submit to the Commission a simple self-certification that
they complied with the applicable requirements.\173\ CME stated that
the proposed procedures for listing products would increase the burdens
associated with new product submissions and rule changes and would
create new and costly bureaucratic inefficiencies, competitive
disadvantages in the global marketplace, and impediments to
innovation.\174\ MarketAxess recommended that the Commission revise
proposed Sec. 37.4 to clarify that temporarily registered SEFs may
list swaps through the Commission's approval or self-certification
procedures.\175\
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\172\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 15-16 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\173\ Id.
\174\ CME Comment Letter at 10, 13 (Feb. 22, 2011). CME also
provided its comments to the rulemaking titled Provisions Common to
Registered Entities, 76 FR 44776 (Jul. 27, 2011). In addition,
rather than repeat its comments that pertain to both the DCM and SEF
NPRMs, CME incorporated its entire DCM rulemaking comment letter
dated Feb. 22, 2011 as Exhibit A to its SEF comment letter dated
Mar. 8, 2011. The Commission notes these comments by referencing the
Feb. 22, 2011 date of CME's DCM comment letter. The Commission is
also changing CME's reference to ``DCM'' to ``SEF'' for these
comments.
\175\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 19 (Mar. 8, 2011). Tradeweb
similarly commented that a SEF applicant should be able to introduce
new products while it is operating under temporary relief. Tradeweb
Comment Letter at 13 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(b) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting proposed Sec. 37.4 subject to certain
modifications. The Commission is removing many of the details from the
proposed rule, which are already contained in part 40 of the
Commission's regulations, and is instead referring SEFs to part
40.\176\ The Commission is also removing the CEA section 15(b)
consideration provision because, when reviewing any SEF rule, the
Commission is already required to take into consideration the
provisions under section 15(b) of the Act.
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\176\ 17 CFR part 40.
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In response to WMBAA's comments that SEFs should not be required to
seek Commission approval of their products and rules, the Commission
notes that a SEF is a registered entity under the Act and pursuant to
section 5c(c) of the Act, registered entities must submit product terms
and conditions and rules to the Commission for approval or under self-
certification procedures.\177\ In addition, the Commission notes that
CME's comments were addressed in the part 40 rulemaking and are outside
the scope of this rulemaking.\178\ The Commission also clarifies that
temporarily registered SEFs may list swaps or submit rules through the
Commission's approval or self-certification procedures under part 40 of
this chapter, and that the timelines under those procedures shall
apply.
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\177\ CEA section 5c(c); 7 U.S.C. 7a-2(c).
\178\ See Provisions Common to Registered Entities, 76 FR 44776
(Jul. 27, 2011).
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5. Sec. 37.5--Information Relating to Swap Execution Facility
Compliance
Proposed Sec. 37.5(a) required a SEF to file with the Commission
information related to its business as a SEF as specified in the
Commission's request. Proposed Sec. 37.5(b) required a SEF to file
with the Commission a written demonstration of compliance with the core
principles. Proposed Sec. 37.5(d) delegated the Commission's authority
to seek information as set forth in Sec. 37.5(b) to the Director of
DMO or such other employee as the Director may designate.
Proposed Sec. 37.5(c) required a SEF to file with the Commission a
notice of the transfer of ten percent or more of its equity no later
than the business day following the date on which the SEF enters into a
firm obligation to transfer the equity interest.\179\ The proposed rule
also required that the notification include any relevant agreement and
a representation from the SEF that it meets all of the requirements of
section 5h of the Act and Commission regulations adopted thereunder.
Additionally, the proposed rule
[[Page 33490]]
required the SEF to notify the Commission of the consummation of the
transaction on the day on which it occurs. Furthermore, the proposed
rule required that, upon the transfer of the equity interest, the SEF
certify, no later than two business days following the date on which
the change in ownership occurs, that the SEF meets all of the
requirements of section 5h of the Act and Commission regulations
adopted thereunder.
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\179\ See generally Core Principles and Other Requirements for
Swap Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 1217 (explaining the proposed
ten percent threshold).
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(a) Summary of Comments
The Commission did not receive any comments on proposed Sec.
37.5(a), (b), or (d). The Commission did, however, receive comments on
the equity interest transfer provisions in proposed Sec. 37.5(c).
CME commented that the submissions required to be simultaneously
filed with the initial notification of an equity interest transfer do
not lend themselves to preparation within the 24-hour time frame
proposed in the rules.\180\ CME further commented that the
representation of compliance with the requirements of CEA section 5h
and the Commission's regulations adopted thereunder would be more
appropriate if required upon consummation of the equity interest
transfer, rather than with the initial notification.\181\
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\180\ CME Comment Letter at 13 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\181\ Id.
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MarketAxess commented that public companies should not have to file
a notice of an equity interest transfer because the ownership structure
of a public company does not implicate the control and influence
concerns raised by the Commission in its proposal, and shareholders are
already obligated under the SEC's regulations to report threshold
acquisitions of equity interests within ten days of such an
acquisition.\182\
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\182\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 29 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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Lastly, Better Markets recognized the important implications of
transferring control in a regulated marketplace and it recommended that
the Commission lower the transfer threshold for reporting to five
percent as similarly required by the SEC for public equity
transfers.\183\
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\183\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 21-22 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(b) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.5(a), (b), and (d) as proposed
subject to certain non-substantive clarifications.\184\ The Commission
is adopting proposed Sec. 37.5(c) with certain revisions discussed
below.
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\184\ The Commission is removing the reference to ``information
relating to data entry and trade details'' in proposed Sec. 37.5(a)
because it is unnecessary. The rule text is broad enough to
encompass such information as it states that, upon the Commission's
request, a SEF shall file with the Commission information related to
its business as a SEF.
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The Commission is revising Sec. 37.5(c) to provide that a SEF must
submit to the Commission a notification of each transaction involving
the transfer of fifty percent or more of the equity interest in the
SEF, and that such notification must be provided at the earliest
possible time, but in no event later than the open of the business day
that is ten business days following the date in which the SEF enters
into a firm obligation \185\ to transfer the equity interest. However,
in all cases, the Commission notes that a SEF must provide the
Commission staff with sufficient time, prior to consummating the equity
interest transfer, to review and consider the implications of the
change in ownership, including whether the change in ownership will
adversely impact the operations of the SEF or the SEF's ability to
comply with the core principles and the Commission's regulations
thereunder.
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\185\ The Commission interprets ``firm obligation'' to mean when
a SEF enters into a letter of intent or any other document that
demonstrates a SEF's firm intent to transfer its equity interest as
described in Sec. 37.5(c).
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The Commission acknowledges CME's concern regarding the one
business day time period for filing the supporting documents with the
equity interest transfer notification. Thus, in addition to extending
the time period to up to ten business days for a SEF to file
notification with the Commission, the Commission is revising the rule
to eliminate the requirement that specific documents be provided with
the notification. Rather, the Commission is revising the rule text to
clarify that upon receiving a notification of the equity interest
transfer, the Commission may request appropriate documentation pursuant
to its authority under Sec. 37.5 of the Commission's regulations. For
example, such documentation may include, but is not limited to: (i)
Relevant agreement(s), including any preliminary agreements (not
including draft documents); (ii) associated changes to relevant
corporate documents; (iii) a chart outlining any new ownership or
corporate or organizational structure, if available; and (iv) a brief
description of the purpose and any impact of the equity interest
transfer.
The Commission is deleting the requirement for a SEF to provide a
representation of compliance with section 5h of the Act and the
Commission regulations thereunder with the equity interest transfer
notification, as requested by CME. The Commission agrees with CME that
this requirement is more appropriate upon consummation of the equity
interest transfer, rather than with the initial notification.
Therefore, the Commission is maintaining the certification requirement
upon consummation of the equity interest transfer as proposed in the
SEF NPRM.
With respect to the other comments, the Commission believes that
the notice requirements should not be limited to privately-held
companies as the Commission's objective is to ensure that equity
transfers do not negatively impact the operations of registered
entities. The Commission must oversee and ensure the continued
compliance of all SEFs with the core principles and the Commission's
regulations. In order to fulfill its oversight obligations, and to
ensure that SEFs maintain compliance with their self-regulatory
obligations, the Commission must receive a notice of an equity interest
transfer. The Commission acknowledges the suggestion by Better Markets
to lower the equity interest transfer threshold to five percent;
however, the Commission believes that the revisions to Sec. 37.5(c)
will still allow the Commission to fulfill its oversight obligations,
while reducing the costs for SEFs to comply with the equity interest
transfer requirements.
Finally, the Commission is revising the rule to remind SEFs that if
any aspect of an equity interest transfer requires the SEF to file a
rule as defined in part 40 of the Commission regulations, then the SEF
must comply with the rule submission requirements of section 5c(c) of
the CEA and part 40 of this chapter, and all other applicable
Commission regulations.
6. Sec. 37.6--Enforceability
Section 37.6 is intended to provide market participants who execute
swap transactions on or pursuant to the rules of a SEF with legal
certainty with respect to such transactions. In that regard, proposed
Sec. 37.6(a) established that any transaction entered into, on, or
pursuant to the rules of a SEF cannot be voided, rescinded, or held
unenforceable as a result of: (1) The SEF violating any provision of
section 5h of the CEA or part 37; (2) any Commission proceeding to
alter or supplement a rule, term, or condition under section 8a(7) of
the CEA or to declare an emergency under section 8a(9) of the CEA; or
(3) any other proceeding the effect of which is to alter or supplement
a specific term or condition or trading rule or procedure, or require a
registered
[[Page 33491]]
SEF to adopt a specific term or condition, trading rule or procedure,
or to take or refrain from taking a specific action. Proposed Sec.
37.6(b) required that all transactions executed on or pursuant to the
rules of a SEF include written documentation memorializing all terms of
the swap transaction, the legal effect of which is to supersede any
previous agreement between the counterparties. The proposed rule also
required that the confirmation of all terms of the transaction take
place at the same time as execution.\186\
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\186\ The Commission proposed Sec. 37.6(b) to facilitate the
process contemplated by the confirmation definition. A swap
``confirmation'' is defined as the consummation (electronically or
otherwise) of legally binding documentation (electronic or
otherwise) that memorializes the agreement of the counterparties to
all of the terms of a swap. A confirmation must be in writing
(whether electronic or otherwise) and must legally supersede any
previous agreement (electronically or otherwise). 17 CFR 45.1; Swap
Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 77 FR 2136, 2197
(Jan. 13, 2012).
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(a) Summary of Comments
Three commenters addressed the practicality of a SEF confirming all
terms of a transaction at the same time as execution. MarketAxess
recommended that a SEF be responsible for confirming only the swap
creation data in its possession at the time of execution, consistent
with the Commission's approach in its proposed part 45
regulations.\187\ MarketAxess also requested that the Commission
clarify that SEFs are only responsible for producing a confirmation for
swaps entered into on, and not just pursuant to the rules of, a
SEF.\188\
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\187\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 28-29 (Mar. 8, 2011).
Proposed Sec. 45.3 required that for all transactions executed on a
SEF, regardless of whether the swap was cleared, the SEF would be
responsible for reporting to a swap data repository only the primary
economic terms of the transaction in its possession at the time of
execution, and that reporting of confirmation data consisting of all
terms of the transaction would be the responsibility of either the
derivatives clearing organization (if cleared) or one of the
counterparties (if uncleared). Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting
Requirements, 75 FR 76574, 76580-81 (proposed Dec. 8, 2010). As
adopted by the Commission, however, Sec. 45.3 requires a SEF to
report both the primary economic terms data as well as all
confirmation data consisting of all transaction terms for each swap
executed on or pursuant to the rules of the SEF as soon as
technologically practicable after execution of the swap. 17 CFR
45.3; Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 77 FR
2136, 2199 (Jan. 13, 2012).
\188\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 29 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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MarkitSERV stated that when counterparties choose to execute a swap
on a SEF that is not subject to the clearing mandate and not submitted
for clearing to a clearinghouse, the parties will require a long-term
credit relationship to be in place, often memorialized in an ISDA
Master Agreement.\189\ MarkitSERV further stated that the confirmation
terms provided by a SEF may not be able to accommodate the specificity
of such a master agreement, thus making the SEF's confirmation
inadequate for purposes of complying with the Commission's
regulations.\190\
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\189\ MarkitSERV Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\190\ Id. MarkitSERV also expressed concern that the SEF NPRM is
conflating the concepts of confirmation and affirmation with the
audit trail requirements in proposed Sec. 37.205. For example,
MarkitSERV sought clarification regarding the SEF NPRM's statement
that ``[v]oice transactions must be entered into some form of
electronic affirmation system immediately upon execution.'' Core
Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 76
FR at 1221. Given the audit trail requirement in proposed Sec.
37.205(b)(1), which states that SEFs that ``permit intermediation
must require that all orders or requests for quotes received by
phone that are executable be immediately entered into the trading
system or platform[,]'' MarkitSERV recommended that the Commission
use the term ``electronic processing system'' instead of
``electronic affirmation system'' because audit trail records and
affirmation are different concepts. Id. at 1244. MarkitSERV Comment
Letter at 4, 6 (Mar. 8, 2011). ABC/CIEBA also sought clarification
as to whether SEFs must enter Permitted Transactions into an
affirmation system, and if so, ABC/CIEBA noted that the SEF NPRM is
inconsistent with other rules. ABC/CIEBA Comment Letter at 7-8 (Mar.
8, 2011). The Commission notes that the final SEF rules do not
require the use of an ``electronic affirmation system.'' The
Commission also clarifies that confirmation and the creation of an
audit trail in Sec. 37.205 are two separate and distinct
requirements. In addition, the Commission notes that Sec. 37.205(b)
merely establishes the requirement that SEFs must capture audit
trail data for regulatory purposes and does not address affirmation,
confirmation, or the public reporting or dissemination of such data.
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Similarly, the Energy Working Group expressed concern over the
provision's requirement that the SEF's confirmation supersede any
previous agreement between the transacting parties, noting that this
language appears to prevent a master agreement from operating between
counterparties transacting on a SEF.\191\ The Energy Working Group also
stated that confirmation cannot take place at the same time as
execution because they are two distinct steps in the swap transaction
process.\192\
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\191\ Energy Working Group Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\192\ Id.
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(b) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.6(a) as proposed.\193\ The
Commission is also adopting Sec. 37.6(b) as proposed subject to the
two revisions discussed below. Although the comments received regarding
proposed Sec. 37.6(b) did not cite ambiguity in the SEF NPRM regarding
a SEF's affirmative duty to provide confirmation documentation to
counterparties, the Commission has determined to revise Sec. 37.6(b)
to state explicitly that a ``swap execution facility shall provide each
counterparty'' with written documentation of all terms of the
transaction to serve as confirmation of such transaction. In response
to MarketAxess's comments, the Commission notes that Sec. 37.6(b) is
consistent with the requirement in final part 45 of the Commission's
regulations that a SEF report confirmation data consisting of all terms
of a transaction to a swap data repository (``SDR'') for each swap
executed on or pursuant to the rules of the SEF.\194\
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\193\ The Commission is making certain non-substantive revisions
to Sec. 37.6(a) for clarity.
\194\ Part 45 requires a SEF to report all confirmation data and
all primary economic terms data as defined in part 23 and Sec. 45.1
of the Commission's regulations for each swap executed on or
pursuant to the rules of the SEF as soon as technologically
practicable after execution of the swap. 17 CFR 45.3; Swap Data
Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 77 FR 2136, 2199 (Jan. 13,
2012). Part 45 defines confirmation data as ``all of the terms of a
swap matched and agreed upon by the counterparties in confirming the
swap.'' Id. at 2197.
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With regard to the specific comments received about the role of
master agreements in the written confirmation provided by a SEF, the
Commission has determined that counterparties choosing to execute a
transaction not submitted for clearing on or pursuant to the rules of a
SEF must have all terms, including possible long-term credit support
arrangements, agreed to no later than execution, such that the SEF can
provide a written confirmation inclusive of those terms at the time of
execution and report complete, non-duplicative, and non-contradictory
data to an SDR as soon as technologically practicable after
execution.\195\ This requirement, as mentioned above, is necessary to
provide market participants who execute swap transactions on or
pursuant to the rules of a SEF with legal certainty with respect to
such transactions, and to promote the Commission's policy goal of
achieving ``straight-through processing'' of swap
[[Page 33492]]
transactions in order to facilitate orderly markets, whether bilateral
or facility traded.\196\ Furthermore, the Commission believes that
credit-support arrangements for uncleared transactions can impact the
ultimate price of a swap, and thus should be agreed to no later than
the time of trade execution in order to promote the statutory goal of
pre-trade price transparency.\197\
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\195\ The Commission notes that swap trading relationship
documentation is not required for swaps cleared by a derivatives
clearing organization. See Sec. 23.504(a)(1) of the Commission's
regulations. The Commission also notes that the commenters' concerns
are most relevant to those transactions that are truly bespoke, not
subject to the clearing mandate, and not voluntarily cleared. There
is no reason why a SEF's written confirmation terms cannot
incorporate by reference the privately negotiated terms of a
freestanding master agreement for these types of transactions,
provided that the master agreement is submitted to the SEF ahead of
execution and the counterparties ensure that nothing in the
confirmation terms contradict the standardized terms intended to be
incorporated from the master agreement. See also Real-Time Public
Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 FR 1182, 1193 (Jan. 9, 2012)
(discussing confirmation and incorporating documents by reference).
\196\ The OTC Derivatives Supervisors' Group, a collaboration of
market participant leadership headed by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, recognized the potential of electronic trading to
facilitate the objectives of straight-through processing in the wake
of the 2008 financial crisis. See Confirmation, Portfolio
Reconciliation, and Portfolio Compression Requirements for Swap
Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 75 FR 81519, 81521-22 (proposed
Dec. 28, 2010) (noting that ``[t]imely and accurate confirmation of
transactions is critical for all downstream operational and risk
management processes, including the correct calculation of cash
flows and discharge of settlement obligations as well as accurate
measurement of counterparty credit exposures.'').
\197\ See CEA section 5h(e); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(e) (stating that the
goal of this section is to promote pre-trade price transparency in
the swaps market). While straight-through processing may not be as
relevant to credit risk associated with transactions executed on or
pursuant to the rules of a SEF but not submitted for clearing, the
data and real-time reporting requirements already finalized by the
Commission mandate reporting by the SEF of all swap transaction
terms ``as soon as technologically practicable'' in order to
effectuate the statutory mandate of post-trade price transparency.
See 17 CFR 43.3(b)(1) (real-time reporting); 17 CFR 45.3(a)(1) (swap
data recordkeeping and reporting requirements). This allowance of a
slight timing delay, however, is meant to account for ``the
prevalence, implementation and use of technology by comparable
market participants,'' and not post-execution confirmation of other
terms such as credit agreements for uncleared swaps. See, e.g., 17
CFR 43.2; Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 FR
1182, 1191 (Jan. 9, 2012) (discussing the definition of ``as soon as
technologically practicable'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, in response to the Energy Working Group's comment that
confirmation cannot take place at the same time as execution, the
Commission is revising Sec. 37.6(b) to state that ``. . . specific
customer identifiers for accounts included in bunched orders involving
swaps need not be included in confirmations provided by a swap
execution facility if the applicable requirements of Sec. 1.35(b)(5)
of this chapter are met.'' The Commission acknowledges that for bunched
orders the post-execution allocation of trades is required for
confirmation. The above revisions to Sec. 37.6 are consistent with
Commission regulation 1.35(b)(5) and provide sufficient time for the
post-execution allocation of bunched orders, but allow SEFs to meet the
requirement that confirmation takes place at the same time as
execution.\198\
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\198\ See 17 CFR 1.35; Customer Clearing Documentation, Timing
of Acceptance for Clearing, and Clearing Member Risk Management, 77
FR 21278, 21286-287, 306 (Apr. 9, 2012); Confirmation, Portfolio
Reconciliation, Portfolio Compression, and Swap Trading Relationship
Documentation Requirements for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants, 77 FR 55904, 55923 (Sep. 11, 2012) for further
details.
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7. Sec. 37.7--Prohibited Use of Data Collected for Regulatory Purposes
Proposed Sec. 37.7 prohibited a SEF from using for commercial
purposes proprietary data or personal information that it obtains from
or on behalf of any person for regulatory purposes. The purpose of this
provision was to protect customer privacy and prevent a SEF from using
such information to advance its commercial interests.\199\
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\199\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1218 n. 34.
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(a) Summary of Comments
Several commenters recommended that the Commission adopt a more
flexible approach toward the use of data collected for regulatory
purposes.\200\ CME, for example, stated that a SEF should be allowed to
use information that is provided for both regulatory and non-regulatory
purposes for commercial purposes, as long as transparent rules or
policies are in place.\201\ Some commenters believed that commercial
use should be allowed, provided that market participants' identities
are protected \202\ or prior consent is obtained.\203\ For example, FSR
believed that commercial use should be allowed for aggregate data as
long as the sources of the information are not revealed.\204\
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\200\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 31 (Mar. 8, 2011); FSR
Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011); ICE Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar.
8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 14 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\201\ CME Comment Letter at 14 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\202\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 31 (Mar. 8, 2011); FSR
Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\203\ CME Comment Letter at 14 (Feb. 22, 2011); MarketAxess
Comment Letter at 31 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\204\ FSR Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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However, SIFMA AMG stated that, given the broad authority under the
proposed rules for SEFs to acquire information, the term ``proprietary
data'' is too narrow to adequately protect market participants from
improper disclosure.\205\ Freddie Mac requested that the Commission
strengthen the proposed rule to additionally prohibit any SEF from
asserting ownership rights over the trading information of any
transacting party.\206\
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\205\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 15-16 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\206\ Freddie Mac Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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Finally, WMBAA requested that the Commission clarify the meaning of
``proprietary data or personal information,'' and recommended limiting
the rule to information obtained outside the ordinary course of trade
execution and related to market surveillance activities.\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 17 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(b) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.7 as proposed, subject to
certain modifications. In response to the commenters, the Commission is
modifying the proposed rule to allow SEFs to use proprietary data or
personal information for business or marketing purposes if the person
from whom it collects or receives such information clearly consents to
the use of its information in such manner. The Commission is also
revising the proposed rule to prohibit a SEF from conditioning access
to its facility based upon such consent. The Commission believes that
the consent requirement will protect persons by allowing them to first
weigh the benefits and consequences of allowing a SEF to make
commercial use of their information. In response to CME's comment about
information provided for both regulatory and non-regulatory purposes,
the Commission notes that a SEF may use information that it receives
for both regulatory and non-regulatory purposes for business or
marketing purposes if the source of the information clearly consents to
the use in such a manner.
In response to comments about the definition of ``proprietary data
and personal information,'' the Commission declines to adopt a further
definition and is maintaining a flexible approach. However, the
Commission notes that some examples of proprietary data and personal
information would include information that separately discloses
business transactions, market positions, or trade secrets. The
Commission recommends that SEFs define these terms in their rulebooks,
which will be subject to Commission review during the SEF registration
process.
8. Sec. 37.8--Boards of Trade Operating Both a Designated Contract
Market and a Swap Execution Facility
Proposed Sec. 37.8(a) required that a board of trade that operates
a DCM and also intends to operate a SEF must separately register the
SEF under part 37, and on an ongoing basis, comply with the core
principles under section 5h of the Act and the part 37 regulations
issued thereunder. Proposed Sec. 37.8(b) implemented CEA section 5h(c)
by requiring a board of trade that operates both a DCM and SEF and uses
the same electronic trade execution system for executing and trading
swaps on both registered entities to clearly identify to market
participants for each swap
[[Page 33493]]
whether the execution or trading of such swaps is taking place on the
DCM or the SEF.\208\
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\208\ CEA section 5h(c); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Summary of Comments
CME stated that the rules of a DCM and SEF would clearly identify,
as necessary, the trade platform upon which a swap was being executed,
rendering the requirements of proposed Sec. 37.8 unnecessary.\209\ CME
requested that the Commission clarify whether proposed Sec. 37.8
created additional substantive obligations on the part of DCMs and SEFs
given that market participants often interface with electronic
platforms via proprietary or third-party front end systems not under
the control of DCMs or SEFs.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ CME Comment Letter at 14 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\210\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.8(a) as proposed, subject to
one revision. Proposed Sec. 37.8(a) only addressed the SEF
registration and compliance of a board of trade that already operates a
DCM and intends to operate a SEF. To address all situations regarding
DCM and SEF registration and compliance, the Commission is revising
Sec. 37.8(a) to apply to ``[a]n entity that intends to operate both a
[DCM] and a [SEF].'' The rule requires the entity to separately
register the DCM and SEF pursuant to part 38 and part 37 of the
Commission's regulations, respectively, and to comply with the
applicable core principles and regulations.
As to CME's comments regarding Sec. 37.8(b), the Commission
clarifies that it would not be sufficient for a board of trade that
operates both a DCM and a SEF to simply have rules that identify
whether a transaction is being executed on the DCM or the SEF. The
Commission notes that section 5h(c) of the Act clearly requires a board
of trade that operates both a DCM and a SEF to identify to market
participants whether each swap is being executed on the DCM or the
SEF.\211\ Accordingly, a consolidated DCM/SEF trading screen must
identify whether the execution is occurring on the DCM or the SEF,
irrespective of how proprietary or third-party front end systems
eventually present that data to market participants.\212\
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\211\ The Commission notes that only eligible contract
participants may execute a swap on a SEF so a board of trade that
operates both a DCM and a SEF must ensure that its SEF does not
allow for non-eligible contract participant trading on the SEF. See
CEA section 2(e); 7 U.S.C. 2(e).
\212\ The Commission notes that it is not replacing the term
``board of trade'' in Sec. 37.8(b) with the term ``entity'' as in
Sec. 37.8(a) because in Sec. 37.8(b) only a board of trade would
be able to use the same electronic trade execution system for
executing and trading swaps on the DCM and on the SEF (i.e., a
trading facility). The Commission also notes that Sec. 37.8(b)
implements CEA section 5h(c), which uses the term ``board of
trade.''
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9. Sec. 37.9--Permitted Execution Methods \213\
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\213\ The Commission is renaming the title of this section from
``Permitted Execution Methods'' to ``Methods of Execution for
Required and Permitted Transactions'' to provide greater clarity.
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As mentioned above, the SEF NPRM required a SEF to offer a minimum
trading functionality (i.e., a centralized electronic trading screen
upon which any market participant can post both firm and indicative
bids and offers that are transparent to all other market participants
of the SEF). The SEF NPRM provided that Required Transactions (i.e.,
transactions subject to the trade execution mandate under section
2(h)(8) of the CEA and not block trades) must be executed through the
SEF's minimum trading functionality, Order Book meeting the minimum
trading functionality, or RFQ System that operates in conjunction with
the SEF's minimum trading functionality.\214\ The SEF NPRM made it
clear that for Required Transactions, pre-trade transparency must be
met.\215\ The SEF NPRM also allowed a SEF to provide additional
execution methods for Permitted Transactions (i.e., transactions not
subject to the clearing and trade execution mandates, illiquid or
bespoke swaps, and block trades), including Voice-Based System.
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\214\ By ``in conjunction with the SEF's minimum trading
functionality,'' the Commission means that the SEF NPRM required a
SEF to offer the minimum trading functionality, and if that SEF also
offered an RFQ System, it was required to communicate any bids or
offers resting on the minimum trading functionality to the RFQ
requester along with the responsive quotes. See the discussion below
regarding ``Taken Into Account and Communicated'' Language in the
RFQ System Definition under Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)--Request for Quote
System in the preamble for further details.
\215\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1220.
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The Commission is restructuring the order of the rule text in Sec.
37.9 and this corresponding preamble discussion to provide clarity.
Despite the order of other preamble sections, which generally follows
the order of the SEF NPRM, the Commission's preamble discussion of
Sec. 37.9 generally follows the order of the restructured rule text.
Additionally, as discussed above in the registration section, the
Commission is moving the minimum trading functionality and Order Book
sections from proposed Sec. 37.9 to final Sec. 37.3.
(a) Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(iv)--Required Transactions and Sec.
37.9(a)(1)(v)--Permitted Transactions
Proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(iv) defined Required Transactions as
transactions that are subject to the execution requirements under the
Act and are made available for trading pursuant to Sec. 37.10, and are
not block trades. Proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(v) defined Permitted
Transactions as transactions that meet any of the following
requirements: (A) Are block trades; (B) are not swaps subject to the
Act's clearing and execution requirements; or (C) are illiquid or
bespoke swaps.
(1) Summary of Comments
Several commenters recommended revisions to the definition of
Permitted Transactions.\216\ To ensure that there are no gaps between
the definitions of Required Transactions and Permitted Transactions,
MarketAxess recommended that the proposed definition of Permitted
Transactions in Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(v) be revised to include all
transactions that are not Required Transactions as defined in proposed
Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(iv).\217\ Freddie Mac recommended that the Commission
revise the proposed definition of Permitted Transactions to incorporate
hedging transactions by any end-user (i.e., non-dealer)
counterparty.\218\
[[Page 33494]]
Additionally, the Coalition commented that the Commission should define
illiquid or bespoke transactions to include typical end-user
trades.\219\
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\216\ Additionally, WMBAA commented that the distinction between
Required Transactions and Permitted Transactions is not required or
authorized by the CEA. WMBAA Comment Letter at 6-7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
In this regard, the Commission notes that the CEA sets out specific
trading requirements for swaps that are subject to the trade
execution mandate. See CEA sections 2(h)(1) and 2(h)(8); 7 U.S.C.
2(h)(1) and 2(h)(8). To meet these statutory requirements, final
Sec. 37.9(a)(1) defines these swaps as Required Transactions and
provides specific methods of execution for such swaps. To
distinguish these swaps from other swaps that are not subject to the
trade execution mandate, the Commission defines such swaps in final
Sec. 37.9(c)(1) as Permitted Transactions and allows these swaps to
be voluntarily traded on a SEF by using any method of execution. See
discussion below regarding execution methods for Required and
Permitted Transactions under Sec. 37.9(b)(1) and (b)(4)--Execution
Methods for Required Transactions and Sec. 37.9(c)--Execution
Methods for Permitted Transactions in the preamble.
\217\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 32 (Mar. 8, 2011).
Similarly, ISDA/SIFMA and the Energy Working Group requested clarity
regarding the definition of Permitted Transactions. ISDA/SIFMA
Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); Energy Working Group Comment
Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\218\ Freddie Mac Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011). Similarly,
MFA recommended that the Commission expand the definition of
Permitted Transactions to include other transactions, such as
exchanges for physical, exchanges for swaps, and linked or packaged
transactions. MFA Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011). The Commission
interprets MFA's comment to be a request that the Commission create
through rulemaking an exception to the CEA section 2(h)(8) trade
execution requirement similar to the centralized market trading
exception established by DCM Core Principle 9 for certain exchange
of futures for related positions. See CEA section 5(d)(9); 7 U.S.C.
7(d)(9); see also Regulation of Noncompetitive Transactions Executed
on or Subject to the Rules of a Contract Market, 63 FR 3708 (Jan.
26, 1998). The Commission notes that while DCM Core Principle 9 does
permit certain exceptions to the centralized market trading
requirements, such exceptions are all premised on there being some
``bona fide business purpose'' for the exception. MFA does not offer
a specific bona fide business purpose for any of its three suggested
off-exchange exceptions, nor is the Commission aware of any. In
addition, MFA does not explain why an exchange of swaps for swaps
transaction, where each leg of the transaction can presumably be
executed on a SEF, needs to be executed off-exchange. The Commission
observes that should swaps based on physical commodities become
subject to the trade execution mandate, there might be some bona
fide business purpose for executing exchanges of swaps for physicals
transactions. However, the market participants who are most likely
to engage in such transactions are also likely to be eligible for
the end-user exception in CEA section 2(h)(7). As an initial matter,
the Commission observes that swaps based on physical commodities may
be subject to the trade execution requirement if the Commission
determines that they are subject to the clearing requirement under
CEA section 2(h)(1) and part 50 of the Commission's regulations.
Should the circumstances arise where the Commission is determining
whether physical commodity swaps should become subject to the
clearing requirement and there are parties who seek to engage in
exchanges of swaps for physicals transactions that are not eligible
for the end-user exception, the Commission could at that time
entertain requests to permit a trade execution requirement exception
for swaps that are components of such exchanges of swaps for
physicals transactions. However, for the above reason, the
Commission believes that a broad exception for such off-exchange
transactions in the absence of bona fide business purposes could
undermine the trade execution requirement by allowing market
participants to execute swaps subject to the trade execution
requirement bilaterally rather than on a SEF or DCM.
\219\ Coalition Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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Several commenters also commented on the reference to block trades
in the definition of Permitted Transactions.\220\ ISDA/SIFMA commented
that the definition of block trade in part 43 of the Commission's
regulations should apply to blocks executed on a SEF.\221\ Tradeweb
sought confirmation that block size trades in swaps that are required
to be cleared and made available to trade would not be subject to the
minimum trading requirements for Required Transactions, but would be
required to be reported to and processed through a SEF in a manner
prescribed by the SEF.\222\ Similarly, GFI requested the Commission to
confirm that block transactions must be effected on a SEF, but may be
subject to special rules.\223\
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\220\ ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 10 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb
Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011); GFI Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8,
2011).
\221\ ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 10 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\222\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\223\ GFI Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(2) Commission Determination
To ensure that there is consistency in the definitions, and in
response to MarketAxess's comment, the Commission is: (1) Revising the
definition of Required Transaction to mean any transaction involving a
swap that is subject to the trade execution requirement in section
2(h)(8) of the Act \224\; and (2) revising the definition of Permitted
Transaction to mean any transaction not involving a swap that is
subject to the trade execution requirement in section 2(h)(8) of the
Act.\225\ The Commission is not revising the definition of Permitted
Transaction to explicitly include ``hedging transactions involving end-
users'' or ``typical end-user'' transactions because the Commission's
revisions to the definition of Permitted Transaction are consistent
with the CEA section 2(h)(8) trade execution requirement.\226\
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\224\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec.
37.9(a)(1)(iv) to Sec. 37.9(a)(1). Several commenters requested
clarification from the Commission whether inter-affiliate trades
would be subject to the CEA section 2(h)(8) trade execution
requirement. JP Morgan Comment Letter at 5 (Jun. 3, 2011); Rosen et
al. Comment Letter at 20-21 (Apr. 5, 2011); Coalition Comment Letter
at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
See Clearing Exemption for Swaps Between Certain Affiliated
Entities, 77 FR 50425 (proposed Aug. 21, 2012) for further details.
\225\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(v)
to Sec. 37.9(c)(1).
\226\ See CEA section 2(h)(8) trade execution requirement
discussion above under Sec. 37.3--Requirements for Registration;
see also discussion below under Sec. 37.9(c)--Execution Methods for
Permitted Transactions.
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With respect to the treatment of block transactions, the Commission
notes that the definition of block trade in part 43 of the Commission's
regulations applies to such transactions involving swaps that are
listed on a SEF.\227\ The Commission also notes that the definition of
block trade states, in part, that block trades occur away from the
registered SEF's or DCM's trading system or platform and is executed
pursuant to the registered SEF's or DCM's rules and procedures.\228\ As
such, block trades are not subject to the execution methods for
Required Transactions and Permitted Transactions in final Sec.
37.9(a)(2) and Sec. 37.9(c)(2), respectively.\229\
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\227\ Section 43.2 of the Commission's regulations states that
``block trade'' means a publicly reportable swap transaction that:
(1) Involves a swap that is listed on a registered SEF or DCM; (2)
Occurs away from the registered SEF's or DCM's trading system or
platform and is executed pursuant to the registered SEF's or DCM's
rules and procedures; (3) Has a notional or principal amount at or
above the appropriate minimum block size applicable to such swap;
and (4) Is reported subject to the rules and procedures of the
registered SEF or DCM and the rules described in this part,
including the appropriate time delay requirements set forth in Sec.
43.5 of this part. 17 CFR 43.2.
\228\ Id.
\229\ The Commission notes that the execution methods for
Required Transactions in final Sec. 37.9(a)(2) excludes block
trades.
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(b) Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)--Request for Quote System
Proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)(A) defined an RFQ System as a trading
system or platform in which a market participant must transmit a
request for quote to buy or sell a specific instrument to no less than
five market participants in the trading system or platform, to which
all such market participants may respond. Under the proposed rule, any
bids or offers resting on the trading system or platform pertaining to
the same instrument must be taken into account and communicated to the
requester along with the responsive quotes.
In addition, proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)(B) defined an RFQ System
as a trading system or platform in which multiple market participants
can both: (1) View real-time electronic streaming quotes, both firm and
indicative, from multiple potential counterparties on a centralized
electronic screen; and (2) have the option to complete a transaction
by: (i) Accepting a firm streaming quote, or (ii) transmitting a
request for quote to no less than five market participants, based upon
an indicative streaming quote, taking into account any resting bids or
offers that have been communicated to the requester along with any
responsive quotes. Finally, proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)(C) provided
that an RFQ System means any such other trading system or platform as
may be determined by the Commission.
(1) Summary of Comments
(i) Comments on RFQ System Definition and Transmission to Five Market
Participants
In general, some commenters stated that the Commission's definition
of an RFQ System imposes rigid requirements that are not supported by
the SEF definition.\230\ Other commenters stated that the defined RFQ
System preserves ``the single-dealer status quo,'' threatens to
diminish the transparency and efficiency of the regulated swaps
[[Page 33495]]
market, and is inconsistent with the Dodd-Frank Act.\231\
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\230\ Rosen et al. Comment Letter at 10 (Apr. 5, 2011); Goldman
Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 2
(Mar. 8, 2011); FXall Comment Letter at 7-8 (Mar 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG
Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\231\ IECA Comment Letter at 3 (May 24, 2011); Mallers et al.
Comment Letter at 3-5 (Mar. 21, 2011); AFR Comment Letter at 4, 5
(Mar. 8, 2011). The Mallers et al. comment letter represents the
view of a number of high frequency trading firms: Allston Trading,
LLC, Atlantic Trading USA LLC, Bluefin Trading LLC, Chopper Trading
LLC, DRW Holdings, LLC, Eagle Seven, LLC, Endeavor Trading, LLC,
GETCO, Hard Eight Futures, LLC, HTG Capital Partners, IMC Financial
Markets, Infinium Capital Management LLC, Kottke Associates, LLC,
Liger Investments Limited, Marquette Partners, LP, Nico Holdings
LLC, Optiver US LLC, Quantlab Financial, LLC, RGM Advisors, LLC,
Traditum Group LLC, WH Trading, and XR Trading LLC.
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As noted above, Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii) of the SEF NPRM contained a
requirement that a market participant transmit an RFQ to no less than
five market participants. In the SEF NPRM, the Commission specifically
asked for public comment on whether five is the appropriate minimum
number of respondents that the Commission should require to potentially
interact with a request for quote.\232\ The Commission also asked for
public comment on the appropriate minimum number, if not five.\233\ The
Commission received the following comments regarding the five market
participant requirement and has responded to those comments below.
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\232\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1221. The Commission asked, ``[i]n light of the
`multiple participant to multiple participant' requirement, the
Commission has proposed that requests for quotes be requested of at
least five possible respondents. Is this the appropriate minimum
number of respondents that the Commission should require to
potentially interact with a request for quote? If not, what is an
appropriate minimum number? Some pre-proposal commenters have
suggested that market participants should transmit a request for
quote to `more than one' market participant. The Commission is
interested in receiving public comment on this matter.'' Id.
\233\ Id.
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Several commenters objected to the requirement in proposed Sec.
37.9(a)(1)(ii) that a market participant transmit an RFQ to no less
than five market participants.\234\ The commenters raised various
concerns with this requirement, including the potential for increased
trading costs,\235\ decreased liquidity,\236\ decreased
transparency,\237\ and breaking trades into smaller sizes.\238\ Several
commenters specifically noted that the five market participant
requirement may result in increased spreads for participants because
non-executing market participants in the RFQ could ``front run'' the
transaction in anticipation of the executing market participant's
forthcoming and offsetting transactions.\239\ Many of these commenters
additionally noted that these risks would be most pronounced in
illiquid swaps or large-sized trades (i.e., transactions approaching
the block trade threshold).\240\ As a result, many of the commenters
noted that it will be difficult and costly to enter into hedging
transactions.\241\
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\234\ Representative Garrett et al. Comment Letter at 1 (Apr. 5,
2013); Eaton Vance Comment Letter at 2 (Feb. 17, 2012); Reuters
Comment Letter at 6 (Dec. 12, 2011); Tradeweb Comment Letter at 5
(Jun. 3, 2011); Traccr Limited Comment Letter at 2 (Jun. 3, 2011);
FHLB Comment Letter at 12-13 (Jun. 3, 2011); AII Comment Letter at 5
(Jun. 2, 2011); Rosen et al. Comment Letter at 11 (Apr. 5, 2011); JP
Morgan Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 2011); Bloomberg Comment
Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall Comment Letter at 8-9 (Mar. 8,
2011); Reuters Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); BlackRock Comment
Letter at 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8,
2011); FSR Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); MFA Comment Letter at
6 (Mar. 8, 2011); MetLife Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 2011);
SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 5-7 (Mar. 8, 2011); Deutsche Comment
Letter at 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment Letter at 31 (Mar.
8, 2011); Barclays Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA
Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); ABC/CIEBA Comment Letter at 6
(Mar. 8, 2011); Global FX Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011);
TruMarx Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Coalition Comment Letter
at 5-7 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME
Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011); Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at
2-3 (Mar. 2, 2011); CanDeal Comment Letter at 2-3 (Feb. 25, 2011).
The Commission notes that some commenters in addressing this
provision used the term ``liquidity providers'' to refer to the
minimum number of ``market participants'' that must receive RFQs.
See, e.g., Tradeweb Comment Letter at 5 (Jun. 3, 2011); AII Comment
Letter at 5 (Jun. 2, 2011); Bloomberg Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 8,
2011); FXall Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011); FSR Comment Letter
at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011). The Commission clarifies that the proposed five
market participant requirement did not imply any requirement that
the requested market participants operate in any particular manner,
such as one that regularly provides liquidity or makes markets in
the particular swap.
\235\ Eaton Vance Comment Letter at 2 (Feb. 17, 2012); JP Morgan
Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 2011); BlackRock Comment Letter at 4
(Mar. 8, 2011); MetLife Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); Global
FX Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); Morgan Stanley Comment Letter
at 2 (Mar. 2, 2011); CanDeal Comment Letter at 2-3 (Feb. 25, 2011).
\236\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 5 (Jun. 3, 2011); Traccr
Limited Comment Letter at 2 (Jun. 3, 2011); FHLB Comment Letter at
12 (Jun. 3, 2011); JP Morgan Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 2011);
BlackRock Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb Comment
Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); MetLife Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8,
2011); CanDeal Comment Letter at 2-3 (Feb. 25, 2011).
\237\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 5 (Jun. 3, 2011); MetLife
Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\238\ BlackRock Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\239\ FHLB Comment Letter at 12 (Jun. 3, 2011); AII Comment
Letter at 5 (Jun. 2, 2011); Bloomberg Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8,
2011); FXall Comment Letter at 8-9 (Mar. 8, 2011); BlackRock Comment
Letter at 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2011); MetLife Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8,
2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Barclays
Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 3
(Mar. 8, 2011); ABC/CIEBA Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Global
FX Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); Coalition Comment Letter at
5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 2,
2011).
\240\ FHLB Comment Letter at 12 (Jun. 3, 2011); AII Comment
Letter at 5 (Jun. 2, 2011); Bloomberg Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8,
2011); FXall Comment Letter at 8-9 (Mar. 8, 2011); MetLife Comment
Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8,
2011); Barclays Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA
Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); Global FX Comment Letter at 3
(Mar. 8, 2011); Coalition Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011);
Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 2, 2011).
\241\ FHLB Comment Letter at 12 (Jun. 3, 2011); AII Comment
Letter at 5 (Jun. 2, 2011); Bloomberg Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8,
2011); FXall Comment Letter at 8-9 (Mar. 8, 2011); BlackRock Comment
Letter at 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2011); MetLife Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8,
2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Barclays
Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 3
(Mar. 8, 2011); ABC/CIEBA Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Global
FX Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); Coalition Comment Letter at
5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 2,
2011).
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In this regard, some commenters noted that the SEC's SB-SEF
proposal \242\ permitted RFQs to be transmitted to one or more SEF
participant(s).\243\ Morgan Stanley commented that, given the impact of
signaling transactions to multiple market participants, as trade size
grows, participants may receive better execution if their RFQs are
transmitted to fewer than five participants.\244\ Similarly, MetLife
commented that participants should have the flexibility to determine
the appropriate number of respondents for a particular trade, which
could vary based on the size and liquidity of the trade.\245\
Additionally, Commissioner Sommers' dissent suggested an alternative
approach to RFQ Systems that would permit a market participant to
transmit an RFQ to ``more than one'' potential counterparty.\246\
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\242\ Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR 10948 (proposed Feb. 28, 2011).
\243\ Reuters Comment Letter at 6 (Dec. 12, 2011); Traccr
Limited Comment Letter at 2 (Jun. 3, 2011); AII Comment Letter at 5
(Jun. 2, 2011); Rosen et al. Comment Letter at 11 (Apr. 5, 2011); JP
Morgan Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011); Reuters Comment Letter at
3 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); FSR
Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); MetLife Comment Letter at 3
(Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011);
Deutsche Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment
Letter at 31 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8,
2011); Global FX Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); Goldman Comment
Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011); TruMarx Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8,
2011).
\244\ Morgan Stanley Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 2, 2011).
\245\ MetLife Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\246\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1259.
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Other commenters, however, stated that an RFQ should be transmitted
to all participants on the SEF.\247\ Mallers et al. stated that
participants would not be disadvantaged by disclosing an RFQ to the
entire market for transactions below
[[Page 33496]]
the block trade threshold, which would not move the market.\248\ In
their view, the five market participant requirement would allow a
participant to conduct semi-private deals with a few favored
participants to the exclusion of other market participants, which would
ultimately decrease liquidity and create a substantial barrier to entry
to the swaps market.\249\ On the other hand, SDMA supported the five
market participant requirement.\250\ In its view, this requirement
promotes price discovery and liquidity, whereas the single market
participant model facilitates abusive trading practices, such as pre-
arranged trading and ``painting the screen'' (i.e., posting of non-
competitive quotes to confuse the market).\251\
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\247\ IECA Comment Letter at 3 (May 24, 2011); Mallers et al.
Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 21, 2011); Better Markets Comment Letter
at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011); AFR Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\248\ Mallers et al. Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 21, 2011).
\249\ Id.
\250\ SDMA Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011). See also Better
Markets Comment Letter at 2 (Apr. 12, 2013) and Allston et al.
Comment Letter at 1 (Feb. 28, 2013).
\251\ SDMA Comment Letter at 5 (Feb. 28, 2013); SDMA Comment
Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(ii) Comments on ``Taken Into Account and Communicated'' Language in
the RFQ System Definition
Some commenters recommended that the Commission delete the
requirement that resting orders be ``taken into account and
communicated'' to the RFQ requester.\252\ FXall and Barclays stated
that this requirement is not necessary because the RFQ requester
already has the ability to view the resting orders on the SEF's minimum
trading functionality or Order Book.\253\ Several commenters stated
that this requirement is mandating that SEFs offer RFQ systems in
conjunction with the SEF's minimum trading functionality, which is not
required.\254\ Similarly, JP Morgan stated that the resting order
functionality is not mandated by the statute.\255\
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\252\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 5 (Jun. 3, 2011); JP Morgan
Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall Comment Letter at 9-10
(Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011);
Barclays Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb Comment Letter
at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\253\ FXall Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011); Barclays Comment
Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\254\ ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall
Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment Letter at 33
(Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\255\ JP Morgan Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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Several commenters requested clarification regarding the
interaction between resting bids and offers and the RFQ system.\256\
Some commenters thought that the ``taken into account and
communicated'' language should mean that a SEF must only communicate to
the RFQ requester the resting bids and offers, and that the RFQ
requester has sole discretion to either respond to, or ignore, these
resting bids and offers.\257\ ISDA/SIFMA and SIFMA AMG requested
clarification that the resting bids and offers do not include
indicative prices.\258\ Several commenters also stated that SEFs should
not be required to inform the providers of resting bids and offers of
the RFQs; otherwise, the RFQ system would be subject to market abuse by
opportunistic third parties seeking market information, and the
requirement would open up RFQs beyond the minimum number of
participants.\259\
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\256\ Reuters Comment Letter at 1 (Jun. 13, 2012); Rosen et al.
Comment Letter at 12-14 (Apr. 5, 2011); JP Morgan Comment Letter at
5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall Comment Letter at 9-10 (Mar. 8, 2011);
Tradeweb Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011); FSR Comment Letter at 5
(Mar. 8, 2011); MetLife Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA
AMG Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment Letter
at 32 (Mar. 8, 2011); Barclays Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011);
ABC/CIEBA Comment Letter at 6-7 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA Comment
Letter at 3-4; Evolution Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\257\ JP Morgan Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); FSR
Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011); MetLife Comment Letter at 3
(Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011);
MarketAxess Comment Letter at 32 (Mar. 8, 2011); ABC/CIEBA Comment
Letter at 6-7 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 3-4 (Mar.
8, 2011); Evolution Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\258\ ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG
Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\259\ FXall Comment Letter at 9-10 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA
Comment Letter at 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9
(Mar. 8, 2011). FSR also commented that the provider of the resting
bid should not be provided with information about the identity of
the RFQ requester. FSR Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(iii) Comments on RFQ Disclosure Issues
AFR and Better Markets stated that SEFs should be required to
disclose RFQ responses to all market participants.\260\ For example,
AFR commented that responses to RFQs should be made transparent to all
market participants prior to trade execution, which would serve the
statutory goal of pre-trade price transparency and would increase price
competition.\261\ Several commenters objected to the recommendation by
AFR and Better Markets.\262\ Some of these commenters noted that such a
requirement could raise the same information leakage concerns as with
the five market participant requirement.\263\
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\260\ AFR Comment Letter at 3 (Feb. 27, 2013); AFR Comment
Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011); Better Markets Comment Letter at 8 (Mar.
8, 2011).
\261\ AFR Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\262\ Rosen et al. Comment Letter at 14 (Apr. 5, 2011);
MarketAxess Comment Letter at 32 (Mar. 8, 2011); Barclays Comment
Letter at 10 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb Comment Letter at 7-8 (Mar. 8,
2011); State Street Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011); Deutsche
Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\263\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); State Street
Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011); Deutsche Comment Letter at 4
(Mar. 8, 2011).
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FSR commented that market participants receiving the RFQ should
have relevant information about the identity of the RFQ requester.\264\
However, Tradeweb commented that the Commission should not impose a
specific requirement that the identity of the RFQ requester be
disclosed or anonymous.\265\ FSR also stated that SEFs should not be
required to publish RFQs until after the trade has been completed, and
then only as part of aggregated disclosures.\266\ Finally, State Street
requested that the Commission clarify that an RFQ System is not
required to provide functionality to make RFQs visible to the entire
market, although it may voluntarily choose to do so.\267\
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\264\ FSR Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\265\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\266\ FSR Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\267\ State Street Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(2) Commission Determination
Based on the comments, the Commission is adopting proposed Sec.
37.9(a)(1)(ii) as final Sec. 37.9(a)(3), subject to a number of
modifications discussed below.\268\
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\268\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec.
37.9(a)(1)(ii) to Sec. 37.9(a)(3).
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(i) RFQ System Definition and Transmission to Five Market Participants
The Commission is adopting the definition of RFQ System in proposed
Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)(A), subject to certain modifications described
below. As explained in the SEF NPRM, the Commission believes that an
RFQ System, as defined in Sec. 37.9, operating in conjunction with a
SEF's minimum trading functionality (i.e., Order Book) is consistent
with the SEF definition and promotes the goals provided in section 733
of the Dodd-Frank Act, which are to: (1) Promote the trading of swaps
on SEFs and (2) promote pre-trade price transparency in the swaps
market.\269\ The Commission notes that the RFQ System definition
requires SEFs to provide market participants the ability to access
multiple market participants, but not necessarily the entire market, in
conformance with the SEF definition.
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\269\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1220-21.
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The Commission agrees with SDMA that the proposed five market
[[Page 33497]]
participant requirement would promote pre-trade price transparency, as
the RFQ requester would be required to solicit executable orders, on a
pre-trade basis, from a larger group of potential responders.\270\ A
broader group of potential responders, in turn, encourages price
competition between the potential responders to the RFQ and may provide
a more reliable assessment of market value than SEF functionality that
would permit a market participant to rely on a quote from a single RFQ
requestee. The Commission nevertheless recognizes commenters' concerns
about the proposed five market participant requirement, such as the
potential for increased trading costs and information leakage to the
non-executing market participants in the RFQ. To address these
concerns, while still complying with the multiple-to-multiple
requirement in the statutory SEF definition and promoting the goals of
pre-trade price transparency and trading of swaps on SEFs provided in
section 733 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commission is requiring that a
market participant transmit an RFQ to no less than two market
participants during a phase-in compliance period and, subsequent to
that period, to no less than three market participants.\271\ The
Commission believes, as noted above, that sending an RFQ to a greater
number of market participants increases the potential for price
competition among responders and provides a more reliable assessment of
market value. The Commission also believes that the three market
participant requirement, with the two market participant phase-in
period, appropriately balances the benefits of pre-trade price
transparency and the information leakage concerns raised by commenters.
The revision from five to three minimum market participants will also
provide market participants with greater flexibility in sending RFQs
for Required Transactions, while still complying with the statutory SEF
definition and promoting pre-trade price transparency.
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\270\ The Commission notes that a SEF market participant may
send an RFQ to the entire market. See id. at 1220 and discussion
below. The Commission also notes that there are generally two
distinct differences between the requirements finalized in this
release and the RFQ-type functionality offered by DCMs. First, RFQ
functionality used by DCMs disseminates RFQs to all market
participants. Second, the responses to the RFQs take the form of
executable bids or offers that are entered into the DCM's order book
or other centralized market, such that orders from any market
participant, not just the one submitting the RFQ, can be matched
against such responsive bids or offers. Although the Commission
considered a minimum RFQ-to-all requirement similar to the current
practice in DCMs, given that swaps tend to be less standardized than
futures, the Commission believes that rules pertaining to the
execution methods for SEFs should provide appropriate flexibility
for market participants trading swaps. The Commission notes that the
less restrictive minimum market participant requirement established
by part 37 reflects the more flexible statutory provisions for SEFs
as compared to DCMs.
\271\ The Commission clarifies that the three market participant
requirement does not imply any requirement that the requested market
participants operate in any particular manner, such as a requirement
that such participants be dedicated liquidity providers or market
makers in the particular swap. The RFQ requester may send the RFQ to
any three market participants on the RFQ system, subject to the
affiliate prohibition discussed below. See supra footnote 234 for
further details.
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The Commission has also determined to clarify that the market
participants required for inclusion in an RFQ in all cases may not be
affiliated with or controlled by the RFQ requester and may not be
affiliated with or controlled by each other, and is revising final
Sec. 37.9(a)(3) to clarify this point.\272\ For an RFQ requester to
send an RFQ to another entity who is affiliated with or controlled by
the RFQ requester is inconsistent with the purpose of requiring that
RFQs be sent to more than one market participant, as explained both in
the SEF NPRM and this release. The Commission notes that if an RFQ is
transmitted to one non-affiliate and two affiliates of the requester or
if an RFQ is transmitted to three requestees who are affiliates of each
other, then the policy objective of promoting the goal of pre-trade
price transparency and complying with the multiple-to-multiple
requirement in the SEF definition could be undermined. The Commission
is also concerned that such an outcome could disincentivize entities
from responding to an RFQ, which would reduce price competition and
liquidity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\ The Commission notes that ``affiliate'' means: (i) One
party, directly or indirectly, holds a majority ownership interest
in the other party, and the party that holds the majority interest
in the other party reports its financial statements on a
consolidated basis under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or
International Financial Reporting Standards, and such consolidated
financial statements include the financial results of the majority-
owned party; or (ii) a third party, directly or indirectly, holds a
majority ownership interest in both parties, and the third party
reports its financial statements on a consolidated basis under
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or International Financial
Reporting Standards, and such consolidated financial statements
include the financial results of both of the parties. A party or
third party directly or indirectly holds a majority ownership
interest if it directly or indirectly holds a majority of the equity
securities of an entity, or the right to receive upon dissolution,
or the contribution of, a majority of the capital of a partnership.
See Commission regulation 50.52.
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The Commission believes, moreover, that the three market
participant requirement is consistent with current market practice
where, in certain markets, many market participants already choose to
send an RFQ to multiple market participants. Tradeweb, for example,
noted that in its experience in the U.S. Treasuries market, market
participants on average send an RFQ to three market participants.\273\
In addition, the Commission understands that many pension and other
managed funds with fiduciary obligations routinely obtain quotes from
at least three market participants in certain securities markets. The
Commission believes that the three market participant requirement, with
the two market participant transition period, supports a common
industry practice of querying multiple market participants, while still
complying with the statutory SEF definition and promoting the goals
provided in section 733 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
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\273\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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Furthermore, the Commission believes that the three minimum market
participant requirement heightens the probability that multiple
participants will respond to an RFQ and, thus, will facilitate the
pricing improvements attendant to competition among RFQ responders. The
Commission is aware of numerous legal, business, and technological
issues that could prevent a market participant from responding to a
specific RFQ. The Commission notes, for example, that DCM market maker
programs often require participants to quote two-sided markets for 75
to 85 percent of the trading day.\274\ Therefore, a participant in the
market maker program may not provide quotes for a portion of the
trading day. While there is no guarantee that even a minimum market
participant requirement will ensure that multiple responses are
available for all RFQs, it increases the probability that the goal of
pre-trade price transparency is achieved and that a competitive market
exists for all market participants.
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\274\ The Commission understands that such provisions are in
place to accommodate various operational and other reasons that
could cause a market participant to not comply with the quoting
obligations.
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Finally, the Commission believes that setting the minimum RFQ
requirement at a uniform number for all Required Transactions in all
asset classes provides regulatory and market efficiencies and is
appropriate for the SEF market structure at this particular time. SEFs
and market participants will benefit from a clear and uniform standard
that would not require them to be subject to different minimum RFQ
requirements, and to monitor compliance with such requirements, for
every swap or class of swaps subject to
[[Page 33498]]
the CEA section 2(h)(8) trade execution requirement.
For the reasons discussed above, at this time, the Commission
believes that the three market participant requirement implements the
multiple-to-multiple requirement in the statutory SEF definition and
will create an appropriate level of pre-trade price transparency for
Required Transactions (i.e., transactions involving swaps that are
subject to the trade execution mandate of section 2(h)(8) of the CEA)
for market participants initiating RFQs. However, the Commission is
also aware of the fact that a phased implementation of this requirement
will assist market participants and prospective SEFs to make an
efficient transition from the swap industry's current market structure
to the more transparent execution framework set forth in these final
rules. Therefore, to provide market participants, SEFs, and the swaps
industry with time to adapt to the new SEF regime, the Commission is
phasing-in the three market participant requirement. From the effective
date of the final SEF regulations until one year from the compliance
date of these final regulations, a market participant transmitting an
RFQ for Required Transactions under Sec. 37.9(a)(2) must still comply
with the RFQ definition in Sec. 37.9(a)(3), but may transmit the quote
to no less than two market participants.\275\
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\275\ The Commission notes that the affiliate prohibition in
Sec. 37.9(a)(3) applies during the interim RFQ-to-2 period.
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Some comments expressed support for the SEC's SB-SEF proposal,
which allows for one-to-one RFQs. If the Commission eliminated the
multiple market participant requirement and instead permitted RFQ
requesters to send RFQs to a single market participant, then the
multiple-participant-to-multiple-participant requirement in the SEF
definition and the pre-trade price transparency goal would be
undermined. In this regard, the Commission notes that while the SEC's
SB-SEF proposal allows for one-to-one RFQs, it proposed to fulfill the
multiple to multiple requirement by mandating full order interaction or
best execution for RFQs.\276\ Under the SEC's SB-SEF proposal, an RFQ
requester must execute against the best priced orders of any size
within and across a SEF's modes of execution, a requirement that the
Commission is not recommending at this time.\277\
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\276\ Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 10953-54, 10971-74.
\277\ Id.
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The Commission notes that some commenters expressed concerns about
the risks with respect to information leakage for illiquid swaps or
large-size trades, and the potential risk of a winner's curse for the
market participant whose quote is accepted by the RFQ requester.
According to the commenters, the other market participants in the RFQ
will be aware of the RFQ, and some or all of those participants will
attempt to front-run the trades by the winning responder to hedge or
layoff the risk from the RFQ transaction.\278\
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\278\ To the extent such risks potentially exist for Required
Transactions, the reduction of the minimum market participant
requirement from the proposed five will help mitigate this risk.
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With respect to commenters' concerns about the potential winner's
curse for illiquid swaps, the Commission clarifies that the minimum
market participant requirement only applies to RFQ Systems for Required
Transactions (i.e., transactions involving swaps that are subject to
the trade execution mandate of section 2(h)(8) of the CEA); such swaps
generally should be more liquid than swaps that are not subject to the
trade execution mandate because they are subject to the clearing
mandate of section 2(h)(1) of the CEA and are made available to
trade.\279\ In this regard, the Commission notes that the interest rate
swaps and credit default swaps that the Commission has determined are
required to be cleared under CEA section 2(h)(1) (and are likely to be
subject to the trade execution mandate of CEA section 2(h)(8)) are some
of the most liquid swaps.\280\ The Commission also notes that 77 swap
dealers have registered with the Commission and nearly all of them make
markets in such swaps.\281\ Further, SEFs may offer RFQ systems without
the three market participant requirement for Permitted Transactions
(i.e., transactions not involving swaps that are subject to the trade
execution mandate of section 2(h)(8) of the CEA).
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\279\ Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of
the CEA, 77 FR 74284 (Dec. 13, 2012); Process for a Designated
Contract Market or Swap Execution Facility To Make a Swap Available
To Trade, 76 FR 77728 (proposed Dec. 14, 2011).
\280\ Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of
the CEA, 77 FR 74284. The Commission notes that these swaps already
went through a Commission determination process that included a five
factor review, including a liquidity review. Id. ISDA, in its letter
requesting interpretive relief regarding the obligation to provide a
pre-trade mid-market mark, recognized that many of the swaps that
the Commission has determined are required to be cleared under CEA
section 2(h)(1) are ``highly-liquid, exhibit narrow bid-ask spreads
and are widely quoted by SD/MSPs in the marketplace . . . '' ISDA
Comment Letter at 2 (Nov. 30, 2012).
\281\ The Commission recognizes that not all swap dealers will
be active in all Required Transactions. The Commission also notes
that of the 77 currently registered swap dealers, 35 swap dealers
are not affiliated with any other swap dealers.
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With respect to commenters' concerns about the potential winner's
curse for large-sized trades, the Commission notes that block trades
would not be subject to the execution methods for Required
Transactions, including the three market participant requirement.\282\
Therefore, excluding block trades from the execution methods for
Required Transactions will address the potential risk of a winner's
curse for such trades. The Commission also clarifies that SEFs are not
required to display a requester's RFQ to market participants not
participating in the RFQ.\283\
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\282\ See definition of block trade in Sec. 43.2 of the
Commission's regulations.
\283\ Similarly, as noted below, SEFs are not required to
display responses to an RFQ to anyone but the RFQ requester.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes, in response to commenters' concerns about
increased trading costs, that an increased number of participants
receiving and responding to RFQs will tighten the bid-ask spreads, and
result in lower transaction costs for market participants. The
Commission notes that the relationship between spreads and the industry
practice for the minimum number of RFQ recipients will vary across
swaps and over time. Further, the Commission believes that as SEFs
compete to grow their swaps trading volumes and deliver improved
liquidity and lower transaction costs for their customers, the final
rules in this release will provide them with the flexibility to
experiment with different minimum numbers of recipients that is higher
than the minimum articulated in this regulation. The final RFQ
requirement will provide some protection to RFQ requesters that at
least a minimum number of market participants will receive their RFQs,
and thus increase the likelihood of receiving multiple, competitive
quotes.
Finally, the Commission is deleting the additional definition of
RFQ System in proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)(B) because it is
unnecessary.\284\ A SEF that chooses to offer an RFQ System to
facilitate Required Transactions is required to offer the RFQ System in
conjunction with the SEF's Order Book, which would encompass the
requirements in proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)(B)(1) and
[[Page 33499]]
(2)(i).\285\ Additionally, a market participant is already required to
send an RFQ to three market participants, which would also be the case
if it is based upon an indicative quote as stated in proposed Sec.
37.9(a)(1)(ii)(B)(2)(ii).\286\
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\284\ The Commission is also deleting the catch-all RFQ
definition in proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)(C) as it is unnecessary.
As discussed below, a SEF may petition the Commission under Sec.
13.2 to amend Sec. 37.9(a)(2) to include additional execution
methods for Required Transactions. See discussion below under Sec.
37.9(b)(1) and (b)(4)--Execution Methods for Required Transactions
in the preamble.
\285\ See discussion below under Sec. 37.9(b)(1) and (b)(4)--
Execution Methods for Required Transactions in the preamble. As
noted above in the registration section, a SEF is not required to
offer indicative quotes.
\286\ Id.
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(ii) ``Taken Into Account and Communicated'' Language in the RFQ System
Definition
To address commenters' concern that the SEF NPRM was ambiguous with
respect to the communication requirement, the Commission is modifying
the definition of RFQ System in proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)(A) to
state that a SEF must provide the RFQ requester: (1) With any firm
resting bid or offer in the same instrument from any of the SEF's Order
Books at the same time as the first responsive bid or offer is received
by the RFQ requester and (2) with the ability to execute against such
firm resting bids or offers along with the responsive orders.\287\ For
example, a market participant transmits an RFQ to three market
participants to buy a US $1 million notional 10-year fixed-to-floating
US$ LIBOR interest rate swap. Any firm offer resting on the SEF's Order
Book for a 10-year fixed-to-floating US$ LIBOR interest rate swap must
be transmitted to the RFQ requester at the same time that the first
responsive offer is received by the RFQ requester. The SEF must provide
the RFQ requester with the ability to lift the firm offers and execute
against any of the responsive orders. The final rule requires that SEFs
communicate any resting bid or offer pertaining to the same instrument
back to the RFQ requester, while the requester retains the discretion
to decide whether to execute against the resting bids or offers or
responsive orders.
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\287\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec.
37.9(a)(1)(ii)(A) to Sec. 37.9(a)(3). The Commission notes that
after the RFQ responses and resting bids or offers on the Order Book
are communicated to the RFQ requester, the RFQ requester may make a
counter request or order as long as it is submitted to 3 market
participants, whether it be to the same 3 market participants as the
original RFQ request, 3 different market participants, or some
combination of both.
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Similar to the three market participant requirement, the Commission
believes that the communication requirement promotes pre-trade price
transparency and the trading of swaps on SEFs, as the RFQ requester
will have the ability to access competitive quotes and quote providers
will be able to have their quotes viewed by the RFQ requester. The
Commission also clarifies that the resting bids and offers being
communicated are not required to include indicative prices, to the
extent that indicative prices are facilitated by the Order Book, and
that SEFs are not required to inform the providers of the resting bids
and offers on the Order Book of the RFQs.
(iii) RFQ Disclosure Issues
The Commission is clarifying that SEFs are not required to disclose
responses to RFQs to all market participants. While the Commission
understands that the RFQ functionality offered by some DCMs
disseminates responses to RFQs to all market participants, it also
notes that the less restrictive disclosure requirement for SEFs
reflects the more flexible statutory provisions for SEFs as compared to
DCMs. As noted in the SEF NPRM, a market participant may access fewer
market participants than the entire market in certain situations.\288\
In response to FSR's and Tradeweb's comments about the identity of the
RFQ requester, the Commission clarifies that it is not imposing a
specific requirement that the identity of the RFQ requester be
disclosed or anonymous. The Commission is also not providing a specific
requirement regarding the publishing of the ``request'' for a quote and
notes that SEFs must comply with all reporting obligations as required
in the Act and Commission's regulations. Finally, as noted in the SEF
NPRM, acceptable RFQ Systems must permit RFQ requesters the option to
make an RFQ visible to the entire market.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\288\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1220 (stating that market participants may
desire to interact with a limited number of market participants
(i.e., fewer than the entire market) and are permitted to do so
under the proposal).
\289\ Id.
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(iv) Other RFQ Issues
As noted in the SEF NPRM, an acceptable RFQ System may allow for a
transaction to be consummated if the original request to five potential
counterparties receives fewer than five responses.\290\ Although the
Commission received no comment letters on this issue, some commenters
in meetings asked the Commission to clarify the amount of time required
to elapse before the RFQ requester can execute against the responsive
quotes since fewer than five responses may be received. As such, the
Commission is modifying the RFQ System definition in final Sec.
37.9(a)(3) to state that a SEF must ensure that its trading protocols
provide each of its market participants with equal priority in
receiving requests for quotes and in transmitting and displaying for
execution responsive orders. The SEF does not need to establish a
minimum latency or specific period of time for the transmission of
responsive orders, provided that the SEF's rulebook and prohibition on
transmission and display priorities are appropriately designed to
prevent market participants from seeking to avoid the three market
participant requirement. A SEF's RFQ System and rulebook must account
for this prohibition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\290\ Id.
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(c) Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(iii)--Voice-Based System
Proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(iii) defined Voice-Based System as a
trading system or platform in which a market participant executes or
trades a Permitted Transaction using a telephonic line or other voice-
based service.
(1) Commission Determination
The Commission did not receive any comments on the definition of
Voice-Based System. However, the Commission is deleting the definition
of Voice-Based System in proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(iii) given its
decision below to allow SEFs to provide any execution method for
Permitted Transactions.
(d) Sec. Sec. 37.9(b)(1) and (b)(4)--Execution Methods for Required
Transactions
Proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(1) stated that Required Transactions may be
executed on an Order Book or an RFQ System. As noted in the SEF NPRM, a
SEF must offer the minimum trading functionality in proposed Sec.
37.9(b)(2) (i.e., a centralized electronic screen with the ability to
post both firm and indicative quotes visible to all market
participants).\291\ Therefore, the SEF NPRM provided that Required
Transactions must be executed through the SEF's minimum trading
functionality, Order Book that meets the minimum trading functionality,
or RFQ System that operates in conjunction with the minimum trading
functionality.\292\ The SEF NPRM made it clear that for Required
Transactions, pre-trade transparency must be met.\293\ Additionally,
proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(4) stated that the Commission may, in its
discretion, require a SEF to offer a different trading method for a
particular swap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\291\ Id. at 1219-20.
\292\ Id.
\293\ Id. at 1220.
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For Required Transactions, the SEF NPRM did not provide for a
specific
[[Page 33500]]
execution method incorporating voice. The proposal stated that trading
systems or platforms facilitating the execution of Required
Transactions via voice exclusively are not multiple participant to
multiple participant and do not provide for pre-trade price
transparency.\294\ However, the SEF NPRM noted that, while not
acceptable as the sole method of execution for Required Transactions,
voice would be appropriate under certain circumstances such as for a
market participant to communicate an order to a SEF's employee or for a
SEF's employee to assist a market participant in executing a
trade.\295\ The SEF NPRM stated that the core principles and the
Commission's regulations would fully apply to such communications,
including, but not limited to, transparency, audit trail, impartial
access, and standards for RFQs.\296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\294\ Id. at 1221.
\295\ Id.
\296\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the SEF NPRM did not provide for a specific execution
method incorporating voice for Required Transactions, it did
contemplate the possibility of certain functionalities that operate in
conjunction with the SEF's minimum trading functionality.\297\ In this
regard, the SEF NPRM stated that, in addition to the SEF's minimum
trading functionality, a SEF may offer other functionalities that
provide multiple participants with the ability to access multiple
participants, but not necessarily the entire market, if the market
participant so chooses.\298\ The SEF NPRM noted that certain defined
RFQ Systems or other systems that meet the SEF definition and comply
with the core principles applicable to SEFs may qualify.\299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\297\ Id. at 1220.
\298\ Id.
\299\ Id.
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(1) Summary of Comments
(i) Comments on Execution Methods for Required Transactions
Some commenters supported the use of order books for Required
Transactions.\300\ For example, Mallers et al. contended that a central
order book market structure for all Required Transactions provides the
most accurate valuation of the market, reduces systemic risks, and
results in better prices.\301\ Other commenters supported the use of
order book structures and RFQ models for Required Transactions.\302\
SDMA, for example, stated that all cleared swaps should be executed
through a central limit order book or an RFQ System.\303\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\300\ Mallers et al. Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 21, 2011); Better
Markets Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); AFR Comment Letter at
4 (Mar. 8, 2011). Similarly, SDMA supports the sole use of order
books for certain products. SDMA Comment Letter at 2 (Apr. 30,
2013).
\301\ Mallers et al. Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 21, 2011).
\302\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 4 (Jun. 3, 2011); SDMA Comment
Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011); Deutsche Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8,
2011); MFA Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); MetLife Comment
Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011); Barclays Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8,
2011); Bloomberg Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011); BlackRock
Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\303\ SDMA Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nodal recommended that the Commission explicitly include blind
auctions as an acceptable method of execution for Required
Transactions.\304\ Nodal commented \305\ that pre-trade transparency
for Required Transactions should not apply to blind auctions.\306\
Nodal articulated its view that the twin goals of pre-trade
transparency and promoting on-exchange trading of swaps on SEFs should
be balanced against each other, instead of being read in conjunction
with one another.\307\
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\304\ Nodal Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\305\ Id. at 2-3; Nodal Comment Letter at 3 (Jun. 3, 2011).
\306\ See discussion above under Sec. 37.3--Requirements for
Registration in the preamble for a description of Nodal's blind
auction.
\307\ Nodal Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Comments on ``Through Any Means of Interstate Commerce'' Language
in the SEF Definition
Given the phrase ``through any means of interstate commerce'' in
the CEA section 1a(50) SEF definition, many commenters supported the
use of multiple methods of execution, such as voice, for Required
Transactions on a SEF.\308\ JP Morgan, for example, stated that the SEF
NPRM assumes that SEFs will always be electronic platforms, which it
contended, appears to directly contradict the phrase ``through any
means of interstate commerce'' in the SEF definition.\309\ According to
WMBAA, the phrase ``through any means of interstate commerce'' in the
SEF definition supports multiple methods of execution for Required
Transactions on a SEF, including a combination of voice and electronic
systems.\310\ In this regard, WMBAA stated that the Commission should
allow any execution method for Required Transactions as long as it
meets the multiple participant to multiple participant requirement in
the SEF definition and the other statutory requirements for SEFs.\311\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\308\ Representative Scott Garrett Comment Letter at 1 (Feb. 27,
2013); WMBAA Comment Letter at 2-3 (Jul. 18, 2011); WMBAA Comment
Letter at 6-8 (Jun. 3, 2011); Rosen et al. Comment Letter at 15
(Apr. 5, 2011); JP Morgan Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA
Comment Letter at 4-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); ICAP Comment Letter at 3, 4-5
(Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME
Comment Letter at 7-8 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\309\ JP Morgan Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\310\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 2 (Jul. 18, 2011).
\311\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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Furthermore, some members of the industry requested that the
Commission clarify in the final rules whether ``work-up'' sessions
would be considered an acceptable method of execution for Required
Transactions.\312\ GFI explained one example of a work-up session
where, after a trade is executed on an order book, one of the
counterparties to the trade may wish to buy or sell additional
quantities of the same instrument at the previously executed
price.\313\ In this case, the parties initiate a work-up session to
execute such additional quantity.\314\ After the initial counterparty
exercises its right of first refusal, other market participants may
also join in the trade at the previously executed price.\315\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\312\ Meetings with ICAP dated Mar. 21, 2012, Mar. 9, 2012, Feb.
16, 2012, Feb. 14, 2012; Meetings with GFI dated Mar. 14, 2012, Feb.
16, 2012; Meeting with WMBAA dated Feb. 16, 2012; ICAP Comment
Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\313\ Meetings with GFI dated Mar. 14, 2012, Feb. 16, 2012.
\314\ Id.
\315\ Id.
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(iii) Comments on Liquidity-Based Execution Mandates
Several commenters stated that the Dodd-Frank Act does not require
certain methods of trading, such as an order book, based upon the
amount of trading activity in a particular instrument.\316\ MarketAxess
contended that nothing in the Dodd-Frank Act supports the requirement
in proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(4) that methods of execution on a SEF should
be based upon characteristics of a particular swap.\317\ MarketAxess
stated that such a requirement would create uncertainty regarding a
SEF's operational structure \318\ and, according to Tradeweb, would
likely decrease the trading activity and liquidity of those swaps
subject to the requirement.\319\ On the other hand, AFR contended that
mandatorily cleared swaps meeting a certain level of trading activity
should
[[Page 33501]]
only be traded through order book systems.\320\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\ Rosen et al. Comment Letter at 10 (Apr. 5, 2011); Barclays
Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SFMA Comment Letter at 5
(Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011);
MarketAxess Comment Letter at 33 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\317\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 33 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\318\ Id.
\319\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\320\ AFR Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
(i) Execution Methods for Required Transactions
The Commission is revising proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(1) as final Sec.
37.9(a)(2) to clarify that each Required Transaction that is not a
block trade as defined in Sec. 43.2 of the Commission's regulations
shall be executed on a SEF in accordance with one of the following
methods of execution: (1) An Order Book as defined in Sec. 37.3(a)(3)
or (2) an RFQ System, as defined in Sec. 37.9(a)(3), that operates in
conjunction with an Order Book.\321\ As explained in this final
rulemaking, the Commission believes that these execution methods are
consistent with the SEF definition and promote the goals provided in
section 733 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The Commission notes, however, that
a SEF may petition the Commission under Sec. 13.2 of the Commission's
regulations to amend Sec. 37.9(a)(2) to include additional execution
methods.\322\ This ability of SEFs to petition the Commission replaces
similar provisions in the SEF NPRM that were included in the Order Book
and RFQ System definitions and provides SEFs with additional
flexibility as existing execution methods evolve or new methods are
developed.\323\
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\321\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(1) to
Sec. 37.9(a)(2).
\322\ See 17 CFR 13.2 for further details. This will allow the
Commission to consider if a broader model for executing on SEFs,
consistent with the suggestion in Commissioner Sommers' dissent,
would be appropriate on a case-by-case basis, in conformance with
the CEA and the Commission's regulations. Core Principles and Other
Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 1259.
\323\ See proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(i)(D) and Sec.
37.9(a)(1)(ii)(C).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In keeping with the statutory instruction that the Dodd-Frank Act
goal of SEFs is to both ``promote the trading of swaps on swap
execution facilities and to promote pre-trade price transparency in the
swaps market'' \324\ (emphasis added), the Commission is reaffirming
its view articulated in the SEF NPRM that these goals can be achieved
for Required Transactions by providing for the execution of such
transactions on trading systems or platforms that allow market
participants to post bids and offers or accept bids and offers that are
transparent to the entire market.\325\ Promoting trading on a SEF
should not result in eliminating the need to provide some degree of
pre-trade transparency. Therefore, even when recognizing the importance
of promoting the trading of swaps on SEFs, some degree of pre-trade
transparency must be met for Required Transactions.\326\ As a result,
the Commission is declining to accept Nodal's recommendation to
explicitly include blind auctions as an acceptable method of execution
for Required Transactions under this rulemaking.\327\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\ CEA section 5h(e); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(e) (emphasis added).
\325\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1220.
\326\ The Commission notes below that pre-trade transparency can
help promote the trading of swaps on SEFs. See the Introduction
section of the Cost Benefit Considerations section for further
details.
\327\ The Commission further notes that this determination does
not accept Nodal's assertion that ``this type of blind auction
trading platform is permissible on DCMs.'' See Nodal Comment Letter
at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) ``Through Any Means of Interstate Commerce'' Language in the SEF
Definition
In consideration of the comments regarding possible limitations on
how the Commission interprets the phrase ``through any means of
interstate commerce'' in the SEF definition, the Commission is revising
the final rule text to clarify that in providing either one of the
execution methods for Required Transactions in Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(i)(A)
or (B) of this final rulemaking (i.e., Order Book or RFQ System that
operates in conjunction with an Order Book), a SEF may for purposes of
execution and communication use ``any means of interstate commerce,''
including, but not limited to, the mail, internet, email, and
telephone, provided that the chosen execution method satisfies the
requirements provided in Sec. 37.3(a)(3) for Order Books or in Sec.
37.9(a)(3) for Request for Quote Systems.\328\ With this use of the
phrase ``any means of interstate commerce,'' the Commission is not
limiting the means of execution or communication that a SEF may utilize
in implementing the required execution methods for Required
Transactions in Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(i)(A) or (B), provided that the chosen
execution method satisfies the requirements provided in Sec.
37.3(a)(3) for Order Books or in Sec. 37.9(a)(3) for Request for Quote
Systems. In this regard, the Commission notes that as the swaps market
evolves, SEFs may develop new means of execution or communication for
use in implementing the required execution methods. Although the
Commission notes that its regulations are technology neutral given the
``any means of interstate commerce'' language, it also emphasizes that,
regardless of the means of interstate commerce utilized, a SEF must
comply with the Act and the Commission's regulations, including the
Sec. 37.9 execution method, impartial access, audit trail, and
surveillance requirements. Furthermore, all transactions on the SEF
must comply with the SEF's rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\328\ The Commission interprets the phrase ``through any means
of interstate commerce'' in CEA Sec. 1a(50) to allow a SEF to
utilize a variety of means of execution or communication, including,
but not limited to, telephones, internet communications, and
electronic transmissions. Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S.
125, 129-30 (1943) (in general, ``instrument'' of interstate
commerce is to be interpreted broadly); United States v. Barlow, 568
F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) (``It is beyond debate that internet
and email are facilities or means of interstate commerce.''); United
States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 2000) (``It is
generally well established that telephones, even when used
intrastate, constitute instrumentalities of interstate commerce.'');
SEC v. Solucorp Indus., 274 F.Supp.2d 379, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(defendants ``used the means and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, including, among other things, the mails and wires,
including the Internet, news wires and telephone lines'' to commit
securities fraud). While the Commission's interpretation of ``any
means of interstate commerce'' allows a SEF to utilize a wide
variety of execution or communication means, all SEFs, regardless of
the execution or communication means they employ, must comply with
all of the substantive SEF requirements, including, but not limited
to, requirements that pertain to execution. For example, a SEF using
the telephone to execute Required Transactions must satisfy the
execution requirements set forth in Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(i)(A) or (B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For example, to meet the RFQ System definition for Required
Transactions, a SEF must satisfy all of the following functions, and in
doing so, all or some of these functions may be performed over the
telephone: (1) Receiving a request from a market participant to execute
a trade, (2) submitting that request to at least 3 market participants
in accordance with the RFQ System definition, (3) communicating the RFQ
responses and resting bids or offers on the Order Book to the RFQ
requester, and (4) executing the transaction. The Commission notes that
regardless of the means of interstate commerce utilized, including the
telephone, the SEF must submit the transaction into its system or
platform so that the SEF is able to comply with the Act and the
Commission's regulations, including audit trail, clearing, and
reporting requirements. Given the different means of interstate
commerce that a SEF may utilize for purposes of communication and
execution in implementing the execution methods for Required
Transactions in Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(i)(A) or (B), the Commission notes
that it must evaluate each system or platform to determine whether it
meets the requirements of Sec. 37.9(a)(2).
The Commission, in order to provide further clarity regarding the
means of
[[Page 33502]]
interstate commerce that a SEF may utilize in order to satisfy the
execution methods for Required Transactions in Sec. 37.9(a)(2), is
providing the following example, which the Commission intends to be
instructive, though not comprehensive. The Commission emphasizes that
the following example should not be construed as bright-line rules:
RFQ System example--a market participant calls an employee
of the SEF with a request for a quote to buy or sell a swap subject to
the trade execution requirement in CEA section 2(h)(8). The SEF
employee disseminates the request for a quote to no less than three
market participants on the SEF (directly or through other SEF employees
or both) by telephone, email, instant messaging, squawk box, some other
means of communication, or some combination thereof. Based on the
responses of these market participants, the SEF employee communicates
the responsive bids or offers and the resting bids or offers on the
SEF's Order Book \329\ to the RFQ requester by one of the above
referenced means of communication. The RFQ requester communicates
acceptance of one of the bids or offers to the SEF employee by one of
the above referenced means of communication. The SEF employee informs
those two market participants by one of the above referenced means of
communication that the swap transaction is executed. The SEF employee
enters the transaction into the SEF's system or platform so that the
SEF is able to comply with the Act and the Commission's regulations,
including audit trail, clearing, and reporting requirements. The
Commission views this example as demonstrating acceptable uses of
different means of interstate commerce while meeting the RFQ System
method of execution in Sec. 37.9(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\329\ See final Sec. 37.9(a)(3) and the preamble for details
regarding the communication of the resting bids or offers on the
Order Book to the RFQ requester.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to commenters, the Commission will generally allow
work-up sessions if such trading protocols are utilized after a
transaction is executed on the SEF's Order Book or RFQ System.\330\ The
Commission, in order to provide further clarity regarding work-up
sessions, is providing the following two examples, which the Commission
intends to be instructive, though not comprehensive. The Commission
notes that the following examples are two types of work-up session that
may be acceptable:
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\330\ The Commission notes that a work-up transaction does not
qualify as a block trade even if an individual market participant's
transactions as part of the work-up transaction has a notional or
principal amount at or above the appropriate minimum block size
applicable to such swap. The Commission believes that the concepts
of work-up transactions and block trades are mutually exclusive.
Block trades are executed pursuant to a SEF's rules, but negotiated
and executed off of the SEF's trading platform. A work-up
transaction is conducted on a SEF's trading platform. See block
trade definition in Sec. 43.2 of the Commission's regulations; see
also Rules Prohibiting the Aggregation of Orders To Satisfy Minimum
Block Sizes or Cap Size Requirements, and Establishing Eligibility
Requirements for Parties to Block Trades, 77 FR 38229 (proposed Jun.
27, 2012). Accordingly, each individual transaction that is part of
the work-up transaction must be reported as it occurs pursuant to
the SEF's reporting obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After two counterparties execute a transaction on a SEF's
Order Book, the SEF may establish a short time period for a work-up
session. The SEF must open up the work-up session to all market
participants so that they may trade an additional quantity of the same
instrument at the same price previously executed by the initial
counterparties. In addition, any resting bids or offers on the SEF's
Order Book equal to or better than the work-up session price must be
included in the work-up session.\331\ The SEF may provide the initial
counterparties execution priority in the work-up session.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\331\ These resting bids or offers would be included at the
work-up session price. The Commission notes that ``equal to or
better than the work-up session price'' means any resting bids that
are equal to or greater than the work-up price or any resting offers
that are equal to or less than the work-up price.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After two counterparties execute a transaction on a SEF's
RFQ System, the SEF may establish a short time period for a work-up
session. The SEF must open up the work-up session to all market
participants so that they may trade an additional quantity of the same
instrument at the same price previously executed by the initial
counterparties. In addition, any resting bids or offers on the SEF's
Order Book equal to or better than the work-up session price must be
included in the work-up session.\332\ The SEF may provide the initial
counterparties execution priority in the work-up session.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\332\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The SEF must have rules governing the operation of any work-up
mechanism, including the length of the session, any priorities accorded
the counterparties to the transaction that triggered the work-up
session, and the handling of any orders submitted during the session
that are not executed. A SEF must also have systems or procedures in
place to ensure that a work-up session is accessible by, and work-up
session information (e.g., the work-up session's trade price and
ongoing volume) is available to, all market participants. The
Commission believes that, if properly conducted, work-up sessions may
enhance price discovery and foster liquidity.
The Commission believes that a work-up session would be a trading
protocol and, thus, constitute a rule under Sec. 40.1 of the
Commission's regulations. Any such rule or amendment thereto must be
codified and included in a SEF's rulebook in accordance with the rule
review or approval procedures of part 40 of the Commission's
regulations or during the SEF application process. Additionally, all
transactions executed through a work-up session must comply with the
SEF's rules. The Commission staff will provide informal guidance to SEF
applicants on whether such work-up sessions are in compliance with the
Act and the Commission's regulations.
(iii) Liquidity-Based Execution Mandates
The Commission is deleting proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(4). Given the
incipience of the regulated swaps market, at this time, the Commission
is not imposing a requirement for specific methods of execution for
Required Transactions based upon the amount of trading activity in such
transactions.
(e) Sec. 37.9(b)(3)--Time Delay Requirement
Proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(3) stated that SEFs must require that
traders who have the ability to execute against a customer's order or
to execute two customers against each other be subject to a 15-second
timing delay between the entry of the two orders, such that one side of
the potential transaction is disclosed and made available to other
market participants before the second side of the potential transaction
(whether for the trader's own account or for a second customer) is
submitted for execution. The SEF NPRM stated that this requirement will
provide other market participants the opportunity to join in the
trade.\333\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\333\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1220.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Summary of Comments
SDMA and Mallers et al. supported the proposed 15-second delay
requirement as necessary to increase price transparency and market
integrity.\334\ Mallers et al. stated that the 15-second rule provides
a meaningful opportunity for other SEF participants to execute against
the individual sides of the cross transaction, and that such crossing
delays have been successfully
[[Page 33503]]
implemented in the futures markets.\335\ However, several commenters
objected to the 15-second delay requirement.\336\ Some commenters
stated that there is no statutory authority for the timing delay
requirement.\337\ Commenters also stated that the timing delay will
increase prices and expose traders to market risk.\338\ Freddie Mac,
for example, stated that liquidity providers may increase prices to
account for anticipated market movements.\339\ Some commenters also
noted that the timing delay requirement may lead to unwillingness on
the part of dealers to provide liquidity because they will not know
whether they will ultimately serve as their customers' principal
counterparty or merely as their executing agent.\340\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\334\ Mallers et al. Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 21, 2011); SDMA
Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\335\ Mallers et al. Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 21, 2011).
\336\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 3 (Jul. 18, 2011); FHLB Comment
Letter at 13 (Jun. 3, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 9 (Jun. 3,
2011); Rosen et al. Comment Letter at 15-16 (Apr. 5, 2011);
BlackRock Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Global FX Comment
Letter at 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2011); JP Morgan Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8,
2011); Evolution Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA Comment
Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8,
2011); TruMarx Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); Deutsche Comment
Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011); FCC Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011);
Phoenix Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 7, 2011).
\337\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 3 (Jul. 18, 2011); WMBAA Comment
Letter at 9 (Jun. 3, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8,
2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011); Deutsche
Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011); MFA Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8,
2011).
\338\ FHLB Comment Letter at 13 (Jun. 3, 2011); BlackRock
Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 7-8
(Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); FCC
Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\339\ Freddie Mac Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\340\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 9 (Jun. 3, 2011); BlackRock
Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); MFA Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8,
2011); Phoenix Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 7, 2011).
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ABC/CIEBA commented that the proposed rule is unclear as to what
limitations, if any, apply to pre-execution communications.\341\ ABC/
CIEBA recommended that the Commission revise the proposed rule to
permit pre-execution communications between counterparties as long as
parties comply with the requirement to execute the trade on the
SEF.\342\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\341\ ABC/CIEBA Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\342\ Id. at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters recommended that the Commission provide
flexibility with respect to the time period of the timing delay.\343\
Goldman recommended that the Commission, in consultation with market
participants and SEFs, set the delay at 1-3 seconds depending on the
complexity of the product.\344\ FXall stated that each SEF should be
able to decide upon the appropriate delay, taking into account the
particular characteristics of that market.\345\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\ Reuters Comment Letter at 5 (Dec. 12, 2011); Goldman
Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 6
(Mar. 8, 2011); FXall Comment Letter at 10 (Mar. 8, 2011); MFA
Comment Letter at 8-9 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\344\ Goldman Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\345\ FXall Comment Letter at 10 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters requested clarification that the 15-second delay
requirement only applies to SEFs that operate an Order Book and not an
RFQ System.\346\ In this regard, SIFMA AMG commented that the timing
delay should not apply to an RFQ System because firm quotes transmitted
in response to an RFQ would already be exposed to the market.\347\
However, Better Markets contended that the requirement should apply to
responsive orders in RFQ systems.\348\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\346\ Reuters Comment Letter at 5 (Dec. 12, 2011); Rosen et al.
Comment Letter at 15-16 (Apr. 5, 2011); Goldman Comment Letter at 3
(Mar. 8, 2011); Global FX Comment Letter at 3-4 (Mar. 8, 2011);
ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Barclays Comment
Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011); FSR Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\347\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\348\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, some commenters requested that the Commission clarify the
term ``trader'' in the proposed rule.\349\ WMBAA stated that it is not
clear whether the term ``trader'' refers to a counterparty, broker, or
another entity.\350\ SIFMA AMG noted that the timing delay should not
apply to asset managers executing trades on behalf of their
clients.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\349\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG
Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011); FSR Comment Letter at 6-7 (Mar.
8, 2011).
\350\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\351\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting the time delay requirement for Required
Transactions in proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(3) as final Sec. 37.9(b)(1),
subject to the modifications described below.\352\ The Commission
clarifies that the purpose of the time delay requirement is to ensure a
minimum level of pre-trade price transparency for Required Transactions
on a SEF's Order Book by allowing other market participants the
opportunity to join or participate in a trade where a broker or dealer
engages in some form of pre-arrangement or pre-negotiation of a
transaction and then attempts, through the SEF's Order Book, to either
internalize the order by executing opposite a customer or cross two
customer orders.\353\ In addition to ensuring a minimum level of pre-
trade price transparency, the Commission believes that the time delay
requirement will incentivize competition between market
participants.\354\ The Commission is revising proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(3)
to clarify the purpose of the time delay requirement as described
above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\352\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(3) to
Sec. 37.9(b)(1).
\353\ The Commission clarifies that the exposure of ``orders''
subject to the 15 second time delay into the Order Book in final
Sec. 37.9(b)(1) means exposure of the price, size, and other terms
of the orders.
\354\ The Commission also notes that the time delay requirement
is similar to certain timing delays for cross trades applicable to
futures transactions executed on DCMs where one side of a potential
transaction (i.e., price, size, and other terms) is exposed to the
market for a certain period of time before the second side of the
potential transaction is submitted for execution. See, e.g., NYMEX
rule 533, which provides for a 5-second delay for futures and a 15-
second delay for options, available at http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/NYMEX/1/5.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to ABC/CEIBA's comment about any limitations on pre-
execution communications, the Commission notes that a SEF that allows
pre-execution communications must adopt rules regarding such
communications that have been certified to or approved by the
Commission.\355\ The Commission also notes that orders that result from
pre-execution communications would be subject to the time delay
requirement in the final rule text. The Commission notes that pre-
execution communications are communications between market participants
for the purpose of discerning interest in the execution of a
transaction prior to the exposure of the market participants' orders
(i.e., price, size, and other terms) to the market. Any communication
that involves discussion of the size, side of market, or price of an
order, or a potentially forthcoming order, constitutes a pre-execution
communication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\355\ See, e.g., CME Rule 539.C Pre-Execution Communications
Regarding Globex Trades, available at http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/CME/I/5/39.html (setting forth rules regarding pre-
execution communications in the DCM context).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission acknowledges commenters' concerns that the time
delay requirement should take into account a product's characteristics.
Therefore, the Commission believes that the 15-second time delay
requirement should serve as a default time delay. The Commission is
revising the rule to allow SEFs to adjust the time period of the delay,
based upon liquidity or other product-specific considerations as stated
in final Sec. 37.9(b)(2). The Commission notes that such adjustments
and accompanying justifications, as well as any establishment of a 15-
second time delay requirement at a SEF, must be submitted
[[Page 33504]]
for the Commission's review pursuant to the procedures described in
part 40 of the Commission's regulations.
The Commission is clarifying that the 15-second time delay
requirement is not applicable to trades that are executed through an
RFQ System. As noted above, the purpose of the time delay requirement
is to ensure a minimum level of pre-trade price transparency for
Required Transactions on a SEF's Order Book. The Commission notes that
an RFQ System already provides pre-trade price transparency to the RFQ
requester and that a dealer attempting to cross or internalize trades
through an RFQ System would be subject to such pre-trade price
transparency. As such, the Commission is revising the rule text to
clarify that the 15-second time delay requirement only applies to a
SEF's Order Book.
Finally, the Commission is replacing the term ``traders'' in
proposed Sec. 37.9(b)(3) with the phrase ``brokers or dealers.'' The
Commission intended the provision to apply only to brokers or dealers
attempting to internalize or cross trades through a SEF's Order Book
and acknowledges that the proposal was unclear with respect to the
meaning of the term ``traders.'' \356\ In response to SIFMA AMG's
concern, the Commission does not have sufficient information at this
time to make a determination whether asset managers executing trades on
behalf of their clients would be subject to the time delay requirement.
The Commission staff will work with SEFs to determine if the time delay
requirement applies to asset managers or other market participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\356\ For example, a futures commission merchant or other market
participant acting in the role of a broker who has the ability to
execute against its customer's order or to execute two of its
customers' orders against each other would be subject to the time
delay requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(f) Sec. 37.9(c)--Execution Methods for Permitted Transactions
Proposed Sec. 37.9(c)(1) provided that Permitted Transactions may
be executed by an Order Book, RFQ System, a Voice-Based System, or any
such other system for trading as may be permitted by the Commission. In
addition, proposed Sec. 37.9(c)(2) stated that a registered SEF may
submit a request to the Commission to offer trading services to
facilitate Permitted Transactions, and that when doing so, the SEF must
certify its compliance with Sec. 37.11 (Identification of non-cleared
swaps or swaps not made available to trade). As noted in the SEF NPRM,
market participants would not be required to utilize the minimum
trading functionality in Sec. 37.9(b) to execute Permitted
Transactions.\357\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\357\ The SEF NPRM stated that pre-trade price transparency is
not required for Permitted Transactions. Core Principles and Other
Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 1220.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Summary of Comments
SIFMA AMG stated that the Commission should not limit the execution
modalities available to market participants who execute Permitted
Transactions on a SEF.\358\ SIFMA AMG also stated that no statutory
basis exists for regulatory execution requirements for Permitted
Transactions.\359\ Additionally, several commenters stated that the
Commission should not prescribe execution methods for swaps executed
off a SEF.\360\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\358\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 10 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\359\ Id.
\360\ Rosen et al. Comment Letter at 19-20 (Apr. 5, 2011);
Deutsche Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); FSR Comment Letter at 8
(Mar. 8, 2011); Global FX Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011);
Barclays Comment Letter at 10 (Mar. 8, 2011); ABC/CIEBA Comment
Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is revising proposed Sec. 37.9(c)(1) to state that
a SEF may offer any method of execution for each Permitted
Transaction.\361\ The Commission agrees that it should not limit the
execution methods that are available to market participants or require
market participants to utilize certain execution methods for Permitted
Transactions, which are not required to be executed on a SEF. The
Commission clarifies, however, that, in accordance with the minimum
trading functionality requirement in final Sec. 37.3(a)(2), a SEF must
offer an Order Book for Permitted Transactions. The Commission further
clarifies that a market participant has the option to utilize the Order
Book or any other method of execution that a SEF provides for Permitted
Transactions. Additionally, the Commission clarifies that this section
only applies to Permitted Transactions listed or traded on a SEF, and
that this section does not apply to transactions not listed or traded
on a SEF.\362\ Finally, the Commission is deleting proposed Sec.
37.9(c)(2) given the deletion to proposed Sec. 37.11 as described
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.9(c)(1) to
Sec. 37.9(c)(2).
\362\ This section does not apply to those entities that do not
have to register as a SEF. As noted above in the registration
section, swap transactions that are not subject to the CEA section
2(h)(8) trade execution requirement would not have to be executed on
a registered SEF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(g) Future Review
Consistent with the Commission's practice of reviewing and
monitoring its regulatory programs, the Commission directs the
Commission staff to conduct a general review of SEFs' experience with
the execution methods prescribed in Commission regulations 37.3(a)(2)
(minimum trading functionality), 37.3(a)(3) (Order Book), and 37.9
(execution methods for Required and Permitted Transactions and time
delay requirement for Required Transactions). If appropriate, the
review should include any Commission staff recommendations regarding
possible modifications to Commission regulations 37.3(a)(2),
37.3(a)(3), or 37.9 that are consistent with the Act (e.g., a
recommendation to modify the minimum number of RFQ requestees required
by the RFQ definition, including whether a trading protocol in which
the minimum number of RFQ requestees differed by swap class or another
category would be appropriate). The Commission staff's review should be
completed within four years of the effective date of these final SEF
regulations, within which time the Commission believes that staff will
have gained sufficient experience and will have three years' worth of
data with respect to the execution methods.
10. Sec. 37.10--Swaps Made Available for Trading
The Dodd-Frank Act added section 2(h)(8) of the CEA to require that
transactions involving swaps subject to the clearing requirement must
be executed either on a DCM or SEF, unless no DCM or SEF makes the swap
``available to trade'' or the related transaction is subject to the
clearing exception under section 2(h)(7) (i.e., the end-user
exception).\363\ In the SEF NPRM, the Commission proposed to require
SEFs to conduct annual assessments and to submit reports to the
Commission regarding whether it has made a swap available to
trade.\364\ In the DCM notice of proposed rulemaking (``NPRM''),\365\
the Commission did not establish any obligation for DCMs under section
2(h)(8) of the Act. After reviewing the SEF NPRM comments regarding the
proposed available to trade process, and in light of the fact that the
DCM NPRM did not establish any obligation for DCMs under section
[[Page 33505]]
2(h)(8) of the CEA, the Commission determined to separately issue a
further notice of proposed rulemaking to establish a process for a DCM
or SEF to make a swap available to trade under section 2(h)(8) of the
Act.\366\ The Commission may implement the available to trade provision
in a separate rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\363\ CEA sections 2(h)(7) and 2(h)(8); 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(7) and
2(h)(8).
\364\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1241.
\365\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated
Contract Markets, 75 FR 80572 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010).
\366\ Process for a Designated Contract Market or Swap Execution
Facility To Make a Swap Available To Trade, 76 FR 77728 (proposed
Dec. 14, 2011).
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11. Sec. 37.11--Identification of Non-Cleared Swaps or Swaps Not Made
Available to Trade
Proposed Sec. 37.11 required a SEF that chooses to offer swaps:
(1) Not subject to the clearing mandate under section 2(h) of the Act,
(2) that are subject to the end-user exception from the clearing
mandate under section 2(h)(7) of the Act, or (3) that have not been
made available to trade pursuant to Sec. 37.10 of the Commission's
regulations to clearly identify to market participants that the
particular swap is to be executed bilaterally between the parties
pursuant to one of the applicable exemptions from execution and
clearing.
(a) Summary of Comments
MarketAxess expressed concern that proposed Sec. 37.11 could be
read to require that all transactions described in the provision must
only be executed bilaterally, and not on a SEF.\367\ To address this
concern, MarketAxess requested the Commission clarify that Sec. 37.11
requires a SEF choosing to facilitate Permitted Transactions to
identify to market participants why the particular swap is a Permitted
Transaction (i.e., falls under one of the three categories described in
the provision).\368\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\367\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 33-34 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\368\ Id. at 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Commission Determination
The Commission believes that proposed Sec. 37.11 is unnecessary
and therefore is deleting it in its entirety. Market participants
should have sufficient notice of the swaps subject to the clearing and
trade execution requirements. Therefore, in conjunction with the
definitions contained in part 37 as adopted, market participants will
know which swaps are Required Transactions and which swaps are
Permitted Transactions, and thus the execution methods deemed
acceptable for each.
C. Regulations, Guidance, and Acceptable Practices for Compliance With
the Core Principles
As noted above, this final part 37 rulemaking establishes the
relevant regulations, guidance, and acceptable practices applicable to
the 15 core principles that SEFs are required to comply with initially
and on a continuing basis as part of the conditions of registration.
The regulations applicable to the 15 core principles are set out in
separate subparts B through P to part 37, which includes a codification
within each subpart of the statutory language of the respective core
principle. The guidance and acceptable practices are set out in
appendix B to part 37.
1. Subpart B--Core Principle 1 (Compliance With Core Principles)
Core Principle 1 requires a SEF to comply with the core principles
set forth in CEA section 5h(f) and any requirement that the Commission
may impose by rule or regulation pursuant to CEA section 8a(5) as a
condition of obtaining and maintaining registration as a SEF.\369\
Additionally, Core Principle 1 provides a SEF with reasonable
discretion in establishing the manner in which it complies with the
core principles unless the Commission determines otherwise by rule or
regulation.\370\ In the SEF NPRM, the Commission proposed to codify the
statutory text of Core Principle 1 in proposed Sec. 37.100, and adopts
that rule as proposed.
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\369\ CEA section 5h(f)(1)(A); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(1)(A).
\370\ CEA section 5h(f)(1)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(1)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Subpart C--Core Principle 2 (Compliance With Rules)
(a) Sec. 37.200--Core Principle 2--Compliance With Rules
Core Principle 2 requires a SEF to establish and enforce compliance
with its rules, including the terms and conditions of the swaps traded
or processed on or through the SEF and any limitations on access to the
SEF.\371\ It also requires a SEF to establish and enforce trading,
trade processing, and participation rules that will deter abuses and
have the capacity to detect, investigate, and enforce those rules.\372\
A SEF must also establish rules governing the operation of the
facility, including rules specifying trading procedures to be used in
entering and executing orders traded or posted on the facility,
including block trades.\373\ Finally, Core Principle 2 requires a SEF
to provide by its rules that when a swap dealer or major swap
participant enters into or facilitates a swap that is subject to the
mandatory clearing requirement of section 2(h) of the Act, the swap
dealer or major swap participant is responsible for complying with the
mandatory trading requirement under section 2(h)(8) of the Act.\374\ In
the SEF NPRM, the Commission proposed to codify the statutory text of
Core Principle 2 in proposed Sec. 37.200, and adopts that rule as
proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\371\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(A); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(A).
\372\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B). This
section also requires a SEF to provide market participants with
impartial access to the market and to capture information that may
be used in establishing whether rule violations have occurred.
\373\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(C); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(C).
\374\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(D); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Summary of Comments
Some commenters expressed general concerns regarding the proposed
rules under Core Principle 2.\375\ FXall and State Street believed that
the proposed rules under Core Principle 2 would require a SEF to act as
a de facto self-regulatory organization (``SRO'') and impose burdens
that would impede the growth of the swaps market.\376\ These commenters
also noted that the proposed requirements were too similar to the
regulations applicable to DCMs, which would place SEFs at a
disadvantage compared to DCMs given that SEFs will operate in a
competitive environment while DCMs operate in a monopolistic
environment.\377\ ICE urged the Commission to limit its prescriptive
rulemaking to issues that it believes require specific, binding
rules.\378\ In this regard, several commenters recommended that the
Commission adopt greater flexibility in implementing Core Principle
2.\379\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\375\ FXall Comment Letter at 3-4, 11 (Mar. 8, 2011); State
Street Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); ICE Comment Letter at 2
(Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 18 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\376\ FXall Comment Letter at 3-4, 11 (Mar. 8, 2011); State
Street Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\377\ Id.
\378\ ICE Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\379\ Reuters Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall Comment
Letter at 3-4, 11 (Mar. 8, 2011); ICE Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 8,
2011); State Street Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some commenters recommended limiting the scope of the proposed
rules under Core Principle 2.\380\ Specifically, WMBAA argued that SEFs
may not be able to satisfy all of the requirements of the proposed
rules given that SEFs cannot be held responsible for what
[[Page 33506]]
happens on a competitor's platform.\381\ Similarly, FXall believed that
SEFs would not have the requisite market data to conduct meaningful
compliance oversight.\382\ SIFMA AMG believed that the Commission's
vague use of the terms ``members,'' ``market participants,'' and
``participants'' could potentially subject dealers' customers, and thus
asset managers and their clients, to ``onerous'' requirements of
multiple SEFs.\383\ Therefore, SIFMA AMG requested clarification that a
SEF's rules would only regulate entities that actually execute
transactions on the SEF.\384\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\380\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 18 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall Comment
Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment Letter at 34 (Mar.
8, 2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 14-15 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\381\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 18 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\382\ FXall Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\383\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 14-15 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\384\ Id.
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(2) Commission Determination
In response to comments by FXall and State Street about treating
SEFs as SROs, the Commission notes that like DCMs, it views SEFs as
SROs and amended the Commission's regulations to include them as
SROs.\385\ Treating a SEF as an SRO is consistent with a SEF's self-
regulatory obligations pursuant to CEA section 5h(f). Therefore, where
appropriate, the Commission is adopting surveillance, audit trail,
investigation, enforcement, and other requirements for SEFs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\385\ See Adaptation of Regulations to Incorporate Swaps, 77 FR
66288 (Nov. 2, 2012). Section 1.3(ee) states that a self-regulatory
organization ``means a contract market (as defined in Sec. 1.3(h)),
a swap execution facility (as defined in Sec. 1.3(rrrr)), or a
registered futures association under section 17 of the Act.'' Id. at
66318.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to commenters' concerns that the proposed requirements
were similar to the regulations applicable to DCMs, the Commission
believes that adopting similar requirements for both types of entities
is warranted given the similar statutory self-regulatory obligations
for both types of entities. Given that both DCMs and SEFs, regardless
of whether they are new or existing entities, are required to fulfill
similar self-regulatory functions, the Commission does not believe that
this approach will adversely affect competition between DCMs and SEFs.
In response to commenters' requests for less prescriptive rules and
greater flexibility in applying the rules, the Commission is moving
various provisions of the proposed rules to guidance and eliminating
other provisions, as discussed below. The provisions that are adopted
as final rules reflect the Commission's opinion of what is required, at
a minimum, for any SEF to comply with the core principles. SEFs may
take any additional steps necessary, beyond the requirements of the
rules, to satisfy statutory obligations.
In response to WMBAA's and FXall's comments regarding certain
limitations faced by SEFs in terms of oversight, the Commission
recognizes the limitations faced by SEFs with respect to position
monitoring, cross-market surveillance, and rule enforcement and
addresses them in the context of comments received below. In response
to SIFMA AMG's comment about the ambiguous use of terms, the Commission
clarifies that ``market participant'' when used with respect to a SEF
means a person that directly or indirectly effects transactions on the
SEF. This includes persons with trading privileges on the SEF and
persons whose trades are intermediated. The Commission also clarifies
that ``member'' has the meaning set forth in CEA section 1a(34).\386\
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\386\ CEA section 1a(34) defines ``member'' as ``an individual,
association, partnership, corporation, or trust--(A) owning or
holding membership in, or admitted to membership representation on,
the registered entity . . . or (B) having trading privileges on the
registered entity. . . .'' 7 U.S.C. 1a(34).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Sec. 37.201--Operation of Swap Execution Facility and Compliance
With Rules
Proposed Sec. 37.201(a) required a SEF to establish rules
governing the operation of the SEF, including rules specifying trading
procedures for entering and executing orders traded or posted on the
SEF, including block trades.\387\ Proposed Sec. 37.201(b) further
required a SEF to establish and impartially enforce compliance with its
rules, including, but not limited to: (1) The terms and conditions of
any swaps traded or processed on or through the SEF; (2) access to the
SEF; (3) trade practice rules; (4) audit trail requirements; (5)
disciplinary rules; and (6) mandatory clearing requirements.\388\
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\387\ The Commission notes that Sec. 37.201(a) codifies CEA
section 5h(f)(2)(C). 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(C).
\388\ The Commission notes that Sec. 37.201(b) codifies certain
sections of CEA section 5h(f)(2). 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Summary of Comments
MarketAxess recommended that the Commission withdraw proposed Sec.
37.201(b)(6), which required a SEF to adopt and enforce mandatory
clearing requirements, on the basis that clearing of a swap occurs
outside of a SEF's main responsibility to facilitate the
transaction.\389\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 34 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.201 as proposed, subject to two
modifications. To address the comment by MarketAxess, the Commission
notes that proposed Sec. 37.201(b)(6) contained a drafting error, and
therefore is replacing the term ``mandatory clearing'' with ``mandatory
trading.'' The Commission also notes that the citation to ``part 45''
in proposed Sec. 37.201(a) should instead cite to ``part 43.''
Therefore, the Commission is modifying the final rule to include these
technical changes.
Additionally, the Commission notes that a SEF must establish and
enforce rules for its employees. These rules must be reasonably
designed to prevent violations of the Act and the rules of the
Commission.\390\ Towards that end, the Commission also notes that a SEF
must have systems in place reasonably designed to ensure that its
employees are operating in accordance with the SEF's rules.\391\ For
example, a SEF that is utilizing an RFQ System in conjunction with an
Order Book for Required Transactions must establish rules specifying
order handling procedures for its employees who receive and execute
orders over the telephone, email, instant messaging, squawk box, some
other method of communication, or some combination thereof so that the
employees may comply with the RFQ System requirements as specified in
final Sec. 37.9(a)(3).\392\
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\390\ The Commission notes that under Sec. 37.1501(d), a duty
of the Chief Compliance Officer is to establish and administer
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent
violations of the Act and the rules of the Commission.
\391\ The Commission notes that under Sec. 37.1501(d), a duty
of the Chief Compliance Officer is to take reasonable steps to
ensure compliance with the Act and the rules of the Commission, and
to establish and administer a compliance manual designed to promote
compliance with applicable laws, rules, and regulations.
\392\ See WMBAA Comment Letter at 2 (Feb. 15, 2013) (explaining
that employees of a SEF provide services such as disseminating bids
and offers, helping to understand market conditions, and executing
transactions between counterparties).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the Commission notes that a SEF's employees have
certain obligations under the Commission's existing regulations. For
example, under Sec. 1.59, a SEF's employees are prohibited from
disclosing for any purpose inconsistent with the performance of its
official duties any material, non-public information obtained through
special access related to the performance of its duties.\393\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\393\ Commission regulation 1.59(d).
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Finally, the Commission notes that under Sec. 1.2 of the
Commission's regulations, a SEF is liable for the acts, omissions, or
failures of its employees
[[Page 33507]]
acting within the scope of their employment.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\394\ Commission regulation 1.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Sec. 37.202--Access Requirements
Proposed Sec. 37.202 addressed Core Principle 2's requirements
that SEFs provide market participants with impartial access to the
market and that SEFs adopt and enforce rules with respect to any
limitations placed on access to the SEF.\395\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(A)(ii) and (2)(B)(i); 7 U.S.C. 7b-
3(f)(2)(A)(ii) and (2)(B)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Sec. 37.202(a)--Impartial Access by Members and Market
Participants \396\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\396\ The Commission is renaming the title of this section from
``Impartial Access by Members and Market Participants'' to
``Impartial Access to Markets and Market Services'' to provide
greater clarity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 37.202(a) required that a SEF provide any eligible
contract participant (``ECP'') and any independent software vendor
(``ISV'') with impartial access to its market(s) and market services
(including any indicative quote screens or any similar pricing data
displays), providing: (1) Access criteria that are impartial,
transparent, and applied in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner; (2) a
process for confirming ECP status prior to being granted access to the
SEF; and (3) comparable fees for participants receiving comparable
access to, or services from, the SEF.
(i) Summary of Comments
Several commenters sought clarification that SEFs would be
permitted to use their own reasonable discretion to determine
individual access criteria, provided that the criteria are impartial,
transparent, and applied in a fair and non-discriminatory manner.\397\
In this regard, ISDA/SIFMA commented that a SEF should be able to limit
access to its trading systems or platforms to certain types of market
participants in order to maintain the financial integrity and
operational safety of the trading platform.\398\ JP Morgan also stated
that a SEF should be able to limit access to certain types of market
participants such as swap dealers.\399\ JP Morgan commented, however,
that the SEF NPRM's preamble language about financial and operational
soundness is problematic because it would not allow SEFs to limit
access to certain types of market participants.\400\ This could disrupt
business models such as that of inter-dealer brokers whose model is
intimately tied to the idea of serving as an intermediary to wholesale
liquidity providers.\401\ Similarly, Rosen et al. recommended that SEFs
should be able to use selective access criteria such as objective
minimum capital or credit requirements or limits on participation to
objective classes of sophisticated market participants.\402\
MarketAxess commented that the meaning of the term ``impartial'' is
unclear and recommended that the Commission revise proposed Sec.
37.202(a)(1) as follows: ``Criteria that are transparent and objective
and are applied in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner[.]'' \403\
Tradeweb noted that, because it offers multiple marketplaces, its
access criteria may reasonably differ for each mode of execution and
within one mode of execution given that each market will offer
different services and may have different types of participants.\404\
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\397\ Reuters Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011); Goldman
Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb Comment Letter at 10
(Mar. 8, 2011).
\398\ ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\399\ JP Morgan Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\400\ Id.
\401\ Id.
\402\ Rosen et al. Comment Letter at 17 (Apr. 5, 2011).
\403\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 23-24 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\404\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 10 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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Mallers et al. supported the impartial access requirement and its
purpose of preventing a SEF's owners or operators from using
discriminatory access requirements as a competitive tool against
certain participants.\405\ Mallers et al. stated that impartial access
is a prerequisite to having an open market in which ECPs can compete on
a level playing field, and that the participation of additional
liquidity providers will improve the pricing and efficiency of the
market and reduce systemic risk.\406\ SDMA also supported the impartial
access requirement and stated that the ability to obtain intellectual
property licenses and the amount of royalties for intellectual property
licenses should be fair and not used to create anticompetitive
advantages for a particular SEF or group of market participants.\407\
UBS requested that the Commission clarify in the final rulemaking that
SEFs may not exclude or discriminate against participants providing
agency services solely as a result of engaging in these
activities.\408\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\405\ Mallers et al. Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 21, 2011).
\406\ Id. at 3.
\407\ SDMA Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\408\ UBS Comment Letter II at 1 (May 18, 2012). UBS submitted
two comment letters on May 18, 2012. The Commission is referencing
UBS's comment letter regarding impartial access as ``UBS Comment
Letter II.''
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MarketAxess and WMBAA stated that a SEF should be able to restrict
access to ISVs because the Dodd-Frank Act does not require SEFs to
provide ISVs with impartial access.\409\ MarketAxess further commented
that the Commission must permit a SEF to restrict access to an ISV who
would use such direct access to provide a competitive advantage to
another SEF or DCM.\410\ Similarly, WMBAA stated that SEFs could
qualify as ISVs in order to seek access to competitors' trading systems
or platforms, which would defeat the existing structure of competitive
sources of liquidity.\411\ Bloomberg commented that the SEF NPRM's
characterization of ISV is too broad; \412\ therefore, an ISV may be
able to replicate the services of a SEF without having to register as a
SEF.\413\ Bloomberg also requested that the Commission clarify that a
user of an ISV service must be a participant of a SEF in order to
access the SEF's data and/or to execute swap transactions on that
SEF.\414\
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\409\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 24 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA
Comment Letter at 19 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\410\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 25 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\411\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 19 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\412\ See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 1222 n. 53 (providing examples of
ISVs).
\413\ Meeting with Bloomberg dated Jan. 18, 2012.
\414\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under proposed Sec. 37.202(a)(2), MarketAxess recommended that
SEFs be permitted to rely on a written or electronically signed
representation by a participant seeking access to the SEF regarding its
status as an ECP.\415\ MarketAxess stated that SEFs may then adopt
rules to require that the participant notify the SEF immediately of any
change to its status after the participant makes the
representation.\416\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 25 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\416\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Better Markets commented that proposed Sec. 37.202(a)(3) should
make clear that any form of preferential access to a SEF through fee
arrangements should not be allowed because it would defeat the goal of
impartial access.\417\ However, MarketAxess stated that SEFs should be
able to provide their market participants with volume discounts and
other pricing arrangements as long as such discounts and arrangements
are based upon objective criteria that are applied uniformly.\418\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\417\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 11-12 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\418\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 25 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.202(a) as proposed, subject to
the
[[Page 33508]]
modifications discussed below.\419\ The Commission does not believe
that the statute allows a SEF to adopt rules that limit access as
requested by ISDA/SIFMA, JP Morgan, and Rosen et al. The statutory
language of Core Principle 2 requires that SEFs establish and enforce
participation rules, including means to provide market participants
with impartial access to the market, and that SEFs adopt and enforce
rules with respect to any limitations they place on access (emphasis
added).\420\ As stated in the SEF NPRM, the Commission reiterates that
the purpose of the impartial access requirements is to prevent a SEF's
owners or operators from using discriminatory access requirements as a
competitive tool against certain ECPs or ISVs. The Commission also
agrees with Mallers et al. who stated that the impartial access
requirement allows ECPs to compete on a level playing field, and that
the participation of additional liquidity providers will improve the
pricing and efficiency of the market and reduce systemic risk. As such,
the Commission believes that access to a SEF should be determined, for
example, based on a SEF's impartial evaluation of an applicant's
disciplinary history and financial and operational soundness against
objective, pre-established criteria. As one example of such criteria,
any ECP should be able to demonstrate financial soundness either by
showing that it is a clearing member of a derivatives clearing
organization (``DCO'') that clears products traded on that SEF or by
showing that it has clearing arrangements in place with such a clearing
member.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\419\ The Commission is also making certain non-substantive
clarifications to the rule.
\420\ CEA sections 5h(f)(2)(A)(ii) and (2)(B)(i); 7 U.S.C. 7b-
3(f)(2)(A)(ii) and (2)(B)(i).
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In this regard, the Commission believes that the impartial access
requirement of Core Principle 2 does not allow a SEF to limit access to
its trading systems or platforms to certain types of ECPs or ISVs as
requested by some commenters.\421\ The Commission notes that the rule
states ``impartial'' criteria and not ``selective'' criteria as
recommended by some commenters. The Commission is using the term
``impartial'' as intended in the statute. ``Impartial'' should be
interpreted in the ordinary sense of the word: fair, unbiased, and
unprejudiced. Subject to these requirements, a SEF may use its own
reasonable discretion to determine its access criteria, provided that
the criteria are impartial, transparent and applied in a fair and non-
discriminatory manner, and are not anti-competitive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\421\ In this regard, the Commission is clarifying in response
to UBS's comment that a SEF may not exclude or discriminate against
a market participant providing agency services subject to any
limitation on such services contained in this final rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to Tradeweb's comment about different access criteria
for different markets, the Commission notes that a SEF may establish
different access criteria for each of its markets. Core Principle 2
does not specify whether impartial access criteria must be the same for
all of a SEF's markets or may differ for each market. Therefore, the
Commission believes that it is within its discretion to allow a SEF to
establish different access criteria for each of its markets. However,
the Commission reiterates that the access criteria must be impartial
and must not be used as a competitive tool against certain ECPs or
ISVs. The Commission also reiterates that each similarly situated group
of ECPs and ISVs must be treated similarly.
In response to MarketAxess's and WMBAA's comments regarding ISVs,
the Commission notes that Congress required SEFs to establish
participation rules, including means to provide market participants
with impartial access to the market.\422\ The Commission believes that
ISVs \423\ provide market participants with additional opportunities to
access SEFs and that, similar to ECPs, SEFs should apply impartial
criteria in a fair and non-discriminatory manner when deciding whether
or not to grant an ISV access. In response to MarketAxess's and WMBAA's
comments regarding ISVs providing a competitive advantage to other
SEFs, the Commission notes that SEFs may set rules for ISVs so they do
not misuse data, for example, by providing the data to another SEF for
purely competitive reasons to the exclusion of market participants. The
Commission also notes that SEFs may charge fees to ISVs based on the
access or services they receive from the SEF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\422\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(B)(i); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B)(i).
WMBAA also commented that ISVs should comply with a SEF's rules, the
SEF core principles, and the oversight or supervision by the SEF in
the same manner as a market participant. WMBAA Comment Letter at 19
(Mar. 8, 2011). The Commission disagrees with WMBAA's comment
because ISVs provide market participants with greater options to
access SEFs and ISVs are not executing swaps on a SEF as are market
participants. Therefore, the Commission believes that ISVs should
not be subject to the same requirements as market participants.
\423\ The Commission notes that examples of independent software
vendors include: smart order routers, trading software companies
that develop front-end trading applications, and aggregator
platforms. Smart order routing generally involves scanning of the
market for the best-displayed price and then routing orders to that
market for execution. Software that serves as a front-end trading
application is typically used by traders to input orders, monitor
quotations, and view a record of the transactions completed during a
trading session. As noted above in the registration section,
aggregator platforms generally provide a portal to market
participants so that they can access multiple SEFs, but do not
provide for execution as execution remains on SEFs. Aggregator
platforms may also provide access to news and analytics. The
Commission believes that transparency and trading efficiency would
be enhanced as a result of innovations in this field for market
services. For instance, certain providers of market services with
access to multiple trading systems or platforms could provide
consolidated transaction data from such trading systems or platforms
to market participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to Bloomberg's comments, the Commission agrees that
ISVs should not be able to replicate the services of a SEF without
having to register as a SEF. The Commission notes that an ISV that
merely provides a service to SEFs will not, merely because it provides
such a service, be deemed to be a SEF as defined in CEA section 1a(50).
However, pursuant to the registration requirements in final Sec.
37.3(a), if an ISV offers a trading system or platform in which more
than one market participant has the ability to execute or trade swaps
with more than one other market participant on that system or platform,
then the ISV has to register as a SEF.\424\ The Commission also notes
that the user of an ISV must have been granted access by a SEF in order
to access that SEF's data and/or to execute a swap transaction on that
SEF through the ISV.\425\
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\424\ See Aggregation Services or Portals discussion above under
Sec. 37.3--Requirements for Registration in the preamble. The
Commission notes that footnote 423 above classifies aggregator
platforms as a type of ISV so the discussion in this section
regarding ISVs also applies to aggregator platforms.
\425\ The Commission notes, however, that the user of an ISV may
not need to have been granted access to the SEF if the ISV is only
providing a composite quote or top level quote for multiple SEFs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission notes that under Sec. 37.202(a)(2), a SEF that is
determining whether to grant an ECP access to its facilities may rely
on a signed representation of its ECP status.\426\ By not prescribing a
process, the Commission is providing SEFs with flexibility and
discretion on how to meet this requirement. The Commission also notes
that for SEFs that permit intermediation, customers of ECPs must also
be ECPs.\427\ In this regard, a SEF must obtain a signed representation
[[Page 33509]]
from an intermediary that its customers are ECPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\ The Commission is replacing the term ``participant'' in
proposed Sec. 37.202(a)(2) with the term ``eligible contract
participant'' in final Sec. 37.202(a)(2) because the term
``participant'' was not defined in the SEF NPRM and the revised term
more clearly communicates the persons to whom this rule applies. In
this regard, the Commission notes that, prior to granting a person
access to its facility, a SEF must obtain confirmation from the
person of its ECP status.
\427\ For example, the Commission notes that a customer of a
futures commission merchant must be an ECP and a customer of a
broker must be an ECP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To address comments submitted in connection with proposed Sec.
37.202(a)(3) regarding fees, the Commission clarifies that Sec.
37.202(a)(3) neither sets nor limits the fees that SEFs may charge. A
SEF may establish different categories of ECPs or ISVs seeking access
to, or services from, the SEF, but may not discriminate with respect to
fees within a particular category.\428\ The Commission notes that Sec.
37.202(a)(3) is not designed to be a rigid requirement that fails to
take into account legitimate business justifications for offering
different fees to different categories of entities seeking access to
the SEF. For example, a SEF may consider the services it receives from
members such as market making services when it determines its fee
structure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\428\ The Commission is replacing the term ``participant'' in
proposed Sec. 37.202(a)(3) with the terms ``eligible contract
participants'' and ``independent software vendors'' in final Sec.
37.202(a)(3) because the term ``participant'' was not defined in the
SEF NPRM and the revised terms more clearly communicates the persons
to whom this rule applies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Sec. 37.202(b)--Jurisdiction
Proposed Sec. 37.202(b) required that prior to granting any ECP
access to its facilities, a SEF must require that the ECP consents to
its jurisdiction.
(i) Summary of Comments
CME recommended that the Commission withdraw the proposed
rule.\429\ CME contended that requiring clearing firms to obtain every
customer's consent to the regulatory jurisdiction of each SEF would be
costly.\430\ Moreover, CME commented that even if such consent were
obtained, the proposed rule would be entirely ineffective in achieving
the Commission's desired outcome.\431\ CME explained that if a non-
member, who had consented to the SEF's jurisdiction under the proposed
rule, committed a rule violation and subsequently elected not to
cooperate in the investigation or disciplinary process, the SEF's only
recourse would be to deny the non-member access and, if appropriate,
refer the matter to the Commission.\432\ CME further explained that a
SEF's enforcement options, and the regulatory outcomes, do not change
based on whether or not there is a record of the non-member consenting
to jurisdiction, but rather depend on whether the non-member chooses to
participate in the SEF's investigative and disciplinary processes.\433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\429\ CME Comment Letter at 17 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\430\ Id. at 16.
\431\ Id.
\432\ Id.
\433\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, Bloomberg requested that the Commission clarify that
proposed Sec. 37.202(b) would only apply to a SEF's members and not
customers of members whose orders are executed on a SEF.\434\ Bloomberg
stated that, rather than subject all market participants to a SEF's
jurisdiction, it would be sufficient and more practical for each SEF
member to provide to the SEF specific information about its
customers.\435\ WMBAA noted that a SEF may only exercise jurisdiction
over a market participant with respect to its own rules and that the
SEF's ultimate sanction would be to ban a market participant from its
trading system or platform.\436\ WMBAA also stated that prohibiting a
market participant from trading on one particular SEF has little
utility because a market participant could continue to execute swaps on
other SEFs.\437\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\ Bloomberg Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\435\ Id.
\436\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 19 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\437\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.202(b) as proposed. While
acknowledging the comments described above, the Commission believes
that Sec. 37.202(b) codifies jurisdictional requirements necessary to
effectuate the statutory mandate of Core Principle 2 that a SEF shall
have the capacity to detect, investigate, and enforce rules of the
SEF.\438\ In the Commission's view, jurisdiction must be established by
a SEF prior to granting eligible contract participants access to its
markets in order to effectively investigate and sanction persons that
violate SEF rules. In particular, a SEF should not be in the position
of asking market participants to voluntarily submit to its jurisdiction
and cooperate in investigatory proceedings after a potential rule
violation has been found. Similarly, market participants should have
advanced notice that their trading practices are subject to the rules
of a SEF, including rules that require cooperating in investigatory and
disciplinary processes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\438\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the avoidance of doubt, the Commission clarifies that the scope
of Sec. 37.202(b) is not limited to members. To the contrary, all
members and market participants of a SEF, as defined above under Sec.
37.200, are within the scope of Sec. 37.202(b).
In response to CME's and WMBAA's comments, the Commission notes
that a SEF's ultimate recourse against a market participant is to deny
such market participant access to the SEF and, if appropriate, refer
the market participant to the Commission. The Commission has the
authority to issue broader sanctions for market participants who commit
SEF rule violations that also violate the CEA and Commission
regulations. Therefore, the Commission expects that a SEF would not
only sanction market participants as appropriate, but also refer
matters to the Commission for additional action when necessary. The
Commission does not agree that this action absolves SEFs from their
responsibility to establish jurisdiction over members and market
participants.
(3) Sec. 37.202(c)--Limitations on Access
Proposed Sec. 37.202(c) required a SEF to establish and
impartially enforce rules governing any decision to allow, deny,
suspend, or permanently bar participants' access to the SEF, including
when such decisions are made as part of a disciplinary or emergency
action taken by the SEF.
(i) Commission Determination
Although no comments were received on Sec. 37.202(c), the
Commission is adopting the proposed rule subject to one
modification.\439\ The Commission is replacing the term ``participant''
with ``eligible contract participant'' because the term ``participant''
was not defined in the SEF NPRM and the revised term more clearly
communicates the persons to whom this rule applies.\440\ The Commission
notes that Sec. 37.202(c) implements Core Principle 2's requirement
regarding limitations on access to the SEF.\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\439\ The Commission is making certain non-substantive
clarifications to the rule.
\440\ For the avoidance of doubt, the Commission notes that this
rule applies to the SEF's members and market participants.
\441\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(A)(ii); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(A)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) Sec. 37.203--Rule Enforcement Program
Proposed Sec. 37.203 required a SEF to establish and enforce
trading, trade processing, and participation rules that will deter
abuses and have the capacity to detect, investigate, and enforce those
rules.\442\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\442\ The Commission notes that Sec. 37.203 codifies CEA
section 5h(f)(2)(B). 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Sec. 37.203(a)--Abusive Trading Practices Prohibited
Proposed Sec. 37.203(a) required a SEF to prohibit certain abusive
trading practices, including front-running, wash trading, pre-arranged
trading, fraudulent
[[Page 33510]]
trading, money passes, and any other trading practices that the SEF
deems to be abusive. The proposed rule further obligated a SEF to
``prohibit any other manipulative or disruptive trading practices
prohibited by the Act or by the Commission pursuant to Commission
regulations.'' SEFs permitting intermediation were required to prohibit
additional trading practices, such as trading ahead of customer orders,
trading against customer orders, accommodation trading, and improper
cross trading. As explained in the SEF NPRM, prohibited trading
practices include those proscribed by section 747 of the Dodd-Frank
Act.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\443\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1223 n.61. Section 747 of the Dodd-Frank Act
amended CEA section 4c(a) to make it unlawful for any person to
engage in any trading, practice, or conduct on or subject to the
rules of a registered entity that--(A) violates bids or offers; (B)
demonstrates intentional or reckless disregard for the orderly
execution of transactions during the closing period; or (C) is, is
of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, spoofing
(bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer
before execution). See Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 76 FR
14943 (proposed Mar. 18, 2011) for proposed interpretive guidance on
these three new statutory provisions of CEA section 4c(a)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Summary of Comments
CME and ABC/CIEBA commented that the proposed rule is problematic
because it enumerated prohibited trade practices without specifically
defining them.\444\ CME stated that SEFs should have reasonable
discretion to establish rules appropriate to their markets that are
consistent with the CEA and that satisfy the core principles.\445\ CME
questioned, in particular, how to interpret the proposed prohibition on
pre-arranged trading with respect to rules that allow for block
trading, exchange for related position transactions, and pre-execution
communications subject to specified conditions.\446\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\444\ ABC/CIEBA Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment
Letter at 17-18 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\445\ CME Comment Letter at 17 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\446\ Id. at 17-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
WMBAA contended that the enumerated abusive trading practices
appear more commonly in markets with retail participants, and therefore
are more likely to occur on a DCM rather than a SEF.\447\ Accordingly,
WMBAA recommended that the Commission include in the final rule abusive
trading practices that are more likely to occur on a SEF.\448\ Finally,
Better Markets recommended that the Commission expand its list of
prohibited trade practices to ban certain high-frequency trading
practices, including exploiting a large quantity or block trade, price
spraying (which it views as a form of front-running), rebate
harvesting, and layering the market (which it analogizes to
spoofing).\449\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\447\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 20 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\448\ Id.
\449\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 13-17 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting proposed Sec. 37.203(a), subject to one
modification described below. In response to CME's and ABC/CIEBA's
comments regarding the perceived vagueness of the enumerated trading
practices, the Commission notes that the enumerated abusive trading
practices reflect the trading practices that are typically accepted as
prohibited conduct by regulators and derivatives exchanges in the
industry. In the SEF NPRM, the Commission stated that the proposed
prohibited trading practices are a compilation of abusive trading
practices that DCMs already prohibit.\450\ The Commission also noted in
the final DCM rulemaking that the prohibited trading practices are
typically already prohibited in DCM rulebooks.\451\ Although the
Commission believes, as noted by CME, that a SEF should have reasonable
discretion to establish rules for its markets, the Commission believes,
at a minimum, that a SEF must prohibit the abusive trading practices
identified in the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\450\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1223.
\451\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated
Contract Markets, 77 FR 36612, 36626 (Jun. 19, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to CME's comment about how to interpret the prohibition
on pre-arranged trading with respect to rules that allow for block
trading and other types of trading, the Commission is amending proposed
Sec. 37.203(a) to clarify that a SEF must prohibit pre-arranged
trading, except for block trades permitted under part 43 of the
Commission's regulations or other types of transactions certified to or
approved by the Commission pursuant to the procedures under part 40 of
the Commission's regulations. This change clarifies that these types of
transactions will not be subject to the prohibition on pre-arranged
trading. The Commission also clarifies, as discussed above under the
time delay requirement, that the prohibition on pre-arranged trading
does not limit pre-execution communications between market
participants, subject to the rules of the SEF. Accordingly, SEFs that
permit pre-execution communications must establish and enforce rules
relating to such communications.
In response to WMBAA's comment that the enumerated abusive trading
practices are more suited to DCMs rather than SEFs, the Commission
believes that similar prohibitions are necessary to promote consistent
protection for all market participants across the swaps market.
Therefore, the Commission believes that the enumerated abusive trading
practices should be prohibited by DCMs and SEFs. The Commission notes
that requiring SEFs to proscribe trading practices which are prohibited
by the Act and Commission regulations does not create any additional
obligations beyond the existing statutory and regulatory requirements
applicable to all SEFs.
The Commission agrees with WMBAA and Better Markets that other
abusive trading practices may exist. In this regard, Sec. 37.203(a)
provides a non-exhaustive, non-exclusive list. The regulations adopted
in this final release provide a SEF with reasonable discretion to
establish rules that prohibit additional abusive trading practices.
Additionally, not only must a SEF prohibit any other trading practices
that a SEF deems abusive,\452\ it must also establish and enforce rules
that will deter abuses under statutory Core Principle 2.\453\
Therefore, if a SEF identifies additional abusive trading practices
that are likely to occur on its trading systems and platforms, then the
SEF is required, by statute and Commission regulation, to prohibit such
abusive trading practices. The Commission anticipates that as SEFs gain
experience with exchange-listed swaps, it may periodically revisit the
list of prohibited abusive trading practices under Sec. 37.203(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\452\ See Final Sec. 37.203(a) in the Commission's regulations.
\453\ CEA section 5h(f)(2); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Sec. 37.203(b)--Capacity to Detect and Investigate Rule Violations
Proposed Sec. 37.203(b) required a SEF to have arrangements and
resources for effective rule enforcement, which included a SEF's
authority to collect information and examine books and records of SEF
members and market participants. As discussed in the preamble to the
SEF NPRM, the Commission believes that a SEF can best administer its
compliance and rule enforcement obligations by having the ability to
reach the books and records of all market participants.\454\ Proposed
Sec. 37.203(b) also required a SEF's arrangements and resources to
facilitate
[[Page 33511]]
the direct supervision of the market and the analysis of data collected
to determine whether a rule violation has occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\454\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1223.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Summary of Comments
FXall and CME requested that the Commission clarify the provision
in proposed Sec. 37.203(b) that requires a SEF to have the authority
to examine the books and records of its members and market
participants.\455\ Specifically, CME expressed concern that the
proposed rule would subject non-registered market participants to
recordkeeping requirements that currently apply only to member,
registrants, and direct access clients of its platform, which it does
not believe would be effective.\456\ CME also commented that the
proposed rule does not detail which books, records, and information a
SEF must be able to obtain from its non-member market
participants.\457\ FXall expressed concern that the requirement for a
SEF to have the authority to examine the books and records of its
members and market participants could be interpreted to require a SEF
to conduct a full regulatory examination program.\458\ FXall,
therefore, recommended that the Commission clarify that this
requirement only applies as may be necessary for a SEF to investigate a
specific potential rule violation that the SEF has detected in the
ordinary course of its trade practice surveillance routine or has
otherwise been brought to its attention.\459\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\455\ FXall Comment Letter at 11-12 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment
Letter at 18 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\456\ CME Comment Letter at 18 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\457\ Id.
\458\ FXall Comment Letter at 11-12 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\459\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.203(b) as proposed, subject to
the following modification. To address CME's concerns about the scope
of proposed Sec. 37.203(b), the Commission is replacing the term
``market participant'' with ``persons under investigation.'' The
Commission recognizes that using the term ``market participant'' could
significantly increase the regulatory responsibilities for SEFs. Thus,
the Commission clarifies that Sec. 37.203(b) places upon a SEF an
affirmative obligation to have the authority to examine books and
records from its members and from any persons under investigation for
effective enforcement of its rules. The Commission also notes that the
books and records collected by the SEF should encompass all information
and documents that are necessary to detect and prosecute rule
violations. In response to FXall's comment, the Commission clarifies
that the requirement for a SEF to have the authority to examine books
and records does not require a SEF to conduct a full regulatory
examination program. However, the Commission notes that in addition to
the SEF's obligations pursuant to Sec. 37.203(b), the audit trail
requirements in Sec. 37.205(c)(2) require a SEF to establish a program
for effective enforcement of its audit trail and recordkeeping
requirements, which would require the examination of books and records.
(3) Sec. 37.203(c)--Compliance Staff and Resources
Proposed Sec. 37.203(c)(1) provided that a SEF must establish and
maintain sufficient compliance staff and resources to conduct a number
of enumerated tasks, such as audit trail reviews, trade practice
surveillance, market surveillance, and real-time monitoring. Proposed
Sec. 37.203(c)(2) required a SEF to continually monitor the size and
workload of its compliance staff and, on at least an annual basis,
formally evaluate the need to increase its compliance staff and
resources. The proposed rule also set forth certain factors that a SEF
should consider in determining the appropriate level of compliance
staff and resources.
(i) Summary of Comments
Two commenters sought clarification regarding a SEF's compliance
resources.\460\ WMBAA requested that the Commission clarify whether the
resources and staff of a compliance department may be shared with
affiliates or between multiple SEFs, and if so, how these shared
resources would be considered in meeting the requirements for
sufficient compliance staff and resources.\461\ WMBAA also requested
clarification as to whether a SEF could consider its third party
service provider's resources and staff for purposes of evaluating the
adequacy of its compliance staff and resources.\462\ MarketAxess
believed that the process by which a SEF must conduct a formal
evaluation of its compliance resources was unclear.\463\ MarketAxess
also noted that while the findings of such an evaluation could result
in the need to increase a SEF's compliance staff and resources, it
could also result in a decrease.\464\ Accordingly, MarketAxess
suggested that the Commission remove the term ``formally'' and clarify
that the evaluation of compliance resources could result in either an
increase or decrease in compliance staff and resources.\465\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\460\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 21 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess
Comment Letter at 35 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\461\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 21 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\462\ Id.
\463\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 35 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\464\ Id.
\465\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.203(c) as proposed, subject to
one modification discussed below.\466\ The Commission agrees in part
with WMBAA's recommendation that some SEF compliance staff can be
shared among affiliated entities under the appropriate circumstances.
However, such arrangements would require prior review by the Commission
staff and appropriate legal documentation between the affiliated
entities with respect to any shared staff (e.g., secondment or
regulatory services agreements that define responsibilities; establish
decision-trees for matters of regulatory consequence; and provide for
exclusive authority and responsibility by each SEF with respect to
matters on its markets). The Commission also emphasizes that any
sharing of compliance staff does not diminish each SEF's obligation to
maintain sufficient staff to meet its own regulatory needs. The
Commission believes that compliance resources may not be shared between
non-affiliated SEFs given potential conflict issues. However, the
Commission recognizes that a SEF may provide regulatory services to a
non-affiliated SEF pursuant to a regulatory services agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\466\ The Commission is making certain non-substantive
clarifications to proposed Sec. 37.203(c)(1). The Commission is
also renumbering proposed Sec. 37.203(c)(1) to Sec. 37.203(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes that a SEF may take into consideration the
staff and resources of its regulatory service provider when evaluating
the sufficiency of its own compliance staff. Regardless of whether a
SEF utilizes a regulatory service provider or shares its compliance
staff with an affiliate, the Commission emphasizes that the SEF must
maintain sufficient internal compliance staff to oversee the quality
and effectiveness of the regulatory services provided and to make
certain regulatory decisions, as required by Sec. 37.204.
Finally, the Commission is deleting proposed Sec. 37.203(c)(2),
which required that a SEF monitor the size and workload of its
compliance staff on a continuous basis and, on at least an annual
basis, formally evaluate the need to increase its compliance resources
and
[[Page 33512]]
staff. The Commission believes that the obligation that a SEF monitor
the adequacy of its compliance staff and resources are implicit in
proposed Sec. 37.203(c)(1). The final rule provides greater
flexibility to SEFs in determining their approach to monitoring their
compliance resources.
(4) Sec. 37.203(d)--Automated Trade Surveillance System
Proposed Sec. 37.203(d) required a SEF to maintain an automated
trade surveillance system capable of detecting and investigating
potential trade practice violations. The proposed rule also required
that an acceptable automated trade surveillance system must have the
capability to generate alerts on a trade date plus one day (T+1) basis
to assist staff in detecting potential violations. The automated trade
surveillance system, among other requirements, must maintain all trade
and order data, including order modifications and cancellations, and
must have the capability to compute, retain, and compare trading
statistics; compute trade gains and losses; and reconstruct the
sequence of trading activity.
(i) Summary of Comments
CME and WMBAA expressed concern about the capabilities required of
an automated trade surveillance system under the proposed rule.\467\
Specifically, CME stated that it has been unable to design an automated
surveillance system that automates the actual investigation of
potential trade practice violations.\468\ CME also challenged the use
of what it deemed as ``broad and ambiguous'' terms to describe the
required capabilities of such a system, and recommended that the
Commission consider applying a more flexible, core principles-based
approach to implementing the requirement.\469\ WMBAA argued that it
would be impossible to create an automated trade surveillance system
with the capabilities described in the proposed rule without knowledge
of a participant's complete trading activity, including trading
activity that takes place on other SEFs.\470\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\467\ CME Comment Letter at 19-20 (Feb. 22, 2011); WMBAA Comment
Letter at 21 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\468\ CME Comment Letter at 19-20 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\469\ Id. at 20.
\470\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 21 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Better Markets recommended that data recorded by an automated trade
surveillance system be time-stamped at intervals consistent with the
capabilities of high-frequency traders that will transact on SEFs.\471\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\471\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 18 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting proposed Sec. 37.203(d), subject to two
modifications discussed below. First, the Commission is moving the
requirement that an automated trade surveillance system maintain all
data reflecting the details of each order entered into the trading
system to final Sec. 37.205(b). The Commission believes that Sec.
37.205(b) is a more logical place in the Commission's rules to address
this aspect of a SEF's automated surveillance system because it also
specifies the requirements for a SEF's audit trail program, including a
history of all orders and trades.
Second, the Commission is deleting the word ``investigating'' from
proposed Sec. 37.203(d) to remove any confusion, as noted by CME. The
Commission notes, in response to CME's comment, that the final rules do
not require a SEF's automated trade surveillance system to conduct the
actual investigations. The Commission believes that the actual
investigation would be carried out by a SEF's compliance staff with the
assistance of automated surveillance tools.
In response to CME's comment pertaining to the breadth of the rule,
the Commission believes that effective surveillance of trading markets
requires that a SEF maintain an automated trade surveillance system
capable of detecting trade practice violations to assist compliance
staff in analyzing large data sets and investigating patterns of
conduct that may go otherwise unnoticed. The Commission also believes
that the analytical tools enumerated in the rule are a necessary
component of an effective trade surveillance system. This rule, as
modified, therefore fulfills the statutory requirement of Core
Principle 2 by assisting the SEF in detecting, investigating, and
enforcing trading rules that will deter abuses.\472\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\472\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission acknowledges the inter-SEF surveillance limitations
expressed by WMBAA. The Commission notes that the purpose of Sec.
37.203(d) is to ensure that a SEF's compliance staff has the necessary
tools to detect, analyze, and investigate potential trade practice
violations on the SEF's trading systems or platforms; it does not
obligate a SEF to establish a cross-market trade practice surveillance
program.
Although the Commission acknowledges the merits of the
recommendation by Better Markets to include time stamps at intervals
consistent with the capabilities of high-frequency traders, the
Commission does not believe that it is necessary to modify Sec.
37.203(d) to address this concern. As discussed in Sec. 37.401 below,
there are efforts underway both within and outside of the Commission to
define and develop approaches for better monitoring of high-frequency
and algorithmic trading.\473\ However, while the rule does not specify
the granularity of time-stamped data, a SEF's automated trade
surveillance system should have the ability to readily determine the
sequence in which orders are entered. This reflects the Commission's
belief that an automated trade surveillance system should time-stamp
data with the granularity necessary to conduct effective surveillance
of all trade-related activity, including high-frequency trading, while
leaving the details of the system to the SEF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\473\ See discussion below regarding high-frequency trading
under Sec. 37.401--General Requirements in the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission notes that the accurate time-stamping of data is
particularly important for SEFs that use an RFQ System, including an
RFQ System with a voice component. For such SEFs, the accurate time-
stamping of both their Order Book and RFQ System activity is critical
for ensuring both that the SEF itself has a robust surveillance system
and that the Commission is able to monitor the SEF's adherence to part
37's Order Book-RFQ System integration requirements.
(5) Sec. 37.203(e)--Real-Time Market Monitoring
Proposed Sec. 37.203(e) required a SEF to conduct real-time market
monitoring of all trading activity on its electronic trading platform
to ensure orderly trading and to identify market or system anomalies.
The proposed rule further required a SEF to have the authority to
adjust prices and cancel trades when needed to mitigate ``market
disrupting events'' caused by platform malfunctions or errors in orders
submitted by market participants. In addition, proposed Sec. 37.203(e)
required that any trade price adjustments or trade cancellations be
transparent to the market and subject to standards that are clear,
fair, and publicly available.
(i) Summary of Comments
CME stated that the proposed standards would be difficult for any
SEF to reasonably meet because they require
[[Page 33513]]
monitoring of all trading activity on a platform to ensure orderly
trading.\474\ CME also reiterated its belief that the proposed rules
are overly prescriptive and recommended that the Commission provide
application guidance instead of a rule.\475\ WMBAA requested
clarification that a SEF's obligation to conduct real-time market
monitoring does not include the requirement to conduct automated trade
surveillance under Sec. 37.203(d).\476\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\474\ CME Comment Letter at 21 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\475\ Id. at 20-21.
\476\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 21 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two commenters opined on the requirement for a SEF to modify or
cancel a swap transaction.\477\ SIFMA AMG argued that a SEF should not
be able to modify or cancel a swap transaction under any circumstances
without the express consent of the counterparties.\478\ SIFMA AMG also
stated that if counterparties consent to an adjustment, then clearing
entities, executing brokers, DCMs, and middleware platforms should also
make the appropriate adjustment.\479\ ISDA/SIFMA recommended that the
Commission adopt a uniform standard for ``market disrupting events.''
\480\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\477\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 14 (Mar. 8, 2011); ISDA/SIFMA
Comment Letter at 13 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\478\ SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 14 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\479\ Id.
\480\ ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 13 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Better Markets stated that a SEF's obligation to conduct real-time
market monitoring should include monitoring orders and cancellations
that are time-stamped at intervals consistent with the capabilities of
high-frequency traders to identify abusive high frequency trading
strategies.\481\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\481\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 18 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting proposed Sec. 37.203(e), subject to one
modification. The Commission agrees with CME that real-time market
monitoring cannot ``ensure'' orderly trading at all times, but the
Commission believes that such monitoring must identify disorderly
trading when it occurs. Accordingly, the Commission is modifying
proposed Sec. 37.203(e) to require a SEF to conduct real-time market
monitoring ``to identify disorderly trading,'' instead of ``to ensure
orderly trading.''
In response to CME's comment that the rule is overly prescriptive,
the Commission believes that Sec. 37.203(e) grants a SEF the
flexibility to determine the best way to conduct real-time market
monitoring so that it can effectively monitor its markets. The
Commission also believes that the rule correctly mandates that a SEF
conduct real-time market monitoring of all trading activity that occurs
on its system or platform in order to detect disorderly trading and
market or system anomalies, and take appropriate regulatory action. The
Commission believes that this rule fulfills the statutory requirement
of Core Principle 2, which requires a SEF to have the capacity to
detect, investigate, and enforce trading rules that will deter
abuses.\482\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\482\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to WMBAA's comment, the Commission clarifies that a
SEF's obligation to conduct real-time market monitoring does not
encompass the automated trade surveillance requirement in Sec.
37.203(d). The Commission notes that while real-time market monitoring
and trade practice surveillance are both self-regulatory functions
assigned to all SEFs, these functions are generally independent and
serve different purposes. As discussed in the SEF NPRM, market
monitoring is conducted on a real-time basis so that a SEF can take
mitigating action against any market or system anomalies on its trading
system or platform.\483\ Trade practice surveillance, on the other
hand, involves reconstructing and analyzing order, trade, and other
data post-execution to identify potential violations and anomalies
found in trade data.\484\ Further, as noted in the SEF NPRM, the
automated trade surveillance system typically differs from the system
used to conduct real-time market monitoring.\485\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\483\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1224.
\484\ Id. at 1223-24.
\485\ Id. at 1224.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission disagrees with SIFMA AMG's comment that a SEF should
not be able to modify or cancel a swap transaction under any
circumstances without the express consent of the counterparties. The
Commission believes that a SEF should have the authority to modify or
cancel a swap transaction without the consent of the counterparties
under certain limited circumstances. For example, a SEF should be able
to cancel a trade when such trade was executed due to a technological
error on the part of the SEF. Further, the Commission believes that the
rule's requirement that any modifications or cancellations by the SEF
be transparent to the market and subject to standards that are clear,
fair, and publicly available will provide protection to counterparties.
The Commission also acknowledges the validity of SIFMA AMG's concern
that any adjustment to a swap transaction should also be reflected by
entities involved in the clearing and processing of the swap. However,
since imposing such a requirement on entities involved in the clearing
and processing of swaps is outside the scope of this SEF rulemaking,
the Commission declines to address this issue in these final rules.
The Commission also rejects ISDA/SIFMA's recommendation to define
the term ``market disrupting events,'' as it does not believe that a
rule definition could reasonably capture the universe of potentially
market disrupting events. The Commission notes that industry
definitions for terms such as ``market disrupting events'' generally
only establish a process or framework for counterparties and other
third parties to determine whether such an event has occurred and can
be subject to challenge, resulting in delayed determinations with
limited utility for effective trade monitoring. Although the Commission
believes that coordination among SEFs regarding market disrupting
events may be appropriate, and encourages SEFs to do so, the Commission
is not defining ``market disrupting events'' at this time. The
Commission may provide examples at a later time once it gains further
knowledge regarding the types of market disrupting events that are
likely to occur on a SEF.
In response to the comment by Better Markets about high-frequency
trading, the Commission declines to modify proposed Sec. 37.203(e) to
include concepts related specifically to high-frequency trading at this
time.\486\ The Commission believes that a SEF's real-time market
monitoring system should be structured to conduct effective market
monitoring for all order and trade types, including, but not limited
to, high frequency trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\486\ See discussion below regarding high-frequency trading
under Sec. 37.401--General Requirements in the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(6) Sec. 37.203(f)--Investigations and Investigation Reports
Proposed Sec. 37.203(f) required a SEF to establish procedures for
conducting investigations, provided timelines for completing such
investigations, detailed the requirements of an investigation report,
and provided for warning letters.
(i) Sec. 37.203(f)(1)--Procedures
Proposed Sec. 37.203(f)(1) required a SEF to have procedures that
require its compliance staff to conduct investigations of possible rule
[[Page 33514]]
violations. The proposed rule required that an investigation be
commenced upon the Commission staff's request or upon discovery of
information by the SEF indicating a possible basis for finding that a
violation has occurred or will occur.
(A) Summary of Comments
CME argued that the proposed rule diminishes a SEF's discretion to
determine the matters that warrant a formal investigation because at
the time of discovery or upon receipt of information, and before any
review has occurred, there will always be ``a possible basis'' that a
violation has occurred or will occur.\487\ CME agreed that formal
written referrals from the Commission, law enforcement authorities,
other regulatory agencies, or other SROs should result in a formal
investigation in every instance.\488\ However, CME contended that a SEF
should have reasonable discretion to determine how it responds to
complaints, leads, and other types of referrals, including the
discretion to follow-up with a less formal inquiry in certain
situations.\489\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\487\ CME Comment Letter at 21 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\488\ Id.
\489\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MarketAxess expressed concern that the proposed rule is not clear
as to whether a SEF can contract its investigations to its regulatory
service provider.\490\ MarketAxess recommended that the Commission
modify the proposed rule by replacing ``compliance staff'' with ``swap
execution facility'' to clarify that a regulatory service provider that
is responsible for a SEF's rule enforcement program can conduct
investigations on behalf of the SEF.\491\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\490\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 35 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\491\ Id. at 35-36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.203(f)(1) as proposed, subject
to certain modifications described below. The Commission confirms that
in certain circumstances a SEF should have reasonable discretion
regarding whether or not to open an investigation, as noted by CME.
Accordingly, the Commission is amending proposed Sec. 37.203(f)(1) to
provide that an investigation must be commenced by the SEF upon the
receipt of a request from Commission staff or upon the discovery or
receipt of information that indicates a ``reasonable basis'' for
finding that a violation may have occurred or will occur.
In response to MarketAxess's comment that the proposed rule is
unclear, the Commission confirms that a SEF may contract with a
regulatory service provider, as provided for under Sec. 37.204, whose
staff may perform the functions assigned to a SEF's compliance staff
under this rule. In this regard, the Commission also notes that the SEF
must maintain sufficient internal compliance staff to oversee the
quality and effectiveness of the regulatory services provided on its
behalf, and to make certain regulatory decisions, as required by Sec.
37.204.
(ii) Sec. 37.203(f)(2)--Timeliness
Under proposed Sec. 37.203(f)(2), the Commission required that
investigations be completed in a timely manner, defined as 12 months
after an investigation is opened, absent enumerated mitigating
circumstances.
(A) Summary of Comments
CME generally supported the proposed rule, but recommended that the
list of possible mitigating circumstances also include the domicile of
the subjects and cooperative enforcement matters since the SEF may not
have independent control over the pace of the investigation.\492\ CME
also requested that the Commission clarify that the twelve month period
for completing an investigation referenced in proposed Sec.
37.203(f)(2) is separate from the time period necessary to prosecute an
investigation.\493\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\492\ CME Comment Letter at 21 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\493\ Id. at 21-22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.203(f)(2) as proposed. The
Commission believes that a 12-month period to complete an investigation
is appropriate and timely. Although the Commission agrees with CME that
additional mitigating factors could justifiably contribute to a delay
in completing an investigation within a 12-month period, the Commission
notes that the factors included in the proposed rule were not intended
to be an exhaustive list of mitigating circumstances. In the
Commission's view, the factors listed in the proposed rule represent
some of the more common examples that could delay completion of an
investigation within the 12-month period. The Commission also confirms
that Sec. 37.203(f)(2) only applies to the investigation phase of a
matter, and is separate from the time period necessary to prosecute an
investigation.
(iii) Sec. 37.203(f)(3)--Investigation Reports When a Reasonable Basis
Exists for Finding a Violation
Proposed Sec. 37.203(f)(3) required a SEF's compliance staff to
submit an investigation report for disciplinary action any time staff
determined that a reasonable basis existed for finding a rule
violation. The proposed rule also enumerated the items that must be
included in the investigation report, including the market
participant's disciplinary history.
(A) Summary of Comments
CME and ICE commented on the requirement that a respondent's
disciplinary history be included in the investigation report that is
submitted to a Review Panel.\494\ CME asserted that a respondent's
disciplinary history would only be relevant if a prior offense is an
element of proof for the potential rule violation under review.\495\
ICE commented that only substantive violations in the respondent's
history would be relevant to the Review Panel's deliberations.\496\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\494\ ICE Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter
at 22, 35 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\495\ CME Comment Letter at 35 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\496\ ICE Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CME commented that rule violations can range from very minor to
egregious and not every rule violation merits formal disciplinary
action.\497\ CME argued that warning letters are sufficient to address
minor rule violations, rather than the issuance of a formal
investigatory report.\498\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\497\ CME Comment Letter at 22 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\498\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MarketAxess stated that the proposed rule does not specify to whom
the investigation reports must be submitted, and recommended that the
reports be submitted to the SEF's Chief Compliance Officer, consistent
with Core Principle 15.\499\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\499\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 36 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.203(f)(3) as proposed, subject
to one modification. The Commission agrees with CME and ICE that a
respondent's disciplinary history is not always relevant to the
determination of whether the respondent has committed a further
violation of a SEF's rules. Accordingly, the Commission is removing
this requirement from the final rule. The Commission notes, however,
that all disciplinary sanctions, including sanctions imposed pursuant
to an accepted settlement offer, must take into account the
respondent's disciplinary history.
[[Page 33515]]
The Commission confirms, as recommended by CME, that ``minor
transgressions'' can be addressed by a SEF's compliance staff with the
issuance of warning letters as discussed below in Sec. 37.203(f)(5).
However, as further discussed below in Sec. 37.203(f)(5), no more than
one warning letter may be issued to the same person or entity found to
have committed the same rule violation more than once within a rolling
12-month period.\500\
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\500\ The Commission notes that a SEF's issuance of a warning
letter for the violation of a SEF rule neither precludes the
Commission from taking an enforcement action against the recipient
of the warning letter based upon the same underlying conduct, nor
does it provide a defense against any such Commission enforcement
action.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Commission clarifies that a SEF's compliance staff
should submit all completed investigation reports to the member or
members of the SEF's compliance department responsible for reviewing
such reports and determining the next steps in the process, such as
whether to refer the matter to the SEF's disciplinary panel or
authorized compliance staff under Sec. 37.206(c).
(iv) Sec. 37.203(f)(4)--Investigation Reports When No Reasonable Basis
Exists for Finding a Violation
Proposed Sec. 37.203(f)(4) required compliance staff to prepare an
investigation report upon concluding an investigation and determining
that no reasonable basis exists for finding a rule violation. If the
investigation report recommended that a disciplinary panel should issue
a warning letter, then the investigation report must also include a
copy of the warning letter and the market participant's disciplinary
history, including copies of warning letters.
(A) Summary of Comments
CME noted that its Market Regulation Department currently has the
authority to administratively close a case and issue a warning letter
without disciplinary committee approval.\501\ Accordingly, CME
recommended that the Commission amend the proposed rule to reflect that
a SEF will also have such authority.\502\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\501\ CME Comment Letter at 21 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\502\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(B) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.203(f)(4) as proposed, subject
to one modification.\503\ The Commission is eliminating the provision
that discussed the concept of warning letters because the Commission
does not believe that a SEF would need to limit the number of warning
letters that can be issued when a rule violation has not been found.
The Commission notes, however, that this modification does not impact
the limitation on the number of warning letters that may be issued by a
disciplinary panel or by compliance staff to the same person or entity
for the same violation committed more than once in a rolling 12-month
period when a rule violation has been found. The Commission clarifies,
in response to CME's comment, that a SEF may authorize its compliance
staff to close a case administratively and issue a warning letter
without disciplinary panel approval when a reasonable basis does not
exist for finding a rule violation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\503\ Similar to Sec. 37.203(f)(3), the Commission notes that a
SEF's compliance staff should submit all completed investigation
reports to the member or members of the SEF's compliance department
responsible for reviewing such reports and determining the next
steps to take.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(v) Sec. 37.203(f)(5)--Warning Letters
Proposed Sec. 37.203(f)(5) provided that a SEF may authorize its
compliance staff to issue a warning letter or to recommend that a
disciplinary committee issue a warning letter. The proposed rule also
prohibited a SEF from issuing more than one warning letter to the same
person or entity for the same potential violation during a rolling 12-
month period.
(A) Summary of Comments
Some commenters opposed the proposed limitation on the number of
warning letters issued during a rolling 12-month period.\504\ CME
contended that the rule does not consider important factors that are
relevant to a SEF when evaluating potential sanctions in a disciplinary
matter.\505\ CME believed that the SEF should have discretion to
determine the appropriate actions in all cases based on the ``totality
of the circumstances.'' \506\ ICE stated that this limitation would
discourage self-reporting of violations because of the lack of
discretion in a resulting penalty assessment.\507\ MarketAxess
requested that the Commission adopt a more uniform approach with
respect to warning letters, permitting them to be issued as a sanction
or an indication of a finding of a violation in all SEF contexts.\508\
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\504\ ICE Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter
at 22 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\505\ CME Comment Letter at 22 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\506\ Id.
\507\ ICE Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\508\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 36 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(B) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting proposed Sec. 37.203(f)(5), subject to
certain modifications, including converting a portion of the rule to
guidance in appendix B to part 37.
The Commission is maintaining in the final rule the limitation on
the number of warning letters issued. The Commission acknowledges the
comments from CME and ICE concerning the issuance of warning letters,
but believes that to ensure that warning letters serve as effective
deterrents and to preserve the value of disciplinary sanctions, no more
than one warning letter may be issued to the same person or entity
found to have committed the same rule violation more than once within a
rolling 12-month period.\509\ As discussed in the SEF NPRM, while a
warning letter may be appropriate for a first-time violation, the
Commission does not believe that more than one warning letter in a
rolling 12-month period for the same violation is ever
appropriate.\510\ Further, a policy of issuing repeated warning
letters, rather than issuing meaningful sanctions, to market
participants who repeatedly violate the same rules reduces the
effectiveness of a SEF's rule enforcement program.\511\
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\509\ For purposes of this rule, the Commission does not
consider a ``reminder letter'' or such other similar letter to be
any different than a warning letter.
\510\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1224.
\511\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, in response to commenters' concerns, the Commission is
narrowing the application of this rule to warning letters that contain
an affirmative finding that a rule violation has occurred. Therefore,
the Commission is removing the provision in the proposed rule that a
warning letter issued in accordance with this section is not a penalty
or an indication that a finding of a violation has been made. To remain
consistent with the modifications to proposed Sec. 37.203(f)(3) and
(f)(4), the Commission is also deleting the proposed requirement that
investigation reports required by paragraphs (f)(3) and (f)(4) of this
section must include a copy of the warning letter issued by compliance
staff.
As noted above, the Commission agrees with CME's comment that minor
transgressions can be addressed by a SEF's compliance staff issuing a
warning letter. Accordingly, in order to provide a SEF with flexibility
in this regard, the Commission is moving this provision of the rule to
the guidance in appendix B to part 37. The text of the guidance
provides that the rules of a SEF may authorize its compliance staff to
issue a warning letter to a person or entity under investigation or to
[[Page 33516]]
recommend that a disciplinary panel take such action.
(7) Sec. 37.203(g)--Additional Rules Required
Proposed Sec. 37.203(g) required a SEF to adopt and enforce any
additional rules that it believes are necessary to comply with the
requirements of Sec. 37.203.
(i) Commission Determination
The Commission did not receive any comments on proposed Sec.
37.203(g); however, the Commission is moving this rule to the guidance
in appendix B to part 37. The Commission believes that this requirement
is already implicit in Core Principle 2 and need not be addressed
separately as a final rule. Additionally, moving proposed Sec.
37.203(g) to guidance provides SEFs with added flexibility in adopting
additional rules that it believes are necessary to comply with the
rules related to Core Principle 2. Consistent with this determination,
the Commission is replacing proposed Sec. 37.203(g) with final Sec.
37.203(g) (titled ``Additional sources for compliance'') that simply
permits SEFs to rely upon the guidance in appendix B to part 37 to
demonstrate to the Commission compliance with Sec. 37.203.
(e) Sec. 37.204--Regulatory Services Provided by a Third Party
(1) Sec. 37.204(a)--Use of Third-Party Provider Permitted \512\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\512\ The Commission is renaming the title of this section from
``Use of Third-Party Provider Permitted'' to ``Use of Regulatory
Service Provider Permitted'' to provide greater clarity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 37.204(a) allowed a SEF to contract with a
registered futures association or another registered entity to assist
in complying with the SEF core principles, as approved by the
Commission. The proposed rule also stated that a SEF that elects to use
the services of a regulatory service provider must ensure that such
provider has the capacity and resources to provide timely and effective
regulatory services. The proposed rule further stated that a SEF will
at all times remain responsible for the performance of any regulatory
services received, for compliance with the SEF's obligations under the
Act and Commission regulations, and for the regulatory service
provider's performance on its behalf.
(i) Summary of Comments
Commenters generally supported the Commission's proposal to allow
third parties to provide regulatory services.\513\ However, MarketAxess
argued that the Commission should permit an entity that is not a
registered futures association or another registered entity with the
Commission to perform regulatory services on behalf of a SEF, such as
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (``FINRA'').\514\ In the
alternative, MarketAxess recommended that the Commission should permit
SEFs, if desired, to form a joint venture to create a special
regulatory service provider for SEFs that would not be a registered
entity.\515\ Similarly, several commenters supported a centralized,
common regulatory organization (``CRO'') that would facilitate
compliance with SEF core principles.\516\ In this regard, WMBAA stated
that a CRO would establish a uniform SEF standard of conduct,
streamline the Commission's evaluation of each SEF registration
application, and conduct effective surveillance of fungible swap
products trading on multiple SEFs.\517\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\513\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 14-15 (Mar. 8, 2011);
Reuters Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011); Bloomberg Comment Letter
at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011); NFA Comment Letter at 1 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\514\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 15 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\515\ Id.
\516\ Parity Energy Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 25, 2011); WMBAA
Comment Letter at 22 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall Comment Letter at 12
(Mar. 8, 2011).
\517\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 22 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MarketAxess and Tradeweb requested clarification on how the
Commission will assess and approve regulatory service providers.\518\
In this regard, Tradeweb commented that SEFs should have flexibility in
contracting with third party service providers, so long as the SEF uses
reasonable diligence and acts in a manner consistent with market
practice.\519\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\518\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 15 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb
Comment Letter at 10 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\519\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 10 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.204(a) as proposed, subject to
two modifications. In response to MarketAxess's comment about non-
registered entities performing regulatory services, the Commission is
revising the proposed rule to allow FINRA to assist SEFs in complying
with the core principles. The Commission notes that FINRA has provided
similar regulatory services for the securities industry for many years
and may serve as a self-regulatory organization for SB-SEFs. Therefore,
the Commission believes that allowing FINRA to serve as a regulatory
service provider for SEFs is appropriate because FINRA is likely to
have the qualifications, capacity, and resources to provide timely and
effective regulatory services for SEFs.
The Commission recognizes the concerns that WMBAA and others have
with respect to SEFs conducting market-wide surveillance activities. As
discussed elsewhere in this final rulemaking,\520\ an individual SEF
may have limited ability to monitor trading activities across markets
since individual swaps may be listed on multiple SEFs (as well as any
DCMs listing swaps). The Commission clarifies that a SEF (or a
regulatory service provider on a SEF's behalf), under Core Principle 2
and the Commission's regulations thereunder, is only responsible for
surveillance and rule enforcement of the SEF's systems and platforms,
and Core Principle 2 does not impose a cross-market surveillance
requirement on a SEF.\521\ Therefore, the final rules do not require
the use of a single industry-wide CRO to assist SEFs with cross-market
surveillance. While not requiring it, the final rules also do not
prohibit the use of a single industry-wide CRO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\520\ See, e.g., discussion under Sec. 37.203(d)--Automated
Trade Surveillance System and Core Principle 6--Position Limits or
Accountability in the preamble.
\521\ The Commission notes that other core principles, such as
Core Principle 4, and the Commission's regulations thereunder may
require SEFs to conduct certain cross-market monitoring.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to MarketAxess's and Tradeweb's comments regarding the
Commission's assessment and approval of regulatory service providers,
the Commission notes that it will assess and approve the use of such
service providers during the full registration process. The Commission
also notes that Exhibit N to Form SEF requests executed or executable
copies of any agreements with regulatory service providers.
Finally, the Commission is modifying Sec. 37.204(a) to make clear
that a SEF may use the services of a regulatory service provider for
the provision of services to assist the SEF in complying with ``the Act
and Commission regulations thereunder'' rather than simply the SEF core
principles as stated in proposed Sec. 37.204(a). The modification
aligns the rule text with what the Commission has always intended to be
the range of a SEF's self-regulatory obligations.
(2) Sec. 37.204(b)--Duty To Supervise Third Party \522\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\522\ The Commission is renaming the title of this section from
``Duty to Supervise Third Party'' to ``Duty to Supervise Regulatory
Service Provider'' to provide greater clarity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 37.204(b) required that a SEF maintain sufficient
compliance staff to supervise any services performed by
[[Page 33517]]
a regulatory service provider. The proposed rule also required that the
SEF hold regular meetings with its regulatory service provider to
discuss current work and other matters of regulatory concern, as well
as conduct periodic reviews of the adequacy and effectiveness of
services provided on its behalf. In addition, proposed Sec. 37.204(b)
required a SEF to carefully document the reviews and make them
available to the Commission upon request.
(i) Summary of Comments
Two commenters recommended that the Commission adopt a more
flexible rule with respect to a SEF's duty to supervise its regulatory
service provider.\523\ In this regard, NFA recommended that the
Commission provide flexibility to a SEF and its regulatory service
provider to mutually determine the necessary process for a SEF to
supervise its regulatory service provider.\524\ CME recommended that
the Commission move the rule to guidance or acceptable practices.\525\
In particular, CME pointed to the requirements that a SEF conduct
periodic reviews of the services provided and hold regular meetings
with the regulatory service provider to discuss ongoing investigations,
trading patterns, market participants, and any other matters of
regulatory concern.\526\ CME stated that ``[w]hile it may well be that
it is constructive for the [SEF] to hold regular meetings with its
service provider and `discuss market participants,' the core principle
should stand on its own and the [SEF] should have the flexibility to
determine how best to demonstrate compliance with the core principle.''
\527\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\523\ NFA Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter
at 18-19 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\524\ NFA Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\525\ CME Comment Letter at 19 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\526\ Id. at 18-19.
\527\ Id. at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.204(b) as proposed.\528\ The
Commission acknowledges the commenters' desire for a flexible approach,
but notes that a SEF that elects to use a regulatory service provider
remains responsible for the regulatory services received and for
compliance with the Act and Commission regulations. The SEF therefore
must properly supervise the quality and effectiveness of the regulatory
services provided on its behalf. The Commission believes that proper
supervision will require that a SEF have complete and timely knowledge
of relevant work performed by the SEF's regulatory service provider on
its behalf. The Commission also believes that this knowledge can only
be acquired through periodic reviews and regular meetings required
under Sec. 37.204(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\528\ The Commission is making certain non-substantive
clarifications to Sec. 37.204(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Sec. 37.204(c)--Regulatory Decisions Required From the SEF
Proposed Sec. 37.204(c) required a SEF that utilizes a regulatory
service provider to retain exclusive authority over all substantive
decisions made by its regulatory service provider, including the
cancellation of trades, issuance of disciplinary charges, denials of
access to the trading platform for disciplinary reasons, and any
decision to open an investigation into a possible rule violation.
Further, the proposed rule required a SEF to document any instance
where its actions differed from those recommended by its regulatory
service provider.
(i) Summary of Comments
CME objected to the idea that all decisions concerning the
cancellation of trades remain in the exclusive authority of the
SEF.\529\ CME contended that a SEF may be better served by granting
such authority to a regulatory service provider because such decisions
require prompt decision-making.\530\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\529\ CME Comment Letter at 19 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\530\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.204(c) as proposed, subject to
two modifications. First, the Commission is removing the requirement
that a decision to open an investigation reside exclusively with the
SEF. The final rule grants a SEF the latitude to determine whether
investigations will be opened by the SEF, by its regulatory service
provider, or some combination of the two. The Commission believes that
opening investigations is an administrative task and does not
necessarily imply the threat of formal disciplinary action or sanctions
against a market participant. Second, the Commission is amending the
rule to clarify that when a SEF documents instances when its actions
differ from those recommended by its regulatory service provider, the
SEF must include the reasons for the course of action recommended by
the regulatory service provider and the reasons why the SEF chose a
different course of action.
The Commission disagrees with CME's comment concerning the
``cancellation of trades'' and believes that a SEF must retain
exclusive authority in this regard. Cancelling trades is an important
exercise of a SEF's authority over its markets and market participants.
Cancelled trades may have meaningful economic consequences to the swap
counterparties involved in the transaction, and may be the subject of
contention between the counterparties if they do not both agree to the
cancellation. The Commission emphasizes that permanent, consequential
decisions must remain with the SEF.
(f) Sec. 37.205--Audit Trail
Proposed Sec. 37.205 implements Core Principle 2's requirement
that SEFs capture information that may be used in establishing whether
rule violations have occurred.\531\ Accordingly, proposed Sec. 37.205
required a SEF to establish procedures to capture and retain
information that may be used in establishing whether rule violations
have occurred. The proposed rule, along with its subparts, established
the requirements of an acceptable audit trail program and the
enforcement of such program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\531\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(B)(ii); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Sec. 37.205(a)--Audit Trail Required
Proposed Sec. 37.205(a) required a SEF to capture and retain all
audit trail data so that the SEF has the ability to detect,
investigate, and prevent customer and market abuses. The proposed rule
also provided that the audit trail data must be sufficient to
reconstruct all transactions within a reasonable period of time and to
provide evidence of any rule violations that may have occurred.
Proposed Sec. 37.205(a) further provided that the audit trail must
permit the SEF to track a customer order from the time of receipt
through fill, allocation, or other disposition, and must include both
order and trade data.
(i) Summary of Comments
WMBAA requested that the Commission establish a common format for
audit trail data to ensure consistency among all SEFs and to make the
information easier for the Commission to use and review when
investigating customer and market abuses.\532\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\532\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 22-23 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.205(a) as proposed, subject to
the
[[Page 33518]]
modifications described below.\533\ The Commission believes that the
requirement that SEFs capture and retain all audit trial data is
essential to ensuring that SEFs can capture information to establish
whether rule violations have occurred, as required by Core Principle
2.\534\ Additionally, the creation and retention of a comprehensive
audit trail will enable SEFs to properly reconstruct any and all market
and trading events and to conduct a thorough forensic review of all
market information. The Commission believes that the ability to
reconstruct markets in such a manner is a fundamental element of a
SEF's surveillance and rule enforcement programs. Consistent with these
principles, the Commission is modifying Sec. 37.205(a) to clarify that
the audit trail data must be sufficient to reconstruct trades and
sufficient to reconstruct indications of interest, requests for quotes,
and orders within a reasonable period of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\533\ The Commission is making certain non-substantive
clarifications to Sec. 37.205(a).
\534\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(B)(ii); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both the proposed and final rules in Sec. 37.205(a) require that a
SEF ``capture and retain all audit trail data necessary to detect,
investigate, and prevent customer and market abuses'' (emphasis added).
The Commission notes that information required to detect abuses may in
some cases include all communications between market participants and a
SEF's trading system or platform. The Commission also notes that a
SEF's obligation to capture in its audit trail all data necessary to
detect, investigate, and prevent customer and market abuses is not
altered by the nature of the trading system or platform that a SEF may
choose to utilize, including a system or platform that, for example,
utilizes the telephone. For example, an acceptable audit trail for a
SEF with a telephone component should include communications between
the SEF's employees and their customers, as well as any communications
between employees as they work customer indications of interest,
requests for quotes, orders, and trades. An acceptable audit trail must
capture the totality of communications (including, but not limited to,
telephone, instant messaging, email, written records, and electronic
communications within a trading system or platform) that could be
necessary to detect, investigate, and prevent customer and market
abuses, as required by both proposed and final Sec. 37.205(a).
The Commission believes that WMBAA's suggestion to establish a
common format for audit trail data may provide some value for SEFs that
wish to coordinate and establish such a standard. However, the intent
of the final rules is to require that a SEF establish and maintain an
effective audit trail program, not to dictate the method or form for
maintaining such information. Importantly, the rule, by not being
prescriptive, provides SEFs with flexibility to determine the manner
and the technology necessary and appropriate to meet the requirements.
The Commission notes, nevertheless, that staff from the Commission's
Office of Data and Technology will coordinate with SEFs to establish
standards for the submission of audit trail data to the Commission.
(2) Sec. 37.205(b)--Elements of an Acceptable Audit Trail Program
Proposed Sec. 37.205(b)(1) required a SEF's audit trail to include
original source documents, on which trade execution information was
originally recorded, as well as records for customer orders, whether or
not they were filled. The proposed rule also required that a SEF that
permits intermediation must require all executable orders or RFQs
received over the telephone to be immediately entered into the trading
system or platform. Proposed Sec. 37.205(b)(2) required that a SEF's
audit trail program include a transaction history database and
specified the trade information required to be included in the
database. Proposed Sec. 37.205(b)(3) required the audit trail program
to also have electronic analysis capability for the transaction history
database. Proposed Sec. 37.205(b)(4) required the audit trail program
to include the ability to safely store all audit trail data and to
retain it in accordance with the recordkeeping requirements of SEF Core
Principle 10 and its associated regulations.
(i) Summary of Comments
WMBAA commented that the requirement for records to be retained for
customer orders should not apply to indications of interest because it
would extend beyond the Commission's statutory authority and the audit
trail requirements currently in place in other financial markets, and
would be unnecessarily costly and burdensome.\535\ WMBAA also commented
that the audit trail requirements must permit the retention of relevant
information through various modes because SEFs may operate trade
execution platforms ``through any means of interstate commerce.'' \536\
Better Markets commented that audit trail records, such as records of
customers' orders and their disposition, must be time-stamped at
intervals that are consistent with the capabilities of high-frequency
traders that use SEFs.\537\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\535\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 23 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\536\ Id.
\537\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 18 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting proposed Sec. 37.205(b), subject to the
modifications discussed below. The Commission is clarifying that ``time
of trade execution'' must be included in the data points of an
acceptable audit trail, and is noting this clarification in final Sec.
37.205(b)(1). The Commission is also revising proposed Sec.
37.205(b)(2) to specify that a transaction history database must
include a history of ``all indications of interest, requests for
quotes, orders, and trades entered into a [SEF's] trading system or
platform, including all order modifications and cancellations.''
Further, the Commission is revising proposed Sec. 37.205(b)(3) to
specifically state that a SEF's electronic analysis capability must
provide it with the ``ability to reconstruct indications of interest,
requests for quotes, orders, and trades, and identify possible trading
violations.'' The revisions to Sec. 37.205(b)(2) and (b)(3), subject
to the additions of the indications of interest and requests for quotes
language, reflect regulatory requirements previously proposed as part
of Sec. 37.203(d), but, as noted above, the Commission is moving these
requirements to final Sec. 37.205(b). Additionally, the Commission is
revising proposed Sec. 37.205(b)(2) by replacing the customer type
indicators listed in the proposed rule with the term ``customer type
indicator code.''
In response to WMBAA's comment regarding indications of interest,
the Commission believes that retaining information about indications of
interest provides another important detail of an audit trail, just as
information of filled, unfilled, or cancelled orders provides important
information for the SEF. This information enables a SEF to fulfill its
statutory duty under Core Principle 2, which requires a SEF to capture
information that may be used in establishing whether rule violations
have occurred.\538\ Absent this information, SEFs would be limited in
their ability to monitor their markets and to detect, investigate, and
prevent customer and market abuses and trading
[[Page 33519]]
rule violations. However, as discussed above, the Commission has
removed the requirement for SEFs to offer indicative quote
functionality, which should reduce the costs of complying with the
audit trail requirements.\539\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\538\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(B)(ii); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B)(ii).
\539\ See discussion above regarding Minimum Trading
Functionality under Sec. 37.3--Requirements for Registration in the
preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to WMBAA's comment about the flexibility of audit trail
requirements to accommodate various methods of execution, the
Commission notes that proposed Sec. 37.205(b) did not discriminate
based on the method of execution. Given the Commission's clarification
that a SEF may utilize any means of interstate commerce in providing
the execution methods in Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(i)(A) or (B), the Commission
emphasizes that no matter how an indication of interest, request for
quote, or order is communicated or a trade is executed, an audit trail
that satisfies the requirements set forth in Sec. 37.205 must be
created.
The Commission is also making certain conforming changes to Sec.
37.205(b)(1) to harmonize its provisions with the Commission's
determination that a SEF may utilize any means of interstate commerce
in providing the execution methods in Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(i)(A) or (B).
First, the Commission is adding ``indications of interest'' to the
items that must be immediately captured in the audit trail pursuant to
Sec. 37.205(b)(1). Second, while proposed Sec. 37.205(b)(1) required
that all executable orders or requests for quotes ``be immediately
entered into the trading system or platform,'' Sec. 37.205(b)(1) as
adopted requires that such information be immediately ``captured in the
audit trail.'' This approach more accurately reflects the intent of
Sec. 37.205, whose purpose is to ensure an adequate audit trail,
rather than to address the operation of a SEF's trading system or
platform.
Accordingly, the final rules in Sec. 37.205(b)(1) include
conforming changes that remove the reference in proposed Sec.
37.205(b)(1) to orders or requests for quotes ``that are executable,''
and also remove the qualification that a SEF's obligation to capture
information in the audit trail is dependent on whether the SEF permits
intermediation. Finally, the final rules remove the additional audit
trail requirement in proposed Sec. 37.205(b)(1) for orders and
requests for quotes that cannot be immediately entered into the trading
system or platform. These clarifications are consistent with the
Commission's intention in Sec. 37.205(a) that a SEF's audit trail
``capture and retain all audit trail data necessary to detect,
investigate, and prevent customer and market abuses.'' It is the
Commission's intent throughout Sec. 37.205 to ensure that all SEFs'
audit trails are equally comprehensive and effective regardless of the
means of interstate commerce that a SEF may provide to meet the
execution methods in Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(i)(A) or (B).
Although Sec. 37.205 sets forth a unified set of audit trail
requirements for all methods of execution, the Commission notes that a
SEF, for example, that utilizes the telephone as a means of interstate
commerce in providing the execution methods in Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(i)(A)
or (B) may comply with the audit trail requirements by utilizing
different technologies than a SEF that does not utilize the telephone.
For example, the Commission believes that a SEF that utilizes the
telephone may comply with the audit trail requirements in Sec.
37.205(a) for oral communications by recording all such communications
that relate to swap transactions, and all communications that may
subsequently result in swap transactions. Such recordings must allow
for reconstruction of communications between the SEF and its customers;
reconstruction of internal and external communications involving SEF
employees who are ascertaining or providing indications of interest,
requests for quotes, or orders; reconstruction of executed
transactions; provide evidence of any rule violations; track a
customer's order; and capture order and trade data as required under
Sec. 37.205(a).
The Commission also believes that a SEF that utilizes the telephone
may comply with the original source document requirement in Sec.
37.205(b)(1) for oral communications by retaining each recording's
original media. By storing the recordings in a digital database and
supplementing it with additional data as necessary, the Commission
believes that a SEF that utilizes the telephone may comply with the
transaction history database requirement in Sec. 37.205(b)(2) for oral
communications. Additionally, the Commission believes that a SEF that
utilizes the telephone may comply with the electronic analysis
capability in Sec. 37.205(b)(3) for oral communications by ensuring
that its digital database of recordings is capable of being searched
and analyzed. The Commission notes, however, that Sec. 37.205(b) does
not establish an affirmative requirement to create recordings of oral
communications if the audit trail requirements are met through other
methods. The discussion above regarding the applicability of audit
trail requirements to SEFs that utilize the telephone in providing the
execution methods in Sec. 37.9(a)(2) applies equally to SEFs that use
non-telephonic means of communication (e.g., instant messaging or
email). In all cases, the operative requirement is to capture in the
audit trail and the transaction history database the totality of
communications that could be necessary to detect, investigate, and
prevent customer and market abuses.
The Commission acknowledges the comment by Better Markets regarding
time-stamping audit trail records at intervals that are consistent with
the capabilities of high-frequency traders. While the audit trail rules
do not specify the granularity of time-stamped data, the Commission
believes that the audit trail rules adopted herein, particularly the
requirements that a SEF retain and maintain all data necessary to
permit it to reconstruct trading, will help to ensure that audit trail
records are time-stamped with the granularity necessary to reconstruct
trades and investigate possible trading violations, including for high-
frequency trading.\540\
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\540\ The Commission notes, as stated above under Sec.
37.203(d)--Automated Trade Surveillance System in the preamble, that
the accurate time stamping of data is particularly important for
SEFs that use an RFQ System, including an RFQ System with a voice
component. For such SEFs, the accurate time stamping of both their
Order Book and RFQ System activity is critical for ensuring both
that the SEF itself has a robust audit trail system and that the
Commission is able to monitor the SEF's adherence to part 37's Order
Book-RFQ System integration requirements.
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(3) Sec. 37.205(c)--Enforcement of Audit Trail Requirements
Proposed Sec. 37.205(c)(1) required that a SEF conduct reviews, at
least annually, of its members and market participants to verify their
compliance with the SEF's audit trail and recordkeeping requirements.
Proposed Sec. 37.205(c)(1) also set forth minimum review criteria.
Proposed Sec. 37.205(c)(2) required that a SEF develop a program for
effective enforcement of its audit trail and recordkeeping
requirements, including a requirement that a SEF levy meaningful
sanctions when deficiencies are found. Proposed Sec. 37.205(c)(2) also
stated that sanctions may not include more than one warning letter for
the same violation within a rolling twelve-month period.
(i) Summary of Comments
Some commenters stated that annual audits are unnecessary and
unduly
[[Page 33520]]
burdensome.\541\ CME commented that annual audits of all SEF market
participants would be costly and unproductive, and should instead apply
at the clearing firm level.\542\ MarketAxess recommended that the
Commission require a single entity or self-regulatory organization,
such as FINRA or NFA, to conduct the audit of each SEF market
participant.\543\ Tradeweb commented that the proposed annual audit
review requirement is not required of DCMs and, as such, should not be
required of SEFs.\544\
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\541\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 6 (Jun. 3, 2011); MarketAxess
Comment Letter at 22 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 33 (Feb.
22, 2011).
\542\ CME Comment Letter at 33 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\543\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 22 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\544\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 6 (Jun. 3, 2011).
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(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.205(c) as proposed, subject to
certain modifications as discussed below. The Commission disagrees with
commenters who assert that the annual audit review requirement is
unnecessary, unduly burdensome, costly, and unproductive. Through its
experience with DCMs and DCOs, the Commission has learned that
sampling-based reviews of audit trail and recordkeeping requirements
are inadequate to ensure compliance with audit trail rules. The
Commission believes that the requirements under Sec. 37.205(c) are
necessary to ensure that SEFs have accurate and consistent access to
all data needed to reconstruct all transactions in their markets and to
provide evidence of customer and market abuses. Absent reliable audit
trail data, a SEF's ability to detect or investigate customer or market
abuses may be severely diminished.
However, in response to commenters' concerns that the rule is
burdensome, the Commission is narrowing the scope of the proposed rule
by removing the reference to ``market participants'' and instead
stating that the annual audit review requirement only applies to
members and those persons and firms that are subject to the SEF's
recordkeeping rules. As a result of this revision, the Commission
declines to adopt CME's recommendation to require annual audit trail
reviews only at the clearing firm level.
The Commission is maintaining proposed Sec. 37.205(c)(2) as a rule
to ensure that SEFs impose meaningful sanctions for violations of audit
trail and recordkeeping rules. However, the Commission is revising the
rule to clarify that the limit on warning letters only applies where a
SEF's compliance staff finds an actual rule violation, rather than just
the suspicion of a violation. This change is consistent with the
revisions in other sections discussing warning letters.\545\
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\545\ See, e.g., discussion above under Sec. 37.203(f)(5)--
Warning Letters in the preamble.
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In response to MarketAxess's recommendation that a single entity
conduct the audit of each SEF market participant, the Commission
believes that a SEF can monitor market participants on its own platform
without relying upon a single cross-market self-regulatory
organization. However, a SEF may use a regulatory service provider
pursuant to Sec. 37.204 to assist it in complying with the
requirements under Sec. 37.205(c).
In response to Tradeweb's comment that the annual audit review
requirement is not required of DCMs, the Commission notes that it
adopted a similar requirement for DCMs under Sec. 38.553 of the
Commission's regulations, to apply to all members and persons and firms
subject to the DCM's recordkeeping rules.\546\ The Commission believes
that similar requirements are appropriate because, as noted above,
SEFs, like DCMs, must have accurate and consistent access to all data
needed to reconstruct all transactions in their markets, including
indications of interest, requests for quotes, orders, and trades, and
to detect, investigate, and prevent customer and market abuses.
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\546\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated
Contract Markets, 77 FR at 36704.
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(g) Sec. 37.206--Disciplinary Procedures and Sanctions
(1) Sec. 37.206--Disciplinary Procedures and Sanctions
Proposed Sec. 37.206 addressed SEF Core Principle 2's requirement
that SEFs establish and enforce trading, trade processing, and
participation rules to deter abuse, and have the capacity to
investigate and enforce such abuses.\547\ Proposed Sec. 37.206
provided that SEFs must establish trading, trade processing, and
participation rules that will deter abuses and have the capacity to
enforce such rules through prompt and effective disciplinary action.
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\547\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B).
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(i) Summary of Comments
Some commenters generally stated that the proposed disciplinary
procedures go beyond the statute and intent of Congress.\548\ In this
regard, FXall stated that, unlike DCMs, retail customers will not be
participants on SEFs; therefore, the same level of protection afforded
to DCM participants is not required for SEFs.\549\ Some commenters
recommended that the proposed disciplinary procedures should be
streamlined through the use of a staff summary fine program.\550\ Some
commenters also requested that SEFs be granted greater flexibility to
establish their own disciplinary procedures.\551\ Tradeweb stated that
the proposed disciplinary procedures would impose significant costs on
SEFs and should be contracted to a central, third-party self-regulatory
organization.\552\
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\548\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 23 (Mar. 8, 2011); ABC/CIEBA
Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall Comment Letter at 12
(Mar. 8, 2011); ICAP Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); State
Street Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\549\ FXall Comment Letter at 12 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\550\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 23 (Mar. 8, 2011), WMBAA
Comment Letter at 24 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall Comment Letter at 12
(Mar. 8, 2011).
\551\ FXall Comment Letter at 12 (Mar. 8, 2011); ICAP Comment
Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Reuters Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8,
2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 23 (Mar. 8, 2011); State Street
Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\552\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 10 (Mar. 8, 2011). Parity
Energy also commented that the proposed disciplinary rules will
impose unnecessary costs and create unnecessary duplication and the
possibility of conflicting rules. Parity Energy Comment Letter at 4
(Mar. 25, 2011).
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(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission's evaluation of public comments with respect to
proposed Sec. 37.206 is based on its understanding that a SEF's
obligation to establish adequate disciplinary rules is implicit in the
statutory language of Core Principle 2, which requires, in part, that a
SEF establish and enforce trading, trade processing, and participation
rules to deter abuse and have the capacity to investigate and enforce
such rules.\553\ The Commission also takes note of public comments
requesting greater flexibility in the application of SEF disciplinary
rules. Accordingly, consistent with both its statutory mandate and its
evaluation of the public comments received, the Commission is adopting
elements of Sec. 37.206 as proposed, while also moving to guidance or
eliminating other parts of the proposed rules.\554\
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\553\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B).
\554\ The Commission is also revising Sec. 37.206 to include
the term ``member'' in addition to the term ``market participant''
in order to provide greater detail and clarity. The Commission
notes, as described above in Sec. 37.200, that the term ``market
participant'' encompasses SEF ``members.''
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The Commission believes that the specific disciplinary rules
retained in the final rules are those that are essential to the
promotion of market integrity by ensuring that SEF markets are free of
fraud or abuse, and also helping to provide basic procedural fairness
for SEF disciplinary
[[Page 33521]]
respondents. While the SEF NPRM noted that the SEF disciplinary
procedures parallel those for DCMs,\555\ the Commission has determined
that the level of protection offered by the proposed rules was more
appropriate for markets that include retail participants, in contrast
to SEFs, whose participants are limited to ECPs.\556\ Consequently, the
Commission is moving to guidance numerous procedural protections set
forth in the proposed rules that are more tailored to retail
participants, including the requirements relating to the issuance of a
notice of charges, and a respondent's right to representation, right to
answer charges, and right to request a hearing.
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\555\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1225 n. 73.
\556\ The Commission also believes that guidance is more
appropriate for the SEF disciplinary procedures because the SEF core
principles do not have a parallel to DCM Core Principle 13, which
specifically discusses disciplinary procedures.
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The remaining final rules provide an essential framework that the
Commission believes adequately ensures the effectiveness of a SEF's
disciplinary program. Accordingly, the Commission is maintaining the
proposed disciplinary rules that represent the most critical components
of a disciplinary program, including the requirements that a SEF: (1)
Establish disciplinary panels that meet certain composition
requirements; (2) levy meaningful disciplinary sanctions to deter
recidivism; and (3) issue no more than one warning letter per rolling
12-month period for the same violation by the same respondent. The
Commission believes that with these modifications, Sec. 37.206 strikes
the appropriate balance between providing the flexibility requested by
the commenters and ensuring that SEFs comply with their statutory
obligation under Core Principle 2.
Some commenters recommended that the proposed disciplinary
procedures should be streamlined through the use of a summary fine
program. The Commission believes that, while summary fines may be
appropriate for some disciplinary matters, such as recordkeeping
violations, many disciplinary matters are dynamic and require the
balancing of multiple unique facts and circumstances, which cannot be
addressed through a summary fine program. Therefore, the Commission
declines to adopt a summary fine program in lieu of disciplinary
procedures.
In response to Tradeweb's comment about contracting out certain
aspects of a SEF's disciplinary functions to a central third-party, the
Commission notes that it views SEFs as SROs,\557\ with all the
attendant self-regulatory responsibilities to establish and enforce
rules necessary to promote market integrity and the protection of
market participants. Such responsibilities include the adherence to,
and maintenance of, disciplinary procedures. The Commission notes that
a SEF may utilize the services of a third-party regulatory service
provider for assistance in performing its self-regulatory functions, as
provided for in Sec. 37.204.
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\557\ See Adaptation of Regulations to Incorporate Swaps, 77 FR
66288 (Nov. 2, 2012). Section 1.3(ee) states that a self-regulatory
organization ``means a contract market (as defined in Sec. 1.3(h)),
a swap execution facility (as defined in Sec. 1.3(rrrr)), or a
registered futures association under section 17 of the Act.'' Id. at
66318.
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(2) Sec. 37.206(a)--Enforcement Staff
Proposed Sec. 37.206(a) required that a SEF establish and maintain
sufficient enforcement staff and resources to effectively and promptly
prosecute possible rule violations within the SEF's jurisdiction.
Proposed Sec. 37.206(a) also required a SEF to monitor the size and
workload of its enforcement staff annually. In addition, proposed Sec.
37.206(a) included provisions to ensure the independence of the
enforcement staff and to help promote disciplinary procedures that are
free of potential conflicts of interest.
(i) Commission Determination
In response to the general comments requesting greater flexibility
regarding disciplinary procedures, the Commission is moving all of the
requirements of proposed Sec. 37.206(a) to guidance, except for the
critical requirement that a SEF maintain sufficient enforcement staff
and resources. The Commission believes that sufficient enforcement
staff and resources are essential to the effective performance of a
SEF's disciplinary program and are necessary to comply with Core
Principle 2. Without a sufficient enforcement staff and resources, a
SEF would be unable to promptly investigate and adjudicate potential
rule violations and deter future violations. To maintain consistency
with the revisions to proposed Sec. 37.203(c)(2), the Commission is
deleting from the rule the reference that a SEF monitor the size and
workload of its enforcement staff annually to provide greater
flexibility to SEFs in determining their approach to monitoring their
enforcement resources. Nonetheless, the Commission believes that a
SEF's obligation to monitor its enforcement staff and resources is
implicit in the requirement to maintain adequate enforcement staff and
resources.
(3) Sec. 37.206(b)--Disciplinary Panels
Proposed Sec. 37.206(b)(1) required a SEF to establish one or more
Review Panels and one or more Hearing Panels. The composition of both
panels was required to meet the composition requirements of proposed
Sec. 40.9(c)(3)(ii) \558\ and could not include any members of the
SEF's compliance staff or any person involved in adjudicating any other
stage of the same proceeding. Proposed Sec. 37.206(b)(2) provided that
a Review Panel must be responsible for determining whether a reasonable
basis exists for finding a violation of SEF rules and for authorizing
the issuance of a notice of charges. If a notice of charges is issued,
proposed Sec. 37.206(b)(3) provided that a Hearing Panel must be
responsible for adjudicating the matter and issuing sanctions.
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\558\ Section 40.9(c)(3)(ii), as proposed, in the separate
release titled Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations,
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding
the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, provided that ``Each
Disciplinary Panel shall include at least one person who would not
be disqualified from serving as a Public Director by Sec.
1.3(ccc)(1)(i)-(vi) and (2) of this chapter (a ``Public
Participant''). Such Public Participant shall chair each
Disciplinary Panel. In addition, any registered entity specified in
paragraph (c)(3)(i) of this section shall adopt rules that would, at
a minimum: (A) Further preclude any group or class of participants
from dominating or exercising disproportionate influence on a
Disciplinary Panel and (B) Prohibit any member of a Disciplinary
Panel from participating in deliberations or voting on any matter in
which the member has a financial interest.'' 75 FR 63732, 63752
(proposed Oct. 18, 2010).
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(i) Summary of Comments
MetLife supported the proposed rule and agreed that SEFs should
maintain a clear separation between disciplinary bodies that recommend
the issuance of charges and those responsible for adjudicating
matters.\559\ CME stated that the Commission should not require a
prescriptive approach to disciplinary panels, as SEFs may develop
structures that clearly satisfy the objective of the core principle,
but that may not precisely comply with the rule text.\560\ CME
illustrated two practices it believed may be precluded by the text of
proposed Sec. 37.206(b): (1) CME's Market Regulation staff determines
whether certain non-egregious rule violations merit referral to a
Review Panel and they issue warning letters on an administrative basis;
and (2) CME's hearing panel adjudicates a disciplinary case prior to
the issuance of charges
[[Page 33522]]
pursuant to a supported settlement agreement.\561\
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\559\ MetLife Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\560\ CME Comment Letter at 35 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\561\ Id.
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(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.206(b) as proposed, subject to
certain modifications described below. The Commission considered
commenters' views and believes that the proposed rule can be modified
to provide additional flexibility without diminishing its purpose.
Accordingly, final Sec. 37.206(b) will require SEFs to have one or
more disciplinary panels, without imposing a specific requirement for
SEFs to maintain a Review Panel and a Hearing Panel.\562\ However, even
under this single-panel approach, individuals who determine to issue
charges in a particular disciplinary matter may not also adjudicate the
matter. Therefore, final Sec. 37.206(b) permits flexibility in the
structure of SEFs' disciplinary bodies, but not in the basic
prohibition, supported by MetLife, against vesting the same individuals
with the authority to both issue and adjudicate charges in the same
matter.
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\562\ The Commission notes that it is replacing specific panel
names (i.e., Review Panel and Hearing Panel) with a generic
reference to the ``disciplinary panel'' throughout part 37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The modifications reflected in final Sec. 37.206(b), together with
the revisions made to the text of proposed Sec. 37.206(d) that will
now be included as guidance, as discussed below, provide additional
flexibility by permitting SEFs to rely on their authorized compliance
staff, rather than on a disciplinary panel, to issue disciplinary
charges. However, the Commission notes that the adjudication of charges
must still be performed by a disciplinary panel.
Finally, the Commission is adopting the composition and conflicts
requirements for disciplinary panels with one modification, by
replacing the reference to Sec. 40.9(c)(3)(ii) with a reference to the
more general ``part 40 of this chapter'' to accommodate any re-
enumeration that may occur with respect to proposed Sec.
40.9(c)(3)(ii).
(4) Sec. 37.206(c)--Review of Investigation Report
Proposed Sec. 37.206(c) required a Review Panel to promptly review
an investigation report received pursuant to proposed Sec.
37.203(f)(3), and to take one of the following actions within 30 days
of receipt: (1) Promptly direct compliance staff to conduct further
investigation if the Review Panel determined that additional
investigation or evidence was needed, (2) direct that no further action
be taken if the Review Panel determined that no reasonable basis
existed for finding a violation or that prosecution was unwarranted, or
(3) direct that the person or entity alleged to have committed a
violation be served with a notice of charges if the Review Panel
determined that a reasonable basis existed for finding a violation and
adjudication was warranted.
(i) Summary of Comments
CME agreed that an investigation report should include the
subject's disciplinary history; however, CME disagreed with the
requirement in proposed Sec. 37.203(f) that the disciplinary history
be included in the version of the investigation report sent to the
Review Panel.\563\ CME believed that the disciplinary history should
not be considered by the Review Panel at all when determining whether
to issue formal charges, arguing that a participant's disciplinary
history is not relevant to the consideration of whether it committed a
further violation of SEF rules.\564\
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\563\ CME Comment Letter at 35 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\564\ Id. While the Commission largely agrees with CME's
comment, the Commission directs interested parties to Sec.
37.203(f) for a further discussion of the required components of
investigation reports.
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(ii) Commission Determination
In response to the general comments requesting greater flexibility,
the Commission is eliminating all of proposed Sec. 37.206(c) except
for paragraph (3) of the proposed rule. In addition, the Commission is
adding language to paragraph (3) to provide SEFs with the flexibility
to allow authorized compliance staff to review an investigation report
and determine whether a notice of charges should be issued in a
particular matter. The Commission is also revising the text of
paragraph (3) to follow the single-panel approach provided for in Sec.
37.206(b). Proposed Sec. 37.206(c)(3), with the revisions described
above, is being incorporated into proposed Sec. 37.206(d). As
described below, all of proposed Sec. 37.206(d) is being moved to the
guidance in appendix B to part 37.
(5) Sec. 37.206(d)--Notice of Charges
Proposed Sec. 37.206(d) described the minimally acceptable
contents of a notice of charges issued by a Review Panel. Specifically,
proposed Sec. 37.206(d) provided that a notice of charges must
adequately state the acts, conduct, or practices in which the
respondent is alleged to have engaged; state the rule(s) alleged to
have been violated; advise the respondent that he is entitled, upon
request, to a hearing on the charges; and prescribe the period within
which a hearing may be requested. Paragraphs (1) and (2) of the
proposed rule permitted a SEF to adopt rules providing that: (1) The
failure to request a hearing within the time prescribed in the notice,
except for good cause, may be deemed a waiver of the right to a
hearing; and (2) the failure to answer or expressly deny a charge may
be deemed to be an admission of such charge.
(i) Commission Determination
Although no comments were received on proposed Sec. 37.206(d), the
Commission believes that it can provide SEFs with additional
flexibility by moving the entire rule to the guidance in appendix B to
part 37.\565\ Moreover, since paragraphs (1) and (2) of proposed Sec.
37.206(d) allowed, but did not require, a SEF to issue rules regarding
failures to request a hearing and expressly answer or deny a charge,
the Commission believes that the language in these paragraphs is better
suited as guidance rather than a rule.
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\565\ As mentioned above, the Commission is moving paragraph (3)
of proposed Sec. 37.206(c) to the text of proposed Sec. 37.206(d)
that will now be included as guidance.
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(6) Sec. 37.206(e)--Right to Representation
Proposed Sec. 37.206(e) provided for a respondent's right, upon
receiving a notice of charges, to be represented by legal counsel or
any other representative of its choosing in all succeeding stages of
the disciplinary process.
(i) Summary of Comments
CME commented that this rule should be limited to avoid conflicts
of interest in representation and, accordingly, requested that the rule
be revised to clarify that a respondent may not be represented by: (1)
A member of the SEF's disciplinary committees; (2) a member of the
SEF's Board of Directors; (3) an employee of the SEF; or (4) a person
substantially related to the underlying investigation, such as a
material witness or other respondent.\566\
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\566\ CME Comment Letter at 35 (Feb. 22, 2011).
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(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is moving proposed Sec. 37.206(e) in its entirety
to the guidance in appendix B to part 37, subject to the following
modification. The Commission is amending the language to incorporate
CME's recommendation. The guidance states that upon being served with a
notice of charges, a respondent should have the right to be represented
by legal counsel or any other representative of its choosing in all
succeeding stages of the disciplinary process, except by any
[[Page 33523]]
member of the SEF's board of directors or disciplinary panel, any
employee of the SEF, or any person substantially related to the
underlying investigations, such as a material witness or respondent.
The Commission believes that this revision appropriately addresses the
conflicts of interest noted by CME.
(7) Sec. 37.206(f)--Answer to Charges
Proposed Sec. 37.206(f) required that a respondent be given a
reasonable period of time to file an answer to a notice of charges. The
proposed rule also provided that the rules of a SEF may prescribe
certain aspects of the answer, which were enumerated in paragraphs (1)
through (3).\567\
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\567\ These aspects were that: (1) The answer must be in writing
and include a statement that the respondent admits, denies, or does
not have and is unable to obtain sufficient information to admit or
deny each allegation; (2) failure to file an answer on a timely
basis shall be deemed an admission of all allegations in the notice
of charges; and (3) failure in an answer to deny expressly a charge
shall be deemed to be an admission of such charge.
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(i) Commission Determination
Although no comments were received on proposed Sec. 37.206(f), the
Commission is moving the entire rule to the guidance in appendix B to
part 37, with certain modifications, in order to provide SEFs with
greater flexibility to adopt their own disciplinary procedures. The
Commission is also condensing the guidance by replacing paragraphs (1)
through (3) with language making clear that any rules adopted by a SEF
governing the requirements and timeliness of a respondent's answer to a
notice of charges should be ``fair, equitable, and publicly
available.''
(8) Sec. 37.206(g)--Admission or Failure To Deny Charges
Proposed Sec. 37.206(g) provided that a SEF may adopt rules
whereby a respondent who admits or fails to deny any of the charges
alleged in the notice of charges may be found by the Hearing Panel to
have committed the violations charged. If a SEF adopted such rules,
paragraphs (1) through (3) of the proposed rule provided that: (1) The
Hearing Panel must impose a sanction for each violation found to have
been committed; (2) the Hearing Panel must promptly notify the
respondent in writing of any sanction to be imposed and advise the
respondent that it may request a hearing on such sanction within a
specified period of time; and (3) the rules of the SEF may provide that
if the respondent fails to request a hearing within the period of time
specified in the notice, then the respondent will be deemed to have
accepted the sanction.
(i) Commission Determination
Although the Commission did not receive comments on proposed Sec.
37.206(g), the Commission is moving the entire rule, with certain
modifications, to the guidance in appendix B to part 37.\568\ Given
that proposed Sec. 37.206(g) allowed, but did not require, a SEF to
issue rules regarding a respondent's admission or failure to deny
charges, the Commission believes that the proposed rule is better
suited as guidance rather than a rule. The Commission also believes
that adopting the proposed rule as guidance, rather than a rule, will
provide SEFs greater flexibility in administering their obligations,
consistent with the general comments seeking the same. Furthermore, the
Commission is modifying the text of proposed Sec. 37.206(g)(2) that
will now be included as guidance to clarify that a respondent may
request a hearing ``within the period of time, which should be stated
in the notice.''
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\568\ The Commission notes that the text that will now be
included as guidance is being modified to reflect the single-panel
approach adopted in Sec. 37.206(b), replacing specific panel names
with a generic reference to the ``disciplinary panel.''
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(9) Sec. 37.206(h)--Denial of Charges and Right to Hearing
Proposed Sec. 37.206(h) required that in every instance where a
respondent has requested a hearing on a charge that is denied, or on a
sanction set by the Hearing Panel pursuant to proposed Sec. 37.206(g),
the respondent must be given the opportunity for a hearing in
accordance with the requirements of proposed Sec. 37.206(j). Proposed
Sec. 37.206(h) also gave SEFs the option to adopt rules that provided,
except for good cause, the hearing must be concerned only with those
charges denied and/or sanctions set by the Hearing Panel under proposed
Sec. 37.206(g) for which a hearing has been requested.
(i) Commission Determination
The Commission received no comments on proposed Sec. 37.206(h),
but is moving the entire rule, with certain modifications, to the
guidance in appendix B to part 37.\569\ In order to provide SEFs with
further flexibility, even within the guidance, the Commission is also
removing the proposed rule's reference to a SEF's ability to limit
hearings to only those charges denied and/or sanctions set by the
Hearing Panel under proposed Sec. 37.206(g) for which a hearing has
been requested.
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\569\ The Commission is revising the proposed rule to reflect
the single-panel approach adopted in Sec. 37.206(b), replacing
specific panel names with a generic reference to the ``disciplinary
panel.'' The Commission is also removing the references to proposed
Sec. Sec. 37.206(g) and (j) given that the Commission is moving
proposed Sec. 37.206(g) to guidance, and either eliminating or
moving certain provisions of proposed Sec. 37.206(j) to guidance.
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(10) Sec. 37.206(i)--Settlement Offers
Proposed Sec. 37.206(i) provided the procedures that a SEF must
follow if it permits the use of settlements to resolve disciplinary
cases. Paragraph (1) of the proposed rule stated that the rules of a
SEF may permit a respondent to submit a written offer of settlement any
time after the investigation report is completed. The proposed rule
also permitted the disciplinary panel presiding over the matter to
accept the offer of settlement, but prohibited the panel from altering
the terms of the offer unless the respondent agreed. In addition,
paragraph (2) of the proposed rule provided that the rules of the SEF
may allow a disciplinary panel to permit the respondent to accept a
sanction without admitting or denying the rule violations upon which
the sanction is based.
Paragraph (3) of the proposed rule stated that a disciplinary panel
accepting a settlement offer must issue a written decision specifying
the rule violations it has reason to believe were committed, and any
sanction imposed, including any order of restitution where customer
harm has been demonstrated. Paragraph (3) also provided that if an
offer of settlement is accepted without the agreement of a SEF's
enforcement staff, then the decision must adequately support the
Hearing Panel's acceptance of the settlement. Finally, paragraph (4) of
the proposed rule allowed a respondent to withdraw his or her offer of
settlement at any time before final acceptance by a disciplinary panel.
If an offer is withdrawn after submission, or is rejected by a
disciplinary panel, the respondent must not be deemed to have made any
admissions by reason of the offer of settlement and must not be
otherwise prejudiced by having submitted the offer of settlement.
(i) Commission Determination
Although the Commission received no comments on proposed Sec.
37.206(i), the Commission is moving the entire rule, with certain
modifications, to the guidance in appendix B to part 37.\570\
[[Page 33524]]
The Commission believes that adopting the proposed rule as guidance,
rather than a rule, will provide SEFs greater flexibility in
administering their obligations, consistent with the general comments
seeking the same. Furthermore, the Commission is revising the guidance
text to make it consistent with its modifications to the customer
restitution provisions adopted below with respect to proposed Sec.
37.206(n).
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\570\ The Commission notes that the text that will now be
included as guidance is being modified to reflect the single-panel
approach adopted in Sec. 37.206(b), replacing specific panel names
with a generic reference to the ``disciplinary panel.''
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(11) Sec. 37.206(j)--Hearings
Proposed Sec. 37.206(j) required a SEF to adopt rules that provide
certain minimum procedural safeguards for any hearing conducted
pursuant to a notice of charges. In general, proposed Sec. Sec.
37.206(j)(1)(i) through (j)(1)(vii) required the following: (i) A fair
hearing; (ii) authority for a respondent to examine evidence relied on
by enforcement staff in presenting the charges; (iii) the SEF's
enforcement and compliance staffs to be parties to the hearing and the
enforcement staff to present its case on the charges and sanctions;
(iv) the respondent to be entitled to appear personally at the hearing,
to cross-examine and call witnesses, and to present evidence; (v) the
SEF to require persons within its jurisdiction who are called as
witnesses to participate in the hearing and produce evidence; (vi) a
copy of the hearing be made and be a part of the record of the
proceeding if the respondent requested the hearing; and (vii) the rules
of the SEF may provide that the cost of transcribing the record be
borne by the respondent in certain circumstances. Additionally,
proposed Sec. 37.206(j)(2) specified that the rules of the SEF may
provide that a sanction be summarily imposed upon any person within its
jurisdiction whose actions impede the progress of a hearing.
(i) Summary of Comments
CME recommended that proposed Sec. 37.206(j)(1)(ii) be revised so
that a respondent may not access protected attorney work product,
attorney-client communications, and investigative work product (e.g.,
investigation and exception reports).\571\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\571\ CME Comment Letter at 36 (Feb. 22, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is partially adopting proposed Sec. 37.206(j), and
is either eliminating or moving to guidance the remaining portion of
the rule. The Commission is maintaining as a rule the provisions
requiring the following: (1) Hearings must be fair; and (2) if a
respondent requested a hearing, a copy of the hearing be made and be a
part of the record of the proceeding.\572\ The Commission is
eliminating proposed Sec. 37.206(j)(1)(vii), a discretionary rule that
in certain cases allowed for the cost of transcribing the record of the
hearing to be borne by the respondent. The Commission is moving the
remainder of proposed Sec. 37.206(j) to the guidance in appendix B to
part 37. The Commission believes that these revisions are appropriate
given commenters' requests for greater flexibility to establish their
own disciplinary procedures.
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\572\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.206(j) to
Sec. 37.206(c). The Commission is also revising the proposed rule
to reflect the single-panel approach adopted in Sec. 37.206(b),
replacing specific panel names with a generic reference to the
``disciplinary panel.'' The Commission is also revising the
reference to Sec. 37.206(l) in proposed Sec. 37.206(j)(1)(vi)
given that it is moving proposed Sec. 37.206(l) to guidance.
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The Commission agrees with CME's comment that a SEF should be
permitted to withhold certain documents from a respondent in certain
circumstances. Therefore, the Commission is revising the text of
proposed Sec. 37.206(j)(1)(ii), which will now be included in
guidance, to provide that a SEF may withhold documents that: (i) Are
privileged or constitute attorney work product; (ii) were prepared by
an employee of the SEF but will not be offered in evidence in the
disciplinary proceedings; (iii) may disclose a technique or guideline
used in examinations, investigations, or enforcement proceedings; or
(iv) disclose the identity of a confidential source.
(12) Sec. 37.206(k)--Decisions
Proposed Sec. 37.206(k) required a Hearing Panel, promptly
following a hearing conducted in accordance with proposed Sec.
37.206(j), to render a written decision based upon the weight of the
evidence and to provide a copy to the respondent. Paragraphs (1)
through (6) detailed the items to be included in the decision.
(i) Commission Determination
The Commission received no comments on proposed Sec. 37.206(k) and
is adopting the rule as proposed with certain non-substantive
clarifications.\573\
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\573\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.206(k) to
Sec. 37.206(d). The Commission is also revising the reference to
Sec. 37.206(j) in proposed Sec. 37.206(k) given that the
Commission has either eliminated or moved to guidance many of the
provisions of proposed Sec. 37.206(j). The Commission is also
revising the proposed rule to reflect the single-panel approach
adopted in Sec. 37.206(b), replacing specific panel names with a
generic reference to the ``disciplinary panel.''
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(13) Sec. 37.206(l)--Right to Appeal
Proposed Sec. 37.206(l) provided the procedures that a SEF must
follow in the event that the SEF's rules permit an appeal. For SEFs
that permit appeals, the language in paragraphs (1) through (4) of
proposed Sec. 37.206(l) generally required the SEF to: (1) Establish
an appellate panel; (2) ensure that the appellate panel composition is
consistent with Sec. 40.9(c)(iv) and not include any members of the
SEF's compliance staff or any person involved in adjudicating any other
stage of the same proceeding; (3) conduct the appeal solely on the
record before the Hearing Panel, except for good cause shown; and (4)
issue a written decision of the board of appeals and provide a copy to
the respondent.
(i) Commission Determination
Although the Commission received no comments on proposed Sec.
37.206(l), the Commission is moving the entire rule to the guidance in
appendix B to part 37.\574\ Given that proposed Sec. 37.206(l)
allowed, but did not require, a SEF to issue rules regarding a
respondent's right to appeal, the Commission believes that the proposed
rule is better suited as guidance rather than a rule. The Commission
also believes that adopting the proposed rule as guidance, rather than
a rule, will provide SEFs greater flexibility in administering their
obligations, consistent with the general comments seeking the same.
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\574\ The Commission notes that the reference to Sec.
40.9(c)(iv) in the proposed rule was a technical error. Instead,
proposed Sec. 37.206(l) should have referenced the composition
requirements of an appellate panel outlined in proposed Sec.
40.9(c)(3)(iii). However, to accommodate any re-enumeration that may
occur with respect to proposed Sec. 40.9(c)(3)(iii), the Commission
is replacing the mistaken reference to Sec. 40.9(c)(iv) with a more
general reference to part 40 in the guidance text. See Requirements
for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets,
and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts
of Interest, 75 FR 63732, 63752 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010). The
Commission is also revising the reference to Sec. 37.206(k) in
proposed Sec. 37.206(l)(4) to Sec. 37.206(d) given the renumbering
in Sec. 37.206. Finally, the Commission is revising the proposed
rule to reflect the single-panel approach adopted in Sec.
37.206(b), replacing specific panel names with a generic reference
to the ``disciplinary panel.''
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(14) Sec. 37.206(m)--Final Decisions
Proposed Sec. 37.206(m) required that each SEF establish rules
setting forth when a decision rendered under Sec. 37.206 will become
the final decision of the SEF.
(i) Commission Determination
Although the Commission received no comments on proposed Sec.
37.206(m), the Commission is moving the entire rule to
[[Page 33525]]
the guidance in appendix B to part 37. The Commission believes that
adopting the proposed rule as guidance rather than a rule provides a
SEF with additional flexibility to establish disciplinary procedures to
meet its obligations pursuant to Core Principle 2.
(15) Sec. 37.206(n)--Disciplinary Sanctions
Proposed Sec. 37.206(n) required that disciplinary sanctions
imposed by a SEF must be commensurate with the violations committed and
must be clearly sufficient to deter recidivism or similar violations by
other market participants. In addition, the proposed rule required that
a SEF take into account a respondent's disciplinary history when
evaluating appropriate sanctions. The proposed rule further required
that in the event of demonstrated customer harm, any disciplinary
sanction must include full customer restitution.
(i) Summary of Comments
WMBAA recommended that any limitation of a market participant's
access to a SEF imposed in response to a rule violation should be
recognized and enforced consistently among all SEFs.\575\ WMBAA also
recommended that any disciplinary sanction imposed by a SEF should be
published and made available to market participants.\576\ Such
requirements, WMBAA argued, are necessary in order to prevent market
participants from gaming the system and maintaining access to markets
after violations.\577\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\575\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 23 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\576\ Id.
\577\ Id. at 24.
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(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting proposed Sec. 37.206(n), subject to
certain modifications.\578\ The Commission is revising proposed Sec.
37.206(n) to clarify that a respondent's disciplinary history should be
taken into account in all sanction determinations, including sanctions
imposed pursuant to an accepted settlement offer. Furthermore, the
Commission is revising proposed Sec. 37.206(n) so that it does not
require customer restitution if the amount of restitution or the
recipient cannot be reasonably determined.\579\
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\578\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.206(n) to
Sec. 37.206(e).
\579\ The Commission notes that commenters to the DCM rulemaking
requested this change and, after considering the comments, the
Commission believes that this revision should also be applicable to
SEFs. Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated Contract
Markets, 77 FR at 36654-55.
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The Commission acknowledges WMBAA's comment that disciplinary
sanctions may not be recognized and enforced consistently across SEFs.
However, each SEF is a distinct entity with its own rulebook and set of
disciplinary procedures. Therefore, each SEF must determine the
sanctions that are appropriate for its own market and thus the same
conduct may result in different sanctions at different SEFs. The
Commission does not believe that such sanction variation supports the
mandatory recognition of sanctions across SEFs. However, if a SEF
believes that it is important to recognize and enforce sanctions
against market participants imposed by other SEFs or DCMs, then the SEF
may implement appropriate rules.
The Commission agrees with WMBAA that any disciplinary sanction
imposed by a SEF should be published and made available to market
participants. Commission Regulation 9.11(a) requires that ``[w]henever
an exchange decision pursuant to which a disciplinary action or access
denial action is to be imposed has become final, the exchange must,
within thirty days thereafter, provide written notice of such action to
. . . the Commission . . . .'' \580\ The Commission has issued guidance
that an exchange may comply with Sec. 9.11(a) by transmitting or
delivering the notice to NFA to be included in NFA's Background
Affiliation Status Information Center database, which is available to
the public online.\581\ The Commission also notes that a SEF may adopt
rules regarding the publishing of disciplinary sanctions imposed by the
SEF.
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\580\ Section 37.2 states that a SEF shall comply with part 9 of
the Commission's regulations.
\581\ NFA's Background Affiliation Status Information Center
database is available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/basicnet/.
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(16) Sec. 37.206(o)--Summary Fines for Violations of Rules Regarding
Timely Submission of Records
Proposed Sec. 37.206(o) permitted a SEF to adopt a summary fine
schedule for violations of rules relating to the timely submission of
accurate records required for clearing or verifying each day's
transactions. Under the proposed rule, a SEF may permit its compliance
staff to summarily impose minor sanctions against persons within the
SEF's jurisdiction for violating such rules. The proposed rule made
clear that a SEF's summary fine schedule must not permit more than one
warning letter in a rolling 12-month period for the same violation
before sanctions are imposed and must provide for progressively larger
fines for recurring violations.
(i) Summary of Comments
CME objected to the restriction of one warning letter per rolling
12-month period.\582\ MarketAxess also requested that the Commission
adopt a uniform approach with respect to warning letters, either
permitting warning letters as a sanction or an indication of a finding
of a violation in all SEF contexts.\583\
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\582\ CME Comment Letter at 36 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\583\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 36 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is partially adopting proposed Sec. 37.206(o) and
is converting the remaining portion of the rule to guidance in appendix
B to part 37.\584\ The Commission is maintaining as a rule the
provision in the proposed rule that prohibits a SEF from issuing more
than one warning letter per rolling 12-month period for the same
violation. As discussed above, the Commission believes that in order to
ensure that warning letters serve as effective deterrents, and to
preserve the value of disciplinary sanctions, no more than one warning
letter may be issued to the same person or entity found to have
committed the same rule violation within a rolling 12-month
period.\585\ While a warning letter may be appropriate for a first-time
violation, the Commission does not believe that more than one warning
letter in a rolling 12-month period for the same violation is ever
appropriate.\586\
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\584\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.206(o) to
Sec. 37.206(f). The Commission is also retitling this section as
``Warning letters.''
\585\ For purposes of this rule, the Commission does not
consider a ``reminder letter'' or such other similar letter to be
any different than a warning letter.
\586\ See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 1224.
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However, in response to MarketAxess's comment, the Commission is
narrowing the application of this rule to warning letters that contain
an affirmative finding that a rule violation has occurred.
Additionally, in order to provide flexibility, the compliance date of
this rule will be one year from the effective date of the final SEF
rules so that persons and entities may adapt to the new SEF regime. The
Commission is converting the remainder of proposed Sec. 37.206(o) to
guidance in appendix B to part 37 because the proposed rule allowed,
but did not require, a SEF to adopt a summary fine schedule.
(17) Sec. 37.206(p)--Emergency Disciplinary Actions
Proposed Sec. 37.206(p) provided that a SEF may impose a sanction,
including
[[Page 33526]]
a suspension, or take other summary action against a person or entity
subject to its jurisdiction upon a reasonable belief that such
immediate action is necessary to protect the best interest of the
marketplace. The proposed rule also provided that any emergency action
taken by the SEF must be in accordance with certain procedural
safeguards as enumerated in the proposed rule.\587\
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\587\ The Commission notes that, pursuant to Sec. 9.11 and
Sec. 37.2, SEFs must provide the Commission with notice of any
disciplinary actions that they take, including emergency
disciplinary actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Commission Determination
Although the Commission received no comments on proposed Sec.
37.206(p), the Commission is moving the entire rule to the guidance in
appendix B to part 37 because it is a discretionary rule.\588\ The
Commission also believes that adopting the proposed rule as guidance,
rather than a rule, will provide SEFs greater flexibility in
administering their obligations, consistent with the general comments
seeking the same.
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\588\ The Commission is also revising the reference to Sec.
37.206(j) in proposed Sec. 37.206(p)(ii) given that the Commission
has either eliminated or moved to guidance many of the provisions of
proposed Sec. 37.206(j).
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The Commission is also codifying new Sec. 37.206(g) \589\ (titled
``Additional sources for compliance'') that permits SEFs to refer to
the guidance and/or acceptable practices in appendix B to part 37 to
demonstrate to the Commission compliance with the requirements of Sec.
37.206.
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\589\ The Commission notes that this paragraph's numbering is
due to the renumbering of Sec. 37.206.
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(h) Sec. 37.207--Swaps Subject to Mandatory Clearing
Proposed Sec. 37.207 required that a SEF provide rules that when a
swap dealer or major swap participant enters into or facilitates a swap
transaction subject to the mandatory clearing requirement under section
2(h) of the Act, the swap dealer or major swap participant shall be
responsible for complying with the mandatory trading requirement under
section 2(h)(8) of the Act.
(1) Summary of Comments
FXall stated that proposed Sec. 37.207 could be read to require a
SEF to be responsible for policing the conduct of swap dealers and
major swap participants generally, and not only with respect to their
trading on such SEF.\590\ In this regard, MarketAxess stated that a
SEF's obligation to require swap dealers and major swap participants to
comply with the mandatory trading requirement should only extend to
swaps that are executed pursuant to its own rules.\591\ MarketAxess
also noted that proposed Sec. 37.207 is identical to proposed Sec.
37.200(d) and therefore is unnecessary.\592\ WMBAA commented that there
is no statutory basis to impose the requirement in proposed Sec.
37.207.\593\
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\590\ FXall Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\591\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 34 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\592\ Id.
\593\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 24 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(2) Commission Determination
The Commission agrees with MarketAxess that proposed Sec. 37.207
is identical to Sec. 37.200(d) and is therefore eliminating proposed
Sec. 37.207. In response to WMBAA's comment, the Commission notes that
Sec. 37.200(d) recites the statutory text of Core Principle 2 and thus
provides the statutory basis for codification of the statutory text as
a regulation.\594\ To address FXall's and MarketAxess's concerns, the
Commission clarifies that a SEF's rules pursuant to Sec. 37.200(d)
need only apply to swaps executed on or pursuant to the rules of that
SEF.
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\594\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(D); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Subpart D--Core Principle 3 (Swaps Not Readily Susceptible to
Manipulation)
Core Principle 3 requires that a SEF permit trading only in swaps
that are not readily susceptible to manipulation.\595\ In the SEF NPRM,
the Commission proposed to codify the statutory text of Core Principle
3 in proposed Sec. 37.300, and adopts that rule as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\595\ CEA section 5h(f)(3); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To demonstrate to the Commission compliance with Core Principle 3,
proposed Sec. 37.301 required a SEF to submit new swap contracts in
advance to the Commission pursuant to part 40 of the Commission's
regulations, and provide to the Commission the information required
under appendix C to part 38. The Commission also proposed guidance for
compliance with Core Principle 3 under appendix B to part 37, which
noted the importance of the reference price for a swap contract. The
guidance also stated that Core Principle 3 requires that the reference
price used by a swap not be readily susceptible to manipulation.
(a) Summary of Comments \596\
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\596\ The Commission notes that in Argus's joint DCM and SEF
rulemaking comment letter dated Feb. 22, 2011, it commented on Core
Principle 3 and specifically, the Commission's guidance in appendix
C to part 38--Demonstration of Compliance That a Contract is Not
Readily Susceptible to Manipulation. The Commission has addressed
Argus's comments in the DCM final rulemaking, Core Principles and
Other Requirements for Designated Contract Markets, 77 FR at 36633-
34. The Commission also notes that in CME's SEF rulemaking comment
letter dated Mar. 8, 2011 and DCM rulemaking comment letter dated
Feb. 22, 2011, it commented on the Commission's guidance in appendix
C to part 38. The Commission has also addressed CME's comments in
the DCM final rulemaking, Core Principles and Other Requirements for
Designated Contract Markets, 77 FR at 36632-34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters generally supported Core Principle 3, and the requirement
that SEFs should have in place appropriate systems and controls to
identify and manage situations where the market or individual swap
contract may be susceptible to manipulation or fraud.\597\ GFI
commented that once the Commission has declared a swap subject to
mandatory clearing, a SEF should not be required to ensure that the
contract is not readily susceptible to manipulation since such activity
would be redundant.\598\ According to GFI, the Commission would not
make a swap subject to mandatory clearing unless it believed that the
swap is not subject to manipulation.\599\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\597\ Reuters Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\598\ GFI Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\599\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.301 as proposed, subject to
certain modifications for clarity. The Commission is deleting from the
rule the references to prior approval or self-certification for new
product submissions under part 40 of the Commission's regulations
because those details are covered under Sec. 37.4 and part 40. The
Commission is also adding to the rule a reference to the guidance and/
or acceptable practices in appendix B to part 37. This reference was
inadvertently omitted from the SEF NPRM.
In response to GFI's comments, the Commission notes that section 5h
of the Act requires that a SEF permit trading only in swaps that are
not readily susceptible to manipulation.\600\ The Commission notes that
this is a separate and distinct requirement for a SEF to comply with,
as opposed to the Commission determination as to whether a swap is
subject to mandatory clearing. The Commission does not have the
authority under CEA section 4(c)(1) to exempt SEFs from complying with
the core principles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\600\ CEA section 5h(f)(3); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission notes that the requirement that a SEF permit trading
in swaps that are not readily susceptible to manipulation requires a
SEF to be responsible for the terms and conditions of the swap
contracts which trade on its facility. To meet this requirement, the
[[Page 33527]]
guidance includes items that a SEF should consider in developing swap
contract terms and conditions for both physical delivery and cash-
settled contracts. The Commission recognizes that a SEF may permit
trading in a wide range of swaps, some standardized and others
customized and complex. The Commission staff is available to consult
with SEFs should questions arise regarding the information that SEFs
should submit to the Commission to satisfy the requirements of Core
Principle 3, especially for the SEF's more customized and complex swap
contracts. The Commission will take into account these considerations
when determining whether a SEF satisfies the requirements of Core
Principle 3.
4. Subpart E--Core Principle 4 (Monitoring of Trading and Trade
Processing)
Under Core Principle 4, a SEF must establish and enforce rules or
terms and conditions defining, or specifications detailing trading
procedures to be used in entering and executing orders traded on or
through the facilities of the SEF and procedures for trade processing
of swaps on or through the facilities of the SEF.\601\ Core Principle 4
also requires a SEF to monitor trading in swaps to prevent
manipulation, price distortion, and disruptions of the delivery or cash
settlement process through surveillance, compliance, and disciplinary
practices and procedures, including methods for conducting real-time
monitoring of trading and comprehensive and accurate trade
reconstructions.\602\ In the SEF NPRM, the Commission proposed to
codify the statutory text of Core Principle 4 in proposed Sec. 37.400,
and adopts that rule as proposed.
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\601\ CEA section 5h(f)(4); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(4).
\602\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed above under Core Principle 3, the Commission
recognizes that a SEF may permit trading in a wide range of swaps, some
standardized and others customized and complex. The Commission staff is
available to consult with SEFs should questions arise regarding how to
satisfy the requirements of Core Principle 4, especially for the SEF's
more customized and complex swap contracts. The Commission will take
into account these considerations when determining whether a SEF
satisfies the requirements of Core Principle 4.
(a) Sec. 37.401--General Requirements
Proposed Sec. 37.401(a) required a SEF to collect and evaluate
data on individual traders' market activity on an ongoing basis in
order to detect and prevent manipulation, price distortions and, where
possible, disruptions of the delivery or cash-settlement process.
Proposed Sec. 37.401(b) required a SEF to monitor and evaluate general
market data in order to detect and prevent manipulative activity that
would result in the failure of the market price to reflect the normal
forces of supply and demand. Proposed Sec. 37.401(c) required a SEF to
have the capacity to conduct real-time monitoring of trading and
comprehensive and accurate trade reconstruction. Further, the proposed
rule required that intraday trade monitoring must include the capacity
to detect abnormal price movements, unusual trading volumes,
impairments to market liquidity, and position-limit violations.
Finally, proposed Sec. 37.401(d) required a SEF to have either manual
processes or automated alerts that are effective in detecting and
preventing trading abuses. The Commission noted in the SEF NPRM
preamble that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a SEF to
monitor for market disruptions in markets with high transaction volume
and a large number of trades unless the SEF installed automated trading
alerts.\603\
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\603\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1227.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Summary of Comments
Several commenters sought clarification that proposed Sec. 37.401
limits a SEF's oversight of market participant activity to its own
SEF.\604\ Tradeweb, for example, commented that a SEF cannot ensure
that a marketplace other than its own has not been manipulated to
affect the SEF's swaps because the SEF will not have enough information
about the other marketplaces.\605\
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\604\ Bloomberg Comment Letter 3-4 (Jun. 3, 2011); Parity Energy
Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 25, 2011); Tradeweb Comment Letter at 11
(Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment Letter at 22 (Mar. 8, 2011);
WMBAA Comment Letter at 25 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\605\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
WMBAA requested that the Commission clarify what it means by
``individual traders'' and ``market activity'' in proposed Sec.
37.401(a).\606\ WMBAA also sought clarification regarding what
constitutes ``general market data'' in proposed Sec. 37.401(b).\607\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\606\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 25 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\607\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CME commented that the Commission's requirements for real-time
monitoring in proposed Sec. 37.401(c) are overly broad, and stated
that requiring real-time monitoring capabilities across every
instrument for vague terms such as ``abnormal price movements,''
``unusual trading volumes,'' and ``impairments to market liquidity''
does not provide a SEF with sufficient clarity with respect to what
specific capabilities satisfy the standard.\608\ Similarly, ICE
requested that the Commission delete the phrase ``impairments to market
liquidity'' from the rule, arguing that the wording is vague and has no
foundation in the core principle.\609\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\608\ CME Comment Letter at 24 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\609\ ICE Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICE and CME also expressed concern regarding the real-time
monitoring of position limits.\610\ ICE stated that real-time
monitoring of position limits may be flawed given that option deltas
change throughout the day, the destination of allocated and give-up
transactions are not immediately known, and off-exchange transactions
may not be reported in real-time.\611\ CME stated that effective real-
time monitoring of position limits is challenging given that the
identical contract will frequently trade in multiple competitive
venues.\612\
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\610\ ICE Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter
at 24 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\611\ ICE Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\612\ CME Comment Letter at 24 (Feb. 22, 2011).
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In response to the Commission's questions in the SEF NPRM regarding
high frequency trading, CME raised concerns over the absence of a
definition for high frequency trading, which CME claimed can include
many different trading strategies.\613\ CME questioned whether the
Commission had unique concerns about high frequency traders, and
further remarked that the Commission has not articulated what purpose
would be served by singling out high frequency trading for special
monitoring.\614\ CME stated, however, that it has the capability to
monitor the messaging frequency of participants in their markets and
can quickly and easily identify which participants generate high
messaging traffic.\615\ With respect to the ability of automated
trading systems to detect and flag high frequency trading anomalies,
CME commented that it is unclear what specific types of anomalies would
be uniquely of concern in the context of a high frequency trader as
opposed to any other type of trader.\616\ CME noted that its systems
were designed to identify anomalies or transaction patterns that
violate their rules or might otherwise be
[[Page 33528]]
indicative of some other risk to the orderly functioning of the
markets.\617\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\613\ Id. at 25.
\614\ Id.
\615\ Id.
\616\ Id.
\617\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.401 as proposed, subject to
certain modifications, including converting portions of the rule to
guidance in appendix B to part 37.\618\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\618\ The Commission is moving proposed Sec. 37.401(d) to the
guidance in appendix B to part 37 and moving the ``trade
reconstruction'' language in proposed Sec. 37.401(c) to final Sec.
37.401(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To address commenters' concerns whether Sec. 37.401 requires a SEF
to monitor market activity beyond its own market, the Commission notes
that the Act requires a SEF to monitor trading in swaps to prevent
manipulation, price distortion, and disruptions of the delivery or cash
settlement process.\619\ Given this statutory requirement, there are
certain instances where a SEF must monitor market activity beyond its
own market.\620\ As noted below, a SEF must assess whether trading in a
third-party index or instrument used as a reference price or the
underlying commodity for its listed swaps is being used to affect
prices on its market.\621\ The Commission, however, provides
flexibility to SEFs by not prescribing in the regulations the specific
methods for monitoring. To provide additional flexibility, in instances
where a SEF can demonstrate to the Commission that trading activity off
the SEF's facility is not relevant to threats of manipulation,
distortion, or disruption for trading conducted on its own facility,
then the SEF may limit monitoring to trading activity on its own
facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\619\ CEA section 5h(f)(4)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(4)(B).
\620\ Refer to the guidance under Core Principle 4 in appendix B
to part 37 for examples of methods for monitoring market activity
beyond a SEF's own market.
\621\ See discussion below under Sec. 37.403--Additional
Requirements for Cash-Settled Swaps and Sec. 37.404--Ability To
Obtain Information in the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to WMBAA's concerns regarding the clarification of
certain terms in Sec. 37.401(a), the Commission is revising the rule
text to change the term ``individual traders'' to ``market
participants'' as ``individual traders'' was meant to apply to a SEF's
market participants. The Commission also clarifies that ``market
activity'' means its market participants' ``trading'' activity. In
Sec. 37.401(b), ``general market data'' means that a SEF shall monitor
and evaluate general market conditions related to its swaps. For
example, a SEF must monitor the pricing of the underlying commodity or
a third-party index or instrument used as a reference price for its
swaps as compared to the prices on its markets.
The Commission is also revising the rule to clarify that: (a) Real-
time monitoring is to detect and, when necessary, resolve
abnormalities; and (b) reconstructing trading activity is to detect
instances or threats of manipulation, price distortion, and
disruptions.
In the guidance, the Commission is clarifying that monitoring of
trading activity in listed swaps should be designed to prevent
manipulation, price distortion, and disruptions. The Commission
believes that SEFs should have rules in place that allow it to
intervene to prevent or reduce market disruptions given such
requirement in Core Principle 4. The Commission also notes that once a
threatened or actual disruption is detected, the SEF should take steps
to prevent the disruption or reduce its severity.
In the guidance, the Commission is also clarifying what activities
should be included in real-time monitoring as compared to what
activities may be done on a T+1 basis. The Commission believes that
monitoring of price movements and trading volumes in order to detect,
and when necessary, resolve abnormalities should be accomplished in
real time in order to achieve, as much as possible, the statute's
emphasis on preventive actions. It is acceptable, however, to have a
program that detects instances or threats of manipulation, price
distortion, and disruptions on at least a T+1 basis, incorporating any
additional data that is available on such T+1 basis, including trade
reconstruction data. The Commission notes that it dropped the
requirements for a SEF to monitor for ``impairments to market
liquidity'' and ``position limit violations'' given commenters'
concerns about the difficulty of such monitoring.
The Commission is moving to guidance the requirement to have
automated alerts in proposed Sec. 37.401(d). The Commission believes
that automated trading alerts, preferably in real time, are the most
effective means of detecting market anomalies. However, a SEF may
demonstrate that its manual processes are effective.
As for the Commission's inquiry in the SEF NPRM about requiring
additional monitoring of high frequency trading, the Commission
believes that a SEF should be capable of monitoring all types of
trading that may occur on its facility, including trading that may be
characterized as ``high frequency.'' The Commission has decided not to
implement, at this time, further rules pertaining to the monitoring of
high frequency trading. The Commission is encouraged that there are
efforts underway both within and outside of the Commission, to define
and develop approaches for better monitoring of high-frequency and
algorithmic trading. This is particularly evident from recent work done
at the request of the Commission's Technology Advisory Committee
(``TAC'').\622\ Further, the United Kingdom government's Foresight
Project also commissioned a recently released report on the future of
computer trading in financial markets, which aims to assess the risks
and benefits of automated buying and selling.\623\ These efforts may
assist the Commission's further development of a regulatory framework
for high frequency trading activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\622\ See, e.g., ``Recommendations on Pre-Trade Practices for
Trading Firms, Clearing Firms and Exchanges involved in Direct
Market Access,'' Pre-Trade Functionality Subcommittee of the CFTC's
Technology Advisory Committee (Mar. 1, 2011) (``TAC Subcommittee
Recommendations''), available at http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/tacpresentation030111_ptfs2.pdf. The Commission notes that the subcommittee report was
submitted to the TAC and made available for public comment, but no
final action has been taken by the full committee.
\623\ See UK Government Office for Science, Foresight Project,
The Future of Computer Trading in Financial Markets (working paper),
available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/current-projects/computer-trading/working-paper.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Sec. 37.402--Additional Requirements for Physical-Delivery Swaps
Proposed Sec. 37.402 required, for physical-delivery swaps, that a
SEF monitor each swap's terms and conditions, monitor the adequacy of
deliverable supplies, assess whether supplies are available to those
making physical delivery and saleable by those taking delivery, and
monitor the ownership of deliverable supplies. Proposed Sec. 37.402
also required that a SEF address any conditions that are causing price
distortions or market disruptions.
(1) Summary of Comments
CME commented that proposed Sec. 37.402 should be an acceptable
practice instead of a prescriptive rule.\624\ Parity Energy commented
that in a market where numerous SEFs permit trading in identical swaps,
requiring each SEF to monitor the adequacy, size, and ownership of
deliverable supply as well as the delivery locations and commodity
characteristics is duplicative, unmanageable, and creates the risk of
conflicting conclusions.\625\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\624\ CME Comment Letter at 25 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\625\ Parity Energy Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 25, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 33529]]
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.402 as proposed, subject to
certain modifications, including converting portions of the rule to
guidance in appendix B to part 37.\626\ In response to comments and to
provide SEFs with greater flexibility, the Commission is revising the
requirement in proposed Sec. 37.402(a)(2) \627\ so that SEFs only have
to monitor the ``availability'' of the commodity supply instead of
monitoring whether the supply is ``adequate.'' The Commission is also
removing from proposed Sec. 37.402 the requirements that SEFs monitor
specific details of the supply, marketing, and ownership of the
commodity to be physically delivered. Instead, appendix B to part 37
lists guidance for monitoring conditions that may cause a physical-
delivery swap to become susceptible to price manipulation or
distortion, including monitoring the general availability of the
commodity specified by the swap, the commodity's general
characteristics, the delivery locations, and, if available, information
on the size and ownership of deliverable supplies. Moving these
specific details to guidance will provide SEFs with additional
flexibility in meeting their monitoring obligations associated with
physical-delivery swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\626\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.402(a)(1)
and (a)(2) to Sec. 37.402(a) and (b), respectively. The Commission
is deleting or moving to guidance proposed Sec. 37.402(a)(3),
(a)(4), and (b).
\627\ Proposed Sec. 37.402(a)(2) is now final Sec. 37.402(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Sec. 37.403--Additional Requirements for Cash-Settled Swaps
Proposed Sec. 37.403(a) required, for cash-settled swaps, that a
SEF monitor: (a) The availability and pricing of the commodity making
up the index to which the swap is settled and; (b) the continued
appropriateness of the methodology for deriving the index for SEFs that
compute their own indices. Where a swap is settled by reference to the
price of an instrument traded in another venue, proposed Sec.
37.403(b) required that the SEF either have an information sharing
agreement with the other venue or be able to independently determine
that positions or trading in the reference instrument are not being
manipulated to affect positions or trading in its swap.
(1) Summary of Comments
Argus expressed concern regarding the requirement in proposed Sec.
37.403(a)(1) for a SEF to monitor the availability and pricing of the
commodity making up the index to which the swap will be settled,
particularly where an index price is published based upon transactions
that are executed off the SEF.\628\ Argus noted that if a SEF is
required to perform this monitoring function, a SEF may choose not to
list the swap and market participants would not have a hedging
instrument.\629\ Argus also commented that the cost to monitor
transactions that are executed off of the SEF could be
prohibitive.\630\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\628\ Argus Comment Letter at 6 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\629\ Id.
\630\ Id. at 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters expressed concern about the requirement in
proposed Sec. 37.403(b) that a SEF have an information sharing
agreement with, or monitor positions or trading in, another venue when
a swap listed on the SEF is settled by reference to the price of an
instrument traded on another venue.\631\ ICE stated that the proposal
places an undue burden on SEFs to monitor positions held at other
trading venues, and that this requirement would be more efficiently
facilitated by a central regulatory body such as the Commission.\632\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\631\ Parity Energy Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 25, 2011); ICE
Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011); Nodal Comment Letter at 5
(Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\632\ ICE Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, CME stated that the Commission is uniquely situated to
add regulatory value to the industry by reviewing for potential cross-
venue rule violations because the Commission is the central repository
for position information delivered to it on a daily basis in a common
format across all venues.\633\ CME asserted that the SEF NPRM's
proposed alternative of requiring SEFs and their customers to report
information that the Commission already receives or will be receiving
is an onerous burden.\634\ CME further asserted that the SEF NPRM's
other proposed alternative, that the SEF enter into an information-
sharing agreement with the other venue, will result in additional costs
to both entities and that it may not be practical or prudent for a SEF
to enter into such an agreement with the other venue.\635\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\633\ CME Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\634\ Id.
\635\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, Nodal stated that a SEF that is a party to an industry
agreement such as the International Information Sharing Memorandum of
Understanding and Agreement should satisfy the information sharing
requirement in the proposed rule by virtue of such agreement.\636\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\636\ Nodal Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.403 as proposed, subject to
certain modifications, including converting portions of the rule to
guidance in appendix B to part 37.\637\ The Act requires SEFs to
monitor trading in swaps to prevent disruptions of the cash settlement
process.\638\ However, in response to Argus's comment about the costs
of proposed Sec. 37.403(a)(1), the Commission has removed from the
rule the requirement that a SEF monitor the availability and pricing of
the commodity making up the index to which the swap will be settled.
Section 37.403(a) \639\ now requires that a SEF monitor the pricing of
the reference price used to determine cash flows or settlement. The
Commission believes that SEFs must monitor the pricing of the reference
price in order to comply with Core Principle 4's requirement to prevent
manipulation, price distortion, and disruptions of the cash settlement
process. As noted in the SEF NPRM, market participants may have
incentives to disrupt or manipulate reference prices for cash-settled
swaps.\640\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\637\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.403(a)(1)
and (a)(2) to Sec. 37.403(a), (b), and (c). The Commission is
moving proposed Sec. 37.403(b) to Sec. 37.404(a).
\638\ CEA section 5h(f)(4)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(4)(B).
\639\ Final Sec. 37.403(a) was proposed Sec. 37.403(a)(1).
\640\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1228.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although no comments were received on proposed Sec.
37.403(a)(2),\641\ the Commission is revising the rule so that the
requirement for monitoring the continued appropriateness of the
methodology for deriving the reference price only applies when the
reference price is formulated and computed by the SEF. In order to
reduce the burden on SEFs, the Commission is clarifying in new Sec.
37.403(c) that when the reference price relies on a third-party index
or instrument, including an index or instrument traded on another
venue, the SEF must only monitor the ``continued appropriateness'' of
the index or instrument as opposed to specifically monitoring the
``continued appropriateness of the methodology'' for deriving the
index. To provide SEFs with greater flexibility, the Commission is
moving the other requirements for monitoring in proposed Sec.
37.403(a)(2) to the guidance in appendix B to part 37. Specifically,
the guidance notes that if a SEF computes its own reference price, it
should promptly amend any methodologies or impose new methodologies as
necessary to resolve threats of disruption or distortions. For
[[Page 33530]]
reference prices that rely upon a third-party index or instrument, the
Commission notes in the guidance that the SEF should conduct due
diligence to ensure that the reference price is not susceptible to
manipulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\641\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.403(a)(2)
to Sec. 37.403(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to commenters' concerns about the requirement in
proposed Sec. 37.403(b) for a SEF to have an information-sharing
agreement with, or monitor positions or trading in, another venue when
a swap listed on the SEF is settled by reference to the price of an
instrument traded on another venue, the Commission notes that the Act
requires SEFs to monitor trading in swaps to prevent disruptions of the
cash settlement process.\642\ Given this statutory requirement, the
Commission believes that a SEF must have access to sufficient
information to determine whether trading in the instrument or index
used as a reference price for its listed swaps is being used to affect
prices on its market. The Commission is adopting this general
requirement, but is moving it to Sec. 37.404 where it more logically
belongs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\642\ CEA section 5h(f)(4)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(4)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although, as CME noted, the Commission does obtain certain position
information in the large-trader reporting systems for swaps, the
Commission may not routinely obtain such position information,
including where a SEF's swap settles to the price of a non-U.S. index
or instrument. However, in response to ICE's and CME's concerns and to
reduce the burden on SEFs, the Commission is removing from the rule
text the requirement for SEFs to assess ``positions'' and is moving it
to the guidance in appendix B to part 37. The Commission is also moving
to the guidance the specific methods for a SEF to obtain information to
assess whether trading in the reference market is being used to affect
prices on its market. The guidance also allows SEFs to limit such
information gathering to market participants that conduct substantial
trading on its facility.
(d) Sec. 37.404--Ability To Obtain Information
Proposed Sec. 37.404(a) provided that a SEF must have rules that
require traders in its swaps to keep and make available records of
their activity in underlying commodities and related derivatives
markets and swaps. Proposed Sec. 37.404(b) required that a SEF with
customers trading through intermediaries have a large-trader reporting
system or other means to obtain position information.
(1) Summary of Comments
CME commented that the Commission should specify in acceptable
practices the types of records that traders are required to keep under
proposed Sec. 37.404(a).\643\ WMBAA commented that the requirement for
a SEF to force traders to maintain trading and financial records is not
required under the CEA.\644\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\643\ CME Comment Letter at 26 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\644\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 26 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.404 as proposed, subject to
certain modifications, including providing guidance in appendix B to
part 37.\645\ As noted above in the discussion of Sec. 37.403, the
Commission is moving to Sec. 37.404 the requirement for a SEF to
assess whether trading in swaps listed on its market, in the index or
instrument used as a reference price, or in the underlying commodity
for its swaps is being used to affect prices in its market.\646\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\645\ The Commission is changing the phrase ``traders in its
swaps'' to ``its market participants'' to provide clarity.
\646\ The Commission notes that this requirement is now in Sec.
37.404(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to CME's and WMBAA's comments on proposed Sec.
37.404(a),\647\ the Commission disagrees that this rule is unnecessary
or that the requirements should instead be codified as acceptable
practices. Core Principle 4 requires a SEF to monitor trading in swaps
to prevent manipulation, price distortion, and disruptions.\648\ In its
experience regulating the futures market, the Commission has found
market participants' records to be an invaluable tool in its
surveillance efforts, and believes that a SEF should have direct access
to such information in order to discharge its obligations under the SEF
core principles, including Core Principle 4. However, the Commission
notes that in the guidance for this rule, a SEF may limit the
application of this requirement to those market participants who
conduct substantial trading activity on its facility, which is
consistent with the Commission's similar requirements that large
traders keep records for futures trading under Sec. 18.05 and for
swaps trading under Sec. 20.6 of the Commission's regulations. The
Commission also notes that the requirement for market participants to
keep such records is sound commercial practice, and that market
participants are likely already maintaining such trading records. In
response to CME's comment, the Commission notes that the nature of
records covered varies with the type of market and a market
participant's involvement, but would generally include purchases,
sales, ownership, production, processing, and use of swaps, the
underlying commodity, and other derivatives that have some relationship
to, or effect on, the market participant's trading in the listed swap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\647\ The Commission notes that this requirement is now in Sec.
37.404(b).
\648\ CEA section 5h(f)(4)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(4)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is also deleting the requirements under proposed
Sec. 37.404(b) and replacing it, in the guidance, with a more general
requirement for a SEF to demonstrate that it can obtain position and
trading information directly from market participants or, if not
available from them, through information-sharing agreements. Moreover,
the guidance for this rule allows a SEF to limit the acquisition of
such information to those market participants who conduct substantial
trading on its facility. The Commission is making this change in
response to commenters' concerns, as noted in other sections, about
obtaining position information because a SEF will not have the
capability to monitor trading activities conducted on other trading
venues.\649\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\649\ See, e.g., comments below under Core Principle 6--Position
Limits or Accountability in the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(e) Sec. 37.405--Risk Controls for Trading
Proposed Sec. 37.405 required that a SEF have risk controls to
reduce the potential risk of market disruptions, including, but not
limited to, market restrictions that pause or halt trading in market
conditions prescribed by the SEF. Additionally, the rule provided that
where a SEF's swap is linked to, or a substitute for, other swaps on
the SEF or on other trading venues, including where a swap is based on
the level of an equity index, such risk controls must be coordinated
with those on the similar markets or trading venues, to the extent
possible.
The preamble of the SEF NPRM recognized that pauses and halts are
only one category of risk controls, and that additional controls may be
necessary to further reduce the potential for market disruptions.\650\
The SEF NPRM preamble specifically listed several risk controls that
the Commission believed may be appropriate, including price collars or
bands, maximum order size limits, stop loss order protections, kill
buttons, and any others that may be suggested by commenters.\651\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\650\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1228.
\651\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 33531]]
(1) Summary of Comments
Several commenters asserted that a SEF should have some discretion
to determine the specific risk controls that are implemented within its
markets.\652\ CME commented that the marketplace would benefit from
some standardization of the types of pre-trade risk controls employed
by SEFs and other trading venues, and expressed support for an
acceptable practices framework that includes pre-trade quantity limits,
price banding, and messaging throttles, but argued that the specific
parameters of such controls should be determined by each SEF.\653\ ICE
recommended that the Commission take a flexible approach to risk
controls so as not to hinder innovation in developing new mechanisms to
prevent market disruptions.\654\ ICE did, however, recommend that the
Commission expressly require a SEF to have pre-trade risk controls or
checks, which are especially important in thinly traded markets where
RFQs are more common.\655\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\652\ ICE Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb Comment
Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 27 (Feb. 22,
2011).
\653\ CME Comment Letter at 27 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\654\ ICE Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\655\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SDMA supported the requirement in proposed Sec. 37.405, but noted
that the rule should include pre-trade and post-trade risk control
requirements that are uniform across the market.\656\ SDMA noted that a
uniform approach would create a much needed single regulatory approach
to risk management across the derivatives market, enhance market
integrity, and decrease systemic risk.\657\ SDMA agreed with the best
practices for pre-trade and post-trade risk controls as noted in the
Pre-Trade Functionality Subcommittee of the CFTC TAC's Recommendations
on Pre-Trade Practices for Trading Firms, Clearing Firms and Exchanges
involved in Direct Market Access.\658\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\656\ SDMA Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\657\ Id. at 6.
\658\ Id. See TAC Subcommittee Recommendations (Mar. 1, 2011).
The report recommended several pre-trade risk controls for
implementation at the exchange level, which were largely consistent
with the pre-trade controls listed in the preamble to the SEF NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, CME objected to the requirement to coordinate risk
controls.\659\ CME stated that a SEF should retain the flexibility to
determine and implement risk controls that it believes are necessary to
protect the integrity of its markets.\660\ CME recommended that the
Commission work constructively with registered entities to facilitate
coordination.\661\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\659\ CME Comment Letter at 26 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\660\ Id.
\661\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting proposed Sec. 37.405, subject to
certain modifications, including converting a portion of the rule to
the guidance in appendix B to part 37. As stated in the SEF NPRM, the
Commission believes that pauses and halts are effective risk management
tools that must be implemented by a SEF to facilitate orderly
markets.\662\ Automated risk control mechanisms, including pauses and
halts, have proven to be effective and necessary in preventing market
disruptions in the futures market and, therefore, will remain as part
of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\662\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1228.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted by SDMA, the Pre-Trade Functionality Subcommittee of the
TAC issued a report that recommended the implementation of several
trade risk controls at the exchange level.\663\ The controls
recommended in the Subcommittee report were consistent, in large part,
with the trade controls referenced in the preamble to the SEF NPRM, and
which are being adopted in the guidance in appendix B to part 37.\664\
The TAC accepted the Subcommittee report, which specifically
recommended that exchanges implement pre-trade limits on order size,
price collars around the current price, intraday position limits (of a
type that represent financial risk to the clearing member), message
throttles, and clear error-trade and order-cancellation policies.\665\
The Subcommittee report also noted that ``[s]ome measure of
standardization of pre-trade risk controls at the exchange level is the
cheapest, most effective and most robust path to addressing the
Commission's concern [for preserving market integrity].'' \666\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\663\ TAC Subcommittee Recommendations (Mar. 1, 2011).
\664\ The preamble to the SEF NPRM specifically mentioned daily
price limits, order size limits, trading pauses, stop logic
functionality, among others. Core Principles and Other Requirements
for Swap Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 1228.
\665\ TAC Subcommittee Recommendations at 4-5 (Mar. 1, 2011).
The TAC discussed this report's findings at its meeting on March 1,
2011. See Transcript of Third Meeting of Technology Advisory
Committee (Mar. 1, 2011) available at http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/tac_030111_transcript.pdf.
\666\ TAC Subcommittee Recommendations at 4 (Mar. 1, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes that the implementation of specific types
of other risk controls is generally desirable, but also recognizes that
such risk controls should be adapted to the unique characteristics of
the markets to which they apply. A SEF implementing any such additional
risk controls should consider the balance between avoiding a market
disruption while not impeding a market's price discovery function.
Controls that unduly restrict a market's ability to respond to
legitimate market events will interfere with price discovery.
Accordingly, consistent with many of the comments on this subject, the
Commission is enumerating specific types of risk controls, in addition
to pauses and halts, that a SEF may implement in the guidance rather
than in the rule, in order to provide a SEF with greater discretion to
select among the enumerated risk controls, or to create new risk
controls that meet the unique characteristics of its markets. A SEF
will also have discretion in determining the parameters for the
selected controls.
Additionally, in response to CME's concern about the requirement to
coordinate risk controls, the Commission is moving this language from
proposed Sec. 37.405 to the guidance. Specifically, a SEF with a swap
that is fungible with, linked to, or a substitute for other swaps on
the SEF or on other trading venues, should, to the extent practicable,
coordinate its risk controls with any similar controls placed on those
other swaps. The guidance also states that if a SEF's swap is based on
the level of an equity index, such risk controls should, to the extent
practicable, be coordinated with any similar controls placed on
national security exchanges.
(f) Sec. 37.406--Trade Reconstruction
Under Core Principle 4, Congress required that a SEF have the
ability to comprehensively and accurately reconstruct all trading on
its facility.\667\ Proposed Sec. 37.406 set forth this requirement,
including the requirement that audit-trail data and reconstructions be
made available to the Commission in a form, manner, and time as
determined by the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\667\ CEA section 5h(f)(4)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(4)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Summary of Comments
CME commented that audit trail data is extremely detailed and
voluminous and that SEFs should be given adequate time to prepare the
trading data before it is supplied to the Commission.\668\ In this
regard, CME recommended that the wording ``in a form, manner, and time
as determined by the Commission'' be
[[Page 33532]]
replaced with ``such reasonable time as determined by the Commission.''
\669\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\668\ CME Comment Letter at 27 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\669\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is revising the rule so that a SEF shall be required
to make audit trail data and reconstructions available to the
Commission ``in a form, manner, and time that is acceptable to the
Commission.'' The Commission notes that it will work with SEFs to
provide them with adequate time to supply such information to the
Commission.
(g) Sec. 37.407--Additional Rules Required
Proposed Sec. 37.407 required a SEF to adopt and enforce any
additional rules that it believes are necessary to comply with the
requirements of subpart E of part 37.
(1) Commission Determination
Although the Commission did not receive any comments on the
proposed rule, the Commission is revising the rule to state that
applicants and SEFs may refer to the guidance and/or acceptable
practices in appendix B to part 37 to demonstrate to the Commission
compliance with the requirements of section 37.400. The Commission is
also moving proposed Sec. 37.407 to new Sec. 37.408, titled
``Additional sources for compliance.''
In new Sec. 37.407, titled ``Regulatory service provider,'' the
Commission is clarifying that a SEF can comply with the regulations in
subpart E through a dedicated regulatory department or by contracting
with a regulatory service provider pursuant to Sec. 37.204.
5. Subpart F--Core Principle 5 (Ability To Obtain Information)
Core Principle 5 requires a SEF to: (a) Establish and enforce rules
that will allow the facility to obtain any necessary information to
perform any of the functions described in section 5h of the Act, (b)
provide the information to the Commission on request, and (c) have the
capacity to carry out international information-sharing agreements as
the Commission may require.\670\ In the SEF NPRM, the Commission
proposed to codify the statutory text of Core Principle 5 in proposed
Sec. 37.500, and adopts that rule as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\670\ CEA section 5h(f)(5); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Sec. 37.501--Establish and Enforce Rules
Proposed Sec. 37.501 required a SEF to establish and enforce rules
that will allow the SEF to have the ability and authority to obtain
sufficient information to allow it to fully perform its operational,
risk management, governance, and regulatory functions and any
requirements under part 37, including the capacity to carry out
international information-sharing agreements as the Commission may
require.
(1) Commission Determination
The Commission received no comments on proposed Sec. 37.501 and is
adopting the rule as proposed. The Commission believes that Sec.
37.501 appropriately implements the requirement in Core Principle 5 for
a SEF to establish and enforce rules that will allow the SEF to obtain
any necessary information to perform any of its functions described in
section 5h of the Act.\671\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\671\ CEA section 5h(f)(5)(A); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(5)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Sec. 37.502--Collection of Information
Proposed Sec. 37.502 required a SEF to have rules that allow it to
collect information on a routine basis, allow for the collection of
non-routine data from its participants, and allow for its examination
of books and records kept by the traders on its facility.
(1) Summary of Comments
WMBAA commented that aside from participants who contractually
agree to provide information, a SEF does not possess the legal
authority to obtain such information.\672\ Additionally, WMBAA stated
that the burden to collect information should be placed upon
counterparties.\673\ In the alternative, WMBAA stated that the
Commission should require a SEF and its participants to enter into
third party service provider agreements for the collection of the
required information.\674\ MarketAxess commented that it is not clear
what is meant by ``non-routine data'' in proposed Sec. 37.502 and that
the rule should make clear that a SEF is only required to collect and
maintain participant information that is directly related to such
participants' activity conducted pursuant to the SEF's rules.\675\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\672\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 26 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\673\ Id.
\674\ Id.
\675\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 37 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.502 as proposed.\676\ In
response to WMBAA's and MarketAxess's comments, the Commission notes
that Core Principle 5 requires a SEF to establish and enforce rules
that will allow it to obtain any necessary information to perform any
of its functions described in section 5h of the Act. The Act and the
Commission's regulations provide a SEF with the legal authority to
collect such information. As mentioned in Sec. 37.204 above, a SEF may
contract with a regulatory service provider to perform regulatory
services on behalf of a SEF. Thus, a SEF may enter into a third party
regulatory service provider agreement for the collection of information
under Sec. 37.502. Additionally, as mentioned in Sec. 37.404 above,
the Act requires SEFs to monitor trading in swaps to prevent
manipulation, price distortion, and disruptions through surveillance,
compliance, and disciplinary practices and procedures.\677\ The
Commission believes that market participant records are a valuable tool
in conducting an effective surveillance program; thus, a SEF should
have direct access to such information in order to discharge its
obligations under the core principles. The Commission notes that market
participants are likely maintaining trading records as part of sound
business practices so requiring SEFs to have rules that allow them to
access such information should not present a burden. To address
MarketAxess's comment about ``non-routine data,'' the Commission
clarifies that ``non-routine data'' means the collection of data on an
ad-hoc basis, such as data that may be collected during an
investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\676\ The Commission is changing the terms ``participants'' and
``traders'' to ``market participants'' to provide clarity.
\677\ CEA section 5h(f)(4)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(4)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Sec. 37.503--Provide Information to the Commission
Proposed Sec. 37.503 required a SEF to provide information in its
possession to the Commission upon request, in a form and manner that
the Commission approves.
(1) Commission Determination
The Commission received no comments on proposed Sec. 37.503 and is
adopting the rule as proposed. The Commission believes that Sec.
37.503 appropriately implements the requirement in Core Principle 5 for
a SEF to provide information to the Commission on request.\678\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\678\ CEA section 5h(f)(5)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(5)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) Sec. 37.504--Information-Sharing Agreements
Proposed Sec. 37.504 required a SEF to share information with
other regulatory organizations, data repositories, and reporting
services as required by the
[[Page 33533]]
Commission or as otherwise necessary and appropriate to fulfill its
self-regulatory and reporting responsibilities. The proposed rule also
stated that appropriate information-sharing agreements can be
established with such entities or the Commission can act in conjunction
with the SEF to carry out such information sharing.
(1) Summary of Comments
WMBAA commented that the proposed rule could be interpreted to
require a SEF to share information with its competitors, unless the
information is disseminated by a neutral third party pursuant to a
services agreement.\679\ WMBAA also requested clarification regarding
the circumstances in which the Commission would determine to carry out
information sharing itself, as opposed to a SEF entering into
information-sharing agreements with the relevant entity.\680\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\679\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 27 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\680\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.504 as proposed, subject to one
modification. The Commission is revising the rule to change the term
``reporting services'' to ``third party data reporting services.'' The
Commission clarifies that the term ``reporting services'' was meant to
refer to independent third parties that would provide trading data on a
public basis and was not meant to include competitor SEFs. To address
WMBAA's comment about information sharing, the Commission clarifies
that a SEF may work with the Commission to fulfill its information
sharing requirements in the absence of agreements with SDRs, regulatory
bodies, or third party data reporting services. Given that each SEF is
unique, a particular SEF would need to contact the Commission to
discuss how the information sharing requirements could be fulfilled.
6. Subpart G--Core Principle 6 (Position Limits or Accountability)
Core Principle 6 requires that a SEF adopt for each swap, as is
necessary and appropriate, position limits or position accountability
to reduce the potential threat of market manipulation or
congestion.\681\ In addition, Core Principle 6 requires that for any
contract that is subject to a federal position limit under CEA section
4a(a), the SEF set its position limits at a level no higher than the
position limitation established by the Commission and monitor positions
established on or through the SEF for compliance with the limit set by
the Commission and the limit, if any, set by the SEF.\682\ In the SEF
NPRM, the Commission proposed to codify the statutory text of Core
Principle 6 in proposed Sec. 37.600, and adopts that rule as proposed.
Proposed Sec. 37.601 repeated the requirements in Sec. 37.600 and
required that SEFs establish position limits in accordance with the
requirements set forth in part 151 of the Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\681\ CEA section 5h(f)(6); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(6).
\682\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Summary of Comments
Several commenters stated that SEFs will have difficulty enforcing
position limitations.\683\ Many of these commenters noted that SEFs
will lack knowledge of a market participant's activity on other venues,
and that will prevent a SEF from being able to calculate the true
position of a market participant.\684\ In this regard, Phoenix stated
that market participants will be allowed to trade on multiple SEFs so
any one SEF's information concerning a market participant's position
will be virtually meaningless, as the market participant may sell a
large position on one SEF and simultaneously buy the same amount of the
instrument on another SEF.\685\ WMBAA recommended that a common
regulatory organization or third party regulatory service provider
monitor position limits because they will have the capability to ensure
coordinated oversight of the trading activity on multiple SEFs and the
ability to implement disciplinary action if needed.\686\ Reuters and
Phoenix recommended that the Commission or its designee monitor
position limits.\687\ Alice recommended that, for cleared swaps, DCOs
maintain position limits, and when a swap is cleared by multiple DCOs,
one DCO would be the primary for a given participant and the other DCOs
would report positions to that DCO.\688\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\683\ Bloomberg Comment Letter at 3-4 (Jun. 3, 2011); Alice
Comment Letter at 5 (May 31, 2011); Rosen et al. Comment Letter at
22 (Apr. 5, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 27 (Mar. 8, 2011);
Tradeweb Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011); Reuters Comment Letter
at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Phoenix Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 7, 2011).
\684\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 2 (Apr. 11, 2013); Bloomberg
Comment Letter at 3-4 (Jun. 3, 2011); Rosen et al. Comment Letter at
22 (Apr. 5, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 27 (Mar. 8, 2011);
Tradeweb Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011); Phoenix Comment Letter
at 3 (Mar. 7, 2011).
\685\ Phoenix Comment Letter at 3-4 (Mar. 7, 2011).
\686\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 27 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\687\ Reuters Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Phoenix
Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 7, 2011).
\688\ Alice Comment Letter at 5 (May 31, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite the concerns raised by other commenters, Phoenix noted
that, if required, a SEF can monitor position limits of market
participants based upon the trading activity that takes place only on
the SEF's platform.\689\ Tradeweb also requested confirmation from the
Commission that a SEF must only monitor its market participants'
position limits or positions in particular instruments with respect to
positions entered into on its own platforms.\690\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\689\ Phoenix Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 7, 2011).
\690\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Commission Determination
In response to commenters concerns about monitoring position
limits, the Commission is removing the requirements in Sec. 37.601.
Instead, final Sec. 37.601 states that until such time that compliance
is required under part 151 of this chapter,\691\ a SEF may refer to the
guidance and/or acceptable practices in appendix B to part 37 to
demonstrate to the Commission compliance with the requirements of Sec.
37.600.
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\691\ See Position Limits for Derivatives, 76 FR 4752 (proposed
Jan. 26, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The guidance provides a SEF with reasonable discretion to comply
with Sec. 37.600, including considering part 150 of the Commission's
regulations.\692\ The guidance also states that for Required
Transactions as defined in Sec. 37.9, a SEF may demonstrate compliance
with Sec. 37.600 by setting and enforcing position limitations or
position accountability levels only with respect to trading on the
SEF's own market. For example, a SEF could satisfy the position
accountability requirement by setting up a compliance program that
continuously monitors the trading activity of its market participants
and has procedures in place for remedying any violations of position
levels. For Permitted Transactions as defined in Sec. 37.9, a SEF may
demonstrate compliance with Sec. 37.600 by setting and enforcing
position accountability levels or sending the Commission a list of
Permitted Transactions traded on the SEF. Therefore, a SEF is not
required to monitor its market participants' activity on other venues
with respect to monitoring position limits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\692\ Part 150 of the Commission's regulations contains the
current position limits regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to comments that a common regulatory organization or
the Commission should monitor position limits, the Commission notes
that Core Principle 6 places the responsibility on a SEF to adopt and
monitor position limits. The Dodd-Frank Act does not mandate that a
common regulatory organization or the Commission monitor position
limits. The Dodd-Frank Act also does not provide the Commission with
the authority to exempt a SEF from
[[Page 33534]]
certain core principles. Therefore, the Commission is providing a SEF
with flexibility to adopt and monitor position limits as described
above.
7. Subpart H--Core Principle 7 (Financial Integrity of Transactions)
Core Principle 7 requires a SEF to establish and enforce rules and
procedures for ensuring the financial integrity of swaps entered on or
through the facilities of the SEF, including the clearance and
settlement of the swaps pursuant to section 2(h)(1) of the Act.\693\ In
the SEF NPRM, the Commission proposed to codify the statutory text of
Core Principle 7 in proposed Sec. 37.700, and adopts that rule as
proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\693\ CEA section 5h(f)(7); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Sec. 37.701--Mandatory Clearing \694\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\694\ The Commission is renaming the title of this section from
``Mandatory Clearing'' to ``Required Clearing'' to be consistent
with terminology used in the CEA and the Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 37.701 required transactions executed on or through
a SEF to be cleared through a Commission registered DCO unless the
transaction is excepted from clearing under section 2(h)(7) of the Act
or the swap is not subject to the clearing requirement under section
2(h)(1) of the Act.
(1) Summary of Comments
ISDA/SIFMA commented that section 2(h)(1) of the CEA provides that
swaps subject to the clearing requirement must be submitted for
clearing to a registered DCO or a DCO that is exempt from registration;
however, proposed Sec. 37.701 requires that transactions executed
through a SEF be cleared only through a Commission-registered DCO.\695\
ISDA/SIFMA recommended that the rule be amended to permit the use of
exempt DCOs.\696\ MarketAxess recommended that proposed Sec. 37.701 be
revised to permit a SEF to rely on a representation from an end-user
that it qualifies for the section 2(h)(7) exemption.\697\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\695\ ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 13 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\696\ Id.
\697\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 38 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.701 as proposed, subject to
certain revisions. The Commission is modifying Sec. 37.701 to state
that ``[t]ransactions executed on or through the swap execution
facility that are required to be cleared under section 2(h)(1)(A) of
the Act or are voluntarily cleared by the counterparties shall be
cleared through a Commission-registered derivatives clearing
organization, or a derivatives clearing organization that the
Commission has determined is exempt from registration.'' The Commission
is deleting proposed Sec. 37.701(a), which referred to the end-user
exception under CEA section 2(h)(7) because, as modified, the final
rule text clarifies that any swaps that are required to be cleared or
that are voluntarily cleared must be cleared through a registered DCO,
or a DCO that the Commission has determined is exempt from
registration. The Commission notes that swaps that are subject to the
clearing requirement must be submitted for clearing, except where the
swap may be eligible for an exception or exemption from the clearing
requirement pursuant to either the exception provided under section
2(h)(7) of the Act and Sec. 50.50 of the Commission's regulations, or
an exemption provided under part 50 of the Commission's regulations.
The rule also provides that counterparties that elect to clear a swap
that is not required to be cleared may do so voluntarily through a
Commission-registered DCO, or a DCO that the Commission has determined
is exempt from registration.
In response to ISDA/SIFMA's recommendation that the rule be amended
to permit the use of exempt DCOs, the Commission is mindful that CEA
section 2(h)(1) provides that swaps subject to the clearing requirement
must be submitted for clearing to a registered DCO or a DCO that is
exempt from registration under the Act. The Commission further notes
that under CEA section 5b(h), the Commission has discretionary
authority to exempt DCOs, conditionally or unconditionally, from the
applicable DCO registration requirements.\698\ Specifically, section
5b(h) of the Act provides that ``[t]he Commission may exempt,
conditionally or unconditionally, a derivatives clearing organization
from registration under this section for the clearing of swaps if the
Commission determines that the [DCO] is subject to comparable,
comprehensive supervision and regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission or the appropriate government authorities in the home
country of the organization.'' \699\ Thus, the Commission has
discretion to exempt from registration DCOs that, at a minimum, are
subject to comparable and comprehensive supervision by another
regulator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\698\ CEA section 5b(h); 7 U.S.C. 7a-1(h).
\699\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission notes that it has not yet exercised its
discretionary authority to exempt DCOs from registration.
Notwithstanding that there are no exempt DCOs at this time, the
Commission has determined to revise the rule text as suggested by ISDA/
SIFMA. If the Commission determines to exercise its authority to exempt
DCOs from applicable registration requirements, the Commission would
likely address, among other things, the conditions and limitations
applicable to clearing swaps for customers subject to section 4d(f) of
the Act.\700\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\700\ The Commission will address any necessary revisions to
part 37 at such time as it determines to exercise its discretionary
authority to exempt DCOs from certain DCO registration requirements.
For example, if exempt DCOs are limited to clearing for only certain
types of market participants, then the Commission will take action
to ensure that SEF market participants have impartial access to swap
clearing through registered DCOs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Until such time as the Commission determines to exercise its
authority to exempt DCOs from the applicable registration requirement,
SEFs must route all swaps through registered DCOs, which are the
appropriate entities to perform the clearing functions under CEA
section 2(h)(1) at this time. Registered DCOs are subject to the CEA,
the Commission's regulations, and its regulatory programs. Among other
things, registered DCOs are supervised for compliance with the
Commission's regulations, and subjected to ongoing risk surveillance
and regular examinations.
In consideration of MarketAxess's comment that a SEF should be able
to rely on a representation from an end-user that it qualifies for the
CEA section 2(h)(7) exception, the Commission clarifies that a SEF is
not obligated to make any determinations with respect to applicability
of the exceptions to the clearing requirement.
(b) Sec. 37.702--General Financial Integrity
Proposed Sec. 37.702(a) required a SEF to provide for the
financial integrity of its transactions by establishing minimum
financial standards for its members. At a minimum, a SEF would have to
ensure that its members meet the definition of ``eligible contract
participant'' under CEA section 1(a)(18). Proposed Sec. 37.702(b)
required a SEF, for transactions cleared by a DCO, to have the capacity
to route transactions to the DCO in a manner acceptable to the DCO for
purposes of ongoing risk management. In proposed Sec. 37.702(c), for
transactions that are not cleared by a DCO, a SEF must require members
to demonstrate that they: (1) Have entered into credit arrangement
documentation for the transaction, (2) have the ability to exchange
collateral, and (3) meet any credit filters that the SEF may adopt.
Proposed Sec. 37.702(d) required a SEF to implement any additional
safeguards
[[Page 33535]]
that may be required by Commission regulations.
(1) Summary of Comments
Bloomberg commented, with respect to proposed Sec. 37.702(a), that
a SEF should be able to determine a market participant's ability to
meet any minimum financial standards by virtue of confirming that the
participant has access to a DCO either as a member or through an
intermediary.\701\ According to Bloomberg, it is not necessary to set
separate, duplicative financial requirements at the SEF level that are
redundant to the exhaustive financial requirements that will be
associated with access to a DCO.\702\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\701\ Bloomberg Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\702\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to proposed Sec. 37.702(b), Reuters agreed that SEFs
should assure the secure and prompt routing to a DCO for swap
transactions subject to the clearing requirement.\703\ MarketAxess
commented that SEFs should be able to send a trade to the DCO via an
affirmation hub.\704\ Use of affirmation hubs, according to
MarketAxess, would allow SEFs to enjoy lower costs and is preferred by
its clients.\705\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\703\ Reuters Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\704\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 35 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\705\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission received several comments with regard to proposed
Sec. 37.702(c). The Energy Working Group noted that proposed Sec.
37.702(c) should be narrower in scope and that a SEF should be able to
fulfill its obligation by ensuring that the counterparties have entered
into bilateral credit support arrangements.\706\ MarketAxess wrote that
a SEF is not in a position to determine whether members' credit filters
or exchanges of collateral are sufficient.\707\ Reuters noted that the
existence of credit and/or collateral arrangements should be primarily
a matter between the counterparties.\708\ ISDA/SIFMA commented that the
Commission should not create new collateral requirements for end-users
transacting through a SEF.\709\ ABC/CIEBA commented that proposed Sec.
37.702(c) would impose costly burdens on SEFs.\710\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\706\ Energy Working Group Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\707\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 37 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\708\ Reuters Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\709\ ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 13 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\710\ ABC/CEIBA Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Goldman noted that there are circumstances where a swap that is
subject to the clearing requirement may not be accepted for clearing
for credit or other reasons.\711\ In such cases and depending on the
SEF's rules under Core Principle 7, parties that execute through the
SEF either would face one another in an uncleared, bilateral
transaction or would potentially owe amounts arising from the trade not
being accepted for clearing.\712\ Therefore, Goldman recommended that
parties should be able to learn the identities of their counterparty
when transacting in cleared and uncleared swaps.\713\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\711\ Goldman Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\712\ Id.
\713\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission has considered the comments received and is adopting
Sec. 37.702(a) as proposed. In response to Bloomberg's comment about
setting financial requirements at the SEF level, the Commission
disagrees that a SEF should be able to determine a member's ability to
meet any minimum financial standards by virtue of confirming that the
member has access to a DCO. The Commission notes that a DCO only
screens clearing members, and not customers, according to financial
standards. Therefore, unless a SEF member is also a clearing member,
the SEF will not be able to determine the member's ability to meet any
minimum financial standards by virtue of confirming that the member has
access to a DCO. The Commission also notes that there is no affirmative
obligation for a DCO to ensure that its members, customers, or
counterparties are ECPs. Therefore, a SEF must ensure that its members
qualify as ECPs and may rely on representations from its members to
fulfill this requirement.\714\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\714\ The Commission notes that under Sec. 37.202(a)(2), a SEF
that permits intermediation must also obtain signed representations
from intermediaries that their customers are ECPs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last year, the Commission adopted rules regarding the processing of
cleared trades.\715\ In that rulemaking, the Commission proposed a new
Sec. 37.702(b) \716\ and adopted a revised Sec. 37.702(b) \717\
regarding cleared swaps traded through a SEF. That final rule required
a SEF to provide for the financial integrity of its transactions that
are cleared by a DCO: (a) By ensuring that it has the capacity to route
transactions to the DCO in a manner acceptable to the DCO for purposes
of clearing; and (b) by coordinating with each DCO to which it submits
transactions for clearing, in the development of rules and procedures
to facilitate prompt and efficient transaction processing in accordance
with the requirements of Sec. 39.12(b)(7) of the Commission's
regulations.\718\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\715\ Customer Clearing Documentation, Timing of Acceptance for
Clearing, and Clearing Member Risk Management, 77 FR 21278 (Apr. 9,
2012).
\716\ Requirements for Processing, Clearing, and Transfer of
Customer Positions, 76 FR 13101, 13109-10 (proposed Mar. 10, 2011).
\717\ Customer Clearing Documentation, Timing of Acceptance for
Clearing, and Clearing Member Risk Management, 77 FR at 21309.
\718\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to MarketAxess's comment about affirmation hubs, the
Commission notes that Sec. 37.702(b), as adopted in April 2012,
requires a SEF to route a swap to a DCO in a manner acceptable to the
DCO.\719\ If the DCO views the use of an affirmation hub as an
acceptable means for routing the swap, the routing otherwise complies
with Sec. 37.702(b), and the trade is processed in accordance with the
standards set forth in Sec. Sec. 1.74, 39.12, 23.506, and 23.610 of
the Commission's regulations, then the use of an affirmation hub for
routing a swap to a DCO for clearing would be permissible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\719\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In consideration of the comments with respect to uncleared swaps,
the Commission is eliminating proposed Sec. 37.702(c). The Commission
agrees with commenters that requiring SEFs to monitor the credit and
collateral arrangements of parties transacting uncleared swaps goes
beyond the scope of what should be expected of a SEF. To address
Goldman's comments requesting that the Commission mandate that a SEF's
rules require identification of the counterparties prior to a swap
transaction, the Commission believes that a SEF should retain
discretion in this regard. Finally, the Commission is deleting proposed
Sec. 37.702(d) as it is unnecessary because a SEF must already
implement safeguards as required by Commission regulations.
(c) Sec. 37.703--Monitoring for Financial Soundness
Proposed Sec. 37.703 required a SEF to monitor its members'
compliance with the SEF's minimum financial standards and routinely
receive and promptly review financial and related information from its
members.
(1) Summary of Comments
ABC/CIEBA commented that this requirement would create significant
barriers to entry, stifle competition, and lead to higher transaction
costs.\720\ FXall commented that like DCMs, SEFs should be permitted to
delegate their financial surveillance functions to the
[[Page 33536]]
Joint Audit Committee to the extent that its members are registered
with NFA.\721\ For non-NFA members, FXall recommended that SEFs be
permitted to delegate financial surveillance obligations to the
members' primary financial regulator or otherwise outsource such duties
to a third party service provider.\722\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\720\ ABC/CEIBA Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\721\ FXall Comment Letter at 13 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\722\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission agrees with the commenters that burdensome financial
surveillance obligations may lead to higher transaction costs.
Therefore, in consideration of the comments, the Commission is revising
Sec. 37.703 to state that a SEF must monitor its members to ensure
that they continue to qualify as ECPs. With regard to the comment
requesting delegation of the proposed Sec. 37.703 responsibilities to
the Joint Audit Committee, the Commission notes that final Sec.
37.703, as revised, obviates the need for any such delegation. Under
final Sec. 37.703, a SEF need only ensure that its members remain ECPs
and may rely on representations from its members.
8. Subpart I--Core Principle 8 (Emergency Authority)
Core Principle 8 requires a SEF to adopt rules to provide for the
exercise of emergency authority, in consultation or cooperation with
the Commission, as is necessary and appropriate, including the
authority to liquidate or transfer open positions in any swap or to
suspend or curtail trading in a swap.\723\ In the SEF NPRM, the
Commission proposed to codify the statutory text of Core Principle 8 in
proposed Sec. 37.800, and adopts that rule as proposed.\724\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\723\ CEA section 5h(f)(8); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(8).
\724\ The Commission notes that Commission regulation
40.6(a)(6)(i) provides that any SEF rule that establishes general
standards or guidelines for taking emergency actions must be
submitted to the Commission pursuant to regulation 40.6(a).
Relatedly, Commission regulation 40.6(a)(6)(ii) provides particular
emergency actions shall be filed with the Commission ``prior to
[its] implementation, or, if not practicable, . . . at the earlier
possible time after implementation, but in no event more than
twenty-four hours after implementation.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Sec. 37.801--Additional Sources for Compliance
Proposed Sec. 37.801 referred applicants and SEFs to the guidance
and/or acceptable practices in appendix B to part 37 to demonstrate
compliance with Core Principle 8. The guidance reflected the
Commission's belief that the need for emergency action may also arise
from related markets traded on other platforms and that there should be
an increased emphasis on cross-market coordination of emergency
actions. In that regard, the proposed guidance provided that, in
consultation and cooperation with the Commission, a SEF should have the
authority to intervene as necessary to maintain markets with fair and
orderly trading and to prevent or address manipulation or disruptive
trading practices, whether the need for intervention arises exclusively
from the SEF's market or as part of a coordinated, cross-market
intervention. The proposed guidance also provided that in situations
where a swap is traded on more than one platform, emergency action to
liquidate or transfer open interest must be as directed, or agreed to,
by the Commission or the Commission's staff. The proposed guidance also
clarified that the SEF should have rules that allow it to take market
actions as may be directed by the Commission.
In addition to providing for rules, procedures, and guidelines for
emergency intervention, the guidance noted that SEFs should provide
prompt notification and explanation to the Commission of the exercise
of emergency authority, and that information on all regulatory actions
carried out pursuant to a SEF's emergency authority should be included
in a timely submission of a certified rule.
(1) Summary of Comments
Several commenters expressed concern about a SEFs ability to
liquidate or transfer open positions.\725\ Bloomberg stated that,
because a SEF will not hold a participant's swap positions, the
Commission should only require that a SEF adopt rules requiring it to
coordinate with a DCO to facilitate the liquidation or transfer of
positions during an emergency.\726\ Similarly, WMBAA noted that a SEF
will not maintain counterparty positions and thus it may not possess
the ability to liquidate or transfer those positions.\727\ Reuters
stated that liquidating open positions does not fall within a trading
platform's traditional role in the market.\728\
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\725\ Bloomberg Comment Letter at 4 (Jun. 3, 2011); Bloomberg
Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter at 28
(Mar. 8, 2011); Reuters Comment Letter at 7 (Mar.8, 2011).
\726\ Bloomberg Comment Letter at 4 (Jun. 3, 2011); Bloomberg
Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\727\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 28 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\728\ Reuters Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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CME stated that SEFs must have the flexibility and independence
necessary to address market emergencies.\729\ Alternatively, ISDA/SIFMA
commented that the Core Principle 8 rules should adopt uniform
standards and that those standards must consider the interaction
between SEFs, DCMs, clearing organizations, swap data repositories, and
other market-wide institutions.\730\
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\729\ CME Comment Letter at 28 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\730\ ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 13 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.801 as proposed, with certain
modifications to the guidance in appendix B to part 37. The Commission
acknowledges commenters concerns regarding a SEF's ability to liquidate
or transfer open positions; however, the statute requires a SEF to have
the authority to liquidate or transfer open positions.\731\ The
Commission expects that SEFs would establish such authority over open
positions through their rules and/or participant agreements and that
the exercise of any such authority would, consistent with the statute,
be done in coordination with the Commission and relevant DCOs.
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\731\ CEA section 5h(f)(8); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(8).
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The Commission is making slight revisions to the guidance to
clarify that SEFs retain the authority to independently respond to
emergencies in an effective and timely manner consistent with the
nature of the emergency, as long as all such actions taken by the SEF
are made in good faith to protect the integrity of the markets. The
Commission believes that market emergencies can vary with the type of
market and any number of unusual circumstances so SEFs need flexibility
to carry out emergency actions. The Commission believes that the
guidance strikes a reasonable balance between the need for flexibility
and the need for standards in the case of coordinated cross-market
intervention.
9. Subpart J--Core Principle 9 (Timely Publication of Trading
Information)
Core Principle 9 requires a SEF to make public timely information
on price, trading volume, and other trading data on swaps to the extent
prescribed by the Commission.\732\ It also requires a SEF to have the
capacity to electronically capture and transmit trade information for
those transactions that occur on its facility.\733\ In the SEF NPRM,
the Commission proposed to codify the statutory text of Core Principle
9 in proposed Sec. 37.900. Proposed Sec. 37.901 required that, for
swaps traded on or through a SEF, the SEF report specified swap data as
[[Page 33537]]
provided under part 43 \734\ and part 45 \735\ of the Commission's
regulations and meet the requirements of part 16 of the Commission's
regulations. Proposed Sec. 37.902 required a SEF to have the capacity
to electronically capture trade information with respect to
transactions executed on the facility.
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\732\ CEA section 5h(f)(9); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(9).
\733\ Id.
\734\ 17 CFR part 43; Real-Time Reporting of Swap Transaction
Data, 77 FR 1182 (Jan. 9, 2012).
\735\ 17 CFR part 45; Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting
Requirements, 77 FR 2136 (Jan. 13, 2012).
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(a) Summary of Comments
In response to the Commission's questions in the SEF NPRM about
end-of-day price reporting for interest rate swaps and the Commission's
proposed revisions to Sec. 16.01,\736\ Eris stated the following: (1)
It is reasonable to require a market to report publicly each trade
(including instrument, price, and volume) intra-day, as soon as the
trade occurs; (2) daily open interest should be published publicly in a
summary fashion and should be grouped in maturity buckets based on the
remaining tenor of each instrument; (3) as to end-of-day pricing, a
clearing house will settle contracts based upon a market-driven curve,
and the methodology, as well as the inputs and components, of the curve
should be made transparent to the full trading community; and (4) the
clearing house should publish the specific settlement value applied to
each cleared swap in the daily mark-to-market process.\737\ Eris also
stated that SEFs and DCMs should be held to the same reporting standard
in this respect.\738\
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\736\ The Commission proposed certain revisions to Sec. 16.01
in the DCM NPRM. See Core Principles and Other Requirements for
Designated Contract Markets, 75 FR 80572 (proposed Dec. 22, 2010)
for further details.
\737\ Eris Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\738\ Id.
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MarketAxess commented that proposed Sec. 37.900(b) and Sec.
37.902 are duplicative and that proposed Sec. 37.902 should be
withdrawn.\739\
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\739\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 39 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(b) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.900 and Sec. 37.901 as
proposed. The Commission acknowledges MarketAxess's comment that Sec.
37.902 is duplicative to Sec. 37.900(b) and thus is withdrawing Sec.
37.902. In response to Eris's comment about the same reporting
standards for SEFs and DCMs that list swaps, the Commission notes that
a SEF, similar to a DCM, must meet the same requirements under part 16
of the Commission's regulations for swaps reporting.\740\ The
Commission also notes that it codified Sec. 16.01 in the final DCM
rulemaking, and in that rulemaking, the Commission states that it
considered the proposed reporting standard put forth by Eris, but the
Commission believes that the more detailed reporting obligations under
Sec. 16.01 are warranted at this time in light of the novelty of swaps
trading on regulated exchanges.\741\
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\740\ The Commission notes that Sec. 16.00 is applicable to a
SEF only to the extent that such SEF has clearing members and lists
options on physicals for trading. Section 16.01 is applicable to a
SEF for all swaps and options traded thereon. Section 16.02 is
applicable to a SEF only to the extent that such SEF lists options
for trading.
\741\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated
Contract Markets, 77 FR 36612, 36642 (Jun. 19, 2012).
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10. Subpart K--Core Principle 10 (Recordkeeping and Reporting)
Core Principle 10 establishes recordkeeping and reporting
requirements for SEFs.\742\ In the SEF NPRM, the Commission proposed to
codify the statutory text of Core Principle 10 in proposed Sec.
37.1000, and adopts that rule as proposed.
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\742\ CEA section 5h(f)(10); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 37.1001 required a SEF to maintain records of all
business activities, including a complete audit trail, investigatory
files, and disciplinary files, in a form and manner acceptable to the
Commission for at least five years in accordance with the requirements
of section 1.31 and part 45 of this chapter. Proposed Sec. 37.1002
required a SEF to report to the Commission such information that the
Commission determines to be necessary or appropriate for it to perform
its duties. Proposed Sec. 37.1003 required a SEF to keep records
relating to swaps defined in section 1a(47)(A)(v) of the CEA open to
inspection and examination by the SEC.
(a) Summary of Comments
MarketAxess stated that a SEF should be permitted to use a
regulatory service provider with respect to its recordkeeping and
reporting requirements.\743\ CME commented that proposed Sec. 37.1003
does not provide any guidance as to what records will need to be
retained and for how long they must be retained.\744\
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\743\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 39 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\744\ CME Comment Letter at 38 (Feb. 22, 2011).
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(b) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1001 as proposed. The
Commission is also withdrawing proposed Sec. 37.1002 and Sec. 37.1003
because they are repetitive of paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) of Sec.
37.1000. In response to MarketAxess's comment, the Commission notes
that a SEF may utilize the services of a regulatory service provider
pursuant to Sec. 37.204 to assist the SEF in complying with its
responsibilities under Core Principle 10. In response to CME's comment,
the Commission notes that in accordance with Core Principle 10 and
Sec. 1.31 of the Commission's regulations, a SEF should retain ``any''
records relevant to swaps defined in section 1a(47)(A)(v) of the Act
and that the SEF should leave such records open to inspection and
examination for a period of five years. The Commission staff also
consulted with representatives from the SEC, who confirmed that the
SEC's relevant recordkeeping requirements typically extend for a period
of five years.\745\
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\745\ See Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 10982, 11063 (Proposed Rule 818(b)
requires SB-SEFs to keep books and records ``for a period of not
less than five years, the first two years in an easily accessible
place). Rule 17a-1(b) (240.17a-1(b) requires national securities
exchanges, among others, to keep books and records for a period of
not less than five years, the first two years in an easily
accessible place, subject to a destruction and disposition
provisions, which allows exchanges to destroy physical documents
pursuant to an effective and approved plan regarding such
destruction and transferring/indexing of such documents onto some
recording medium.). 17 CFR 240.17a-1(b).
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11. Subpart L--Core Principle 11 (Antitrust Considerations)
Core Principle 11 governs the antitrust obligations of SEFs.\746\
In the SEF NPRM, the Commission proposed to codify the statutory text
of Core Principle 11 in proposed Sec. 37.1100, and adopts that rule as
proposed. Additionally, proposed Sec. 37.1101 referred applicants and
SEFs to the guidance in appendix B to part 37 for purposes of
demonstrating compliance with proposed Sec. 37.1100.
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\746\ CEA section 5h(f)(11); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(11).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Summary of Comments
NGSA commented that if SEFs are allowed to select the SDR to which
SEF-executed swaps are reported, there is a threat of anticompetitive
tying of swap data reporting services from a particular SDR to the
SEF's services, which may harm competition among SDRs.\747\
Accordingly, NGSA recommended that the Commission amend the proposed
rules to explicitly prohibit a SEF from tying the swap data reporting
services of a particular SDR to the swap execution services provided by
such SEF and from entering into an exclusive agreement
[[Page 33538]]
with any SDR to report all swaps to such SDR.\748\
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\747\ NGSA Comment Letter at 2 (Jun. 8, 2012). DTCC also raised
this concern in its comment letter. DTCC Comment Letter at 3 (Jun.
10, 2011).
\748\ NGSA Comment Letter at 5 (Jun. 8, 2012).
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(b) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1101 and the corresponding
guidance in appendix B to part 37 as proposed and declines to revise
the proposed rules as NGSA recommends. The Commission notes that under
Core Principle 11, SEFs may not adopt any rule or take any action that
results in any unreasonable restraint of trade or impose any material
anticompetitive burden on trading or clearing. The Commission believes
that Core Principle 11 adequately addresses NGSA's concern. The
Commission also notes that it has not limited a SEF's choice of DCOs.
The Commission believes that SDRs and DCOs should be able to compete
for a SEF's business subject to the anticompetitive considerations
under Core Principle 11. Additionally, the Commission notes that
multiple SEFs are likely to trade the same swap contracts so market
participants will be able to choose the appropriate SEF to trade swaps
based on SDR and other considerations.
12. Subpart M--Core Principle 12 (Conflicts of Interest)
Core Principle 12 governs conflicts of interest.\749\ In the SEF
NPRM, the Commission proposed to codify the statutory text of Core
Principle 12 in proposed Sec. 37.1200, and adopts that rule as
proposed. As noted in the SEF NPRM, the substantive regulations
implementing Core Principle 12 were proposed in a separate release
titled ``Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations,
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding
the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest.'' \750\ Until such time as the
Commission may adopt the substantive rules implementing Core Principle
12, SEFs have reasonable discretion to comply with this core principle
as stated in Sec. 37.100.
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\749\ CEA section 5h(f)(12); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(12).
\750\ Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations,
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding
the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 FR 63732 (proposed Oct.
18, 2010).
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13. Subpart N--Core Principle 13 (Financial Resources)
Core Principle 13 requires a SEF to have adequate financial,
operational, and managerial resources to discharge each of its
responsibilities.\751\ In particular, Core Principle 13 states that a
SEF's financial resources are considered to be adequate if the value of
such resources exceeds the total amount that would enable the SEF to
cover its operating costs for a period of at least one year, calculated
on a rolling basis.\752\ In the SEF NPRM, the Commission proposed to
codify the statutory text of Core Principle 13 in proposed Sec.
37.1300, and adopts that rule as proposed.
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\751\ CEA section 5h(f)(13); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(13).
\752\ Id.
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(a) Sec. 37.1301--General Requirements
Proposed Sec. 37.1301 set forth the financial resources
requirements for SEFs in order to implement Core Principle 13. Proposed
Sec. 37.1301(a) required a SEF to maintain financial resources
sufficient to enable it to perform its functions in compliance with the
SEF core principles. Proposed Sec. 37.1301(b) required an entity
operating as both a SEF and a DCO to comply with both the SEF financial
resources requirements and the DCO financial resources requirements in
Sec. 39.11.\753\ Proposed Sec. 37.1301(c) stated that financial
resources would be considered sufficient if their value is at least
equal to a total amount that would enable the SEF, or applicant for
designation as such, to cover its operating costs for a period of at
least one year, calculated on a rolling basis.
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\753\ See Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions
and Core Principles, 76 FR 69334 (Nov. 8, 2011). Commission
regulation Sec. 39.11 establishes requirements that a DCO will have
to meet in order to comply with DCO Core Principle B (Financial
Resources), as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act. Amended Core Principle
B requires a DCO to possess financial resources that, at a minimum,
exceed the total amount that would enable the DCO to meet its
financial obligations to its clearing members notwithstanding a
default by the clearing member creating the largest financial
exposure for the DCO in extreme but plausible conditions; and enable
the DCO to cover its operating costs for a period of one year, as
calculated on a rolling basis.
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(1) Summary of Comments
Several commenters raised concerns about the financial resources
requirement to cover one year of operating costs. Parity Energy
recommended that the Commission interpret ``operating costs of a swap
execution facility for a 1-year period'' to be the cost to the SEF of
an orderly wind-down of operations, where the SEF is one of many
execution avenues for standardized, cleared swaps and its failure would
have minimal impact on market risk or stability.\754\ Phoenix
recommended that because a SEF does not take or hold positions in any
of the products traded on it, an orderly wind-down of a SEF should take
six months so SEFs should be required to maintain financial resources
to cover six months of its operating costs.\755\ Similarly, TruMarx
contended that SEFs should not have such stringent financial resources
standards because a SEF is a trading platform and, therefore, will not
carry on its books the risks of positions and trades executed on
it.\756\ Rather, TruMarx stated that risk will be borne by the
principals entering into the transactions, their clearing brokers, and
clearing houses.\757\
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\754\ Parity Energy Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 25, 2011).
\755\ Phoenix Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 7, 2011).
\756\ TruMarx Comment Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\757\ Id.
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Alternatively, SDMA noted that it would be disruptive to the market
if a SEF went into bankruptcy.\758\ Therefore, it contended that 12
months of working capital is the absolute minimum amount of financial
resources that SEFs should have, and recommend that the Commission
require that SEFs have 18 months of working capital.\759\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\758\ SDMA Comment Letter at 12 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\759\ Id.
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(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1301 as proposed.\760\ To
address the concerns about the financial resources requirement, the
Commission notes that Core Principle 13 requires each SEF to maintain
adequate financial resources to discharge its responsibilities.\761\ In
order to fulfill this responsibility, the core principle states that
the financial resources of a SEF shall be considered to be adequate if
the value of the financial resources exceeds the total amount that
would enable the SEF to cover its operating costs for a period of one
year, calculated on a rolling basis.\762\
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\760\ The Commission is making a technical change due to the
fact that the cross reference in Sec. 37.1301(b) should include
``of this chapter'' at the end of the reference in order to comply
with federal regulatory guidelines. Accordingly, the Commission is
revising Sec. 37.1301(b) to read: ``An entity that operates as both
a swap execution facility and a derivatives clearing organization
shall also comply with the financial resources requirements of
section 39.11 of this chapter.'' The Commission is also removing the
phrase ``or applicant for designation as such'' from Sec.
37.1301(c) because it is unnecessary. Section 37.3 and Form SEF read
together make clear that an applicant must comply with the financial
resources requirement.
\761\ CEA section 5h(f)(13)(A); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(13)(A).
\762\ CEA section 5h(f)(13)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(13)(B).
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In response to comments that Core Principle 13 should be
interpreted to mean the cost to wind-down a SEF's operations, the
Commission notes that such an interpretation would require SEFs to have
significantly less financial resources. The Commission believes that a
SEF's financial strength is vital to ensure that the SEF can discharge
its
[[Page 33539]]
core principle responsibilities in accordance with the CEA and that
those costs are greater than the cost to wind-down operations. Based on
its experience regulating DCMs and DCOs, the Commission has learned
that financial strength is vital to market continuity and the ability
of an entity to withstand unpredictable market events, and believes
that one year of operating expenses on a rolling basis is appropriate.
For these reasons, the Commission also disagrees with TruMarx's
argument that SEFs should not have such stringent financial resources
standards because they will not hold the risks of positions and trades.
(b) Sec. 37.1302--Types of Financial Resources
Proposed Sec. 37.1302 set forth the type of financial resources
available to satisfy the requirements of proposed Sec. 37.1301. The
proposed rule stated that financial resources may include: (a) The
SEF's own capital; and (b) Any other financial resource deemed
acceptable by the Commission. The Commission invited comment regarding
particular financial resources to be included in the final
regulation.\763\
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\763\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1230.
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(1) Summary of Comments
Several commenters recommended that the Commission include specific
examples of financial resources that might satisfy the requirement.
Phoenix recommended that the Commission include in final Sec. 37.1302
the following financial resources: assets of a parent company that
wholly owns the SEF, and, subject to Sec. 37.1304 (Valuation of
financial resources), the SEF's accounts receivable from SEF
members.\764\ Phoenix contended that as long as the parent company has
committed to guarantee the financial resource obligations of the SEF,
those assets should be available to the SEF, and that amounts owed to a
SEF by its customers are easily obtainable by a SEF.\765\ CME believed
that Congress intended the term ``financial resources'' to be construed
broadly and include anything of value at the SEF's disposal, including
operating revenues.\766\ Reuters recommended that assets of affiliated
entities within a corporate group should be acceptable types of
financial resources.\767\
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\764\ Phoenix Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 7, 2011).
\765\ Id.
\766\ CME Comment Letter at 37 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\767\ Reuters Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is revising proposed Sec. 37.1302(a) to state that
a SEF's own capital means its assets minus its liabilities calculated
in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(``GAAP''). The Commission believes that if a particular financial
resource is an asset under GAAP, then it is appropriate for inclusion
in the calculation for this rule. If a particular financial resource is
not an asset under GAAP, but based upon the facts and circumstances a
SEF believes that the particular financial resource should be
acceptable, the Commission staff will work with the SEF to determine
whether such resource is acceptable. In this regard, the Commission is
clarifying that the language in final Sec. 37.1302(b) is intended to
provide flexibility to both SEFs and the Commission in determining
other acceptable types of financial resources on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, the Commission notes that it may not have jurisdiction
over a SEF's parent company or its affiliates; therefore, the
Commission cannot consider the parent company's or affiliates'
financial resources in determining whether the SEF possesses adequate
financial resources.
(c) Sec. 37.1303--Computation of Financial Resource Requirement \768\
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\768\ The Commission is renaming the title of this section from
``Computation of Financial Resource Requirement'' to ``Computation
of Projected Operating Costs to Meet Financial Resource
Requirement'' to provide greater clarity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 37.1303 required a SEF, each fiscal quarter, to make
a reasonable calculation of its projected operating costs over a
twelve-month period to determine the amount needed to meet the
requirements of proposed Sec. 37.1301. Proposed Sec. 37.1303 provided
SEFs with reasonable discretion to determine the methodology used to
compute such projected operating costs. The proposed rule authorized
the Commission to review the methodology and require changes as
appropriate.
(1) Summary of Comments
MarketAxess noted that the proposed regulations do not prescribe
specific methodologies for computing projected operating costs and
recommended that the Commission provide a safe harbor for specific
methodologies.\769\
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\769\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 39 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1303 as proposed because it
provides flexibility to both SEFs and the Commission regarding the
calculation of projected operating costs.\770\ This flexibility would
be limited if the Commission prescribed specific methodologies for
computing projected operating costs in the rule text. In response to
MarketAxess's comment, the Commission notes that SEFs may work with the
Commission staff to create an appropriate methodology for computing
such operating costs.
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\770\ The Commission is revising the language of Sec. 37.1303
for clarity.
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(d) Sec. 37.1304--Valuation of Financial Resources
Proposed Sec. 37.1304 required a SEF, not less than quarterly, to
compute the current market value of each financial resource used to
meet its obligations under proposed Sec. 37.1301. The proposed rule
required SEFs to perform the valuation at other times as appropriate.
As stated in the SEF NPRM, the rule is designed to address the need to
update valuations in circumstances where there may have been material
fluctuations in market value that could impact a SEF's ability to meet
its obligations under proposed Sec. 37.1301.\771\ The proposed rule
required that, when valuing a financial resource, the SEF reduce the
value, as appropriate, to reflect any market or credit risk specific to
that particular resource (i.e., apply a haircut).\772\ The SEF NPRM
stated that the Commission would permit SEFs to exercise discretion to
determine applicable haircuts, which would be subject to Commission
review and acceptance.\773\
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\771\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1231.
\772\ A ``haircut'' is a deduction taken from the value of an
asset to reserve for potential future adverse price movements in
such asset.
\773\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1231 n. 102.
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(1) Summary of Comments
MarketAxess commented that proposed Sec. 37.1304 did not prescribe
specific methodologies for valuing financial resources and recommended
that the Commission provide a safe harbor for specific
methodologies.\774\
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\774\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 39 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1304 as proposed.\775\ As with
[[Page 33540]]
Sec. 37.1303, Sec. 37.1304 provides flexibility to both SEFs and the
Commission regarding the valuation of financial resources. This
flexibility would be limited if the Commission prescribed specific
methodologies for valuing financial resources in the rule text. In
response to MarketAxess's comment, the Commission notes that SEFs may
work with the Commission staff to create an appropriate methodology for
valuing such financial resources.
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\775\ MarketAxess noted that Sec. 37.1304 contains a
typographical error as it mistakenly cross-references proposed Sec.
37.701, which relates to the mandatory clearing requirement, instead
of proposed Sec. 37.1301. The Commission has made this technical
change in the final rule. Additionally, the Commission is revising
the language of Sec. 37.1304 for clarity.
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(e) Sec. 37.1305--Liquidity of Financial Resources
Proposed Sec. 37.1305 required a SEF's financial resources to
include unencumbered, liquid financial assets (i.e., cash and/or highly
liquid securities) equal to at least six months' operating costs. As
noted in the SEF NPRM, the Commission believes that the requirement to
have six months' worth of unencumbered, liquid financial assets would
provide a SEF time to liquidate the remaining financial assets it would
need to continue operating for the last six months of the required one-
year period.\776\ The proposed rule stated that if any portion of such
financial resources is not sufficiently liquid, the SEF may take into
account a committed line of credit or similar facility to satisfy this
requirement. As stated in the SEF NPRM, a SEF may only use a committed
line of credit or similar facility to meet the liquidity requirements
set forth in Sec. 37.1305.\777\ Accordingly, the SEF NPRM stated that
a committed line of credit or similar facility is not available to a
SEF to satisfy the financial resources requirements of Sec.
37.1301.\778\
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\776\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1231.
\777\ Id.
\778\ Id.
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(1) Summary of Comments
Several commenters recommended alternate liquidity requirements to
the six months of operating costs. CME commented that the liquidity
measurement is only relevant in the context of winding-down operations,
and claimed that a three-month period, rather than a six-month period,
is a more accurate assessment of how long it would take for a SEF to
wind down.\779\ Similarly, Phoenix recommended that a SEF be required
to maintain liquid assets equal to three months of operating
expenses.\780\ Parity Energy commented that the Commission should
tailor financial requirements to a SEF's size and market impact and
recommended limiting the six month liquid asset requirement to only
those SEFs whose failure could impact market stability.\781\ SDMA,
however, recommended that the Commission require SEFs to have at least
12 months of unencumbered capital.\782\
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\779\ CME Comment Letter at 37 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\780\ Phoenix Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 7, 2011).
\781\ Parity Energy Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 25, 2011).
\782\ SDMA Comment Letter at 12 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1305 as proposed. The
Commission views a six month period as appropriate for a wind down
period and notes that commenters did not provide any support for
alternative time frames. In response to Parity Energy's comment, the
Commission notes that the purpose of the liquidity requirement is so
that all SEFs have liquid financial assets to allow them to continue to
operate and to wind down in an orderly fashion. Therefore, the
Commission is not limiting the liquidity requirement to only those SEFs
whose failure could impact market stability. In this regard, the
Commission notes that the statutory financial resources requirements
apply to all SEFs and are necessary to ensure core principle
compliance. The statute does not distinguish SEFs' financial resources
based on their market impact.
The Commission also notes that it is using the term
``unencumbered'' in Sec. 37.1305 in the normal commercial sense to
refer to assets that are not subject to a security interest or other
adverse claims. By ``committed line of credit or similar facility,''
the Commission means a committed, irrevocable contractual obligation to
provide funds on demand with preconditions limited to the execution of
appropriate agreements. For example, a facility with a material adverse
financial condition restriction would not be acceptable. The purpose of
this requirement is for a SEF to have no impediments to accessing its
line of credit at the time it needs liquidity. Further, SEFs are
encouraged to periodically check their line of credit arrangements to
confirm that no operational difficulties are present.
(f) Sec. 37.1306--Reporting Requirements \783\
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\783\ The Commission is renaming the title of this section from
``Reporting Requirements'' to ``Reporting to the Commission'' to
provide greater clarity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 37.1306(a)(1) required that, at the end of each
fiscal quarter, or at any time upon Commission request, a SEF report to
the Commission: (i) The amount of financial resources necessary to meet
the requirements of Sec. 37.1301; and (ii) the value of each financial
resource available to meet those requirements. Proposed Sec.
37.1306(a)(2) required a SEF to provide the Commission with a financial
statement, including balance sheet, income statement, and statement of
cash flows of the SEF or of its parent company. Proposed Sec.
37.1306(b) required calculations to be made on the last business day of
the SEF's fiscal quarter.
Proposed Sec. 37.1306(c) required a SEF to provide the Commission
with sufficient documentation explaining the methodology it used to
calculate its financial requirements and the basis for its valuation
and liquidity determinations. The proposed rule also required the SEF
to provide copies of any agreements establishing or amending a credit
facility, insurance coverage, or any similar arrangement that evidences
or otherwise supports its conclusions.
Finally, proposed Sec. 37.1306(d) required SEFs to file the report
no later than 17 business days \784\ from the end of its fiscal quarter
but allowed SEFs to request an extension of time from the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\784\ This filing deadline is consistent with the deadline
imposed on FCMs for the filing of monthly financial reports. See 17
CFR 1.10(b) for further details.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Summary of Comments
CME wrote that it would not be feasible for SEFs to comply with the
proposed filing deadline of 17 business days from the end of a SEF's
fiscal quarter.\785\ CME recommended a reporting deadline of 40
calendar days after the end of each fiscal quarter and 60 calendar days
after the end of the fiscal year, which it noted is consistent with the
SEC's reporting requirements.\786\ CME also sought clarification that
consolidated financial statements covering multiple registered entities
satisfy the reporting requirements.\787\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\785\ CME Comment Letter at 38 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\786\ Id.
\787\ Id.
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MarketAxess stated that the proposed reporting requirements are
unnecessary and burdensome, and recommended that the Commission allow a
senior officer of the SEF to represent to the Commission that the SEF
satisfies the financial resources requirements.\788\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\788\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 40 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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Two commenters discussed disclosure of the reports. CME recommended
that the Commission clarify that filings made in compliance with the
proposed financial resources regulations are confidential.\789\
[[Page 33541]]
However, SIFMA AMG commented that SEFs should submit to the Commission
and make available for public comment evidence demonstrating sufficient
resources.\790\
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\789\ CME Comment Letter at 38 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\790\ SIMFA AMG Comment Letter at 13 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1306 as proposed, subject to
certain amendments to the filing deadlines.\791\ The Commission agrees
with CME that the proposed 17 business day filing deadline may be
burdensome. In the final rule, the Commission is extending the 17
business day proposed filing deadline to 40 calendar days for the
fiscal quarter reports and to 60 calendar days for the fiscal year-end
report, which will also harmonize the filing deadlines with the SEC's
requirements for its Form 10-Q and Form 10-K. The Commission also
clarifies that consolidated financial statements must disclose all
relevant and appropriate figures such that a determination of the
sufficiency of financial resources of a SEF can be made without
additional requests for information from the entity. In such case,
consolidated financial statements would comply with the reporting
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\791\ The Commission is also making certain non-substantive
clarifications to Sec. 37.1306.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to MarketAxess's comment that the reporting
requirements are unnecessary and burdensome, the Commission believes
that prudent financial management requires SEFs to prepare and review
financial reports on a regular basis and expects that SEFs would
regularly review their finances. In this regard, the Commission notes
that because of the importance of this requirement, a mere
representation by a senior officer is insufficient for verification
that the SEF meets its financial obligations. The quarterly reporting
required by Sec. 37.1306 will adequately provide the Commission with
assurance that a SEF satisfies its financial resources requirements.
The Commission notes that DCMs and DCOs have similar financial
resources reporting obligations and does not believe that SEFs should
be treated differently. The Commission also believes that much of the
information required by the reports should be readily available to a
sophisticated organization, which the Commission expects would
regularly account for its financial resources. As such, the Commission
notes that the cost of submitting these reports to the Commission would
be de minimis.
The Commission further clarifies that it does not intend to make
financial resources reports public. However, where such information is,
in fact, confidential, the Commission encourages SEFs to submit a
written request for confidential treatment of such filings under the
Freedom of Information Act (``FOIA''), pursuant to the procedures
established in section 145.9 of the Commission's regulations.\792\ The
determination of whether to disclose or exempt such information in the
context of a FOIA proceeding would be governed by the provisions of
part 145 and any other relevant provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\792\ 17 CFR 145.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Commission is adding new Sec. 37.1307 titled
``Delegation of Authority'' to the final SEF rules to delegate
authority to the Director of DMO to perform certain functions that are
reserved to the Commission under subpart N.
14. Subpart O--Core Principle 14 (System Safeguards)
Core Principle 14 pertains to the establishment of system
safeguards and requires SEFs to: (1) Establish and maintain a program
of risk analysis and oversight to identify and minimize sources of
operational risk through the development of appropriate controls and
procedures and the development of automated systems that are reliable,
secure, and have adequate scalable capacity; (2) establish and maintain
emergency procedures, backup facilities, and a plan for disaster
recovery that allow for the timely recovery and resumption of
operations and the fulfillment of the responsibilities and obligations
of the SEF; and (3) periodically conduct tests to verify that backup
resources are sufficient to ensure continued order processing and trade
matching, price reporting, market surveillance, and maintenance of a
comprehensive and accurate audit trail.\793\ In the SEF NPRM, the
Commission proposed to codify the statutory text of Core Principle 14
in proposed Sec. 37.1400, and adopts that rule as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\793\ CEA section 5h(f)(14); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(14).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Sec. 37.1401--Requirements
Proposed Sec. 37.1401(a) required a SEF to: Establish and maintain
a program of risk analysis and oversight; establish and maintain
emergency procedures, backup facilities, and a plan for disaster
recovery; and periodically conduct tests to verify that backup
resources are sufficient. Proposed Sec. 37.1401(b) required that a
SEF's program of risk analysis and oversight address six categories of
risk analysis and oversight, including: Information security; business
continuity-disaster recovery (``BC-DR'') planning and resources;
capacity and performance planning; systems operations; systems
development and quality assurance; and physical security and
environmental controls. Proposed Sec. 37.1401(c) suggested that a SEF
follow generally accepted standards and best practices when addressing
the categories of risk analysis and oversight.
Proposed Sec. 37.1401(d) and (e) also required each SEF to
maintain a BC-DR plan, BC-DR resources, emergency procedures, and
backup facilities sufficient to enable timely recovery and resumption
of its operations and ongoing fulfillment of its responsibilities and
obligations as a SEF following any disruption, either through
sufficient infrastructure and personnel resources of its own or through
sufficient contractual arrangements with other SEFs or disaster
recovery service providers. If the Commission determines that a SEF is
a critical financial market, then that SEF would be subject to more
stringent requirements, set forth in Sec. 40.9 of the Commission's
regulations.
The proposed rule also required each SEF to notify the Commission
staff of various system security-related events, including prompt
notice of all electronic trading halts and systems malfunctions
(proposed Sec. 37.1401(f)(1)), cyber-security incidents (proposed
Sec. 37.1401(f)(2)), and any activation of the SEF's BC-DR plan
(proposed Sec. 37.1401(f)(3)). In addition, the proposed rule required
each SEF to provide the Commission staff with timely advance notice of
all planned changes to automated systems that may impact the
reliability, security, or adequate scalable capacity of such systems
(proposed Sec. 37.1401(g)(1)) and planned changes to programs of risk
analysis and oversight (proposed Sec. 37.1401(g)(2)).
The proposed rule also required each SEF to provide relevant
documents to the Commission (proposed Sec. 37.1401(h)) and to conduct
regular, periodic, objective testing and review of its automated
systems (proposed Sec. 37.1401(i)). Moreover, proposed Sec.
37.1401(j) required each SEF, to the extent practicable, to coordinate
its BC-DR plan with those of the market participants upon whom it
depends to provide liquidity, to initiate coordinated testing of such
plans, and to ensure that its BC-DR plan takes into account the BC-DR
plans of relevant telecommunications, power, water, and
[[Page 33542]]
other essential service providers. Finally, proposed Sec. 37.1401(k)
stated that part 46 of the Commission's regulations governs the
obligations of entities determined to be critical financial markets,
with respect to maintenance and geographical dispersal of disaster
recovery resources.
(1) Summary of Comments
CME objected to what it considers to be an overly broad requirement
in proposed Sec. 37.1401(f)(1) to notify the Commission staff promptly
of all electronic trading halts and systems malfunctions.\794\ CME
stated that the required reporting should be limited only to material
system failures.\795\ CME also objected to proposed Sec.
37.1401(g)(1), stating that the requirement that SEFs provide the
Commission with timely advance notice of all planned changes to
automated systems that may impact the reliability, security, or
adequate scalable capacity of such systems is overly burdensome, and
not cost effective.\796\ Additionally, CME stated that the proposed
Sec. 37.1401(g)(2) requirement that SEFs provide timely advance notice
of all planned changes to their program of risk analysis and oversight
is too broad and generally unnecessary.\797\ Finally, CME noted that it
does not control, or generally have access to, the details of the
disaster recovery plans of its major vendors.\798\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\794\ CME Comment Letter at 36 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\795\ Id.
\796\ Id. at 37.
\797\ Id.
\798\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MarketAxess and WMBAA sought clarification of the criteria used to
determine which SEFs are ``critical financial markets,'' as referenced
in proposed Sec. 37.1401(d).\799\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\799\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 40 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA
Comment Letter at 28 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Commission Determination
As noted in the SEF NPRM, automated systems play a central and
critical role in today's electronic financial market environment, and
the oversight of core principle compliance by SEFs with respect to
automated systems is an essential part of effective oversight of swaps
market.\800\ Advanced computer systems are fundamental to a SEF's
ability to meet its obligations and responsibilities under the core
principles.\801\ Accordingly, the Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1401
as proposed, subject to the modifications described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\800\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1231.
\801\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the Commission did not receive related comments, the
Commission is eliminating proposed Sec. 37.1401(a) because this
paragraph is repetitious of proposed rule Sec. 37.1400. The Commission
is also moving the following portions of proposed Sec. 37.1401 to the
guidance in appendix B to part 37 because the rules as proposed
provided SEFs with a degree of discretion: (1) Proposed Sec.
37.1401(c) suggesting that a SEF follow generally accepted standards
and best practices in addressing the categories of its risk analysis
and oversight program; (2) the portion of proposed Sec. 37.1401(i)
suggesting that a SEF's testing of its automated systems and BC-DR
capabilities be conducted by qualified, independent professionals; and
(3) proposed Sec. 37.1401(j) suggesting that a SEF coordinate its BC-
DR plan with those of others.\802\ Given that these proposed provisions
provided SEFs with a degree of discretion, the Commission believes that
they are better suited as guidance rather than rules, and as guidance,
SEFs will have greater flexibility in administering their obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\802\ As a result of these changes, proposed section (b) is
adopted as section (a), proposed section (d) is adopted as section
(b), proposed section (e) is adopted as section (c), proposed
section (f) is adopted as section (d), proposed section (g) is
adopted as section (e), proposed section (h) is adopted as section
(f), proposed section (i) is adopted as section (g), and proposed
section (k) is adopted as section (h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to CME's comments, the Commission is revising proposed
Sec. 37.1401(f)(1) to provide that SEFs only need to promptly notify
the Commission staff of all material system malfunctions. With respect
to planned changes to automated systems or programs of risk analysis
and oversight, the Commission is revising proposed Sec. 37.1401(g) to
require timely advance notification of all material changes to
automated systems and to programs of risk analysis and oversight. The
Commission believes that these revisions are appropriate because the
scope of the proposed rules may have been too broad as CME noted. The
Commission notes that proposed Sec. 37.1401(j) does not require SEFs
to control or have access to the details of the disaster recovery plans
of its major vendors. Rather, the requirement in the proposed rule,
which is being adopted as guidance, suggests coordination to the extent
possible.
In response to comments from WMBAA and MarketAxess, the Commission
is revising proposed Sec. 37.1401(d) to include a reference to
appendix E to part 40 of the Commission's regulations, which describes
the Commission's criteria for determining whether a SEF is a critical
financial market.\803\ Appendix E to part 40 describes the evaluation
and notification process for SEFs once designated as a critical
financial market.\804\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\803\ Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery, 75 FR 42633
(proposed Jul. 22, 2010). The Commission notes that this rulemaking
is not yet final.
\804\ Id. at 42639.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the references to Sec. 40.9 regarding critical
financial markets in proposed Sec. 37.1401(d) and 37.1401(k), the
Commission notes that Sec. 40.9, which was proposed in a separate
rulemaking,\805\ is not yet final. However, SEFs deemed critical
financial markets will be subject to the requirements set forth in
Sec. 40.9 upon its effective date. The Commission further notes that
the reference to part 46 in proposed Sec. 37.1401(k) was a technical
error. Instead, the proposed rule should have referenced part 40.
Accordingly, the Commission is replacing the mistaken reference to part
46 with a reference to part 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\805\ Id. at 42638-39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Subpart P--Core Principle 15 (Designation of Chief Compliance
Officer)
Core Principle 15 establishes the position and duties of chief
compliance officer (``CCO'').\806\ Core Principle 15 also requires the
CCO to design procedures to establish the handling, management
response, remediation, retesting, and closing of noncompliance
issues.\807\ The statute also requires a CCO to prepare and sign an
annual compliance report that is filed with the Commission.\808\ In
addition, Core Principle 15 requires the CCO to include in the report a
certification that, under penalty of law, the report is accurate and
complete.\809\ In the SEF NPRM, the Commission proposed to codify the
statutory text of Core Principle 15 in proposed Sec. 37.1500, and
adopts that rule as proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\806\ CEA section 5h(f)(15); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15).
\807\ Id.
\808\ Id.
\809\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(a) Sec. 37.1501--Chief Compliance Officer
Proposed Sec. 37.1501 implemented the statutory provisions of Core
Principle 15 and granted CCOs the authority necessary to fulfill their
responsibilities.
(1) Sec. 37.1501(a)--Definition of Board of Directors
Proposed Sec. 37.1501(a) defined ``board of directors'' as the
board of directors of
[[Page 33543]]
a swap execution facility or for those swap execution facilities whose
organizational structure does not include a board of directors, a body
performing a function similar to a board of directors.
(i) Commission Determination
The Commission received no comments on Sec. 37.1501(a) and is
adopting the rule as proposed.
(2) Sec. 37.1501(b)--Designation and Qualifications of Chief
Compliance Officer
Proposed Sec. 37.1501(b)(1) required a SEF to establish a CCO
position and to designate an individual to serve in that capacity.
Proposed Sec. 37.1501(b)(1)(i) required that a SEF provide its CCO
with the authority and resources to develop and enforce policies and
procedures necessary to fulfill its statutory and regulatory duties. In
addition, proposed Sec. 37.1501(b)(1)(ii) provided that CCOs must have
supervisory authority over all staff acting in furtherance of the CCO's
statutory, regulatory, and self-regulatory obligations.
Proposed Sec. 37.1501(b)(2) required that a CCO have the
appropriate background and skills to fulfill the responsibilities of
the position. Proposed Sec. 37.1501(b)(2)(i) prohibited anyone who
would be disqualified from registration under CEA sections 8a(2) or
8a(3) from serving as a CCO.\810\ Proposed Sec. 37.1501(b)(2)(ii)
prohibited a CCO from being a member of the SEF's legal department or
its general counsel.\811\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\810\ See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 1232 (discussing the reasons for this
requirement).
\811\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Summary of Comments
Some commenters stated that by mandating that the CCO have the
authority and resources to ``enforce'' a SEF's policies and procedures,
the proposed rules change the traditional role of a CCO and give the
CCO authority that should be reserved for senior management.\812\ These
commenters stated that the traditional and proper role of a CCO is to
advise management on compliance issues and that management has the
authority to enforce compliance policies and procedures.\813\ The
commenters recommended that the Commission revise the proposed rules to
give effect to the well-established and critical distinction between a
CCO and management.\814\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\812\ WMBAA Comment Letter II at 2-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall
Comment Letter at 14-15 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 5-6
(Feb. 7, 2011). WMBAA submitted two comment letters to the SEF
rulemaking comment file on Mar. 8, 2011. The second comment letter
referred to herein as ``WMBAA Comment Letter II'' only pertains to
the SEF NPRM's proposed CCO provisions. Additionally, rather than
repeat its comments regarding the CCO provisions that pertain to
both the DCO and SEF NPRMs, CME incorporated its entire DCO
rulemaking comment letter regarding CCOs dated Feb. 7, 2011 as
Exhibit B to its SEF comment letter dated Mar. 8, 2011. The
Commission notes these comments by referencing the Feb. 7, 2011 date
of CME's DCO comment letter regarding CCOs. The Commission is also
changing CME's reference to ``DCO'' to ``SEF'' for these comments.
\813\ WMBAA Comment Letter II at 2-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall
Comment Letter at 14-15 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 5-6
(Feb. 7, 2011).
\814\ WMBAA Comment Letter II at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall Comment
Letter at 14-15 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 6 (Feb. 7,
2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some commenters stated that the proposed rules should not prohibit
a CCO from serving as the SEF's general counsel or as a member of the
SEF's legal department.\815\ WMBAA noted that it is not uncommon for a
company's CCO to be its general counsel.\816\ Similarly, CME noted that
many CCOs have certain other job responsibilities, most typically in
related ``control areas'' such as the Legal Department or Internal
Audit.\817\ Additionally, MarketAxess stated that this prohibition
could prevent a smaller SEF from structuring its internal management in
the most efficient manner.\818\ Parity Energy recommended that this
requirement only apply to SEFs that could have a substantial impact on
market risk and stability if they were to fail.\819\ However, Tradeweb
and Better Markets expressed support for a dedicated CCO position
independent of a SEF's legal department.\820\ Better Markets also
commented that in situations where there are a number of affiliated
organizations, a single senior CCO should have overall responsibility
for each affiliated and controlled entity, even if the individual
entities have CCOs.\821\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\815\ WMBAA Comment Letter II at 6-7 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess
Comment Letter at 27 (Mar. 8, 2011); ICE Comment Letter at 6-7 (Mar.
8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 3 (Feb. 7, 2011).
\816\ WMBAA Comment Letter II at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\817\ CME Comment Letter at 3 (Feb. 7, 2011).
\818\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 27 n. 31 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\819\ Parity Energy Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 25, 2011).
\820\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 12 (Mar. 8, 2011); Better
Markets Comment Letter at 19 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\821\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 19 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1501(b) as proposed, subject to
two modifications described below. In general, the Commission disagrees
with the commenters who believe that a CCO's function is solely to
monitor and advise on compliance issues. These commenters do not
provide any statutory support for this view and their position appears
to conflict with the statutory responsibilities of a CCO as set forth
in the Act. In particular, CEA section 5h(f)(15)(B) requires a CCO to
``resolve any conflicts of interest that may arise'' and to ``ensure
compliance with this Act.'' \822\ These duties suggest that a CCO is
intended to be more than just an advisor, and must have the appropriate
authority to enforce policies and procedures related to his or her
areas of responsibility. The Commission believes that such authority is
particularly important for a SEF CCO, given the CCO's responsibility in
overseeing a SEF's self-regulatory programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\822\ CEA sections 5h(f)(15)(B)(iii) and (v); 7 U.S.C. 7b-
3(f)(15)(B)(iii) and (v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, to clarify the CCO's supervisory authority, the Commission
is amending proposed Sec. 37.1501(b)(1)(ii) to state that ``[t]he
chief compliance officer shall have supervisory authority over all
staff acting at the direction of the chief compliance officer''
(emphasis added). This modification provides greater clarity as to the
SEF staff that must be under the managerial oversight of a CCO by
emphasizing that such staff includes persons necessary for SEFs to
fulfill their self-regulatory obligations, including compliance staff
(e.g., trade practice and market surveillance staff and enforcement
staff). The Commission notes that other SEF staff are not captured by
the requirements of Sec. 37.1501(b)(1).
The Commission is withdrawing proposed Sec. 37.1501(b)(2)(ii),
which prohibits the CCO from serving as a SEF's general counsel or as a
member of its legal department. In the SEF NPRM, the Commission noted
that there is potentially a conflict of interest present if a CCO
serves as a SEF's general counsel or as a member of its legal
department.\823\ However, the Commission has determined that the
potential costs of hiring additional staff to satisfy the requirement
in proposed Sec. 37.1501(b)(2)(ii) may impose an excessive burden on
SEFs, particularly smaller SEFs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\823\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1232, n. 103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the Commission is eliminating proposed Sec.
37.1501(b)(2)(ii) from the final SEF rules, the Commission notes that a
conflict of interest may compromise a CCO's
[[Page 33544]]
ability to effectively fulfill his or her responsibilities as a CCO,
and that such conflicts may be more likely to arise when a CCO is also
employed as the SEF's general counsel or within its legal department.
Therefore, the Commission expects that as soon as any conflict of
interest becomes apparent, a SEF will immediately implement contingency
measures. For example, a SEF may reassign the conflicted matter to an
alternate employee who does not report to the CCO and who does not
possess a conflict of interest. The Commission believes that a SEF's
Regulatory Oversight Committee (``ROC'') \824\ should regularly monitor
for potential conflicts of interest in its oversight of the CCO, and
should be particularly involved in the oversight of any matter in which
a CCO was recused.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\824\ See Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations,
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding
the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 FR 63732, 63747-48
(proposed Oct. 18, 2010). Proposed Sec. 37.19(b) describes the role
of the ROC. The Commission notes that this rule is not yet final.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission disagrees with the recommendation by Better Markets
to require a single senior CCO to have responsibility over multiple
affiliated registered entities, some of which would be required by the
CEA and Commission regulations to have their own CCOs. Such a situation
might cause unnecessary confusion and dilute CCO accountability at the
individual entity level. Additionally, the Commission believes that the
proposed rule is sufficient to manage instances where there are a
number of affiliated organizations within a corporate family. In these
instances, each SEF would be required to appoint its own CCO.
(3) Sec. 37.1501(c)--Appointment, Supervision, and Removal of Chief
Compliance Officer
Proposed Sec. 37.1501(c)(1) required that a CCO's appointment and
compensation be approved by a majority of the SEF's board of directors
or its senior officer. Proposed Sec. 37.1501(c)(1) also required a CCO
to meet with the SEF's board of directors at least annually and the ROC
at least quarterly, and to provide any information requested regarding
the SEF's regulatory program. In addition, proposed Sec. 37.1501(c)(1)
required a SEF to notify the Commission of the appointment of a new CCO
within two business days of such appointment. Proposed Sec.
37.1501(c)(2) required a CCO to report directly to the board of
directors or to the senior officer of the SEF, at the SEF's discretion.
Proposed Sec. 37.1501(c)(3) required approval of a majority of a SEF's
board of directors to remove a CCO. If a SEF does not have a board of
directors, the proposed rule provided that the CCO may be removed by
its senior officer. Proposed Sec. 37.1501(c)(3) also required a SEF to
notify the Commission of, and explain the reasons for, the departure of
the CCO within two business days. In addition, proposed Sec.
37.1501(c)(3) required a SEF to immediately appoint an interim CCO, to
appoint a permanent CCO as soon as reasonably practicable, and to
notify the Commission within two business days of appointing any new
interim or permanent CCO.
(i) Summary of Comments
Some commenters requested that the Commission define the term
``senior officer'' and provided recommendations.\825\ FXall recommended
that the Commission define the term ``senior officer'' to include the
SEF's president, chief executive officer, chief legal officer, or other
officer with ultimate supervisory authority for the SEF entity.\826\
CME recommended that the term ``senior officer'' be defined to include
the senior officer of a division that is engaged in SEF activities
rather than the senior officer of a larger corporation.\827\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\825\ FXall Comment Letter at 14 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb
Comment Letter at 12 n.8 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 2-3
(Feb. 7, 2011).
\826\ FXall Comment Letter at 14 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\827\ CME Comment Letter at 2-3 (Feb. 7, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters also requested that the Commission grant a SEF greater
flexibility in determining how a CCO is appointed, compensated,
supervised, and removed.\828\ In this regard, WMBAA stated that a CCO
should be permitted to satisfy the statutory requirement of reporting
to the board of directors or a senior officer by reporting to a
ROC.\829\ MarketAxess commented that the proposed requirements for a
majority of the board of directors to approve the appointment,
compensation, and removal of the CCO go beyond the statutory mandate
and would effectively place the CCO at the same level as the SEF's
senior officer.\830\ CME argued that each SEF should be given the
flexibility to take additional steps beyond those required in the
proposed rule, based on the SEF's particular corporate structure, size,
and complexity, to ensure an appropriate level of independence for its
CCO.\831\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\828\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 6 (Jun. 3, 2011); MarketAxess
Comment Letter at 26 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA Comment Letter II at 7
(Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb Comment Letter at 12 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\829\ WMBAA Comment Letter II at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\830\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 26 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\831\ CME Comment Letter at 9 (Feb. 7, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
AFR and Better Markets recommended, however, that the rules for
CCO's appointment, compensation, supervision, and removal be
strengthened.\832\ AFR recommended that CCOs be responsible only to a
SEF's ROC.\833\ It argued that CCO independence may only be ensured by
vesting oversight of the position exclusively in public directors.\834\
Similarly, Better Markets recommended that decisions relating to a
CCO's designation, compensation, and termination should be the sole
responsibility of the independent members of the board of
directors.\835\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\832\ AFR Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011); Better Markets
Comment Letter at 19-20 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\833\ AFR Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\834\ Id.
\835\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 19-20 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1501(c) as proposed, subject to
several modifications described below.\836\ In response to commenters'
requests to define the term ``senior officer,'' the Commission
believes, based on the statutory language that requires a CCO to report
directly to the ``board or to the senior officer,'' that ``senior
officer'' would only include the most senior executive officer of the
legal entity that is registered as a SEF.
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\836\ The Commission is making certain non-substantive revisions
to Sec. 37.1501(c) for clarity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the commenters' requests for greater flexibility,
the Commission believes that proposed Sec. 37.1501(c) generally
strikes the appropriate balance between flexibility and ensuring that a
SEF's CCO is insulated from day-to-day commercial pressures. The
proposed rules provide a degree of flexibility by allowing a SEF's
board of directors or senior officer to appoint, set the compensation
of, and supervise the CCO. The proposed rules also protect the CCO from
undue influence by requiring that the board of directors or the senior
officer (if the SEF does not have a board of directors) be responsible
for removing the CCO and that the CCO meet with the board of directors
at least annually and with the ROC at least quarterly. In response to
CME's comment about additional flexibility beyond the rules, the
Commission notes that Sec. 37.1501(c) sets forth minimum standards so
a SEF may implement additional measures if it deems doing so necessary
to insulate the CCO from undue influence. The Commission encourages
SEFs to review and enact conflict mitigation procedures as appropriate
for their specific
[[Page 33545]]
corporate and/or organizational structure.
However, the Commission is revising proposed Sec. 37.1501(c) in
six respects. First, the Commission is modifying proposed Sec.
37.1501(c)(1) to more clearly state that the CCO is obligated to meet
with the board of directors at least annually and with the ROC at least
quarterly, even if the CCO was appointed by, or is supervised by, the
senior officer of the facility. Second, to clarify a CCO's duty to
provide information to a SEF's board of directors or ROC, the
Commission is modifying proposed Sec. 37.1501(c)(1) to state that
``[t]he chief compliance officer shall provide any information
regarding the swap execution facility's self-regulatory program that is
requested by the board of directors or the regulatory oversight
committee'' (emphasis added). Third, the Commission is eliminating the
requirement in proposed Sec. 37.1501(c)(1) that a CCO's appointment
and compensation require the approval of a majority of a SEF's board of
directors. The Commission believes that board of director approval is a
sufficient requirement for appointment, and that a SEF should have
appropriate discretion to determine the voting percentage necessary to
appoint a CCO or determine salary. Fourth, the Commission is
eliminating the requirement in proposed Sec. 37.1501(c)(3) that a SEF
explain the reason for the departure of a CCO within two business days.
The Commission believes that the specific reason for the departure may
be unnecessary in most instances. However, the Commission will have the
opportunity to investigate the reason for the departure if it so
desires because a SEF must notify the Commission of a CCO's departure
within two business days. Fifth, the Commission is eliminating the
requirement in proposed Sec. 37.1501(c)(3) that a SEF immediately
appoint an interim CCO, and appoint a new permanent CCO as soon as
reasonably practicable, upon the removal of a CCO. The Commission
believes that the requirement to appoint a new CCO is implicit in Sec.
37.1501(b)(1), which requires that a SEF designate an individual to
serve as CCO. Finally, the Commission is eliminating the requirement in
proposed Sec. 37.1501(c)(3) that a SEF notify the Commission within
two business days of appointing a new CCO because this requirement is
already included in Sec. 37.1501(c)(1).
(4) Sec. 37.1501(d)--Duties of Chief Compliance Officer
Proposed Sec. 37.1501(d) generally listed the following CCO
duties: (1) Overseeing and reviewing compliance with section 5h of the
CEA and related Commission regulations; (2) in consultation with the
board of directors or the senior officer, resolving any conflicts of
interest that may arise; (3) establishing and administering written
policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of
the CEA and Commission regulations; (4) ensuring compliance with the
CEA and Commission regulations relating to agreements, contracts, or
transactions, and with Commission regulations issued under section 5h
of the CEA; (5) establishing procedures for the remediation of
noncompliance issues identified by the CCO; (6) establishing and
following appropriate procedures for noncompliance issues; (7)
establishing a compliance manual and administering a code of ethics;
(8) supervising a SEF's self-regulatory program; and (9) supervising
the effectiveness and sufficiency of any regulatory services provided
to the SEF.
(i) Summary of Comments
Better Markets and CME commented on proposed Sec. 37.1501(d)(2)
regarding conflicts of interest.\837\ Better Markets recommended that
the Commission revise proposed Sec. 37.1501(d)(2) to require a CCO to
consult with both the independent members of the board of directors and
the senior officer when resolving conflicts of interest, which are
particularly contentious.\838\ CME requested that the Commission revise
proposed Sec. 37.1501(d)(2) to require a CCO to establish policies and
procedures reasonably designed to resolve any conflicts of interest
that may arise.\839\ Although CME conceded that the language in
proposed Sec. 37.1501(d)(2) mirrors the language in the Act, it
believes that Congress did not intend for the CCO to resolve conflicts
in the executive or managerial sense.\840\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\837\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 20 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME
Comment Letter at 6 (Feb. 7, 2011).
\838\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 19, 20 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\839\ CME Comment Letter at 6 (Feb. 7, 2011).
\840\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several commenters argued that proposed Sec. 37.1501(d)(4),
requiring a CCO to ``ensure'' compliance with the Act and Commission
regulations, is an impracticable standard.\841\ Instead, many of these
commenters recommended alternative language, which generally stated
that the CCO put in place policies and procedures that reasonably
ensure compliance with the Act and Commission regulations.\842\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\841\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 6-7 (Jun. 3, 2011); WMBAA
Comment Letter II at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment Letter
at 26 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb Comment Letter at 12 (Mar. 8, 2011);
CME Comment Letter at 4 (Feb. 7, 2011).
\842\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 6-7 (Jun. 3, 2011); Tradeweb
Comment Letter at 12 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 4 (Feb.
7, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CME also took issue with the requirement in proposed Sec.
37.1501(d)(6), which requires a CCO to ``follow'' appropriate
procedures for the handling, management response, remediation,
retesting, and closing of noncompliance issues.\843\ CME requested that
the Commission eliminate this requirement, which it believes is a
function of senior management.\844\ Additionally, WMBAA recommended
that the Commission delete proposed Sec. 37.1501(d)(8) and (d)(9),
regarding the supervision of a SEF's self-regulatory program and any
regulatory service provider, because these functions should be the
responsibility of management.\845\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\843\ CME Comment Letter at 6 (Feb. 7, 2011).
\844\ Id.
\845\ WMBAA Comment Letter II at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1501(d) as proposed, subject to
certain modifications described below. The Commission is revising
proposed Sec. 37.1501(d)(2) to clarify that the list of enumerated
conflicts of interest is not exhaustive.\846\ The Commission is not
adopting the recommendation by Better Markets to require the CCO to
consult with both the independent members of the board of directors and
the senior officer when resolving conflicts of interest. Considering
the statutory provisions of CEA section 5h, the Commission believes
that it is unnecessary to require the CCO to do so. However, the
Commission notes that Sec. 37.1501(d)(2) sets forth minimum standards
so a SEF may institute higher standards, such as requiring its CCO to
consult with both the independent members of the board of directors and
the senior officer when resolving conflicts of interest. The Commission
also declines to adopt CME's recommendation regarding conflicts of
interest. As CME acknowledged, the Commission is following the
statutory language in its implementation of Sec. 37.1501(d)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\846\ The Commission notes that the preamble to the SEF NPRM
already clarified this point. To provide additional clarity, the
Commission is clarifying this point in the final rule by adding the
word ``including'' before the list of enumerated conflicts of
interest. See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 1233.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to commenters' concerns about the requirement to
``ensure'' compliance in proposed Sec. 37.1501(d)(4),
[[Page 33546]]
the Commission is modifying the rule to state that the CCO shall take
``reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the Act and the rules of
the Commission.'' The Commission understands that a single individual
cannot guarantee compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations.
The Commission believes that this modification is responsive to
commenters' concerns and is consistent with the final rules for other
registered entities.\847\ The Commission is also removing the reference
to ``agreements, contracts, or transactions'' in proposed Sec.
37.1501(d)(4) to more closely follow the language in the Act. In making
this modification, the Commission does not intend to modify any
substantive obligations of the CCO with regard to agreements,
contracts, or transactions to the extent that these documents implicate
the Act or Commission regulations under the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\847\ See, e.g., Swap Data Repositories: Registration Standards,
Duties and Core Principles, 76 FR 54538, 54584 (Sept. 1, 2011)
(stating that the duties of an SDR's CCO include ``[t]aking
reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the Act and Commission
regulations . . .''); Derivatives Clearing Organization General
Provisions and Core Principles, 76 FR 69334, 69434 (Nov. 8, 2011)
(stating that the duties of a DCO's CCO include ``[t]aking
reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the Act and Commission
regulations . . .'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to clarify differences between the SEF NPRM's preamble and
rule text regarding proposed Sec. 37.1501(d)(7), the Commission is
revising the rule to state that the CCO's duties include
``[e]stablishing and administering a compliance manual designed to
promote compliance with the applicable laws, rules, and regulations . .
.'' (emphasis added). The Commission also disagrees with CME and WMBAA
that the requirements in proposed Sec. 37.1501(d)(6), (d)(8), and
(d)(9) are functions of management. These provisions, as discussed
above, require a CCO to establish and follow appropriate procedures
regarding noncompliance issues, supervise the SEF's self-regulatory
program, and supervise the effectiveness and sufficiency of any
regulatory service provider. As noted above, the Commission disagrees
with the commenters who believe that a CCO's function is solely to
monitor and advise on compliance issues. Finally, the Commission is
revising proposed Sec. 37.1501(d)(9) to remove the references to
``registered futures association'' and ``other registered entity'' and,
instead, adding a reference to ``regulatory service provider'' given
the inclusion of FINRA as a regulatory service provider under Sec.
37.204.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\848\ The Commission is renaming the title of this section from
``Annual Compliance Report Prepared by Chief Compliance Officer'' to
``Preparation of Annual Compliance Report.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) Sec. 37.1501(e)--Annual Compliance Report Prepared by Chief
Compliance Officer \848\
Proposed Sec. 37.1501(e) generally enumerated the following
information that must be included in the annual compliance report: (1)
A description of the SEF's written policies and procedures, including
the code of ethics and conflicts of interest policies; (2) a detailed
review of the SEF's compliance with CEA section 5h and Commission
regulations, which, among other requirements, identifies the policies
and procedures that ensure compliance with the core principles; (3) a
list of any material changes to the compliance policies and procedures
since the last annual compliance report; (4) a description of staffing
and resources set aside for the SEF's compliance program; (5) a
description of any material compliance matters, including instances of
noncompliance; (6) any objections to the annual compliance report by
those persons who have oversight responsibility for the CCO; and (7) a
certification by the CCO that, to the best of his or her knowledge and
reasonable belief, and under penalty of law, the annual compliance
report is accurate and complete.
(i) Summary of Comments
FXall and CME asserted that the information required to be included
in the annual compliance report is too detailed.\849\ FXall, for
example, commented that the requirements for the annual compliance
report go beyond those set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act and that
producing the report will consume considerable resources.\850\ FXall
proposed alternative requirements, which it believes would be more in-
line with the requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act.\851\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\849\ FXall Comment Letter at 16-17 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment
Letter at 7-8 (Feb. 7, 2011).
\850\ FXall Comment Letter at 16 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\851\ See id. for details regarding FXall's proposed
alternatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the requirement in proposed Sec. 37.1501(e)(2)(i)
to identify policies and procedures that ``ensure'' compliance with the
core principles, FXall and CME stated that policies and procedures
cannot ``ensure'' or guaranty compliance, but can only be reasonably
designed to result in compliance.\852\ CME also recommended that the
requirement in proposed Sec. 37.1501(e)(5) to describe any material
compliance matters be revised to require the report to identify ``any
material non-compliance issues that were not properly addressed.''
\853\ MarketAxess recommended that the Commission remove proposed Sec.
37.1501(e)(6) because in its opinion other persons should be able to
correct the CCO's annual report.\854\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\852\ FXall Comment Letter at 17 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment
Letter at 7 (Feb. 7, 2011).
\853\ CME Comment Letter at 7-8 (Feb. 7, 2011).
\854\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 26 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MarketAxess and FSR expressed their concern that the CCO's
certification of the annual compliance report in proposed Sec.
37.1501(e)(7) may impose strict liability on a CCO where the report
contains even a minor and insignificant error.\855\ These commenters
recommended adding a materiality qualifier to the certification.\856\
Additionally, both FXall and CME recommended that the SEF's senior
officer, not the CCO, certify the accuracy of the annual compliance
report.\857\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\855\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 26 (Mar. 8, 2011); FSR
Comment Letter at 10 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\856\ Id.
\857\ FXall Comment Letter at 15 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment
Letter at 8 (Feb. 7, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1501(e) as proposed, subject to
certain modifications described below. The Commission disagrees with
the comments from FXall and CME regarding the complexity and the burden
of the annual compliance report. The annual compliance report is meant
to provide the Commission with a detailed account of a SEF's compliance
with the CEA and Commission regulations, as well as a detailed account
of a SEF's self-regulatory program. The Commission believes that the
level of detail the proposed rules require, including the requirement
that the annual report include a description of all noncompliance
issues identified, is necessary to ensure that the Commission can
determine the effectiveness of a SEF's compliance and self-regulatory
programs.\858\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\858\ In this regard, the Commission disagrees with CME's
recommendation regarding proposed Sec. 37.1501(e)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, in response to comments, the Commission is revising
proposed Sec. 37.1501(e)(2)(i) to require that the annual compliance
report identify ``the policies and procedures that are designed to
ensure compliance with each subsection and core principle, including
each duty specified in section 5h(f)(15)(B) of the Act . . .''
(emphasis added). The Commission is also removing proposed Sec.
37.1501(e)(6), which requires the annual compliance report to include
any objections by
[[Page 33547]]
those persons who oversee the CCO.\859\ The Commission believes that
the board of directors \860\ may append its own comments if desired,
but the statutory text and the Commission's implementing regulations do
not require it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\859\ As a result of this deletion, the Commission is adopting
proposed Sec. 37.1501(e)(7) as Sec. 37.1501(e)(6).
\860\ If a SEF does not have a board of directors, then the
senior officer of the SEF may append his or her own comments if
desired.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission disagrees with the comments from MarketAxess and FSR
regarding the inclusion of a materiality qualifier to the certification
requirement. The Commission believes that the current certification
sufficiently protects the CCO from being held strictly liable for any
minor inaccuracies because it includes a ``knowledge'' and ``reasonable
belief'' qualifier. The Commission also disagrees with CME's and
FXall's comments to have the SEF's CEO, instead of the CCO, certify the
accuracy of the annual compliance report. While the CEA does not
explicitly require that the CCO certify the report, it does require
that the CCO ``annually prepare and sign'' the report, and that the
report ``include a certification that, under penalty of law, the
compliance report is accurate and complete.'' \861\ The Commission
believes that these two requirements read together provide sufficient
basis for the CCO to certify that the report is accurate and complete.
However, the Commission is modifying Sec. 37.1501(e) to explicitly
state that the CCO ``sign'' the annual compliance report in order to
follow the statutory text more closely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\861\ CEA section 5h(f)(15)(D); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)15)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(6) Sec. 37.1501(f)--Submission of Annual Compliance Report by Chief
Compliance Officer to the Commission \862\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\862\ The Commission is renaming the title of this section from
``Submission of Annual Compliance Report by Chief Compliance Officer
to the Commission'' to ``Submission of Annual Compliance Report.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed Sec. 37.1501(f)(1) required, among other items, that the
CCO provide the annual compliance report to the board of directors or
the senior officer for review, prior to submission to the Commission.
The proposed rule also stated that the board of directors or the senior
officer may not require the CCO to make any changes to the report.
Proposed Sec. 37.1501(f)(2) required that the annual compliance report
be electronically provided to the Commission not more than 60 days
after the end of the SEF's fiscal year. Proposed Sec. 37.1501(f)(3)
required the CCO to promptly file an amendment to an annual compliance
report upon discovery of any material error or omission. Proposed Sec.
37.1501(f)(4) allowed a SEF to request an extension of time to file its
compliance report based on substantial, undue hardship. Finally,
proposed Sec. 37.1501(f)(5) stated that annual compliance reports will
be treated as exempt from mandatory public disclosure for purposes of
FOIA \863\ and the Sunshine Act \864\ and parts 145 and 147 of the
Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\863\ 5 U.S.C. 552.
\864\ 5 U.S.C. 552b(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Summary of Comments
Some commenters stated that proposed Sec. 37.1501(f)(1) should be
modified to allow the board of directors or the senior officer to make
changes to the annual compliance report.\865\ These commenters
generally argued that the CCO should be accountable to management and,
by not permitting the board of directors or the senior officer to
revise the report, the proposed rule undermines the authority of the
board of directors.\866\ Better Markets recommended that the CCO should
be required to present his or her finalized report to the board of
directors and executive management prior to its submission.\867\ Better
Markets further recommended that the independent directors and/or the
Audit Committee, as well as the entire board of directors, review and
approve the report or detail where and why it disagrees with any
provision before submission to the Commission.\868\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\865\ FXall Comment Letter at 17-18 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA
Comment Letter II at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment Letter at
26 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\866\ Id.
\867\ Better Markets Comment Letter at 20 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\868\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to proposed Sec. 37.1501(f)(5), CME recommended that
the Commission expressly state that annual compliance reports are
confidential documents that are not subject to public disclosure by
listing such reports as a specifically exempt item in Commission
regulation 145.5.\869\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\869\ CME Comment Letter at 9 (Feb. 7, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1501(f) as proposed, subject to
two modifications described below. The Commission has determined not to
adopt the commenters' recommendation to allow the board of directors or
the senior officer to make changes to the annual compliance report. The
Commission believes that allowing the board of directors or the senior
officer to make changes to the report would prevent the CCO from making
a complete and accurate assessment of a SEF's compliance program. The
Commission has determined not to adopt the recommendation by Better
Markets that the board of directors approve the annual compliance
report or detail any disagreement. The Commission believes that
requiring the board of directors to approve the report increases the
risk that the CCO would be subject to undue influence by the board or
by management. The Commission notes that the board of directors may
include its own opinion of the annual compliance report if it disagrees
with the CCO's assessment. The Commission believes that the rule
strikes the appropriate balance between ensuring that the board of
directors cannot adversely influence the content of the annual
compliance report and granting the board the opportunity to express its
opinion of the report to the Commission.
The Commission is revising proposed Sec. 37.1501(f)(2) to clarify
that a SEF shall submit its annual compliance report to the Commission
concurrently with the SEF's filing of its fourth fiscal quarter
financial report pursuant to Sec. 37.1306. The Commission is making
this technical correction because CEA section 5h(f)(15)(D)(ii) sets
forth such a requirement, which was inadvertently omitted from the
proposed rules.\870\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\870\ CEA section 5h(f)(15)(D)(ii); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(15)(D)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the Commission is withdrawing proposed Sec.
37.1501(f)(5). The Commission acknowledges CME's concern regarding the
public release of annual compliance reports and clarifies that the
Commission does not intend to make annual compliance reports public.
However, where such information is, in fact, confidential, the
Commission encourages SEFs to submit a written request for confidential
treatment of such filings under FOIA, pursuant to the procedures
established in section 145.9 of the Commission's regulations.\871\ The
determination of whether to disclose or exempt such information in the
context of a FOIA proceeding would be governed by the provisions of
part 145 and any other relevant provision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\871\ 17 CFR 145.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(7) Sec. 37.1501(g)--Recordkeeping
Proposed Sec. 37.1501(g)(1) generally stated that a SEF must
maintain the following records: (i) A copy of written policies and
procedures adopted in furtherance of compliance with the Act and
Commission regulations; (ii) copies
[[Page 33548]]
of all materials created in furtherance of the CCO's duties listed in
paragraphs (d)(6) and (d)(7) of proposed Sec. 37.1501; (iii) copies of
all materials in connection with the review and submission of the
annual compliance report; and (iv) any records relevant to a SEF's
annual report. Proposed Sec. 37.1501(g)(2) required a SEF to maintain
these records in accordance with Sec. 1.31 and part 45 of the
Commission's regulations.
(i) Summary of Comments
MarketAxess commented that the final rule should provide an
exception for legally privileged materials.\872\ MarketAxess argued
that it is unreasonable for the Commission to take the position that a
CCO should not be able to receive privileged advice from counsel in an
effort to comply with these new, complex, and uncertain rules.\873\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\872\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 27 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\873\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Commission Determination
The Commission is adopting Sec. 37.1501(g) as proposed.\874\ The
Commission does not believe that Sec. 37.1501(g) changes existing
Commission policies regarding the assertion of attorney-client
privilege by registrants. As stated in the SEF NPRM, the Commission
designed Sec. 37.1501(g) to ensure that the Commission staff would be
able to obtain the necessary information to determine whether a SEF has
complied with the CEA and applicable regulations.\875\ The Commission
believes that proposed Sec. 37.1501(g) properly accomplishes this
goal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\874\ The Commission is making certain non-substantive
clarifications to Sec. 37.1501(g). In addition, the Commission is
revising the citation to paragraphs ``(d)(6) and (d)(7)'' in
proposed Sec. 37.1501(g)(1)(ii) to cite to paragraphs ``(d)(8) and
(d)(9).'' The Commission notes that this was a drafting error.
\875\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1235.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the Commission is adding new Sec. 37.1501(h) titled
``Delegation of authority'' to the final SEF rules to delegate
authority to the Director of DMO to grant or deny a swap execution
facility's request for an extension of time to file its annual
compliance report under paragraph (f)(4) of Sec. 37.1501.
III. Related Matters
A. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \876\ requires federal
agencies, in promulgating regulations, to consider the impact of those
regulations on small entities. The regulations adopted herein will
affect SEFs. The Commission has previously established certain
definitions of ``small entities'' to be used by the Commission in
evaluating the impact of its regulations on small entities in
accordance with the RFA.\877\ In addition, the Commission has
previously determined that DCMs, derivatives transaction execution
facilities (``DTEFs''), exempt commercial markets (``ECMs''), exempt
boards of trade (``EBOTs''), and DCOs are not small entities for the
purpose of the RFA.\878\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\876\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
\877\ See 47 FR 18618-21 (Apr. 30, 1982).
\878\ See 47 FR 18618, 18619 (Apr. 30, 1982) discussing DCMs; 66
FR 42256, 42268 (Aug. 10, 2001) discussing DTEFs, ECMs, and EBOTs;
and 66 FR 45604, 45609 (Aug. 29, 2001) discussing DCOs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While SEFs are new entities to be regulated by the Commission
pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act,\879\ in the SEF NPRM the Commission
proposed that SEFs should not be considered as small entities for the
purpose of the RFA for essentially the same reasons that DCMs and DCOs
have previously been determined not to be small entities.\880\ The
Commission received no comments on the impact of the rules contained
herein on small entities. Therefore, the Chairman, on behalf of the
Commission, hereby certifies, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), that the
regulations will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\879\ Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
\880\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1235.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act (``PRA'') \881\ imposes certain
requirements on federal agencies in connection with their conducting or
sponsoring any collection of information as defined by the PRA. An
agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently
valid control number issued by the Office of Management and Budget
(``OMB''). This final rulemaking contains new collection of information
requirements within the meaning of the PRA. Accordingly, in connection
with the SEF NPRM, the Commission submitted an information collection
request, titled ``Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap
Execution Facilities,'' to OMB for its review and approval in
accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11. Additionally,
pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), the Commission, in the SEF NPRM,
requested comments from the public on the proposed information
collection requirements in order to, among other items, evaluate the
necessity of the proposed collections of information and minimize the
burden of the information collection requirements on respondents.\882\
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\881\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
\882\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1236.
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On April 28, 2011, OMB assigned control number 3038-0074 to this
collection of information, but withheld final approval pending the
Commission's resubmission of the information collection, which includes
a description of the comments received on the collection and the
Commission's responses thereto. The Commission has revised some of its
proposed estimates of the number of mandatory responses in order to
clarify the Commission's original intent; otherwise, the proposed
burden hour estimates are being adopted as discussed herein. The
Commission has submitted the revised information collection request to
OMB for its review, which will be made available by OMB at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain.
As noted in the SEF NPRM, the Commission will protect proprietary
information according to the Freedom of Information Act and 17 CFR part
145, ``Commission Records and Information.'' In addition, section
8(a)(1) of the CEA strictly prohibits the Commission, unless
specifically authorized by the CEA, from making public ``data and
information that would separately disclose the business transactions or
market positions of any person and trade secrets or names of
customers.'' \883\ The Commission is also required to protect certain
information contained in a government system of records according to
the Privacy Act of 1974.\884\
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\883\ 7 U.S.C. 12(a)(1).
\884\ 5 U.S.C. 552a.
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1. Proposed Collection of Information
In the SEF NPRM, the Commission estimated that each SEF respondent
would have an average annual reporting burden of 308 hours.\885\ In
deriving this estimate, the Commission compared the reporting
requirements for other entities that fall under the Commission's
regulatory oversight, such as an Exempt Commercial Market with a
significant price discovery contract (``SPDC ECM''), a DTEF, and a
DCM.\886\ Specifically, the Commission estimated that a SEF will have
more reporting requirements than a SPDC ECM and a DTEF, but fewer
[[Page 33549]]
reporting requirements than a DCM (as most recently calculated).\887\
The Commission employed an average of its most recent hourly burdens
for DCMs, DTEFs, and SPDC ECMs.\888\ Those hourly burdens provided in
the SEF NPRM are noted below:
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\885\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1236.
\886\ Id.
\887\ Id. SPDC ECMs were subject to 9 core principles, DTEFs
were subject to 9 core principles, and DCMs are subject to 23 core
principles. SEFs will be subject to 15 core principles. Id. at 1236
n. 124.
\888\ Id. at 1236.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current estimate of DCM's annual burden: 440 hours per DCM 889
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\889\ After passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
of 2000 and a switch to the core principles framework for DCMs, the
Commission estimated that the recordkeeping and reporting
obligations imposed by part 38 would total 300 burden hours per DCM.
See A New Regulatory Framework for Trading Facilities,
Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations, 66 FR 42256, 42268 (Aug.
10, 2001); 66 FR 14262, 14268 (proposed Mar. 9, 2001). In 2007, the
Commission amended the acceptable practices in part 38 for
minimizing conflicts of interest, estimating that the amendments
would increase the information collection and reporting burden by an
additional 70 hours per DCM. See Conflicts of Interest in Self-
Regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations (``SROs''), 72 FR 6936,
6957 (Feb. 14, 2007); 71 FR 38740, 38748 (proposed Jul. 7, 2006).
Most recently, the Commission adopted revisions to part 38 to
implement the Dodd-Frank Act, estimating that the revisions would
increase the information collection and reporting burden by an
additional 70 hours per DCM. See Core Principles and Other
Requirements for Designated Contract Markets, 77 FR 36612, 36662
(Jun. 19, 2012). The average for purposes of the initial burden hour
estimate for SEFs averages both initial estimates for DCMs with the
other most recent estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial estimate of DTEF's annual burden: 200 hours per DTEF 890
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\890\ A New Regulatory Framework for Trading Facilities,
Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations, 66 FR at 42268; 66 FR at
14268.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial estimate of SPDC ECM's annual burden: 233 hours per ECM 891
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\891\ Significant Price Discovery Contracts on Exempt Commercial
Markets, 74 FR 12178, 12187 (Mar. 23, 2009); 73 FR 75888, 75902
(proposed Dec. 12, 2008).
In the SEF NPRM, the Commission estimated that 30 to 40 SEFs will
register with the Commission as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act.\892\
Therefore, the Commission estimated the annual aggregate hour burden
for all respondents to be 10,780 hours.\893\ Based on an hourly rate of
$52,\894\ the Commission estimated that respondents may expend up to
$16,016 annually to comply with the proposed regulations.\895\ This
would result in an aggregate cost across all SEF respondents of
$560,560 per annum (35 respondents x $16,016).\896\ The SEF NPRM also
provided the following summary of estimates:
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\892\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1236. For hourly reporting requirements, an
average of 35 SEFs was used for calculation purposes. Id. at 1236 n.
125.
\893\ Id. at 1236.
\894\ In arriving at a wage rate for the hourly costs imposed,
the Commission consulted the Management and Professional Earnings in
the Securities Industry Report, published in 2010 by the Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA Report). The wage
rate is a composite (blended) wage rate arrived at by averaging the
mean annual salaries of an Assistant/Associate General Counsel, an
Assistant Compliance Director, a Senior Programmer, and a Senior
Treasury/Cash Management Manager as published in the SIFMA Report
and dividing that figure by 2,000 annual work hours to arrive at the
hourly rate of $52.
\895\ Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1236.
\896\ Id.
Estimated number of respondents: 35
Annual responses by each respondent: 1
Total annual responses: 35
Quarterly responses by each respondent: 4
Total quarterly responses: 140
Estimated average hours per response: 308
Aggregate annual reporting hours burden: 10,780 897
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\897\ 308 average hours per respondent x 35 respondents = 10,780
total hours/year. Id.
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2. Summary of Comments and Commission Response
While no commenter directly addressed the proposed aggregate burden
hour estimate, the Commission did receive comments related to the costs
of various recordkeeping and reporting requirements in the proposed
rules.
(a) Sec. 37.3--Requirements and Procedures for Registration
WMBAA commented that the Commission could reduce the regulatory
burden of the registration procedures by reconciling its Form SEF with
the SEC's registration form such that a potential SEF will have to fill
out only one form.\898\ Similarly, MarketAxess stated that it is costly
and inefficient for a SEF that is required to be registered by both the
Commission and SEC to go through two full registration processes, and
that the Commission instead should permit ``notice'' or ``passport''
registration of an SB-SEF already registered with the SEC.\899\ While
the Commission acknowledges notice registration under section 5h(g) of
the Act, it notes that the registration requirements for SEFs may
differ from the registration requirements for SB-SEFs and thus the
Commission must conduct an independent review of a SEF applicant's
registration application to ensure that the potential SEF's proposed
trading models and operations comply with the Commission's
requirements. Given such differing requirements, the Commission also
notes that Form SEF may differ from the SEC's registration form.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\898\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 14 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\899\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 20-21 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to temporary registration, the Commission has
eliminated the requirement from the SEF NPRM that an applicant provide
transaction data that substantiates that the execution or trading of
swaps has occurred and continues to occur on the applicant's trading
system or platform at the time the applicant submits its temporary
registration request. The Commission has also eliminated the
certification requirement that an applicant believes that when it
operates under temporary registration it will meet the requirements of
part 37 of the Commission's regulations. Instead, the Commission has
revised the temporary registration provisions to require a SEF
applicant that is already operating a swaps-trading platform, in
reliance upon either an exemption granted by the Commission or some
form of no-action relief granted by the Commission staff, to include in
the temporary registration notice a certification that it is operating
pursuant to such exemption or no-action relief. The Commission believes
that these revisions will not materially affect the proposed part 37
information collection estimate.
(b) Sec. 37.4--Procedures for Listing Products and Implementing Rules
CME commented that the proposed product and rule certification
process substantially increased the documentation burden, which in turn
would increase the cost and amount of time it takes to list new
products and implement new rules, with no corresponding benefit to the
public.\900\ While CME cited the 8,300 additional aggregate hours that
product and rule submissions were estimated to impose on all registered
entities,\901\ the Commission notes that this figure was already
accounted for in the Commission's information collection estimate in
the part 40 rulemaking titled ``Provisions Common to Registered
Entities.'' \902\ Therefore, the burden
[[Page 33550]]
associated with that information collection is not duplicated here.
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\900\ CME Comment Letter at 10, 13 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\901\ Id. at 10.
\902\ Provisions Common to Registered Entities, 76 FR 44776,
44789 (Jul. 27, 2011). The Commission also notes that the annual
burden hour estimate for DCMs that was used to calculate the annual
burden hour estimate for SEFs in this part 37 rulemaking did not
include the recordkeeping and reporting hours accounted for in the
part 40 rulemaking's information collection estimate. Therefore,
there is no double counting of hours for product and rule
submissions. Furthermore, the Commission notes that, similar to the
DCM rulemaking, many of the collection burdens associated with this
part 37 rulemaking are covered by other existing or pending
collections of information. Therefore, only those burdens that are
not covered elsewhere are included in this collection of
information.
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(c) Sec. 37.5(c)--Equity Interest Transfers
CME commented that the ``level of immediacy'' contemplated by the
24-hour timeframe for submitting agreements with the notification to
the Commission of an equity interest transfer in proposed Sec. 37.5(c)
may be unrealistic.\903\ CME further commented that the representation
of compliance with the requirements of CEA section 5h and the
Commission's regulations adopted thereunder would be more appropriate
if required upon consummation of the equity interest transfer, rather
than with the initial notification.\904\ In this final rulemaking, the
Commission has revised proposed Sec. 37.5(c) to remove references to
specific documents that must be provided with the equity transfer
notification, and instead provided that the Commission may request
supporting documentation. The Commission has also revised the proposed
rule to increase the threshold of when a SEF must file an equity
interest transfer notification with the Commission from ten percent to
fifty percent and has extended the time period for a SEF to file the
notification to up to ten business days from one business day under the
proposed rule. In addition, the Commission has deleted the requirement
for a SEF to provide a representation of compliance with section 5h of
the Act and the Commission regulations thereunder with the equity
interest transfer notification, as requested by CME. The Commission
notes that these revisions should slightly reduce the burden of the
information collection requirements for those respondents who are not
requested to provide supporting documentation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\903\ CME Comment Letter at 13 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\904\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) Sec. 37.202(b)--Jurisdiction
CME stated that it would be costly for a SEF to obtain every
customer's consent to its regulatory jurisdiction as required by
proposed Sec. 37.202(b).\905\ As noted in the preamble, the Commission
believes that jurisdiction must be established by a SEF prior to
granting members and market participants access to its markets in order
to effectuate the statutory mandate of Core Principle 2 that a SEF
shall have the capacity to detect, investigate, and enforce rules of
the SEF. The Commission notes that any information collection costs
associated with this rule is covered by the Commission's information
collection estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\905\ Id. at 16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(e) Sec. 37.203(f)--Investigations and Investigation Reports
CME stated that minor transgressions could be handled effectively
through the issuance of a warning letter rather than a formal
investigatory report.\906\ As explained in the preamble, the Commission
clarifies that warning letters may be issued for minor transgressions;
however, no more than one warning letter may be issued to the same
person or entity found to have committed the same rule violation more
than once within a rolling 12-month period. The Commission also
clarifies that the limit on the number of warning letters is not
applicable when a rule violation has not been found. The Commission
believes that these clarifications will not materially affect the
proposed part 37 information collection estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\906\ Id. at 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(f) Sec. 37.205--Audit Trail
WMBAA commented that the proposed audit trail requirement in Sec.
37.205(b) to retain records of customer orders should not apply to
indicative quotes because it would be burdensome and costly.\907\ As
discussed in the preamble, the Commission believes that this
requirement is necessary so that a SEF has a complete picture of all
trading activity in order to carry out its statutory mandate to monitor
its markets to detect abusive trading practices and trading rule
violations. The Commission accounted for this recordkeeping requirement
in the proposed burden hour estimate; therefore, the estimate remains
unaffected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\907\ WMBAA Comment Letter at 23 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(g) Sec. 37.404--Ability to Obtain Information
WMBAA commented that the requirement for SEFs to mandate that
traders maintain trading and financial records is not required under
the Act.\908\ The Commission notes that market participants' trading
records are an invaluable tool in its surveillance efforts and believes
that a SEF should have direct access to such information in order to
discharge its obligations under the SEF core principles. However, as
noted in the preamble, the Commission states in the guidance that SEFs
may limit the application of this requirement to those market
participants who conduct substantial trading on their facility. The
Commission notes that the requirement for market participants to keep
such records is sound commercial practice, and that market participants
are likely already maintaining such trading records; therefore, the
Commission believes that the revision above will not materially affect
the proposed part 37 information collection estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\908\ Id. at 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(h) Sec. 37.703--Monitoring for Financial Soundness
FXall commented that SEFs would be burdened by the ``onerous
financial surveillance obligations'' of proposed Sec. 37.703, which
include the routine review of members' financial records.\909\ The
Commission agrees that burdensome financial surveillance obligations
may lead to higher transaction costs; therefore, as discussed in the
preamble, the Commission has revised the proposed rule to state that
SEFs must monitor their market participants to ensure that they
continue to qualify as ECPs. The Commission believes that this revision
will not materially affect the proposed part 37 information collection
estimate and is thus maintaining the estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\909\ FXall Comment Letter at 3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Sec. 37.1306--Financial Resources Reporting to the Commission
MarketAxess commented that the financial resources reporting
requirements are unnecessary and burdensome and recommended that the
Commission allow a senior officer of the SEF to represent to the
Commission that it satisfies the financial resources requirements.\910\
The Commission disagrees with MarketAxess and, as discussed in the
preamble, believes that much of the information required by the reports
should be readily available to a SEF in the ordinary course of
business. The Commission's proposed burden hour estimate includes this
reporting requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\910\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 40 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(j) Sec. 37.1401--System Safeguards Requirements
CME commented that the requirements to notify the Commission staff
of all system security-related events and all planned changes to
automated systems that may impact the reliability, security, or
scalability of the systems are overly burdensome.\911\ As noted in the
preamble, the Commission has revised the rule to only require
notification of material system malfunctions and material planned
system changes. While
[[Page 33551]]
these revisions should decrease the regulatory burden imposed by the
rule, the Commission believes that, given the infrequent nature of the
information collection requirement as originally proposed, the effect
of the revisions should be de minimis and therefore not affect the
proposed burden hour estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\911\ CME Comment Letter at 36-37 (Feb 22, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(k) Sec. 37.1501(e)--Preparation of Annual Compliance Report
FXall commented that the information required by the proposed
regulations to be included in the annual compliance report is too
detailed and will be too costly to compile.\912\ The Commission is not
persuaded by FXall's comment, and notes that the annual compliance
report is meant to be the primary tool by which the Commission can
evaluate the effectiveness of a SEF's compliance and self-regulatory
programs, thus requiring a high level of detail. The Commission's
proposed burden hour estimate includes the annual compliance report
requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\912\ FXall Comment Letter at 16 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Final Burden Estimate
The final regulations require each respondent to file information
with the Commission. For instance, SEF applicants must file
registration applications with the Commission pursuant to Sec. 37.3.
SEFs must record, report, and disclose information related to prices,
trading volume, and other trading data for swaps pursuant to Core
Principles 9 and 10 (``Timely Publication of Trading Information'' and
``Recordkeeping and Reporting''). In general, the collections of
information are required to demonstrate a SEF's operational capability
and are a tool by which both the SEF and the Commission can evaluate
the effectiveness of a SEF's self-regulatory programs.
The mandatory information collections are contained in several of
the general provisions being adopted in subpart A, as well as in
certain regulations implementing Core Principles 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9,
10, 13, 14, and 15. Generally, the information collections covered in
this final part 37 rulemaking are not covered in other existing
collections or collections that are being established in connection
with other Dodd-Frank rulemakings, and pertain to the following general
categories of recordkeeping and reporting: registration; submissions
related to material changes in the SEF's operations or business
structure; compliance; financial resources reports, and an annual
report by the CCO related to the SEF's performance of its self-
regulatory responsibilities.
As discussed above, the methodology used to formulate the proposed
estimate was an average of other registered entities. Due to the
relatively low magnitude of changes made to the mandatory information
collection provisions in this final part 37 rulemaking, the Commission
has determined not to alter its proposed estimate of 308 hours per SEF
respondent. By definition, averages are meant to serve as only a
reference point; the Commission understands that due to both
discretionary and mandatory requirements, some SEFs may go above the
final estimate of 308 hours to complete mandatory information
collection requirements, while others may stay below. The Commission
is, however, adjusting the proposed estimate of annual and quarterly
responses to clarify the Commission's original intent. In this regard,
the Commission is adding an estimated average hours per response number
below, which is based on 5 responses per year (1 annual response and 4
quarterly responses) per respondent.
Estimated number of respondents: 35
Annual responses by each respondent: 1 \913\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\913\ Under Sec. 37.1501, the SEF's CCO is required to submit
to the Commission annually a compliance report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total annual responses: 35
Quarterly responses by each respondent: 1 \914\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\914\ Under Sec. 37.1306, a SEF is required to submit to the
Commission each fiscal quarter a report of its financial resources
available to meet the financial resources requirements of Core
Principle 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total quarterly responses: 140 \915\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\915\ 1 quarterly response x 4 quarters per year x 35
respondents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated average hours per response: 62 \916\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\916\ 308 average burden hours per respondent/5 responses total
per year (1 annual response and 4 quarterly responses) = 61.6
average hours per response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aggregate annual reporting hours burden: 10,780
Therefore, the Commission estimates that based on 35 registered
SEFs, this final part 37 rulemaking will result in 10,780 information
collection hours across all respondents.\917\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\917\ 5 responses total per year x 61.6 average hours per
response x 35 respondents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Aggregate Information Burden
The Commission concludes that new information collection 3038-0074
will result in each SEF respondent expending, on average, $16,632
annually based on an hourly wage rate of $54 to comply with the
recordkeeping and reporting requirements of this final part 37
rulemaking.\918\ In aggregate, this will result in a cost to all SEF
respondents of $582,120 per annum based on 35 expected respondents.
This aggregate cost estimate has been adjusted from the estimate in the
SEF NPRM to account for updated wage rate data.\919\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\918\ See supra footnote 894 for a discussion of the wage rate.
The Commission has revised the wage rate to $54 per hour based on
data from the 2011 SIFMA Report.
\919\ While the Commission recognizes that some estimates cited
in the following cost-benefit consideration section suggest that
reporting and recordkeeping requirements may result in a much higher
aggregate cost to SEFs and market participants, it notes that all of
the estimates provided therein account for more than pure
recordkeeping and reporting costs subject to the PRA. Therefore, the
Commission has not considered those estimates for purposes of
reaching its final burden hour estimate and aggregate cost
projection.
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C. Cost Benefit Considerations
1. Introduction
Section 15(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'' or ``Act'')
mandates that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission''
or ``CFTC'') consider the costs and benefits of the regulations that it
is adopting in this rulemaking to implement the statutory requirements
for the registration and operation of swap execution facilities
(``SEFs''), a new type of regulated marketplace for the trading and
execution of financial derivative contracts known as swaps.\920\ In
considering the costs and benefits of the final SEF regulations, the
Commission has grouped the same into the following categories--SEF
Market Structure, Registration, Recordkeeping and Reporting,
Compliance, Monitoring and Surveillance, Financial Resources and
Integrity, and Emergency Operations and System Safeguards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\920\ CEA section 15(a); 7 U.S.C. 19(a). A more complete
explanation of this statutory requirement is provided below. See
infra section 1(b) of this Cost Benefit Considerations section.
Swaps, futures, and options are collectively referred to as
derivatives--contracts used by market participants to hedge against
the risk of a future change in prices, such as commodity prices,
interest rates, and exchange rates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several preliminary matters, however, provide background for the
Commission's consideration of the costs and benefits of the rules
adopted in this release. Discussed in this Introduction section, these
preliminary matters are: (a) The circumstances and events that form the
backdrop for the statutory requirements that this rulemaking
implements; (b) the Commission's statutory mandate to consider costs
and benefits and its methodology for doing so; and (c) the estimated
aggregate costs of forming and operating a SEF.
[[Page 33552]]
(a) Background
An appreciation of certain background elements is helpful to
understand the costs and benefits of this rulemaking. These are: (i)
The definition of the derivative financial transactions (i.e., swaps)
that will be executed on SEFs; (ii) the execution and regulation of
swaps prior to the Dodd-Frank Act; (iii) the 2008 financial crisis and
the role of the over-the-counter (``OTC'') swaps market; (iv) the new
regulatory regime to reform the swaps market in Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act; and, more specifically, (v) the role and purpose of SEFs
within the Title VII regulatory regime. Each of these background
elements is discussed below.
(1) The Definition of a Swap
Congress defined the term ``swap'' in the Dodd-Frank Act.\921\ The
statutory definition of the term ``swap'' includes, in part, any
agreement, contract, or transaction ``that provides for any purchase,
sale, payment, or delivery (other than a dividend on an equity
security) that is dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the
extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a
potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence.'' \922\ The
statutory definition, among other things, generally includes options
(other than options on futures) as well as transactions that now or in
the future are commonly known to the trade as swaps.\923\ The
definition also articulates a broad range of underlying interests upon
which a swap may be based: ``1 or more interest or other rates,
currencies, commodities, securities, instruments of indebtedness,
indices, quantitative measures, or other financial or economic
interests or property of any kind . . .'' \924\ or ``the occurrence,
nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of any event or
contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or
commercial consequence.'' \925\ In a joint rulemaking with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC''), the Commission also
adopted rules further defining the term ``swap.'' \926\
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\921\ See Dodd-Frank Act section 721(a)(21), adding CEA section
1a(47). 7 U.S.C. 1a(47).
\922\ CEA section 1a(47)(A)(ii); 7 U.S.C. 1a(47)(A)(ii).
\923\ CEA section 1a(47)(A)(i) & (iv); 7 U.S.C. 1a(47)(A)(i) &
(iv). Futures are not within the definition of swap and remain
separately subject to requirements of the CEA. See CEA section
1a(47)(B)(i); 7 U.S.C. 1a(47)(B)(i).
\924\ CEA section 1a(47)(A)(i) & (iii); 7 U.S.C. 1a(47)(A)(i) &
(iii).
\925\ CEA section 1a(47)(A)(ii); 7 U.S.C. 1a(47)(A)(ii).
\926\ See Further Definition of ``Swap,'' ``Security-Based
Swap,'' and ``Security-Based Swap Agreement''; Mixed Swaps;
Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 77 FR 48208 (Aug. 13,
2012).
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(2) The Execution and Regulation of Swaps Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act
Unlike futures contracts which are regulated by the Commission and
are listed for trading on exchanges called designated contract markets
(``DCMs''), swap transactions (excluding some exchange-traded options
encompassed by the post-Dodd-Frank Act definition) evolved off-
exchange--largely to provide customized solutions for unique risk
management needs that exchange-traded products addressed less
effectively--lending themselves to the often used label of ``OTC
derivatives.'' Accordingly, many swap transactions prior to the Dodd-
Frank Act were negotiated privately OTC between counterparties.\927\ In
these situations, only the counterparties knew that the swap
transaction was taking place, and regulators and other market
participants lacked access to pricing information during the
negotiation phase (pre-trade) and after the agreement was consummated
(post-trade). While centralized exchanges permit multiple market
participants to compare, assess, accept, or reject bids (offers to buy)
and asks (offers to sell), the privately negotiated OTC market provided
little, if any, pre- or post-trade transparency.\928\
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\927\ The Commission notes that privately negotiated swap
transactions between counterparties is only one method to execute or
trade a swap transaction in the OTC market. Counterparties in the
OTC market may execute or trade swap transactions through many
trading methods such as order books, RFQ systems, or systems that
incorporate electronic and voice components.
\928\ Absent a centralized trading mechanism such as a limit
order book, buyers and sellers ``negotiated terms privately, often
in ignorance of prices currently available from other potential
counterparties and with limited knowledge of trades recently
negotiated elsewhere in the market. OTC markets are thus said to be
relatively opaque; investors are somewhat in the dark about the most
attractive available terms and conditions and about whom to contact
for attractive terms.'' Darrell Duffie, Dark Markets: Asset Pricing
and Information Transmission in Over-the-Counter Markets 1
(Princeton University Press) (2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a typical privately negotiated OTC swap transaction, a customer
for a swap is likely to obtain a private quote from, and bilaterally
negotiate contract terms with, one of a small number of market-making
dealers. These dealers, often large financial institutions, may stand
ready to take either a long position (if they want to buy) or a short
position (if they want to sell), profiting from spreads (the difference
between the bid and the offer price) and fees. Relative to their non-
dealer (usually ``buy-side'') counterparties, these dealers enjoy
asymmetric information advantages.\929\ The Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 (``CFMA'')--which largely excluded swaps
transacted between ``eligible contract participants'' \930\ from
regulation under the CEA--reinforced this outcome.\931\ Swaps remained
largely insulated from regulation prior to the enactment of the Dodd-
Frank Act.\932\
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\929\ Asymmetric information exists when one party to a
transaction has more or better information than the other. In the
context of the swaps market, as dealers are always on one side of a
large fraction of trades, it is highly likely that they will have
better information on prevailing market conditions and valuations
compared to their non-dealer counterparties. See Michael Fleming,
John Jackson, Ada Li, Asani Sarkar & Patricia Zobel, ``An Analysis
of OTC Interest Rate Derivatives Transactions: Implications for
Public Reporting,'' Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports,
No. 557, at 6 n. 14 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr557.pdf. Major
derivatives dealer activity accounts for 89% of the total interest
rate swap activity in notional terms. Id.
\930\ CEA section 1a(18); 7 U.S.C. 1a(18).
\931\ Under the CFMA, prior to the adoption of Title VII of the
Dodd-Frank Act, swaps based on exempt commodities--including energy
and metals--could be traded among eligible contract participants
without CFTC regulation, but certain CEA provisions against fraud
and manipulation continued to apply to these markets. No statutory
exclusions were provided for swaps on agricultural commodities by
the CFMA, although they could be traded under certain regulatory
exemptions provided by the CFTC prior to its enactment. Swaps based
on securities were subject to certain SEC enforcement authorities,
but the SEC was prohibited from prophylactic regulation of such
swaps. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-
554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
majority found that the CFMA ``effectively shielded OTC derivatives
from virtually all regulation or oversight,'' and ``OTC derivatives
markets boomed'' in the law's wake, increasing ``more than
sevenfold'' after the CFMA was enacted. See The Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final
Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and
Economic Crisis in the United States (Official Government Edition),
at 48, 364 (2011) (hereinafter the ``FCIC Report''), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.
\932\ Legislative history indicates that in enacting the Dodd-
Frank Act, Congress recognized that OTC market opacity, combined
with the availability of superior price information primarily to
dealers, limited the ability of swaps customers ``to shop for the
best price or rate.'' See Mark Jickling & Kathleen Ann Ruane, ``The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Title
VII, Derivatives,'' Cong. Research Serv., R41398, at 7 (Aug. 30,
2010). See also S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 30 (2010) (``Information on
[OTC derivative contract] prices and quantities is opaque. . . .
This can lead to inefficient pricing and risk assessment for
derivatives users and leave regulators ill-informed about risks
building up throughout the financial system''). Ben Bernanke,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
stated, ``[a]t times [during the crisis], the complexity and
diversity of derivatives instruments also posed problems. Financial
firms sometimes found it quite difficult to fully assess their own
net derivatives exposures or to communicate to counterparties and
regulators the nature and extent of those exposures. The associated
uncertainties helped fuel losses of confidence that contributed
importantly to the liquidity problems I mentioned earlier. The
recent legislation addresses these issues by requiring that
derivatives contracts be traded on exchanges or other regulated
trading facilities when possible and that they be centrally
cleared.'' ``Too Big To Fail: Expectations and Impact of
Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk
in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission,'' 11 (Sep. 2, 2010) (statement of Ben Bernanke,
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System),
available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0902-Bernanke.pdf.
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[[Page 33553]]
From these beginnings, the unregulated swaps market has expanded
exponentially over the last thirty years. According to the Bank for
International Settlements (``BIS''), the global OTC derivatives market
measures at over $647 trillion in notional size.\933\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\933\ The Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Review,
at A 131 (Sep. 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/dt1920a.pdf.
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(3) The 2008 Financial Crisis and the Role of the OTC Swaps Market
In the fall of 2008, the United States experienced a financial
crisis that led to millions of Americans losing their jobs, millions of
families losing their homes, and thousands of small businesses closing
their doors. The BIS characterized 2008 as a year that escalated for
``what many had hoped would be merely . . . manageable market turmoil
[to] a full-fledged global crisis.'' \934\ Faced with what policy
makers at the time perceived as a grave threat that without immediate
and unprecedented government action U.S. and global credit markets
would freeze, the federal government mounted an extraordinary
intervention at great cost to the American taxpayer to buttress the
stability of the U.S. financial system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\934\ The Bank for International Settlements, 79th Annual
Report, at 23 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2009e2.pdf, for a broader discussion of the development of the
crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While there were multiple causes of the financial crisis,
unregulated swaps played an important role. Swaps contributed
significantly to the interconnectedness between banks, investment
banks, hedge funds, and other financial entities. As the swaps market
grew, additional participation added risk to the already highly-
leveraged and interconnected market. Accordingly, swaps concentrated
and heightened risks in the financial system and to the public.
The crisis elevated concern among regulators that the opaque
structure of the OTC swaps market and the consequent lack of
information about swap prices and quantities would hinder efficient
pricing, and that the lack of information about outstanding positions
and exposures could ``leave regulators ill-informed about the risks
building up in the financial system. . . . Lack of transparency in the
massive OTC market intensified systemic fears during the crisis about
interrelated derivatives exposures from counterparty risk.'' \935\ As
regulators did not have a clear view into how OTC derivatives were
being used, they also feared that ``the complexity and limited
transparency of the market reinforced the potential for excessive risk-
taking. . . .'' \936\
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\935\ S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 30 (2010).
\936\ See Darrell Duffie, Ada Li & Theo Lubke, ``Policy
Perspectives on OTC Derivatives Market Infrastructure,'' Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, No. 424, at 1 (Mar. 2010),
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr424.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) The New Regulatory Regime To Reform the Swaps Market in Title VII
of the Dodd-Frank Act
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act into
law. Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act established a comprehensive new
regulatory framework for swaps and charged the Commission and the SEC
with oversight of the more than $300 trillion domestic swaps
market.\937\ The legislation was enacted, among other reasons, to
promote market integrity within the financial system, reduce risk, and
increase transparency, including by: (i) Providing for the registration
and comprehensive regulation of swap dealers and major swap
participants; (ii) imposing clearing and trade execution requirements
on swaps; (iii) creating a rigorous recordkeeping and real-time
reporting regime; and (iv) enhancing the rulemaking and enforcement
authority of the Commission with respect to, among others, all
registered entities, including SEFs. These various elements work in
concert to provide the Commission with a comprehensive view of the
entire swaps market, furthering the Commission's ability to monitor the
market. Consistent with the view that the vulnerability of the OTC
derivatives market during the financial crisis was not attributable to
a single weakness, but a combination of several,\938\ Title VII does
not provide for a single-dimensional fix. Rather, it weaves together a
multidimensional regulatory construct designed to ``mitigate costs and
risks to taxpayers and the financial system.'' \939\
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\937\ See Section 733 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which adopted CEA
section 5h regarding registration, operation, and compliance
requirements for SEFs. 7 U.S.C. 7b-3. See also Section 723(a)(3) of
the Dodd-Frank Act, which amended CEA section 2(h) to add CEA
section 2(h)(8) setting forth a trade execution requirement. 7
U.S.C. 2(h)(8). Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act authorized the SEC to
regulate security-based swaps. See Section 763 of the Dodd-Frank
Act, which amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to add
section 3D of the Exchange Act, among other provisions.
\938\ See FCIC Report at xxiv (listing uncontrolled leverage;
lack of transparency, capital and collateral requirements;
speculation; interconnection among firms; and concentrations of risk
in the market as contributing factors).
\939\ S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 92 (2010).
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(5) The Role and Purpose of SEFs Within the Title VII Regulatory Regime
One of the most important goals of the Dodd-Frank Act is to bring
transparency to the opaque OTC swaps market. It is generally accepted
that when markets are open and transparent, prices are more competitive
and markets are more efficient.\940\ The legislative history of the
Dodd-Frank Act indicates that Congress viewed exchange trading as a
mechanism to ``provide pre- and post-trade transparency for end users,
market participants, and regulators.'' \941\ As such, exchange trading
was intended as ``a price transparency mechanism'' that complements
Title VII's separate central clearing requirement to mitigate
counterparty risk.\942\ Additionally, legislative history reveals a
Congressional expectation that, over time, exchange trading of swaps
would reduce transaction costs, enhance market efficiency, and counter
the ability of dealers to extract economic rents from higher bid/ask
spreads at the expense of other market participants.\943\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\940\ See academic research discussed below.
\941\ S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 34 (2010).
\942\ Id. at 33-34 (quoting former CFTC Chair Brooksley Born,
the report states `` `[w]hile central clearing would mitigate
counterparty risk, central clearing alone is not enough. . . .
[e]xchange trading is also essential in order to provide price
discovery, transparency, and meaningful regulatory oversight of
trading and intermediaries.' '').
\943\ Id. at 34 (quoting Stanford University Professor Darrel
Duffie, `` `[t]he relative opaqueness of the OTC market implies that
bid/ask spreads are in many cases not being set as competitively as
they would be on exchanges. . . . [t]his entails a loss in market
efficiency.' '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consistent with this purpose, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA to
create SEFs, a new type of regulated marketplace, and promotes swap
trading and execution on them. The statutory requirements for SEFs are
similar to the requirements for the existing Commission-regulated
futures market, which incorporates pre-trade and post-trade
transparency aspects not present in the OTC swaps market. SEFs will
allow buyers and sellers to meet in an open, centralized marketplace,
where prices are publicly available. As statutorily defined, a SEF is
``a trading
[[Page 33554]]
system or platform in which multiple participants have the ability to
execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple
participants in the facility or system, through any means of interstate
commerce, including any trading facility, that (A) facilitates the
execution of swaps between persons; and (B) is not a designated
contract market.'' \944\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\944\ CEA section 1a(50), as amended by section 721 of the Dodd-
Frank Act. 7 U.S.C. 1a(50). ``Trading facility'' is also a
statutorily defined term. See CEA section 1a(51); 7 U.S.C. 1a(51).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With this rulemaking, in conjunction with the separate made
available to trade rulemaking \945\ and the swaps block
rulemaking,\946\ the Commission is implementing the Dodd-Frank Act's
trade execution mandate.\947\ Pursuant to this trade execution
requirement, transactions involving swaps subject to the clearing
requirement in CEA section 2(h)(1) \948\ must be executed on a SEF or a
DCM, unless no SEF or DCM ``makes the swap available to trade'' or the
related transaction is subject to the clearing exception under CEA
section 2(h)(7).\949\ Further, no facility may be operated for the
trading or processing of swaps unless first registered as a SEF or
DCM.\950\ SEFs are required to comply with 15 statutorily enumerated
core principles,\951\ as well as any other requirements that the
Commission prescribes by rule or regulation.\952\
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\945\ The Commission separately proposed rules to determine
whether a swap is ``made available to trade'' for purposes of the
trade execution requirement in CEA section 2(h)(8). Process for a
Designated Contract Market or Swap Execution Facility To Make a Swap
Available To Trade, 76 FR 77728 (proposed Dec. 14, 2011).
\946\ The Commission separately proposed rules to determine
minimum block trade sizes for swaps. Since the execution methods for
Required Transactions excludes block trades, this rulemaking affects
the scope of the trade execution mandate. See Procedures to
Establish Appropriate Minimum Block Sizes for Large Notional Off-
Facility Swaps and Block Trades, 77 FR 15460 (proposed Mar. 15,
2012).
\947\ See Section 723(a)(3) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which amended
the CEA to add section 2(h)(8). 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(8).
\948\ See Section 723(a)(3) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which amended
the CEA to add section 2(h)(1). 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(1).
\949\ See Section 723(a)(3) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which amended
the CEA to add section 2(h)(7). 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(7). The Commission
separately proposed rules to determine whether a swap is ``made
available to trade'' for purposes of the trade execution requirement
in CEA section 2(h)(8). Process for a Designated Contract Market or
Swap Execution Facility To Make a Swap Available To Trade, 76 FR
77728 (proposed Dec. 14, 2011).
\950\ CEA section 5h(a)(1); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(a)(1).
\951\ CEA section 5h(f); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f).
\952\ CEA section 5h(f)(1)(A); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(1)(A). Further,
CEA section 5h(h) mandates that the Commission prescribe rules
governing SEF regulation. 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Taken together, these statutory provisions provide the framework
that transforms the swaps market from one in which prices for
bilaterally-negotiated contracts are privately quoted--often by dealers
with an informational advantage--to one in which bid/offer prices for
swap contracts are accessible to multiple market participants to
compare, assess, accept, or reject. By improving price transparency,
the new provisions should reduce information asymmetry and, in turn,
the informational advantage enjoyed by a small number of dealers to the
detriment of other market participants.\953\ These provisions benefit
the financial system as a whole by creating more efficient market
places, where market participants will take into account the price at
which recent transactions have occurred when determining at what price
to display quotes or orders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\953\ While the SEF rules focus on measures to promote pre-trade
price transparency and trade execution, they complement other
Commission rules pertaining to real-time reporting (part 43 of the
Commission's regulations) and swap data recordkeeping and reporting
(part 45 of the Commission's regulations). The addition of the CEA
section 5h rules for registration, operation, and compliance of SEFs
to this mix results in a suite of rules covering all critical
aspects of the trading process--pre-trade, trade, and post-trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed, this rulemaking furthers Congress' goal of promoting
transparency in the swaps market.\954\ The goal of pre-trade
transparency on SEFs is statutorily mandated in the Dodd-Frank
Act.\955\ Notwithstanding the fact that Congress directed the
Commission to construe the statute in light of this goal, some
commenters have questioned the benefits of the Commission's proposals
in furtherance of that goal.\956\
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\954\ Pre-trade transparency is defined as ``the dissemination
of current bid and ask quotations, depths, and information about
limit orders away from the best prices. Post-trade transparency
refers to the public and timely transmission of information on past
trades, including execution time, volume and price.'' See Ananth
Madhavan, David Porter & Daniel Weaver, ``Should securities markets
be transparent?,'' 8 Journal of Financial Markets 265, 268 (Aug.
2005). See also Larry Harris, Trading and Exchanges--Market
Microstructure for Practitioners 102 (Oxford University Press)
(2003) (hereinafter Harris, ``Trading and Exchanges'').
\955\ See section 733 of the Dodd-Frank Act, adding CEA section
5h. 7 U.S.C. 7b-3. Under section 5h, Congress provided an explicit
rule of construction, stating that ``[t]he goal of this section is
to promote the trading of swaps on swap execution facilities and to
promote pre-trade price transparency in the swaps market.'' CEA
section 5h(e); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(e).
\956\ See, e.g., ISDA Research Staff & NERA Economic Consulting,
Costs and Benefits of Mandatory Electronic Execution Requirements
for Interest Rate Products, ISDA Discussion Papers Series, Number
Two, at 1, 4 (Nov. 2011) (added to the public comment file for the
SEF rulemaking on Nov. 10, 2011) (hereinafter ``ISDA Discussion
Paper''); ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); MetLife
Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to commenters who question the Congressionally-directed
goal of pre-trade price transparency and the Commission's
implementation of that goal, the Commission notes that there is a body
of research that tends to be generally supportive, albeit based on
experience in other markets, as discussed below. Although this research
was not critical to or relied upon by the Commission in its decision-
making of how to best implement Congress' goal of promoting pre-trade
price transparency, it does provide a useful counterpoint to many of
the general comments raised by commenters and therefore merits brief
mention.
While there are no studies on the effect of pre-trade transparency
in the swaps market, empirical research on the likely effects of
transparency on market participants exists in other markets, including
the equity market, which has pre-trade transparency, and the corporate
bond market, which has a similar market structure to the OTC swaps
market and has post-trade transparency.\957\ While academics have a
range of perspectives on market structure and transparency issues,\958\
the empirical research discussed below and throughout this document
supports the general proposition that a lack of pre- and post-trade
transparency, which are characteristics of any dark, opaque market,
generally increases search and transaction costs, and negatively
impacts price discovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\957\ The corporate bond markets are generally comparable to the
OTC swap markets in terms of the large number of instruments traded,
with potentially a large overlap of market participants.
Additionally, any single issuer will have multiple bonds
outstanding, with different maturity dates and coupons. Some
potential SEF registrants will likely be firms operating trading
platforms for corporate bonds.
\958\ For example, Larry Harris notes that market participants
might be ``ambivalent about transparency,'' and explains that
traders ``favor transparency when it allows them to see more of what
other traders are doing, but they oppose it when it requires that
they reveal more of what they are doing. Generally, those who know
the least about market conditions most favor transparency. Those who
know the most oppose transparency because they do not want to give
up their informational advantages.'' The Commission also recognizes
that there is a continuum of markets occupying ``various points
between high and low transparency.'' See Harris, ``Trading and
Exchanges,'' at 101. See also ISDA Research Notes, ``Transparency
and over-the-counter derivatives: The role of transaction
transparency,'' No. 1, at 2-3 (2009), available at http://www2.isda.org/attachment/MTY4NA==/ISDA-Research-Notes1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While some commenters contend that pre-trade price transparency
requirements would increase costs for market participants, there is
academic support for the general proposition that increased
transparency will actually
[[Page 33555]]
lower costs for market participants,\959\ ``help them predict future
price changes, to predict when their orders will execute, and to
evaluate their brokers' performance,'' \960\ and will improve the
quality of execution they receive from the marketplace.\961\ Greater
transparency in general can increase market liquidity by reducing
information asymmetry between informed and less informed market
participants, and greater pre-trade transparency also helps improve
price discovery by promoting competition among liquidity
providers.\962\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\959\ Discussing the trade-off between higher costs to liquidity
providers and the lower costs to institutional investors from
greater post-trade transparency in the corporate bond markets,
Bessembinder & Maxell conclude that while ``[T]raders employed by
insurance companies and investment management firms bear costs
associated with decreases in service provided by bond dealers . . .
these higher costs are offset by lower trade execution costs that .
. . benefit the investors who ultimately own the bonds transacted. .
.'' See Hendrik Bessembinder & William Maxwell, ``Markets:
Transparency and the Corporate Bond Market,'' 22 Journal of Economic
Perspectives 217, 232-33 (Spring 2008) (hereinafter Bessembinder &
Maxwell, ``Transparency'').
\960\ Harris, ``Trading and Exchanges,'' at 101.
\961\ It is instructive to note the view that transparency is
``not an objective per se but rather a means for ensuring the proper
functioning of the market.'' See Marco Avellaneda & Rama Cont,
``Transparency in Credit Default Swap Markets,'' Finance Concepts,
at 3 (Jul. 2010), available at http://www.finance-concepts.com/images/fc/CDSMarketTransparency.pdf.
\962\ Pagano & R[ouml]ell explain the regulatory policy support
for pre-trade transparency as a means ``to enable ordinary traders
to check for themselves whether they have gotten a fair price.''
Comparing the price formation in auction and dealer markets, they
find that greater transparency generates lower trading costs for
uninformed traders on average, although not necessarily for every
trade size. See Marco Pagano & Ailsa R[ouml]ell, ``Transparency and
Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed
Trading,'' 51 Journal of Finance 579 (Jun. 1996). Research
referenced later in the release has found that such competition can
reduce revenues and increase costs and risks for liquidity
providers, thus causing them to reduce their participation in the
markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Academic research supports the view that a lack of pre-trade
transparency affects trading costs because it contributes to frictions
in the search process, which in turn can translate into higher
transaction costs and impact equilibrium prices and allocations. Given
the lack of pre-trade transparency and the absence of centralized
markets (i.e., exchanges) in the OTC swaps market, market participants
will likely contact multiple dealers sequentially by phone or by some
other electronic means of communication.\963\ Bessembinder and Maxwell
explain that the take-it-or-leave-it aspect of the negotiation process
in the bond markets (which is also present in the OTC swaps market)
``limits one's ability to obtain multiple quotations before committing
to trade.'' \964\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\963\ Many of the existing electronic trading platforms for
bonds and for swaps display indicative quotes, but the Commission is
not aware of research on the quality of these indicative quotes, and
of their likely impact on price discovery and market quality in
terms of transaction costs.
\964\ See Bessembinder & Maxwell, ``Transparency,'' at 223
(explaining that in addition to the cost of conducting the search,
market participants are exposed to the additional cost from the fact
that a dealer's quote is only good ``as long as the breath is
warm''). Comparing execution cost in the equity and corporate bond
markets, Edwards, Harris & Piwowar theorize that despite the fact
that corporate bonds are less risky than equity (in the same
company), differences in pre- and post-trade transparency between
the two markets contribute to higher transaction costs in the bond
markets. See Amy Edwards, Lawrence Harris & Michael Piwowar,
``Corporate Bond Market Transactions Costs and Transparency,'' 62
Journal of Finance 1421, 1438 (Jun. 2007) (hereinafter Edwards et
al., ``Transaction Costs and Transparency'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More generally, this area of research, also called search and
matching theory, ``offers a framework for studying frictions in real-
world transactions and has led to new insights into the working of
markets.'' \965\ This research shows that ``even with very minor search
costs and with a large number of sellers, a search and matching
environment would deliver a rather large departure from the outcome
under perfect competition (which would prevail if the search costs were
zero).'' \966\ This ``Diamond paradox'' \967\ is of relevance to this
rulemaking because given search costs, no matter how small, the
presence of multiple dealers can result in trades being transacted at
the single monopoly price.\968\ This highlights the importance of
reducing the costs that exist when a market is dominated by a small
number of dealers--in other words, an oligopoly.\969\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\965\ See ``Markets with Search Frictions,'' The Royal Swedish
Academy of Sciences, at 1 (Oct. 11, 2010), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2010/advanced-economicsciences2010.pdf.
\966\ Id. at 5.
\967\ See Peter Diamond, ``A Model of Price Adjustment,'' 3
Journal of Economic Theory 156 (Jun. 1971).
\968\ See Darrell Duffie, Nicolae G[acirc]rleanu & Lasse Heje
Pedersen, ``Valuation in Over-the-Counter Markets,'' 20 The Review
of Financial Studies 1865, 1888-89 (Nov. 2007) (hereinafter Duffie
et al., ``Valuation in OTC Markets'') for a series of examples of
markets where search costs impact price discovery, adversely
resulting in prices diverging from competitive market outcomes.
\969\ An oligopoly is a market form in which a market or
industry is dominated by a small number of sellers (oligopolists)--
dealers or market makers in the context of the OTC swaps markets.
While the traditional research into oligopolistic behavior has
focused on attempts by firms to collude, which could potentially
result in non-competitive or monopoly pricing for the rest of the
market, the search literature explains that the monopoly pricing is
due to the presence of search costs. Indicative of the potential
impact of such oligopolistic behavior by dealers in an environment
with low pre-trade transparency, Hendershott & Madhavan reference
research comparing transactions costs between equity and corporate
and municipal bond markets. See Terrence Hendershott & Ananth
Madhavan, ``Click or Call? Auction versus Search in the Over-the-
Counter Market,'' Working Paper, at 2 (Mar. 19, 2012) (hereinafter
Hendershott & Madhavan, ``Click or Call''). They explain that
despite improvements in the post-trade transparency in both
corporate and municipal bond markets, transaction costs are higher
compared to equivalent-sized equity trades due to ``the lack of pre-
trade transparency that confers rents to dealers.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Academic research into the impact of pre-trade transparency on
market quality in the context of the equity markets is an active area
of research. As buy and sell interest at the best bid and offer price
is widely available to all market participants in these markets, they
are not necessarily analogous to the OTC swap markets, where such
information is simply not available. Nevertheless, research in this
area is notable because the equity markets have pre-trade transparency,
and Congress has mandated pre-trade transparency on SEFs. Various
research papers examine the impact of changes in relative levels of
pre-trade transparency within a specific trading venue or exchange, and
depending on the specific circumstances of each such event, market
participants' behavior can be influenced, which in turn can impact
liquidity and costs.\970\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\970\ Empirical research evaluating the impact of transparency
on market quality are typically in the context of natural
experiments when there is a change in the set of trading rules in a
particular market. Madhavan, Porter & Weaver examined the outcomes
when the Toronto Stock Exchange increased transparency levels for
stocks traded on the floor and on the screen, and found that it
reduced the earnings of specialists (or liquidity providers); lower
order flows from them in turn reduced market depth and caused the
market to exhibit increased price volatility and higher transaction
costs. See Ananth Madhavan, David Porter & Daniel Weaver, ``Should
securities markets be transparent?,'' 8 Journal of Financial Markets
265 (Aug. 2005). Eom, Ok & Park focus on the impact of changes in
the display in the level of depth of the limit order book in the
Korean equity market and find evidence of positive effects on market
quality measured in terms of depth, volume and quoted spreads, but
beyond a point, these effects taper-off, and can even become
negative. See Kyong Shik Eom, Jinho Ok & Jong Ho Park, ``Pre-trade
transparency and market quality,'' 10 Journal of Financial Markets
319 (Nov. 2007). In another paper, Boehmer, Saar & Yu present
evidence that when the New York Stock Exchange took specific steps
to display limit-order book information to traders off the exchange
floor, ``an increase in pre-trade transparency affects investors'
trading strategies and can improve certain dimensions of market
quality.'' See Ekkehart Boehmer, Gideon Saar & Lei Yu, ``Lifting the
Veil: An Analysis of Pre-trade Transparency at the NYSE,'' 60 The
Journal of Finance 783 (Apr. 2005). Additionally, in a paper
highlighting the impact of pre-trade transparency on price
discovery, and highlighting the risks of driving trading activity to
competing markets, Hendershott & Jones found that when the Island
electronic communications network stopped displaying its limit order
book in certain exchange-traded funds (``ETFs''), ETF prices
adjusted more slowly, and there was ``substantial price discovery
movement from ETFs to the futures market.'' See Terrence Hendershott
& Charles M. Jones, ``Island Goes Dark: Transparency, Fragmentation,
and Regulation,'' 18 The Review of Financial Studies 743 (Fall
2005).
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[[Page 33556]]
While the literature from the equity markets referenced above
focuses on changes in relative levels of pre-trade transparency,
research from the corporate bond markets also directly addresses the
benefits from bringing post-trade transparency into dark markets.
Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar examine trading costs in the corporate
bond market using a record of every corporate bond trade reported on
the TRACE \971\ system between January 2003 and January 2005.\972\ In
their paper, they find evidence that post-trade transparency through
TRACE has lowered transaction costs in the corporate bond market and
that higher post-transparency has helped improve liquidity in this
market.\973\ Summarizing findings from studies by other researchers on
the impact of TRACE on market participants, Bessembinder and Maxwell
confirm that it has helped provide a level playing field--in the
context of information regarding current prices at which various
corporate bonds are being traded.\974\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\971\ The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (``TRACE'') is
operated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (``FINRA''),
and facilitates the mandatory reporting of OTC secondary market
transactions in eligible fixed income securities. All broker/dealers
who are FINRA member firms have an obligation to report transactions
in corporate bonds to TRACE under an SEC-approved set of rules. See
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/MarketTransparency/TRACE/for further details.
\972\ See Edwards et al., ``Transaction Costs and
Transparency,'' at 1426. As with OTC swaps, given that there is no
pre-trade transparency in the corporate bond markets, bid-ask
spreads, a key determinant of transaction costs, have to be
estimated using specialized econometric techniques. In this paper,
they assume that there has been no change in the market structure
(in terms of execution methods) before and after TRACE.
\973\ In a related paper on the impact of higher transparency on
liquidity, research examining the impact of higher post-trade
transparency on the liquidity of the BBB-rated corporate bond market
shows that ``overall, adding transparency has either a neutral or a
positive effect on liquidity.'' Id. at 1438.
\974\ Bessembinder & Maxwell point out that prior to the
introduction of TRACE, ``customers found it difficult to know
whether their trade price reflected market conditions . . . . With
transaction reporting, customers are able to assess the
competitiveness of their own trade price by comparing it to recent
and subsequent transactions in the same and similar issues.''
Bessembinder & Maxwell, ``Transparency,'' at 226.
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(b) The Statutory Mandate To Consider the Costs and Benefits of the
Commission's Action: Section 15(a) of the CEA
Section 15(a) of the CEA requires the Commission to consider the
costs and benefits of its actions before promulgating a regulation
under the CEA or issuing certain orders.\975\ CEA section 15(a) further
specifies that the costs and benefits shall be evaluated in light of
the following five broad areas of market and public concern: (1)
Protection of market participants and the public; (2) efficiency,
competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures markets; (3) price
discovery; (4) sound risk management practices; and (5) other public
interest considerations.\976\ The Commission considers below the costs
and benefits resulting from its discretionary determinations with
respect to the section 15(a) factors.
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\975\ CEA section 15(a); 7 U.S.C. 19(a).
\976\ Id.
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To aid the Commission in its consideration of the costs and
benefits resulting from its regulations, the Commission requested in
the SEF NPRM that commenters provide data and supporting information
which quantify or qualify the costs and benefits of the proposed
rules.\977\ While a number of industry commenters expressed the general
view that implementing and complying with the proposed rules would come
at considerable cost and that the proposed rules would be
burdensome,\978\ the Commission only received one comment quantifying
the costs that may result from the proposed regulations.\979\ In
meetings requested by potential SEF registrants during the comment
period, the Commission staff invited those entities to provide specific
data to support general assertions that the proposed regulations would
be costly. Again, no such information was provided. In another effort
to gather such data, the Commission staff initiated follow-up contacts
with certain potential SEFs regarding their projected expenses in light
of the Commission's proposed regulations. The product of these
conversations is reflected in the cost estimates included in this
release.
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\977\ See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR 1214, 1237 (proposed Jan. 7, 2011).
\978\ See, e.g., FXall Comment Letter at 2-4 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME
Comment Letter at 2 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\979\ See ISDA Discussion Paper (Nov. 2011).
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While certain costs are amenable to quantification, other costs are
not easily monetized, such as the costs to the public of another
financial crisis. The Commission's final regulations are intended to
mitigate that risk, and, therefore, serve an important if
unquantifiable public benefit. While the benefits of effective
regulation are difficult to value in dollar terms, the Commission
believes that they are no less important to consider given the
Commission's mission to protect both market users and the public.
Additionally, where appropriate, in response to the cost concerns
of some commenters, the Commission, as discussed below, adopted cost-
mitigating alternatives presented by commenters where doing so would
still achieve the goals of the Dodd-Frank Act.
The discussion of costs and benefits that follows begins with an
informational discussion of the aggregate estimated costs of forming
and operating a SEF. Although these costs are mostly attributable to
Congress' mandate that there be SEFs, they provide useful context for
the costs and benefits attributable to the Commission's action of
implementing that mandate in this rulemaking. Relatedly, the Commission
believes that many of the costs that arise from the application of the
final rules are a consequence of the Congressional trade execution
mandate of section 2(h)(8) of the CEA, as well as the Congressional
goals to promote the trading of swaps on SEFs and to promote pre-trade
price transparency in the swaps market in section 5h(e) of the CEA. For
example, those market participants who are not eligible for the CEA
section 2(h)(7) end user exception will no longer have the option to
execute Required Transactions bilaterally even when they consider it
more costly or less convenient to execute trades on a SEF (or a DCM).
As described more fully below, the Commission has considered these
costs in adopting these final rules, and has, where appropriate,
attempted to mitigate the costs while observing the express direction
of Congress in CEA sections 2(h)(8) and 5h(e).
After the discussion of the aggregate costs of forming and
operating a SEF, the Commission's consideration of costs and benefits
is organized into seven categories: (1) SEF Market Structure; (2)
Registration; (3) Recordkeeping and Reporting; (4) Compliance; (5)
Monitoring and Surveillance; (6) Financial Resources and Integrity; and
(7) Emergency Operations and System Safeguards. For each category,\980\
the
[[Page 33557]]
Commission summarizes the final regulations; describes and responds to
comments discussing the costs and benefits; \981\ assesses
alternatives, including those raised by commenters; and considers the
costs and benefits in light of the five factors set out in CEA section
15(a), which expressly requires the Commission to consider the costs
and benefits of ``the action of the Commission.'' \982\ In this regard,
as with the aggregate costs of forming and operating a SEF attributable
to Congress, where the Commission merely codifies a statutory
requirement, the Commission believes that there is no act of discretion
for consideration under CEA section 15(a). For example, for each core
principle, the first section of the Commission's regulations is a
codification of the statutory language of the core principle as a rule
and, accordingly, there is no Commission act of discretion and thus no
costs and benefits for the Commission to consider under section 15(a).
In other cases, such as Core Principle 1, the rule simply codifies the
text of the core principle, and thus will not be discussed as it is
outside the scope of section 15(a).
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\980\ The costs and benefits of Core Principle 12 are discussed
in connection with a separate proposed rulemaking entitled
Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated
Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the
Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 75 FR 63732 (proposed Oct. 18,
2010).
\981\ The Commission notes that a number of these regulations
also refer to requirements that are contained in other rulemakings,
some that have been finalized and others that have not. The costs
and benefits of these regulations have been, or will be, discussed
in those other rulemakings.
\982\ CEA section 15(a); 7 U.S.C. 19(a).
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The Commission expects that the costs and benefits will vary based
on the specific circumstances of the individual entity seeking
registration as a SEF. For example, some SEF-like execution platforms
that currently operate in the OTC marketplace may generally already
have the infrastructure to comply with the Commission's regulations
without the need for sizeable additional expenditures. For these
potential SEF registrants, the regulations may occasion minimal
incremental costs above their existing cost structure. In contrast,
potential SEF registrants that are not currently operating in the OTC
marketplace, registered as a DCM, or operating as an exempt board of
trade will likely lack existing infrastructure and may incur costs, at
times significant, in both physical and human capital to meet the
requirements of the regulations.\983\ Accordingly, where appropriate
and possible to account for these differences, the Commission has
attempted to express costs and benefits as a range, sometimes one that
is wide.
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\983\ The Commission notes that these registrants will also
incur costs to meet the statutory requirements.
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Finally, in some instances, quantification of costs to certain
market participants is not reasonably feasible because costs will
depend on the size, structure, and product offering of a SEF, which are
likely to have considerable variation, or because required information
or data will not exist until after a SEF commences operation as a
registrant. In other instances--for example with respect to protection
of market participants and the public--suitable metrics to quantify
costs and benefits simply do not exist. Notwithstanding the above-
mentioned limitations, the Commission identifies and considers the
costs and benefits of these rules in qualitative terms.
(c) Estimated Aggregate Costs of Forming and Operating a SEF
In its discussion paper, ISDA estimated the cost of establishing a
new SEF to be $7.4 million,\984\ and estimated ongoing operating costs
to be nearly $12 million per year.\985\ ISDA based its cost estimates
on a survey of groups which included a ``small number of (large) Buy-
Side firms and the 16 largest dealers.'' \986\ ISDA's estimate is based
on a trading architecture that includes an order matching engine, and a
Request for Quote system or other means of interstate commerce that
will allow members to show (and see) bids and offers.\987\ In addition,
ISDA's estimate includes costs associated with: systems to capture and
retain data necessary to create an audit trail for at least 5 years; an
electronic analysis capability and the ability to collect and evaluate
market data on a daily basis; a real-time electronic monitoring system
to detect and deter manipulation, distortion, and market disruption;
reporting transaction information to the Commission and data
repositories using unique product identifiers; a Chief Compliance
Officer; and disaster recovery.\988\ ISDA also identified major
operating costs to include the cost of compensation and benefits for
staff, leasing office space, maintaining and upgrading operational
infrastructure and systems, maintaining sufficient financial resources
to cover operating costs for at least one year, maintaining an
independent board of governors, and maintaining emergency backup
facilities.\989\
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\984\ ISDA Discussion Paper at 30-31 (Nov. 2011). While the ISDA
discussion paper is largely concerned with the costs and benefits
resulting from the statute and regulations implemented by other
rulemakings, relevant portions are discussed in this release. ISDA's
estimate includes the costs of: registering with the Commission;
developing an electronic system capable of providing market
participants with the ability to make bids and offers to multiple
participants and capable of maintaining safe storage capacity;
developing and maintaining electronic analysis, reporting, and
monitoring software; developing new products; drafting contractual
arrangements with SEF users and vendors; drafting market rules and
policies; and developing emergency backup procedures and systems.
\985\ Id. at 31-32. This estimate includes the cost of
compensation and benefits for staff, leasing office space,
maintaining and upgrading operational infrastructure and systems,
maintaining sufficient financial resources to cover operating costs
for at least one year, maintaining an independent board of
governors, and maintaining emergency backup facilities.
\986\ Id. at 31, 34.
\987\ Id. at 29.
\988\ Id. at 30.
\989\ Id. at 31.
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In another comment letter, MarketAxess stated that the SEC's cost
estimates in its proposed rulemaking for security-based SEFs (``SB-
SEFs''), were ``generally realistic and accurate estimates of the costs
of establishing and operating a SB-SEF'' and that these estimates would
be ``comparable to, and thus relevant for, calculation of costs for a
SEF.'' \990\
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\990\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 5 (Jun. 3, 2011).
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The SEC estimated that the cost of forming an SB-SEF is
approximately $15-20 million, including the first year of
operation.\991\ These costs included a software and product development
estimate of $6.5-10 million for the first year and ongoing technology
and maintenance costs of $2-4 million.\992\ The SEC also estimated that
it would cost approximately $50,000-$3 million for an operator of an
existing platform to modify its platform to conform to the statute and
the SEC's proposed rules, depending on the enhancements that would be
required by the final regulations.\993\
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\991\ Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap
Execution Facilities, 76 FR 10948, 11041 (proposed Feb. 28, 2011).
\992\ Id.
\993\ Id.
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In the Commission staff's follow-up conversations, potential SEFs
stated that the costs associated with the SEF NPRM may differ from the
SEC's cost estimates in various areas. For example, one commenter
estimated first-year software and product development costs of $4
million rather than the $6.5-10 million estimated by the SEC. Another
commenter stated that existing entities will be able to leverage
existing technology at minimal cost, and that there is no real cost
associated with the rulemaking from a technology perspective if an
entity is not a startup. As stated above, ISDA's estimates also
differed from those of the SEC, including estimated initial software
development costs of $1 million and
[[Page 33558]]
initial product development costs of $1.25 million.\994\
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\994\ ISDA Discussion Paper at 32 (Nov. 2011). ISDA's paper also
contained a discussion of the costs likely to be faced by dealers
and buy-side users of interest rate swaps that must be executed on
regulated exchanges. Some of these costs result from statutory
requirements that were not the product of Commission discretion,
while other costs are likely to derive from regulations being
implemented in other rulemakings. Other costs simply reflect the
cost of doing business and are not directly imposed by Commission
regulations. Accordingly, these costs are beyond the scope of this
rulemaking and will not be discussed in this release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Commission staff's follow-up conversations, potential SEFs
stated that total ongoing costs would range from $3.5 million to $5
million per year. These potential SEFs also told the Commission staff
that it would cost them approximately $2 million to conform to the
statute and the Commission's proposed rules, including contracting with
the National Futures Association (``NFA'') to perform regulatory
services.
While the Commission believes that the various cost estimates
(including those for SB-SEFs and those reflecting costs imposed by
statute) can be used as a rough guide to the costs that would be
incurred to establish and operate a SEF, the Commission notes that the
majority of these costs are necessary to establish and operate any
platform for the trading of swaps, as a number of firms had already
done prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. The Commission
believes that the additional costs of modifying a platform to comply
with the Commission's regulations to implement the statute represent a
relatively modest proportion of these costs.
(1) Regulatory Costs
Pursuant to final Sec. 37.204 adopted in this release, SEFs may
utilize a regulatory service provider for assistance in performing
certain self-regulatory functions, including, among others, trade
practice surveillance, market surveillance, real-time market
monitoring, investigations of possible rule violations, and
disciplinary actions.\995\ The costs described in this cost benefit
consideration section reflect the costs that a SEF is likely to face if
it does not choose to utilize the services of a regulatory service
provider. To the extent that utilizing a regulatory service provider is
more cost-effective for a SEF than performing the functions
independently, the quantitative and qualitative cost discussions in
this release may overstate the costs of complying with the rules. Based
on the Commission staff's follow-up discussions with potential SEFs, it
appears that most SEFs will be entering into agreements with regulatory
service providers for the provision of these functions. In fact, the
Commission understands that many potential SEFs have already entered
into formal agreements with a regulatory service provider. The
Commission notes that competition among regulatory service providers,
including NFA and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, may
result in additional cost savings for SEFs that choose to outsource
compliance obligations.
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\995\ Rule 37.204 permits SEFs to contract with a regulatory
service provider for the provision of services to assist in
compliance with the core principles, as approved by the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. SEF Market Structure
(a) Background
(1) Minimum Trading Functionality (Order Book)
Final Sec. 37.3(a)(2) requires that each SEF provide its market
participants with a minimum trading functionality referred to as an
Order Book,\996\ which the Commission believes is consistent with the
SEF definition and promotes the goals provided in section 733 of the
Dodd-Frank Act.\997\ As noted in the preamble, the Commission is
withdrawing the proposed requirement that SEFs offer indicative quote
functionality because the Commission believes that, at this time, such
a requirement is unnecessary.\998\
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\996\ An Order Book means: (i) An electronic trading facility,
as that term is defined in section 1a(16) of the Act; (ii) a trading
facility, as that term is defined in section 1a(51) of the Act; or
(iii) a trading system or platform in which all market participants
in the trading system or platform have the ability to enter multiple
bids and offers, observe or receive bids and offers entered by other
market participants, and transact on such bids and offers. See Final
Sec. 37.3(a)(3) of the Commission's regulations.
\997\ CEA section 1a(50) defines a SEF as ``a trading system or
platform in which multiple participants have the ability to execute
or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple
participants in the facility or system, through any means of
interstate commerce . . .'' 7 U.S.C. 1a(50). In section 5h(e) of the
Act, Congress provided a ``rule of construction'' to guide the
Commission's interpretation of certain SEF provisions (stating that
the goals of section 5h of the Act are to ``promote the trading of
swaps on [SEFs] and to promote pre-trade price transparency in the
swaps market''). 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(e).
\998\ See Minimum Trading Functionality discussion above under
Sec. 37.3--Requirements for Registration in the preamble.
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(2) Methods of Execution on a SEF
Final Sec. 37.9 governs the execution methods that are available
on a SEF and classifies transactions executed on a SEF as either
Required Transactions (i.e., any transaction involving a swap that is
subject to the trade execution requirement in section 2(h)(8) of the
Act \999\) or Permitted Transactions (i.e., any transaction not
involving a swap that is subject to the trade execution requirement in
section 2(h)(8) of the Act).
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\999\ Transactions that are subject to the trade execution
requirement of CEA section 2(h)(8) are subject to the clearing
requirement of CEA section 2(h)(1) and are ``available to trade'' on
a SEF or DCM. See Process for a Designated Contract Market or Swap
Execution Facility To Make a Swap Available To Trade, 76 FR 77728
(proposed Dec. 14, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to final Sec. 37.9(a)(2), market participants may only
execute Required Transactions using either the SEF's Order Book or an
RFQ System that will transmit a request for a quote to at least three
market participants and that operates in conjunction with the Order
Book. In contrast, while SEFs must offer an Order Book for Permitted
Transactions, market participants may execute Permitted Transactions on
a SEF using any method of execution.\1000\
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\1000\ The SEF NPRM provided that Permitted Transactions may be
executed by an Order Book, RFQ System, Voice-Based System, or any
such other system for trading as may be permitted by the Commission.
Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 1241.
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(3) Request for Quote (``RFQ'') System for Required Transactions
The RFQ System definition in final Sec. 37.9(a)(3) requires that
each market participant transmit a request for a quote to at least
three market participants, with each of these market participants being
given the opportunity to respond. As described in greater detail in the
preamble, permitting RFQ requesters to send RFQs to a single market
participant would undermine the multiple participant to multiple
participant requirement in the SEF definition and the goal of pre-trade
price transparency.\1001\ The three market participant requirement will
help the RFQ requester benefit from price competition among multiple
RFQ responders and thus promotes price discovery. In addition, final
Sec. 37.9(a)(3) requires that any firm bid or offer pertaining to the
same instrument resting on any of the SEF's Order Books must be
communicated to the RFQ requester at the same time the first responsive
bid or offer is received by such requester.
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\1001\ See RFQ System Definition and Transmission to Five Market
Participants discussion above under Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)--Request
for Quote System in the preamble.
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(4) Time Delay Requirement
Final Sec. 37.9(b)(1) sets forth a time delay requirement for a
broker or dealer who has the ability to execute against its
[[Page 33559]]
customer's order or to execute two of its customers' orders against
each other. These orders (i.e., price, size, and other terms) are
subject to a 15-second time delay between the entry of the two orders,
such that one side of the potential transaction is disclosed and made
available to other market participants before the second side of the
potential transaction is submitted for execution. This time delay
requirement is similar to certain timing delays applicable to futures
transactions executed on DCMs, which are also designed to promote pre-
trade transparency by allowing other market participants the
opportunity to participate in the transaction and thus prevent any two
market participants from crossing a bilaterally (off-exchange)
negotiated trade. The Commission notes that the 15-second requirement
is a default time delay; the final rule also permits SEFs to adjust
this time delay requirement based upon a swap's liquidity or other
product-specific characteristics.
(b) Costs
(1) Costs to SEFs
(i) Minimum Trading Functionality (Order Book) and Methods of Execution
on a SEF
In the Commission staff's follow-up conversations with potential
SEFs, one commenter noted that it would cost approximately $250,000 to
upgrade its existing system to provide the required minimum trading
functionality, while another stated that there is no real cost
associated with the rulemaking from a technology perspective if an
entity is already operating a trading platform, and that an existing
platform could become compliant with the rule by leveraging existing
technology at minimal cost. The Commission believes that these
estimates are reasonable for existing platforms. Though the Commission
is not requiring that systems be upgraded once they have achieved
compliance with the rules, it expects that SEFs may have business
incentives to incur ongoing programming costs to upgrade their systems.
ISDA/SIFMA noted that the minimum trading functionality may limit
competition by increasing costs to applicants that would otherwise
prefer to offer solely RFQ functionality.\1002\ As discussed in the
preamble to this release,\1003\ the Commission believes that the
minimum trading functionality is consistent with the SEF definition and
promotes the statutory goals of pre-trade price transparency and
trading on SEFs provided in section 733 of Dodd-Frank.\1004\
Nevertheless, the Commission has adopted cost-mitigating alternatives
identified by commenters, including: (1) Deleting the requirement that
indicative bids and offers must be posted on a SEF's Order Book; (2)
allowing work-up sessions \1005\ where the original counterparties to a
trade and other market participants can trade additional quantities of
a swap at the previously executed price; and (3) allowing SEFs to use
any means of interstate commerce in providing the execution methods for
Required Transactions in Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(i)(A) or (B) of this final
rulemaking (i.e., Order Book or RFQ System that operates in conjunction
with an Order Book). Not having to display indicative quotes will
likely reduce the programming costs for SEFs, since they will not need
to program that functionality into the platform. The Commission
believes the requirement to communicate any firm bid or offer will
marginally add to the programming costs for SEFs and is included in the
$250,000 estimate provided above. As commenters have described, work-up
sessions are part of current OTC market practice, and the Commission
believes that this additional flexibility for market participants to
execute transactions in the SEF context will promote the trading of
swaps on SEFs consistent with CEA section 5h(e).
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\1002\ ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\1003\ See Minimum Trading Functionality discussion above under
Sec. 37.3--Requirements for Registration in the preamble.
\1004\ In section 5h(e) of the Act (as adopted by section 733 of
the Dodd-Frank Act), Congress provided a ``rule of construction'' to
guide the Commission's interpretation of certain SEF provisions
(stating that the goals of section 5h of the Act are to ``promote
the trading of swaps on [SEFs] and to promote pre-trade price
transparency in the swaps market''). 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(e).
\1005\ As described earlier, a work-up session refers to a
practice wherein once a trade has been executed, one of the
counterparties to the trade can express an interest in transacting
additional volume at the same price.
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(ii) Time Delay Requirement
A SEF will incur some additional programming costs as a result of
the requirement that a SEF must provide for a 15-second time delay in
certain circumstances. The Commission did not receive any specific
estimates of these programming costs and notes that the rule permits a
SEF to adjust the minimum time delay requirement based upon a swap's
liquidity or other product-specific characteristics. For example, less
liquid contracts may need a longer time delay than more liquid
contracts.
(2) Costs to Market Participants
(i) General Costs
In its discussion paper, ISDA described what it asserted would be
the likely costs and benefits of what it labeled the ``electronic
execution mandate,'' that is, mandating the execution of interest rate
swaps on DCMs or on SEFs.\1006\ According to ISDA, ``[t]he study
indicates that the EE mandate [electronic execution mandate], in all
likelihood, will bring little benefit to the market while adding
significantly to the costs of using derivatives.''\1007\ ISDA stated
that the electronic execution mandate will result in higher bid/ask
spreads and significant operational, technological, and compliance
costs for those transacting in interest rate swaps.\1008\ ISDA further
stated that these costs will be borne by end users and may force some
participants to withdraw from the market with ``virtually no effect on
small end users.'' \1009\ ISDA stated that the electronic execution
mandate is both unnecessary and counterproductive as electronic trading
is already developing rapidly as users take advantage of the existing
choice in execution venues.\1010\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1006\ ISDA Discussion Paper at 20-21 (Nov. 2011).
\1007\ Id. at 1.
\1008\ Id. at 4.
\1009\ Id.
\1010\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to ISDA, the electronic execution mandate will take away
users' choice, create inefficiencies, and discourage innovation.\1011\
ISDA stated that the electronic execution mandate will impose new costs
because:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1011\ Id.
SEFs themselves need to be established, licensed and operated.
Buy-Side users will face significant technology and operational
challenges as well as increased regulatory reporting requirements.
Dealers will have to upgrade infrastructure to deal with automated
trading and comply with increased regulatory reporting and record-
keeping. All participants will face increased reconciliations,
oversight and reporting requirements as well. Finally, regulators
will need additional staff to properly oversee the new
markets.\1012\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1012\ Id. at 24.
According to ISDA, the aggregate market-wide ``set up costs are
estimated to exceed $750 million and annual costs may run to $250
million.''\1013\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1013\ Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In terms of benefits, ISDA concluded that:
Transparency and market access may improve marginally for small
financial entities that use IRS [interest rate swaps] but any
benefit they receive will be very modest relative to the added costs
of execution.
[[Page 33560]]
Indeed, the imposition of clearing and the higher fees that will
result from the EE Mandate [electronic execution mandate] and other
provisions of DFA [Dodd-Frank Act] may cause these and other
participants to reduce their activity or even withdraw from the IRS
market.\1014\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1014\ Id. at 36.
ISDA asserted that transaction costs for OTC trades in interest
rate swaps are already low with levels of transparency that market
participants consider sufficient, and that trading in a regulated
market or on an exchange does not guarantee a more efficient market
because traders often get better execution off-exchange.\1015\ ISDA
further asserted that liquidity in OTC interest rate swaps is at least
as good as liquidity in exchange-traded futures contracts, especially
outside of the most liquid futures contract months, and that market
participants predicted that bid-ask spreads in interest rate swaps
would increase after the execution mandate takes effect.\1016\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1015\ Id. at 20-21.
\1016\ Id. at 2-4, 20-21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISDA also estimated that the market as a whole will need to absorb
at least an additional $400 million in annual expenses as a result of
the changes implemented in connection with the Dodd-Frank Act, and that
assuming SEFs will execute 1,000 trades a day (comparable to what ISDA
states is the current number of transactions in the OTC market), this
will amount to execution costs of $1,280 per trade.\1017\ As a result,
ISDA stated that dealer costs will be passed on to end users and will
cause participants to withdraw from the market, discouraging
innovation.\1018\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1017\ Id. at 35.
\1018\ Id. at 4.
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The Commission notes that a majority of the costs identified by
ISDA result from statutory requirements that were not the product of
Commission discretion. For example, the requirements that certain swaps
must be executed on a SEF or DCM,\1019\ and that no person may operate
a facility for the trading or processing of swaps unless the facility
is registered as a SEF or as a DCM,\1020\ are statutory requirements.
Additionally, CEA section 5h(e) contains a rule of construction that
states ``[t]he goal of this section is to promote the trading of swaps
on swap execution facilities and to promote pre-trade price
transparency in the swaps market.'' \1021\ The interest rate swaps
discussed by ISDA are included in these statutory requirements.
Moreover, notwithstanding ISDA's use of the term ``electronic execution
mandate,'' this rulemaking does not require that market participants
execute swaps in Required Transactions electronically, since SEFs will
be allowed to use any means of interstate commerce in providing the
execution methods for such transactions as described in Sec.
37.9(a)(2)(ii). Nevertheless, the Commission addresses below many of
ISDA's comments regarding the statutory trading mandate for interest
rate swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1019\ CEA section 2(h)(8); 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(8).
\1020\ CEA section 5h(a)(1); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(a)(1).
\1021\ CEA section 5h(e); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, while commenters did not submit any data to support or
refute ISDA's estimates, during follow-up calls with potential SEFs,
one commenter stated that the U.S. credit default swap market
experiences approximately 1,350 trades per day. If interest rate swaps
and other swaps are included, the total number of trades per day is
likely to be a much higher figure. In turn, this would imply that the
execution costs per trade are likely to be lower than ISDA's estimate,
which was based on only 1,000 trades per day.
The Commission notes that while SEFs are expected to list for
trading a wide variety of swaps, ISDA's comment addresses only the
costs and benefits applicable to the interest rate swap market. The
interest rate swap market is one of the most liquid swap markets and is
characterized by relatively tight bid-ask spreads, a high level of
notional principal, and relatively high volume compared to other swap
markets, including credit default swaps. Most other swap markets,
especially many of the instruments like credit derivatives which
contributed to the financial crisis, are less liquid than the interest
rate swap market and thus will benefit more from the enhanced pre-trade
and post-trade price transparency and centralized marketplaces that
will be available on SEFs.
While it may be true, as ISDA asserts, that some buy-side users
contend that current levels of price transparency in the interest rate
swap market are adequate, the Commission notes that an increase in pre-
trade transparency benefits the public because it will allow all market
participants (not just those with a strong business relationship with a
particular swap dealer) \1022\ to transact in the market on a level
playing field, and will likely enhance price discovery in the swaps
market. Moreover, as noted, section 5h(e) of the CEA states that a
purpose of SEFs is to promote pre-trade transparency in the swaps
market.\1023\
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\1022\ The ISDA comment ignores the liquidity risk inherent in
the current bilateral interest rate swap market. It addresses the
cost of entering into a new position, but not of unwinding it. If a
buy-side firm wishes to unwind a swap in the OTC market, it will
typically have to complete the unwind trade with the original
counterparty or swap dealer. Given that the dealer is aware of the
true trading interest of the buy-side firm, the quote might be one-
sided favoring the dealer. Assuming sufficient liquidity, any
anonymous trading platform will pose a lower unwind risk/cost to
most non-dealer or buy-side firms.
\1023\ CEA section 5h(e); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to ISDA, market participants asserted that bid-ask
spreads in interest rate swaps will widen after SEFs begin
trading.\1024\ The Commission notes that such predictions are
speculative and are not based on data, which does not yet exist because
SEFs have yet to begin trading. Moreover, during the Commission staff's
follow-up conversations, other market participants (potential SEFs)
shared information illustrating that after the financial crisis,
participation by dealers or liquidity providers increased on their
trading platforms. These sources stated that in some instances, new
entrants now account for over a quarter of the total business
transacted on such platforms. The Commission believes that, holding all
else constant, increased participation and competition among liquidity
providers should result in tighter spreads and greater depth, both key
components of improved liquidity.\1025\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1024\ ISDA Discussion Paper at 2-4 (Nov. 2011).
\1025\ See Hendershott & Madhavan, ``Click or Call,'' at 2;
Darrell Duffie, Nicolae G[acirc]rleanu & Lasse Heje Pedersen,
``Over-the-Counter Markets,'' 73 Econometrica 1815 (Nov. 2005)
(hereinafter Duffie et al., ``OTC Markets'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, to promote the trading of swaps on SEFs, the Commission's
final rules, as mentioned above, further increase the flexibility
regarding the trading platforms that a SEF may offer for Required
Transactions (which the Commission expects will include many interest
rate swap contracts).\1026\ In addition, as discussed above,\1027\
work-up sessions will allow market participants to continue using
certain existing market practices, which will help facilitate the
transition of swap markets to SEFs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1026\ See, e.g., Minimum Trading Functionality discussion above
under Sec. 37.3--Requirements for Registration in the preamble and
``Through Any Means of Interstate Commerce'' Language in the SEF
Definition discussion above under Sec. 37.9(b)(1) and (b)(4)--
Execution Methods for Required Transactions in the preamble.
\1027\ See ``Through Any Means of Interstate Commerce'' Language
in the SEF Definition discussion above under Sec. 37.9(b)(1) and
(b)(4)--Execution Methods for Required Transactions in the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To support its comments on the potentially adverse impact of moving
interest rate swaps to centralized execution platforms, ISDA provided
data on bid-offer spreads from both interest rate swap markets and
[[Page 33561]]
exchange-traded futures markets.\1028\ The Commission notes that
interest rate swap dealers use exchange-traded interest rate futures,
primarily the Eurodollar futures, to hedge the exposures that arise
from their interest rate swap dealing activity. A dealer seeking to
hedge an interest rate swap using Eurodollar futures will typically
trade a strip of Eurodollar futures.\1029\ In its comparisons of
typical bid-offer spreads in exchange-traded interest rate futures and
in OTC interest rate swaps, ISDA provided spreads in the front month
Treasury bond and Treasury note futures contracts and the relatively
illiquid interest rate swap futures contracts, but not the highly
liquid Eurodollar futures contract.\1030\ As noted, the Eurodollar
futures contract is the primary vehicle used by interest rate swap
dealers to hedge their residual interest rate exposure. Therefore, the
Commission believes that Eurodollar futures bid-offer spreads are a
more appropriate metric for comparison to interest rate swap bid-ask
spreads than the interest rate swap futures contracts bid-ask spreads
used by ISDA. Likewise, Eurodollar futures are more closely related to
the OTC interest rate swap market and more useful for hedging interest
rate swap positions than Treasury futures contracts. Thus, Eurodollar
futures are also a better metric for comparison to interest rate swaps
than Treasury futures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1028\ ISDA Discussion Paper at 12-20 (Nov. 2011).
\1029\ A strip of Eurodollar futures contracts is a position
consisting of a sequence of contract months, for example, a position
consisting of the March 2013, June 2013, September 2013, and
December 2013 Eurodollar futures contracts. This position is
economically equivalent to a one year interest rate swap with
quarterly payment dates on the futures expiration dates.
\1030\ According to the CME Group Web site, during the first
eight months of 2012, Eurodollar futures contracts had a total
volume of approximately 2300 million contracts. During that same
period, the combined volume of CME Group's interest rate swap
futures contracts was only about 312,000 contracts, approximately 1/
10 of one percent of the volume in Eurodollar futures contracts. See
http://www.cmegroup.com/wrappedpages/web_monthly_report/Web_Volume_Report_CMEG.pdf, updated monthly and viewed in September
2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Underlying ISDA's comment is an implicit assumption that moving
swaps to electronic trading platforms will not result in any major
changes to the number of transactions that occur. In computing its cost
estimates, ISDA assumes that the number of trades on SEFs will be
comparable to the number of trades that occur in the OTC market today.
As noted above, ISDA states that, assuming SEFs will execute 1,000
trades a day, total execution costs will amount to $1,280 per
trade.\1031\ However, transaction volume has increased dramatically in
securities markets and DCM futures markets that have migrated to
electronic trading platforms (such as order books) from open outcry and
other non-electronic trading environments. This volume increase is due
to a tendency for typical transaction sizes to be much smaller on
electronic order book markets and also because order books attract
participation from new and alternate sources of liquidity, including
participants using automated trading strategies.\1032\ Transactions
levels increased in the securities and futures markets when trading
moved to electronic platforms, and the Commission believes that it is
likely that the number of transactions in the swap markets will
increase as swap trading migrates to SEFs and DCMs. The Commission is
unaware of any comments or studies indicating that transaction sizes in
the swap markets will remain unchanged when they move to electronic
platforms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1031\ See ISDA Discussion Paper at 35 (Nov. 2011). A recent
paper by the New York Federal Reserve estimated 2,500 trades/day in
the interest rate swap market. See Michael Fleming, John Jackson,
Ada Li, Asani Sarkar, & Patricia Zobel, ``An Analysis of OTC
Interest Rate Derivatives Transactions: Implications for Public
Reporting,'' Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, No.
557, at 2 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr557.pdf.
\1032\ See, e.g., George H. K. Wang & Aysegul Ates, ``When Size
Matters: The Case of Equity Index Futures,'' EFMA 2004 Basel
Meetings Paper (Dec. 2003); Samarth Shah & B. Wade Brorsen,
``Electronic vs. Open Outcry: Side-by-Side Trading of KCBT Wheat
Futures,'' 36 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 48
(Apr. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) RFQ-5 Market Participant Requirement
Several commenters stated that the five market participant
requirement in proposed Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii) is likely to increase
costs, but commenters did not provide any data to support this
assertion.\1033\ MetLife stated that disclosure of a large expected
trade by RFQ to five swap dealers would likely result in a material
widening of bid/ask spreads and increased hedging costs, as swap
dealers will pass on to their customers the cost of protecting
themselves against potential adverse price movements due to the
required pre-trade transparency.\1034\ Some commenters specifically
noted that these adverse price movements would be due to non-executing
market participants receiving the RFQ front-running the transaction in
anticipation of the executing market participant's forthcoming and
offsetting transactions.\1035\ Commenters additionally stated that the
risks associated with the five market participant requirement would be
most pronounced in illiquid swaps or large-sized trades (i.e.,
transactions approaching the block trade threshold).\1036\ Some
commenters also stated that the five market participant requirement
would negatively impact liquidity.\1037\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1033\ See RFQ System Definition and Transmission to Five Market
Participants discussion above under Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)--Request
for Quote System in the preamble.
\1034\ MetLife Comment Letter at 2-3 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\1035\ See RFQ System Definition and Transmission to Five Market
Participants discussion above under Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)--Request
for Quote System in the preamble.
\1036\ Id.
\1037\ Id.; ISDA Discussion Paper at 2 (Nov. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the Commission believes that the five market participant
requirement promotes the statutory goal of pre-trade transparency
because the RFQ requester will have access to quotes from a larger
group of potential responders, the Commission is sensitive to
commenters' concerns about this requirement, such as the potential for
increased trading costs and information leakage to the non-executing
market participants in the RFQ. To address these concerns, while still
complying with the statutory SEF definition and promoting the goals
provided in section 733 of the Dodd-Frank, the Commission is revising
final Sec. 37.9(a)(3) so that a market participant must transmit an
RFQ to no less than three market participants.
As noted in the preamble, the Commission believes that the three
market participant requirement is consistent with current market
practice where, in certain markets, many market participants already
choose to send an RFQ to multiple market participants, while still
complying with the statutory SEF definition and promoting the goal of
pre-trade transparency.
Additionally, the Commission believes that adopting a minimum
market participant requirement of fewer than three (e.g., a minimum of
two market participants) will expose market participants to a higher
risk of not receiving multiple responses to their RFQs. The receipt of
multiple responses increases the likelihood that the requestor will
execute at the best possible price. The Commission has learned that
business or technology reasons may prevent any given market participant
from responding to a specific RFQ. For example, DCM market maker
programs typically require participants to quote two-sided markets for
75 to 85 percent of the trading day. Therefore, if the Commission
established a minimum market
[[Page 33562]]
participant requirement of two, there could be instances where one
market participant does not respond to the RFQ, leaving the RFQ
requester with only a single response. While there is no guarantee that
even a minimum of three market participants will ensure that multiple
responses are available for all RFQs at all times, it increases the
probability that the goal of pre-trade price transparency is achieved
and that a competitive market is created for market participants.
In response to the concerns raised by commenters about increased
trading costs, the Commission also notes that research in the corporate
bond market supports the view that RFQ systems in general increase
search options for investors, and that the competition that ensues
among market participants results in lower bid-ask spreads.\1038\ One
paper by Hendershott and Madhavan provides evidence that by allowing a
market participant to negotiate simultaneously with multiple
participants, and thus not be constrained by the limitations of the
sequential search process as discussed above, RFQ systems contribute to
a statistically significant reduction in transaction costs for quote
requesters.\1039\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1038\ See Hendershott & Madhavan, ``Click or Call,'' at 10-12.
\1039\ Id. at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, the authors compare transaction costs across two
different market structures, one with an RFQ and one with a traditional
OTC structure, and find that investors are more likely to use RFQ
systems when their costs are high because increased RFQ participation
reduces their transaction costs.\1040\ This is so because competition
among dealers lowers costs.\1041\ While Hendershott and Madhavan's
estimates for transaction costs in the corporate bond market are
consistent with those reported by others,\1042\ access to RFQ market
data, plus their choice of econometric model, help them obtain deeper
insights into the reasons for differences in costs across different
types of bonds.\1043\ This research in the debt markets supports the
final rules' three market participant requirement because it
demonstrates that unless multiple market participants receive the RFQ,
the quote requester will not be able to generate a minimal level of
competition sufficient to reduce the quoted bid-ask spread.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1040\ Id. at 14.
\1041\ Id. at 17.
\1042\ See, e.g., Edwards et al., ``Transaction Costs and
Transparency,'' 1421-51.
\1043\ Hendershott & Madhavan, ``Click or Call,'' at 1-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As stated by commenters, in a market with high levels of pre-trade
transparency, concerns about leakage of trading interest typically grow
with trade size; a market participant posting a bid or offer in the
order book, or sending a request for a quote to multiple dealers, will
typically be concerned that information about their trading interest
will adversely impact the market price. However, empirical research by
Hendershott and Madhavan demonstrates that standard-sized (as opposed
to large size) trades are more likely to be traded on an RFQ
system.\1044\ For these trade sizes, market participants believe that
the benefits from lowering search costs mitigate concerns about
information leakage.\1045\ On the other hand, for larger trades (i.e.,
block trades), leakage concerns could dominate any expected savings in
search costs from participating in the order book or RFQ system, and
larger trades are more likely to be executed though a bilateral
bargaining process. The Commission's understanding of this potential
trade-off between lower search costs and higher leakage risk is
generally consistent with the results from Hendershott and Madhavan
described above. These findings are relevant for the final rules'
exclusion of block-sized trades from the execution methods for Required
Transactions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1044\ Id. at 15, 18, 28.
\1045\ Id. A market participant sending an order to the market
is likely to be concerned about others in the market being able to
glean information through the order. In the context of a firm
sending a large size trade, one substantially bigger than the
typical trade size, there will always be concern that the size of
the order will be interpreted as containing information, and elicit
responses from other market participants. Firms will typically be
interested in ensuring that the size of the order does not have an
adverse impact on the order price, or the quotes from liquidity
providers. Accordingly, while looking to execute such orders, firms
will take steps to avoid leakage of the information of their trading
interest beyond a very small group of potential counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While some commenters stated that the five market participant
requirement would result in excessive and costly disclosure, other
commenters argued that the requirement would result in insufficient
transparency, comparing the proposed requirement to the current status
quo of private OTC markets, where large swap dealers can choose to only
interact with one another.\1046\ According to Mallers et al., because
the SEF NPRM would permit a market participant to interact with a
limited number of market participants (i.e., less than the entire
market), the proposal would allow ``semi-private side deals'' to take
place, and that in light of the 2008 financial crisis, the ``costs and
risks of permitting private RFQ markets [remained] high.'' \1047\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1046\ Mallers et al. Comment Letter at 3-5 (Mar. 21, 2011).
\1047\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, the Commission agrees that a broader group of
potential responders will encourage price competition and provide a
fairer assessment of market value; however, the Commission is mindful
of concerns that the five RFQ recipient model may impose additional
costs, especially for illiquid and bespoke swaps. Following the
practice for futures on DCMs, the Commission could have required that
RFQs be disseminated to all market participants.\1048\ However, the
Commission recognizes that swaps tend to be less standardized than
futures; therefore, the rules pertaining to the execution methods for
SEFs should provide the requisite flexibility to market participants
trading swaps. As such, the Commission is implementing the minimum
three market participant requirement. The Commission also believes that
the three market participant requirement reflects the more flexible
statutory provisions for SEFs as compared to DCMs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1048\ The Commission notes that a SEF market participant may
send an RFQ to the entire market. Core Principles and Other
Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 1220. Based on
its experience with RFQ-to-all functionality offered by DCMs, the
Commission notes that there are two distinct differences between
these and the requirements finalized in this release. First, RFQs
submitted to DCMs are disseminated to all market participants.
Second, the responses to the RFQs take the form of executable bids
or offers that are entered into the DCM's order book or other
centralized market, such that orders from any market participant,
not just the one submitting the RFQ, can be matched against such
responsive bids or offers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While commenters have not submitted any data on the potential
impact of the proposed five market participant requirement from the
potential information leakage and front-running risks, the Commission
believes that the three market participant requirement adopted in this
final release does not necessarily introduce a new source of risk for
market participants as these risks to the extent that they exist are
present in the current OTC market. The Commission also believes that
the prices of bids and offers made in response to RFQs will reflect any
subsequent hedging risks by the responders, and the potential winner's
curse to the extent one exists will, if at all, be realized only if the
market participant does not price this risk fully into its quote.
Nonetheless, the revision from five to three market participants should
help to mitigate this potential
[[Page 33563]]
risk, while still complying with the statutory SEF definition and
promoting pre-trade price transparency and price competition.
Furthermore, regarding comments concerns' about the potential
winner's curse for illiquid swaps, the Commission notes that the three
market participant requirement will only apply to transactions in swaps
that are subject to the CEA section 2(h)(8) trade execution mandate
(i.e., transactions in more liquid swaps, which are subject to the
clearing mandate and made available to trade, and not to illiquid and
bespoke swaps).\1049\ The Commission also notes that the interest rate
swaps and credit default swaps that the Commission has determined are
required to be cleared under CEA section 2(h)(1) (and are likely to be
subject to the trade execution mandate of CEA section 2(h)(8)) are some
of the most liquid swaps.\1050\ Additionally, 77 swap dealers have
registered with the Commission and nearly all of them make markets in
such swaps.\1051\ SEFs may offer RFQ systems without the three market
participant requirement for Permitted Transactions (i.e., transactions
not involving swaps that are subject to the trade execution mandate of
CEA section 2(h)(8)). In response to commenters' concerns about the
potential winner's curse for large-sized trades, the Commission notes
that block-sized transactions would not be subject to the execution
methods for Required Transactions, including the three market
participant requirement.\1052\ Therefore, excluding block-sized
transactions from the execution methods for Required Transactions will
address the potential risk of a winner's curse for large-sized trades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1049\ Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of
the CEA, 77 FR 74284 (Dec. 13, 2012); Process for a Designated
Contract Market or Swap Execution Facility To Make a Swap Available
To Trade, 76 FR 77728 (proposed Dec. 14, 2011).
\1050\ Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of
the CEA, 77 FR 74284. The Commission notes that these swaps already
went through a Commission determination process that included a five
factor review, including a liquidity review. Id. ISDA, in its letter
requesting interpretive relief regarding the obligation to provide a
pre-trade mid-market mark, recognized that many of the swaps that
the Commission has determined are required to be cleared under CEA
section 2(h)(1) are ``highly-liquid, exhibit narrow bid-ask spreads
and are widely quoted by SD/MSPs in the marketplace . . .'' ISDA
Comment Letter at 2 (Nov. 30, 2012).
\1051\ The Commission recognizes that not all swap dealers will
be active in all Required Transactions. The Commission also notes
that of the 77 swap dealers, 35 swap dealers are not affiliated with
any of the 77 swap dealers.
\1052\ See definition of block trade in Sec. 43.2 of the
Commission's regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted in the preamble, the three market participants may not be
affiliated with or controlled by the RFQ requester and may not be
affiliated with or controlled by each other, and the Commission is
revising final Sec. 37.9(a)(3) to clarify this point. The Commission
believes that for an RFQ requester to send an RFQ to another entity who
is affiliated with or controlled by the RFQ requester would undermine
the benefits of the requirement.
The costs associated with the no-affiliate rule may include, for
example, the costs that a SEF would incur to upgrade its systems to
create filters that would prevent RFQs from being sent to affiliated
parties, but these costs could be mitigated or eliminated by, for
example, the SEF requiring market participants accepting RFQs to
disclose their affiliations to potential RFQ requestors before a
request is transmitted. Another possibility is for a SEF to monitor
RFQs and cancel trades that it determines are made pursuant to RFQs
between affiliated parties. Yet another possibility is for the SEF to
include in its rules a requirement that market participants must not
transmit RFQs to their affiliates or to market participants who are
affiliated with each other.
The primary benefit of this no-affiliate rule is to ensure that
RFQs are sent to three unaffiliated parties who can be expected to
provide truly independent quotes. If an RFQ requester were to transmit
an RFQ to one non-affiliate and two affiliates or if an RFQ requester
transmits an RFQ to three requestees who are affiliates of each other,
then the goal of pre-trade price transparency would be undermined
(since the quotes might be coordinated or otherwise not independent)
and the RFQ could effectively turn into an RFQ-to-one, which is
contrary to the statutory SEF definition. The Commission also notes
that such an outcome could disincentivize entities from responding to
an RFQ, which would reduce price competition and liquidity.\1053\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1053\ As any trades emanating from an RFQ will be subject to
real time reporting, if a non-affiliated respondent to an RFQ
observes trades happening away from better or equal prices quoted by
it, such respondents might be discouraged from responding to future
RFQ requests, thus hurting market integrity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission clarifies that SEFs are not required to: (1) Display
RFQs to market participants not participating in the RFQ, (2) disclose
RFQ responses to all market participants, or (3) disclose the identity
of the RFQ requester. The Commission also clarifies that an acceptable
RFQ System may allow for a transaction to be consummated if the
original request to three potential counterparties receives fewer than
three responses. Moreover, Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(ii) clarifies that in
providing either one of the execution methods for Required Transactions
(i.e., an Order Book or an RFQ System that operates in conjunction with
an Order Book), a swap execution facility may for purposes of execution
and communication use any means of interstate commerce, including, but
not limited to, the mail, internet, email, and telephone, provided that
the chosen execution method satisfies the requirements provided in
Sec. 37.3(a)(3) for Order Books or in Sec. 37.9(a)(3) for Request for
Quote Systems. Finally, in order to provide market participants, SEFs,
and the swaps industry generally with additional time to adapt to the
new SEF regime, the Commission is phasing-in the three market
participant requirement so that from the effective date of the SEF rule
until one year after the compliance date for the SEF rule, RFQ
requesters may transmit RFQs to no less than two market participants
(rather than three). These provisions will likely significantly
mitigate the likelihood and magnitude of the potential costs noted by
commenters.
(iii) Time Delay Requirement
Some commenters stated that the rule requiring a 15-second time
delay before crossing a trade between two customers should be
eliminated because it may impact liquidity or result in increased
costs.\1054\ FHLB stated that this requirement would likely increase
the bid-ask spread, because ``by waiting for 15 seconds before entering
into an offsetting transaction, brokers will be exposed to risks
associated with market fluctuations and will have to pass the costs of
these risks along to its customer.'' \1055\ No commenter provided
dollar estimates or data regarding these costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1054\ See Time Delay Requirement discussion above under Sec.
37.9--Permitted Execution Methods in the preamble.
\1055\ FHLB Comment Letter at 13 (Jun. 13, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The time delay requirement (which only applies to a SEF's Order
Book and not to its RFQ System) supports the Congressional goal of pre-
trade transparency on SEFs by allowing other market participants the
opportunity to participate in a trade where dealer internalization or a
dealer crossing customers' orders would otherwise reduce such pre-trade
price transparency.\1056\ The Commission
[[Page 33564]]
believes that this requirement will minimize the possibility of dealer
internalization and incentivize competition between market
participants. Absent this requirement, market participants would be
free to conduct pre-execution communications away from the centralized
market and then ensure that the orders from such private negotiations
are matched by coordinating their submission to the SEF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1056\ Dealer internalized or cross-trades are not open and
competitive and may result in inferior execution for one of the
parties compared to situations where the bid or offer is exposed to
the market. Accordingly, DCM rules typically require that an order
be exposed to an order book or trading pit before it can be crossed
with another order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, the Commission notes that the costs outlined by commenters
are speculative, since SEFs have not yet begun operation. Moreover, the
time delay requirement is similar to certain timing delays adopted by
DCMs, and the Commission is not aware of evidence that those DCM rules
are imposing significant costs on participants in those markets.\1057\
Nevertheless, the Commission's final rules recognize that a one-size-
fits-all approach to the time delay requirement is not appropriate for
all swap products and markets on a SEF. Accordingly, the Commission is
revising the proposed rule to allow a SEF to adjust the duration of the
time delay requirement based upon a swap's liquidity or other product-
specific characteristics. SEFs therefore will have the ability to
reduce the costs described by the commenters, if they arise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1057\ See, e.g., NYMEX rule 533, which provides for a 5-second
delay for futures and a 15-second delay for options, available at
http://www.cmegroup.com/rulebook/NYMEX/1/5.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Benefits
As a whole, the minimum trading functionality (i.e., Order Book)
and permissible execution methods established by Sec. Sec. 37.3 and
37.9 advance the Congressional goals of promoting pre-trade price
transparency in the swaps market and promoting trading of swaps on
SEFs.\1058\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1058\ CEA section 5h(e); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Promotion of Pre-Trade Price Transparency
The order book requirement is designed to ensure a base level of
pre-trade transparency to all market participants by providing for live
executable bids and offers in Required Transactions. This requirement
gives all market participants (and potential market participants)
access to the same key information that swap dealers have, including
current information about the price of a particular swap, at the same
time. An order book with executable bids and offers will ensure that
prior to placing an order or executing a trade, a market participant
will be able to view other bids and offers submitted to the SEF,
including prices, quantities, and order book depth.\1059\ Access to
such information allows market participants to make informed trading
decisions involving variables such as price, size, and timing, and to
better assess the quality of execution effected by their
intermediaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1059\ See Duffie et al., ``OTC Markets,'' at 1827 (presenting
results showing that bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can find
each other more easily).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intermediaries will know that their market participants have
information to assess the quality of executions and can send their
business elsewhere if they are not satisfied with their executions.
Thus, intermediaries will have greater incentive to provide efficient
execution to their customers at competitive prices.
In addition, an order book is an efficient method of execution of
transactions for swaps that are subject to the CEA section 2(h)(8)
trade execution mandate because it provides prompt and fast executions
of marketable orders at market prices, while providing for a variety of
functionalities such as limit orders and stop-loss orders. The order
book functionality for such transactions will introduce core levels of
pre-trade transparency without hindering the ability of SEFs and market
participants to deploy other market structures depending on the needs
of the individual products and markets.
As discussed above, the benefits of pre-trade (and post-trade)
transparency generally flow from reducing information
asymmetries.\1060\ In transparent markets, all market participants (and
potential market participants) have timely access to the same public
pricing information that insiders or professionals have, reducing
potential negotiating advantages. Also, in a transparent market, market
participants can better assess the quality of executions effected by
their intermediaries by comparing execution prices against quotations
and other transactions. A potential entrant can view current price
quotations as well as prices of recent trades in an instrument, and can
thereby assess whether it can offer a better price. Market transparency
can thus provide incentives for new participants to enter the market,
increasing competition, reducing concentration, and narrowing spreads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1060\ See, e.g., Transparency of Structured Finance Products
(Final Report), Technical Committee of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions, at 17, 21 (Jul. 2010),
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD326.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 15-second time delay requirement is intended to limit dealer
internalization of trades (cross trades) and to incentivize competition
between market participants. This requirement will also promote pre-
trade price transparency of swaps executed on SEFs by allowing other
market participants the opportunity to participate in the trade. The
Commission's final rules also recognize that a one-size-fits-all
approach to the time delay requirement is not appropriate for all swap
products on a SEF. Therefore, the final rules provide SEFs with an
appropriate level of discretion to adjust the minimum time delay
requirement based upon a swap's liquidity or other product-specific
characteristics. Moreover, the Commission has clarified that the time
delay requirement does not apply to the RFQ System.
The Commission recognizes commenters' concerns, as discussed in
this section, that there may be certain circumstances in which pre-
trade price transparency may reduce overall market liquidity.
Therefore, the Commission has taken certain steps in the final
regulations to mitigate such benefit-reducing effects (such as
excluding block trades, tying the time-delay requirement to a swap's
liquidity, clarifying the subset of swaps that are Required
Transactions, and allowing SEFs to offer any method of execution for
Permitted Transactions).
(2) Promotion of Trading on SEFs
While the statutory goal of pre-trade price transparency is
reflected in the minimum trading functionality (i.e., Order Book)
requirement, the regulations also provide a SEF with additional
flexibility for offering the trading and execution of swaps by
providing additional execution methods (e.g., RFQ Systems along with
the discretion to offer any method of execution for Permitted
Transactions). The Commission believes that these additional
functionalities will provide flexibility in methods of execution that
will promote the trading of swaps on SEFs, which in turn will promote
price transparency.
For example, execution methods and market structures in general can
vary depending on the product--simple or complex, the state of
development of the market--established or new, market participants--
retail or institutional, and other related factors. The Commission
anticipates that the order book method will typically work well for
liquid Required Transactions (i.e., transactions involving swaps that
are subject to the trade execution requirement under CEA section
2(h)(8)), but for less liquid
[[Page 33565]]
Required Transactions, RFQ systems are expected to help facilitate
trading. RFQ systems are currently used by market participants in the
OTC swap market, many in conjunction with order book functionality. By
providing a SEF with the flexibility to offer alternate execution
methods to its market participants, the Commission is leveraging best
practices from current swap trading platforms. The additional
flexibility offered for the trading and execution of Permitted
Transactions will allow a SEF to offer new, innovative market
structures to facilitate trading in these swaps that are not subject to
the trade execution requirement under CEA section 2(h)(8), and thus may
help to promote the trading of these swaps on SEFs.
Additionally, the RFQ system communication requirement helps
promote the trading of swaps on SEFs and enhances price competition and
pre-trade price transparency by ensuring that RFQ requesters have
access to competitive prices, and that competitive resting bids and
offers left by market participants on the SEF will be transmitted to
the RFQ requester for possible execution.
(3) Facilitating Search
The Duffie, G[acirc]rleanu, and Pedersen (``DGP'') approach
reflects the typical search process, which involves approaching
intermediaries sequentially (similar to making phone calls to different
dealers asking for quotes); strategic bargaining then ensues--prices
negotiated reflect each investor's or the dealer's alternatives to
trade.\1061\ DGP's results show that both traded prices as well as
transaction costs depend on investors' search abilities, access to
market makers, and investors' bargaining powers.\1062\ DGP's results
show that bid-ask spreads are lower if investors can find each other
more easily, through market structures designed to allow them to
negotiate simultaneously, instead of sequentially, with multiple,
competing liquidity providers.\1063\ Contrary to what commenters have
stated, DGP reason that improvements in an investor's ability to search
for alternate counterparties forces dealers to improve on their quoted
prices and spreads.\1064\ Further, they demonstrate that those with
better access to market makers (or liquidity providers) receive tighter
bid-ask spreads.\1065\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1061\ See Duffie et al., ``OTC Markets,'' at 1818-20.
\1062\ Id. at 1815.
\1063\ Id. at 1827.
\1064\ Id. at 1817.
\1065\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final rules establishing a market structure for SEFs, including
the provisions governing Order Books and RFQ Systems are designed to
deliver improved search capabilities to investors and better access to
market makers. These provisions will facilitate the shifting of trading
to the centralized SEF market structure from the bilateral OTC market
structure where investors may have limited ability to find one another.
The importance of facilitating investors' ability to find each
other more easily is highlighted by evidence in the DGP paper of
another dealer-centric market--the one prevailing at Nasdaq until the
mid-1990s, where all trades had to be routed to a dealer.\1066\
Notwithstanding competition among the dealers, and the fact that there
was both pre- and post-trade transparency in the equity markets,
spreads at Nasdaq at that time were wider than at the New York Stock
Exchange.\1067\ Though the latter had ``a single specialist for each
stock, floor brokers can find and trade among themselves, and outside
brokers can find each other and trade `around' the specialist with
limit orders.'' \1068\ Along these lines, the final rules provide for
an anonymous but transparent order book that will facilitate trading
among market participants directly without having to route all trades
through dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1066\ Id. at 1834-35.
\1067\ Id.; see also Hendrik Bessembinder & Herbert M. Kaufman,
``A Comparison of Trade Execution Costs for NYSE and NASDAQ-Listed
Stocks,'' 32 The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 287
(Sep. 1997).
\1068\ Duffie et al., ``OTC Markets,'' at 1834-35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) Consideration of Alternatives
Some commenters recommended that the Commission modify the proposed
five market participant requirement from no less than five market
participants to either ``one or more'' \1069\ or to all market
participants.\1070\ Other commenters recommended an alternative that
would include some level of order interaction between the SEF's order
book functionality and RFQ systems, including the order interaction
model proposed by the SEC for SB-SEFs.\1071\ MFA recommended that the
Commission expand the definition of Permitted Transaction to include
other transactions, such as exchanges of swaps for physicals, exchanges
of swaps for swaps, and linked or packaged transactions.\1072\ Each of
these alternatives is discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1069\ See, e.g., Rosen et al. Comment Letter at 11 (Apr. 5,
2011).
\1070\ Mallers et al. Comment Letter at 4 (Mar. 21, 2011); AFR
Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\1071\ Rosen et al. Comment Letter at 12-14 (Apr. 5, 2011); JP
Morgan Comment Letter at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); FXall Comment Letter at
9-10 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011);
FSR Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011); MetLife Comment Letter at 3
(Mar. 8, 2011); SIFMA AMG Comment Letter at 9 (Mar. 8, 2011);
MarketAxess Comment Letter at 32 (Mar. 8, 2011); Barclays Comment
Letter at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); ABC/CIEBA Comment Letter at 6-7 (Mar. 8,
2011); ISDA/SIFMA Comment Letter at 3-4; Evolution Comment Letter at
5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\1072\ MFA Comment Letter at 8 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Modification to the Number of RFQ Requests
Numerous commenters recommended that the Commission adopt the SEC's
proposed approach for SB-SEFs by allowing RFQs to be sent to one or
more market participants (while not recommending that the Commission
adopt the SEC's proposed order interaction requirement), instead of
requiring that RFQs be sent to at least five market participants.\1073\
The benefit of this approach, cited favorably by some commenters, would
be to protect proprietary trading strategies and mitigate hedging
costs.\1074\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1073\ See RFQ System Definition and Transmission to Five Market
Participants discussion above under Sec. 37.9(a)(1)(ii)--Request
for Quote System in the preamble. Under the SEC's interpretation of
the SB-SEF definition, such an RFQ system would provide multiple
participants with the ability, but not the obligation, to transact
with multiple other participants. Registration and Regulation of
Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 10953.
\1074\ See, e.g., Rosen et al. Comment Letter at 11 (Apr. 5,
2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other commenters, however, stated that only requiring RFQs to be
sent to one or more market participants would preserve the single-
dealer status quo, would diminish the transparency and efficiency of
the regulated swaps markets, and would be inconsistent with the goals
of the Dodd-Frank Act.\1075\ These commenters supported another
alternative under which an RFQ must be transmitted to all participants
on the SEF.\1076\ In particular, one commenter stated that participants
would not be disadvantaged by disclosing an RFQ to the entire market
for transactions below the block trade threshold, which would not move
the market.\1077\ In this commenter's view, the proposed five market
participant requirement would still allow a participant to conduct
semi-private deals with a few favored participants to the exclusion of
other market participants, which would ultimately decrease liquidity
and create a
[[Page 33566]]
substantial barrier to entry into the swaps market.\1078\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1075\ See, e.g., Mallers et al. Comment Letter at 3-5 (Mar. 21,
2011).
\1076\ Id.
\1077\ Id. at 4.
\1078\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission considered the costs and benefits of the above
alternatives, but believes that neither alternative would satisfy the
objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act. As noted by one commenter, only
requiring that RFQs be sent to one market participant would preserve
the status quo,\1079\ while requiring that RFQs be sent to the entire
market may not be feasible for certain less liquid swaps. Nevertheless,
in light of the comments, the Commission is reducing the required
minimum number of recipients for RFQs in the final rule from five to
three. The Commission expects that this will mitigate the concerns of
commenters as discussed above, while continuing to satisfy the
objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act. As discussed above in connection with
the RFQ to three market participant requirement, the Commission views
three RFQ recipients as appropriately balancing between ensuring
liquidity in the swaps market and promoting pre-trade price
transparency. The Commission further notes that the three RFQ recipient
model will provide a more reliable indicator of market value than a
quote from a single RFQ responder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1079\ IECA Comment Letter at 3 (May 24, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Order Interaction
Another alternative was to allow for one-to-one RFQs, but to
mandate full order interaction.\1080\ However, according to commenters,
an order interaction requirement across trading platforms would impose
significant architectural and operational costs on SEFs.\1081\ In
particular, potential SEFs were concerned that they would incur
significant expenses by having to create the technological capabilities
necessary to ensure that market participants execute against the best
price.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1080\ Under the SEC's SB-SEF NPRM, an RFQ requester must
execute against the best-priced orders of any size within and across
an SB-SEF's modes of execution. See Registration and Regulation of
Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, 76 FR at 10953-54, 10971-
74.
\1081\ See, e.g., Tradeweb Comment Letter at 6 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission did not propose this type of order interaction and
has declined to impose such a requirement herein. Accordingly, the
final regulations respond to concerns regarding a transacting party's
ability to take into consideration factors other than price when
choosing a counterparty or clearing entity, by, for example, offsetting
an existing position cleared through the Derivatives Clearing
Organization (``DCO'') through which the position was entered into,
even though a slightly better price may exist for the same instrument
at a different DCO. This flexibility will allow market participants to
execute swap transactions in accordance with the unique execution
requirements of each transaction.
(3) Expand Definition of Permitted Transaction
Another alternative is to expand the definition of Permitted
Transaction to include other transactions, such as exchanges of swaps
for physicals, exchanges of swaps for swaps, and linked or packaged
transactions. The Commission interprets MFA's comment suggesting this
alternative to be a request that the Commission create through
rulemaking an exception to the CEA section 2(h)(8) trade execution
mandate similar to the centralized market trading exception established
by DCM Core Principle 9 for certain exchange of futures for related
positions (``EFRPs'').\1082\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1082\ See CEA section 5(d)(9); 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(9). The Commission
notes that DCM Core Principle 9 does not explicitly permit DCMs to
offer exchange of swaps for physicals or exchange of swaps for
swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission has determined not to adopt this alternative,
because a broad exception for the off-exchange transactions described
by MFA could undermine the trade execution requirement by allowing
market participants to execute swaps subject to the trade execution
requirement bilaterally rather than on a SEF or DCM. The Commission
notes that market participants with a bona fide business purpose for
executing exchange of swaps for physicals in physical commodity swaps
(should such swaps become subject to the trade execution mandate) are
likely to be eligible for the end-user exception. The Commission is not
currently aware of any bona fide business purpose for executing such
transactions in financial swaps subject to the trade execution mandate.
In light of the end-user exception, the Commission expects that the
costs associated with the Commission's determination will be minimal.
The Commission is aware that the swaps market will evolve in ways that
it does not currently anticipate and is open to revisiting this issue
should a bona fide business purpose arise to execute swaps that are
subject to the trade execution mandate in a manner recommended by the
commenter.
(e) Section 15(a) Factors
(1) Protection of Market Participants and the Public
The final regulations, specifically the provisions requiring a
minimum trading functionality (i.e., Order Book) and the communication
of any firm bid or offer along with responses to the RFQ, promote the
protection of market participants and the public by promoting the
statutory goals of increased pre-trade transparency and trading on
SEFs. Taken together, these final rules should reduce the likelihood
that market participants and SEFs execute swaps at non-market prices,
thus protecting traders and members of the public that rely on the
prices of swaps facilitated or executed on SEFs. The rules should
benefit market participants by reducing the potential rents extracted
by dealers from customers in opaque markets, ``and more so from less
informed customers.'' \1083\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1083\ Bessembinder & Maxwell, ``Transparency,'' at 226. Their
conclusions in the context of post-trade transparency introduced by
the TRACE system can be generalized to the improvement in pre-trade
transparency introduced through the minimum trading functionality
(i.e., Order Book) and the ability to negotiate simultaneously with
multiple market participants through the RFQ system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission mitigates the costs to market participants by
minimizing the risk of information leakage to other market participants
by clarifying that SEFs are not required to: (1) Display RFQs to market
participants not participating in the RFQ, (2) disclose RFQ responses
to all market participants, or (3) disclose the identity of the RFQ
requester.
As discussed above, the Commission anticipates that the
requirements in Sec. 37.9 will result in better pricing and liquidity
and increased participation on SEFs because market participants will be
able to trade on flexible platforms without compromising on pre- and
post-trade transparency. The final regulations also provide information
and pricing benefits to market participants using an RFQ System because
market participants seeking liquidity will have access to additional
pricing information after disseminating an RFQ. The final regulations
increase the likelihood that RFQ requesters will receive competing
quotes from a larger group of responders. The Commission notes that
competition between multiple quote providers should result in tighter
bid-offer spreads for the RFQ requesters.
The rules promoting trading on SEFs protect the public by
encouraging trading on regulated SEFs rather than on unregulated OTC
markets. Moreover,
[[Page 33567]]
some market participants may be end users that provide goods and
services to the public (e.g., airlines or electric utilities). To the
extent that these end users obtain better pricing due to these rules
and are able to pass those cost savings to their customers and
shareholders, the public would gain additional benefits from the pre-
trade transparency and promotion of trading on SEFs.
(2) Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of the Markets
\1084\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1084\ The Commission notes that CEA Sec. 15(a)(2)(B) requires
the Commission to consider the costs and benefits of its actions in
light of ``considerations of the efficiency, competitiveness, and
financial integrity of futures markets.'' The Commission is also
considering the costs and benefits of these rules in light of
considerations of the efficiency, competitiveness, and financial
integrity of ``swap markets.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The final regulations will improve the efficiency, competitiveness,
and financial integrity of the swaps market by providing a SEF with the
flexibility to offer several execution methods for Required
Transactions to meet the needs of market participants, including RFQ
Systems, as well as the flexibility to offer any execution method for
Permitted Transactions. This flexibility reflects the fact that there
is a continuum of markets occupying ``various points between high and
low transparency'' \1085\ and will allow participants to efficiently
execute trades using various methods of execution depending on the
liquidity levels in particular products. For example, participants may
execute more liquid products on an Order Book, while executing less
liquid products using RFQ functionality. Final Sec. 37.9, specifically
the provisions related to RFQ Systems (including the minimum RFQ to
three requirement) and the 15 second time delay requirement for cross
trades, should also facilitate an increase in the number of market
participants that provide liquidity on SEFs by providing greater
opportunities for those market participants, which will contribute to
the competitiveness of the swaps market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1085\ See ISDA Research Notes, ``Transparency and over-the-
counter derivatives: The role of transaction transparency,'' No. 1,
at 2-3 (2009), available at http://www2.isda.org/attachment/MTY4NA==/ISDA-Research-Notes1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Research by Hendershott and Madhavan supports the benefits of
increased competition facilitated by RFQ systems.\1086\ By enabling
market participants to meet each other directly (without being forced
to go through an intermediary as is the case in the current OTC market
structure), and by providing them a facility (via the RFQ system) to
simultaneously negotiate with multiple market participants, the rules
reduce the search costs inherent in the current OTC market structure as
described by Duffie, G[acirc]rleanu, and Pedersen,\1087\ and thus
promote a more efficient and competitive market structure for the swaps
markets. In another paper, Zhu addresses the requirement for a minimum
of five quote providers as a means to ``increase direct trading among
`end-users' and reduce the fraction of trading volume that is conducted
through intermediaries.'' \1088\ Similarly, Avellaneda and Cont
emphasize the importance of market transparency as ``not an objective
per se but rather a means for ensuring the proper functioning of the
market.'' \1089\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1086\ See Hendershott & Madhavan, ``Click or Call,'' at 3
(stating that ``[T]he evolution of bilateral, sequential trading
into an auction type framework'' (their definition of the RFQ
system), ``offers a path from an over-the-counter market to
centralized, continuous trading'').
\1087\ Duffie et al., ``OTC Markets,'' at 1815.
\1088\ Haoxiang Zhu, ``Finding a Good Price in Opaque Over-the-
Counter Markets,'' 25 The Review of Financial Studies 1255, 1264
(Apr. 2012).
\1089\ Marco Avellaneda & Rama Cont, ``Transparency in Credit
Default Swap Markets,'' Finance Concepts, at 3 (Jul. 2010),
available at http://www.finance-concepts.com/images/fc/CDSMarketTransparency.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Price Discovery
The final rules provide for pre-trade transparency and promote
trading on SEFs, both of which will enhance price discovery on a SEF.
The minimum trading functionality will allow non-dealer firms with
access to the SEF to compete with dealers by also placing bids and
offers on the SEF. The 15 second time delay requirement will ensure a
minimum level of pre-trade transparency by allowing other market
participants the opportunity to participate in a privately negotiated
trade before it is crossed. The broader participation and pre-trade
transparency could increase market depth and improve price discovery.
Research by Zhu shows that execution methods similar to the RFQ system
can help improve the dispersion of quote information across a broader
cross-section of market participants, the sensitivity of quoted prices
to information, and the ability of the market to aggregate information
distributed among multiple participants.\1090\ These conclusions
support findings from research by Duffie, G[acirc]rleanu, and Pedersen
that ``[s]earch frictions affect not only the average levels of asset
prices but also the asset market's resilience to aggregate shocks[,]''
both of which are critical elements of any efficient and effective
price discovery process.\1091\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1090\ Haoxiang Zhu, ``Finding a Good Price in Opaque Over-the-
Counter Markets,'' 25 The Review of Financial Studies 1255, 1257-58
(Apr. 2012).
\1091\ Duffie et al., ``Valuation in OTC Markets,'' at 1881.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The differentiation in execution methods for Required and Permitted
Transactions, and the ability to use ``any means of interstate
commerce'' in providing the execution methods for Required Transactions
as described in Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(ii), will allow a SEF to adjust its
market structures for emerging and less liquid markets by using a
variety of means of communication in providing the execution methods
for Required Transactions and using any execution method the SEF deems
appropriate for Permitted Transactions. This approach reflects the
Commission's belief that the price discovery process varies across
markets and products.
(4) Sound Risk Management Practices
Centralized trading platforms have multiple checks and balances
built into their systems designed to reduce operational risks (such as
human error) inherent in order submission, matching, and confirmation.
The Commission believes that adoption of centralized trading platforms
for swaps trading on a SEF will contribute to a system-wide reduction
in operational risks, and will help standardize risk management
practices in the marketplace. This in turn will reduce overall
transaction costs, and will, along with pre-trade transparency and the
prospects for improved price discovery discussed earlier, encourage
market participants to trade swaps on SEFs and thus aid in the
development of the swaps market. As markets are interlinked, the growth
of the swaps market will likely drive growth of the futures and other
derivatives markets through the liquidity externality mechanism, which
in turn will improve the ability of a broader range of market
participants to measure, hedge, and transfer their risks through such
contracts.\1092\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1092\ See Yakov Amihud, Haim Mendelson, & Beni Lauterbach,
``Market microstructure and securities values: Evidence from the Tel
Aviv Stock Exchange,'' 45 Journal of Financial Economics 365, 378-80
(Sep. 1997) (discussing liquidity externalities in trading).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) Other Public Interest Considerations
The Commission has not identified any effects that these rules will
have on other public interest considerations other than those
enumerated above.
3. Registration
(a) Background
Section 5h(a)(1) of the Act provides that no person may operate a
facility for
[[Page 33568]]
the trading or processing of swaps unless the facility is registered as
a SEF or a DCM.\1093\ The SEF definition in CEA section 1a(50) defines
a SEF as ``a trading system or platform in which multiple participants
have the ability to execute or trade swaps by accepting bids and offers
made by multiple participants in the facility or system, through any
means of interstate commerce, including any trading facility, that--(A)
Facilitates the execution of swaps between persons; and (B) is not a
designated contract market.'' \1094\ In accordance with these
provisions, the Commission has clarified that a facility would be
required to register as a SEF if it offers a trading system or platform
in which more than one market participant has the ability to execute or
trade swaps with more than one other market participant on the system
or platform.\1095\ In response to comments, the Commission also
provides examples of how it would interpret the registration
requirement for certain entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1093\ CEA section 5h(a)(1); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(a)(1).
\1094\ CEA section 1a(50); 7 U.S.C. 1a(50).
\1095\ See Requirements for Registration discussion above under
Sec. 37.3--Requirements for Registration in the preamble for
further details.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 37.3(a)(1) codifies this statutory registration requirement
and Sec. 37.3(b) requires, among other things, that applicants
requesting approval of registration as a SEF must file a complete Form
SEF, which consists of general questions and a list of exhibits that
will enable the Commission to determine whether the applicant complies
with the core principles and the Commission's regulations. Form SEF
standardizes the information that an applicant must provide to the
Commission and includes comprehensive instructions that will guide
applicants through the process.\1096\ Section 37.3(b)(5) requires the
Commission to review any application for registration as a SEF
submitted two years or later after the effective date of part 37
pursuant to the 180-day timeframe and procedures specified in CEA
section 6(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1096\ Sections 37.3(d)-(g) provide procedures for other actions
involving registration, including reinstating a dormant
registration, requesting a transfer of registration, withdrawal of
an application for registration, and vacation of registration. These
procedures will further the ability of the Commission to efficiently
monitor SEFs' compliance with the core principles, and will result
in minimal administrative costs for SEFs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under Sec. 37.3(c), SEF applicants may submit a notice to the
Commission requesting temporary registration, allowing them to operate
during the pending application process once a notice granting temporary
registration from the Commission has been received. The SEF NPRM
required these applicants to submit transaction data substantiating
that they are trading swaps. In response to comments, the Commission is
eliminating this requirement from the final rule and is also extending
the termination date of the proposed temporary registration provision
by one year. In addition, the Commission is shortening the proposed
effective date of the regulations from 90 days to 60 days subsequent to
publication in the Federal Register. In connection with this change,
the Commission is also using its discretion to establish alternative
dates for the commencement of its enforcement of regulatory provisions
and is setting a general compliance date of 120 days subsequent to
Federal Register publication.
(b) Costs
In its discussion paper, ISDA estimated the average cost of
registration would be $333,000.\1097\ Based on the Commission staff's
follow-up discussions with commenters, the Commission estimates that
the total cost of completing and filing a registration application with
the Commission will be between $333,000 and $500,000. This range
accounts for the time that will be expended to prepare and file Form
SEF.\1098\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1097\ ISDA Discussion Paper at 32 (Nov. 2011).
\1098\ The Commission notes that the SEC estimated that the one-
time registration burden to prepare and file Form SB-SEF will be
approximately 100 hours for each new and existing entity. See
Registration and Regulation of Security-Based Swap Execution
Facilities, 76 FR at 11024. The SEC based this estimate on its
experience with the registration process for national securities
exchanges, having last estimated the average time it should take to
fill out the securities exchange registration form (Form 1) to be 47
hours. Id. The SEC adjusted this figure upwards to account for the
greater resources that would be required initially in lieu of an
established framework and familiarity of the industry in order to
gather supporting documentation and complete Form SB-SEF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, based on the statute as interpreted by the
Commission, a facility that meets the SEF definition would be required
to register as a SEF and would incur the costs of registration. These
facilities would also be required to meet the minimum trading
functionality and other requirements of Sec. 37.9. The costs and
benefits of those requirements are discussed above. The 180-day review
period for SEF applications submitted two years or later after the
effective date of part 37 is not expected to impose significant costs
on applicants who submit their applications sooner since they will be
eligible for two years of temporary registration and will not need to
await final Commission approval before commencing SEF operation.
(c) Benefits
As discussed above, based on the statute as interpreted by the
Commission, a facility that meets the SEF definition would be required
to register as a SEF. These facilities will, as registered SEFs, have
the benefit of being able to offer Required Transactions for execution,
while alternative entities that are not required to register as SEFs,
including one-to-many systems or platforms, will only be able to offer
Permitted Transactions for execution. This will ensure, consistent with
the statute, a level playing field, that all Required Transactions are
executed on registered SEFs. This will provide market participants in
Required Transactions with the benefits associated with the minimum
trading functionality, core principles, and other requirements set out
in this release.
Additionally, the Commission's interpretation of the registration
requirement through a set of examples helps to clarify which facilities
must register as a SEF. The Commission believes that providing examples
of how it would interpret the CEA section 5h(a)(1) registration
requirement will ensure that a consistent set of metrics is available
to market participants while evaluating the applicability of the
registration requirements. Providing specific examples will also
mitigate the costs potential registrants may incur in seeking advice on
issues pertaining to registration.
Form SEF is designed to ensure that only applicants that comply
with the Act and the Commission's regulations are registered as SEFs.
Form SEF is expected to minimize the amount of time the Commission
staff will need to review applications and reduce the need for the
Commission staff to request, and applicants to provide, supplementary
information, which, in turn, benefits potential SEFs by reducing the
time it takes to become fully registered. This standardized
registration process will provide applicants with legal certainty
regarding the type of information that is required and will ensure that
no applicant is given a competitive advantage in the application
process.
Further, granting temporary registration for up to two years will
improve market continuity by allowing the Commission ample time to
review applications without jeopardizing an applicant's ability to
operate pending Commission review. By withdrawing the existing trading
activity requirement in proposed Sec. 37.3(b)(1)(ii), all SEF
[[Page 33569]]
applicants, not only those operating existing platforms, may apply for
temporary registration. The withdrawal of the trading activity
requirement should promote competition between SEFs by providing
opportunities for new entities to establish trading operations that
compete with existing platforms. The 180-day review period for SEF
applications submitted two years or later after the effective date of
part 37 will provide any later SEF applicants with the same review
period as is applicable under the CEA to DCMs and will provide greater
certainty for SEF applicants regarding the time period for the
Commission's review of their applications.
(d) Consideration of Alternatives
Several commenters stated that the Commission should harmonize its
registration procedures with the SEC in order to avoid unnecessary cost
and duplication for SEFs.\1099\ In particular, Tradeweb stated that SEF
applicants should not have to file separate applications for each mode
of execution, and that where a SEF is offering both swaps and security-
based swaps, the SEF should only be required to file one application
for both agencies.\1100\
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\1099\ See Application Procedures discussion above under Sec.
37.3--Requirements for Registration in the preamble.
\1100\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 3-4 (Jun. 3, 2011).
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The Commission recognizes that substantially similar registration
forms and procedures could facilitate compliance and reduce regulatory
costs for SEFs seeking dual registrations. The Commission notes,
however, that it must comprehensively review and understand a SEF's
proposed trading models and operations, which will facilitate trading
for a more diverse universe of financial instruments and underlying
commodities than SB-SEFs. Accordingly, the Commission is not permitting
notice registration to SEC-registered SB-SEFs. Additionally, in
response to comments raised, the Commission clarified in the preamble
that a SEF applicant does not need to file separate applications for
each mode of execution, but that its application must describe each
mode of execution offered. This should allay concerns that multiple
costly applications must be filed with the Commission.
(e) Section 15(a) Factors
(1) Protection of Market Participants and the Public
The interpretation of the registration provision to apply to
facilities that meet the SEF definition will ensure that market
participants transacting any swap on these platforms, whether or not
they are subject to the trade execution requirement, will benefit from
the core principles and other requirements for SEFs (including the pre-
trade transparency available on SEFs), especially those designed to
protect market participants and the public. Furthermore, given the
critical role that SEFs will play in the financial markets, it is
essential that the Commission conduct a comprehensive and thorough
review of all SEF applications for registration. Such a review is
important for the protection of market participants and the public
because it ensures that only qualified applicants who satisfy the
statutory requirements and the Commission's regulations thereunder can
operate as SEFs. Form SEF will enable the Commission to efficiently and
accurately determine whether an applicant meets such requirements.
(2) Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of the Markets
The Commission's interpretation of the registration provision to
apply to facilities that meet the SEF definition, along with the
minimum trading functionality requirement, will promote competition in
the swaps market by providing a level playing field for entities that
meet the SEF definition.
The standardized registration procedures and Form SEF will create
an efficient process that will reduce the resources associated with
submitting and reviewing completed applications. The final rules
promote market competition by not discriminating between new and
existing platforms applying to register as SEFs. For example, the
elimination of the proposed existing trading activity requirement for
temporary registration will ensure that new entities wishing to qualify
for temporary registration will not be placed at a competitive
disadvantage to existing entities. The required information in Form SEF
(Exhibits I-K--Financial Information and M and T--Compliance) will
allow the Commission to evaluate each applicant's ability to operate a
financially-sound SEF and to appropriately manage the risks associated
with its role in the financial markets.
(3) Price Discovery
The Commission has not identified any effects that these procedures
will have on price discovery.
(4) Sound Risk Management Practices
The registration procedures will require SEF applicants to examine
their proposed risk management program through a series of detailed
exhibits and submissions. These risks include risks associated with the
SEF applicant's financial resources and operational and market risks
associated with trading on the SEF platform. The submission of exhibits
relating to risk management, including Exhibits I-K (Financial
Information) and M, O, and T (Compliance), will provide data and
information that will aid the Commission staff's analysis and
evaluation of an applicant's ability to comply with the core
principles.
(5) Other Public Interest Considerations
The Commission has not identified any effects that these procedures
will have on other public interest considerations other than those
enumerated above.
4. Recordkeeping and Reporting
(a) Background
This release finalizes a series of provisions governing the
recordkeeping and reporting responsibilities of SEFs and market
participants.\1101\ Among other requirements, these rules require each
SEF to: (1) Provide the Commission with information about its business
as a SEF (Sec. Sec. 37.5(a), 37.503), provide a written demonstration
of compliance with any core principle (Sec. 37.5(b)), and provide
notice of any transaction involving the transfer of at least fifty
percent of the equity interest in the SEF (Sec. 37.5(c)); (2) provide
each counterparty to a swap on the SEF with a written record of all of
the terms of the transaction (Sec. 37.6(b)); \1102\ and (3) maintain
records of all business activities, including a complete audit trail,
investigatory files, and disciplinary files, in a form and manner
acceptable to the Commission for at least 5 years (Sec. 37.1001).
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\1101\ For example, section 37.901 states that SEFs must report
swap data as specified in parts 43 and 45 and meet the requirements
of part 16. This provision references other Commission regulations,
the costs and benefits of which are discussed in connection with
those rulemakings.
\1102\ The discretionary costs and benefits specific to the
confirmation process are discussed in the part 23 rulemaking for new
confirmation standards.
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A SEF must also: (1) Have the ability to obtain the information
necessary to perform its self-regulatory responsibilities, including
the authority to examine books and records (Sec. Sec. 37.501, 37.502);
(2) share information with other regulatory organizations, data
repositories, and third-party data reporting services as required by
the Commission (Sec. 37.504); (3) demonstrate that it has access to
sufficient information to assess whether
[[Page 33570]]
trading is being used to affect prices in its market (Sec. 37.404(a));
and (4) require market participants to keep records of their trading
and make such records available to the SEF or the SEF's regulatory
service provider, and the Commission, upon request (Sec. 37.404(b)).
The final rules also govern a SEF's use of data and records
obtained from market participants, and prohibit a SEF from using for
business or marketing purposes proprietary or personal information that
it collects from any person unless the person clearly consents to the
use of its information in such a manner (Sec. 37.7).
(b) Costs
The costs associated with responding to requests for information or
demonstrations of compliance under recordkeeping rules in Sec. 37.5
will include the staff hours required to prepare exhibits, draft
responses, and submit materials. These costs will vary among SEFs
depending upon the nature and frequency of Commission inquiries.
The Commission is reducing the reporting burden associated with
final Sec. 37.5(c) (equity interest transfers) by raising the
threshold of when a SEF must file a notification with the Commission
from 10 percent to 50 percent, by increasing the time frame for
submitting such notification to 10 days rather than the next business
day, and by eliminating the proposed requirement that SEFs must provide
a series of documents and a representation along with the notification
of an equity transfer interest. Under the final rules, the Commission,
upon receiving a notification of an equity interest transfer, may
request appropriate documentation of the transfer, but all the
documentation should already be in the possession of the SEF.
Accordingly, a SEF that enters into agreements that could result in
equity interest transfers of 50 percent of more will incur one-time
costs associated with preparing and submitting the required
notification for each event.
Further, final Sec. 37.1001 (requirement to maintain business
records including audit trail, investigatory, and disciplinary files)
codifies the substantive requirements found in Core Principle 10.
Accordingly, most, if not all, of the costs associated with this rule
are attributable to statutory mandate. Commenters did not mention any
specific costs with respect to this rule. In addition, Sec. Sec.
37.501 and 37.503 (establish and enforce rules and provide information
to the Commission) codify requirements that appear in the statute and
impose no additional costs on SEFs or market participants beyond those
attributable to Congressional mandate.
Final Sec. 37.502 requires each SEF to have rules that allow it to
collect information or examine books and records of participants, but
imposes no affirmative obligations on SEFs to do so. Accordingly, the
only direct costs associated with Sec. 37.502 are the de minimis costs
associated with writing such rules.
Final Sec. 37.504 (information sharing agreements) codifies and
implements the Core Principle 5 requirement that a SEF have the
capacity to carry out international information-sharing agreements as
the Commission may require. Accordingly, SEFs will bear the cost of
responding to Commission requests to share information with other
regulatory organizations, data repositories, and third-party data
reporting services. The cost of responding to Commission requests to
share information will vary depending on the frequency and nature of
the requests. To the extent that it is necessary for a SEF to enter
into an information sharing agreement, the SEF may face additional
costs such as negotiating such agreement. However, these costs are
unlikely to be significant and will only be incurred should a SEF
determine that it is necessary to enter into an information sharing
agreement.
A market participant's cost to maintain records under Sec. 37.404
(ability to obtain information) should be minimal if, as expected, it
is part of its normal business practice. As a result, a market
participant's additional cost to provide records to the SEF, and the
SEF's cost to request and process the records, will be nominal if,
based upon the Commission's experience with DCMs, such requests are
infrequent and targeted to specific and significant market situations.
Additionally, the Commission has moved to guidance the requirement
from proposed Sec. 37.404(b) that a SEF require customers engaging in
intermediated trades to use a comprehensive large-trader reporting
system or be able to demonstrate that they can obtain position data
from other sources. This change should mitigate costs by providing SEFs
with greater flexibility to identify particular methods of compliance
that suit their markets and business structures.
The Commission is also amending Sec. 37.7 (use of proprietary or
personal information) to allow SEFs to use certain information for
business or marketing purposes if the person consents to the use of
such information. The costs imposed by this provision are limited to
the cost a SEF might incur in obtaining such person's consent to use
its information for the purposes described above. The Commission does
not prescribe the method by which a SEF must obtain such consent, which
provides flexibility to SEFs.
(c) Benefits
The Dodd-Frank Act created a robust recordkeeping regime in order
to reduce risks associated with swaps trading, increase transparency,
and promote market integrity. Taken as a whole, the recordkeeping and
reporting regulations adopted in this release will provide a SEF and
the Commission with access to information that will enhance a SEF's
ability to oversee its platforms and markets and enable the Commission
to determine whether a SEF is operating in compliance with the statute
and the Commission's regulations. The information-sharing requirement
in Sec. 37.504 will also provide cost-savings across market regulators
by allowing the SEF to serve as the focal point for collecting certain
data instead of each regulator duplicating efforts and collecting the
information independently.
The confirmation requirement in Sec. 37.6(b) will provide market
participants with the certainty that transactions entered into on or
pursuant to the rules of a SEF will be legally enforceable on all
parties to the transaction. The requirement that a SEF provide each
counterparty with a confirmation at the same time as execution will
support the policy goal of straight-through processing to ensure that
counterparties do not encounter gaps in their records as to their
exposure level with other counterparties. This will also reduce the
costs and risks involved in resolving disputes between counterparties
to a trade; given dependency across trades, for example, if a
participant has already unwound a position or taken a position via a
trade under dispute or hedged it, any delays or uncertainties in the
confirmation will result in higher costs from having to further unwind
such linked trades.
The prohibition on the use by a SEF of proprietary or personal
information for business purposes without consent (Sec. 37.7) will
ensure that information provided to a SEF for regulatory purposes will
not be used to advance the commercial interests of the SEF. The rule
does, however, afford market participants the flexibility to consent to
a SEF's use of their personal information for commercial purposes, if
they so desire.
[[Page 33571]]
(d) Section 15(a) Factors
(1) Protection of Market Participants and the Public
The recordkeeping and reporting rules will protect market
participants and the public by improving a SEF's and the Commission's
ability to detect manipulative or disruptive activity. This, in turn,
may deter SEFs and market participants from engaging in practices that
may harm other market participants and harm the public by placing the
larger economy at risk. Additionally, certification of continued
compliance with the core principles will enable the Commission to
ensure that performance of SEF functions is limited to only those
entities that have adequately demonstrated an ability to comply with
the Act and accompanying regulations. This will protect the public by
promoting trading on regulated SEFs rather than OTC markets. While SEFs
and the Commission may at times require access to market participants'
information for regulatory purposes, the rules also protect market
participants by stipulating that information they provide to SEFs for
regulatory purposes is not used inappropriately to advance the
commercial interests of the SEF without their consent.
(2) Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of the Markets
The recordkeeping and reporting rules promote financial integrity
as they ensure that the Commission and SEFs will have access to
information to ensure that trading is conducted pursuant to the
regulatory requirements, and that SEFs have sufficient documentation to
detect, enforce, and deter potential rule violations.
(3) Price Discovery
The Commission has not identified any effects that these rules will
have on price discovery considerations.
(4) Sound Risk Management Practices
Requiring that SEFs maintain audit trail, investigatory files,
disciplinary, and other records will provide the Commission with access
to data that will allow it to assess whether market participants are
manipulating or otherwise disrupting trading in the swaps market. The
Commission and SEFs can then take action to mitigate these risks.
(5) Other Public Interest Considerations
The Commission has not identified any effects that these rules will
have on other public interest considerations other than those
enumerated above.
5. Compliance
(a) Rule Writing and Enforcement
Under Core Principle 2, a SEF must implement a number of rule-
writing and enforcement-related provisions. Among other requirements, a
SEF must: (1) Establish a rulebook that addresses critical areas of
market protection (Sec. 37.201), including rules prohibiting certain
abusive trading practices (Sec. 37.203(a)), rules ensuring impartial
access to the SEF's trading system (Sec. 37.202), and rules governing
internal disciplinary procedures (Sec. 37.206); and (2) have resources
for effective rule enforcement, including sufficient compliance staff
and resources (Sec. 37.203(c)), authority to collect information and
examine books and records (Sec. 37.203(b)), and procedures for
conducting investigations into possible rule violations (Sec.
37.203(f)). The Commission is also clarifying that a SEF must establish
and enforce rules for its employees that are reasonably designed to
prevent violations of the Act and the rules of the Commission.
Additionally, Sec. 37.204 provides SEFs with the option to choose
to contract with a regulatory service provider for the provision of
services to assist in complying with the CEA and Commission
regulations, provided that the SEF supervise the regulatory service
provider and retain exclusive authority with respect to all substantive
decisions made by the regulatory service provider on the SEF's behalf.
(1) Costs
The costs associated with the rule-writing and enforcement
provisions outlined above will consist mostly of one-time
administrative outlays such as wages paid to attorneys and other
compliance personnel for time spent drafting, reviewing, implementing,
and updating rules. While new entities seeking to become SEFs would
need to develop a rulebook, existing entities that already have written
rules would only incur the incremental expense of updating them.
SEFs will also incur the initial and recurring costs associated
with investing in the resources and staff necessary to provide
effective rule enforcement. A SEF must have sufficient staff and
resources, including resources to collect information and examine books
and records, as well as automated systems to assist the compliance
staff in carrying out the SEF's self-regulatory responsibilities. One
commenter stated that these requirements are overly burdensome, but did
not provide any data in support.\1103\
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\1103\ State Street Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission believes that having a minimum level of resources in
place for rule enforcement purposes is a critical element of a
sufficient compliance program, and is necessary pursuant to the
statutory mandate of Core Principle 2, which requires SEFs to have the
capacity to detect, investigate, and enforce its rules.\1104\ SEFs may
be able to reduce these costs by contracting with a regulatory service
provider. In addition, the Commission reduced the costs of the final
rules by eliminating the requirement in proposed Sec. 37.203(c)(2)
that a SEF monitor the size and workload of its compliance staff on an
ongoing basis and, on at least an annual basis, formally evaluate the
need to increase its compliance resources and staff. The Commission
believes that the final rulemaking provides greater flexibility to SEFs
in determining their approach to monitoring their compliance resources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1104\ CEA section 5h(f)(2)(B); 7 U.S.C. 7b-3(f)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the use of a third-party regulatory service
provider as permitted under Sec. 37.204 (Regulatory services provided
by a third party), two commenters in follow-up conversations indicated
to the Commission staff that they each may contract (or have already
contracted) with a regulatory service provider to perform various
compliance functions at a cost of between $540,000 and $720,000 per
year. This estimate represents the total cost of contracting a SEF's
compliance functions to a regulatory service provider. Additionally,
ISDA estimates an assessment on SEFs of $45,000 per year to contract
with a regulatory service provider and $635,000 per year in dues for
membership to the regulatory service provider.\1105\ Section 37.204 is
intended to be a cost-saving provision that mitigates the burden placed
on SEFs by the rule enforcement program and, as stated by one
commenter, this rule may reduce a SEF's overall costs by at least
thirty percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1105\ ISDA Discussion Paper at 28 (Nov. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEFs that choose to contract with a regulatory service provider
will need to hire sufficient compliance staff to supervise the quality
and effectiveness of the services provided by the regulatory service
provider, including the cost of holding regular meetings with the
regulatory service provider to review and assess the adequacy of the
services provided. SEFs will also incur the cost of documenting any
instances
[[Page 33572]]
in which their decisions differ from those recommended by their
regulatory service provider.
(2) Benefits
Establishing a rulebook and an effective rule enforcement program
will ensure that SEFs have specific and transparent procedures for
addressing critical areas of market protection, and that SEFs will have
the resources needed to implement those procedures. In particular, the
requirements that a SEF offer impartial access, provide a fair and
competitive market free of abusive trading practices, have sufficient
resources to oversee and monitor the market, promptly investigate rule
violations, establish disciplinary procedures that will deter abuses,
and provide respondents with adequate safeguards will foster greater
confidence that SEFs will provide a fair and competitive market free of
trading abuses. This confidence is likely to result in increased
trading of swaps on SEFs, improving liquidity and resulting in more
competitive quotes.
According to conversations with commenters, SEFs that contract-out
certain regulatory functions to a regulatory service provider are
likely to realize significant cost savings from economies of scale--one
commenter stated that contracting with a regulatory service provider
would reduce a SEF's overall costs by at least thirty percent.
According to NFA's Web site, it appears that many potential SEFs have
already contracted with, or are in the process of contracting with, a
regulatory service provider.\1106\ Additionally, the rule governing the
use of regulatory service providers ensures that SEFs will have
sufficient staff to adequately supervise their regulatory service
providers. By requiring that SEFs oversee the services provided by the
regulatory service provider, the rule will likely result in cost
savings to the SEF, as the failure of a service provider to adequately
fulfill its duties may result in costs to SEFs for not meeting
compliance obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1106\ See, e.g., ``NFA Signs Agreement with ICAP to provide
Regulatory Services to ICAP's Swap Execution Facility'' (Mar. 20,
2012), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/NFA-regulation/regulationNewsRel.asp?ArticleID=3996.
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(3) Consideration of Alternatives
As referenced above, one of a SEF's rule-writing obligations is to
develop rules governing internal disciplinary procedures, including
rules governing disciplinary panels. CME stated that the Commission
should not provide a prescriptive approach to disciplinary panels in
proposed Sec. 37.206(b) by requiring a ``hearing panel'' to be
separate from a ``review panel.'' \1107\ In response, the Commission
removed the proposed requirement to establish separate hearing and
review panels, instead allowing a SEF to establish one or more
disciplinary panels, which will, among other things, issue notices of
charges, conduct hearings, render written decisions, and impose
disciplinary sanctions. The final rule will continue to achieve the
goals of the proposed regulations by deterring violations of SEF rules,
preventing recidivist behavior, and protecting respondents and
customers harmed by violations of exchange rules. The procedures will
achieve these goals while also providing SEFs with greater flexibility
to structure their disciplinary bodies in a manner that best suits
their business models and markets. The final rule is unlikely to impose
additional personnel expenditures on SEFs, as the Commission
anticipates that SEFs, like DCMs, will rely upon unpaid disciplinary
panel members. The Commission anticipates that any actual costs
associated with the disciplinary panel will be limited to de minimis
administrative expenses for convening hearings over which the panel
presides, such as postage, facility rentals, and printing.
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\1107\ CME Comment Letter at 35 (Feb. 22, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission notes that it has provided additional flexibility to
SEFs by delaying the effective date of proposed Sec. 37.206(o) to 1
year from the effective date of the SEF rules.\1108\ Where a rule
violation is found to have occurred, this provision limits the number
of warning letters to one per rolling twelve month period for the same
violation. The delay in the effective date of this provision is likely
to mitigate costs for persons and entities so that they may adapt to
the new SEF regime.
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\1108\ The Commission is renumbering proposed Sec. 37.206(o) to
Sec. 37.206(f). The Commission is also retitling this section as
``Warning letters.''
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As recommended by commenters, the Commission has also adopted cost-
mitigating alternatives that will provide SEFs with additional
flexibility and discretion to implement disciplinary and other
enforcement programs in the manner they find most suited to their
market. In particular, the Commission has: eliminated the requirement
that an investigation report include the member or market participant's
disciplinary history at the SEF; removed the requirement that SEFs
include a copy of a warning letter in an investigation report; amended
the standard for commencing an investigation from a ``possible basis''
to a ``reasonable basis'' that a violation may have occurred or will
occur; and deleted several provisions.\1109\
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\1109\ Deleted provisions include proposed Sec. 37.203(c)(2)
(ongoing monitoring of compliance staff and resources), the second
sentence of proposed Sec. 37.206(a) (annual review of enforcement
staff), the majority of proposed Sec. 37.206(c) (timely review of
investigation reports), the last sentence of proposed Sec.
37.206(h) (denial of charges and right to a hearing), and proposed
Sec. 37.206(j)(1)(vii) (cost of transcribing the record to be borne
by the respondent).
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The Commission has also moved part or all of several provisions to
guidance.\1110\ By moving these provisions to guidance, entities will
have the flexibility to tailor compliance programs to varying business
models and trading platforms as well as unanticipated technological
innovation or behavioral changes. While the Commission's pairing of
guidance and regulations provides for a broad and flexible regulatory
framework, it also promotes uniformity of safe and sound operation such
that market participants and the public receive comparable levels of
protection irrespective of the particular SEF on which they transact.
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\1110\ See second part of proposed Sec. 37.206(a) (enforcement
staff), proposed Sec. 37.206(d) (notice of charges), proposed Sec.
37.206(e) (right to representation), proposed Sec. 37.206(f)
(answer to charges), proposed Sec. 37.206(g) (admission or failure
to deny charges), proposed Sec. 37.206(h) (denial of charges and
right to hearing), proposed Sec. 37.206(i) (settlement of offers),
the majority of proposed Sec. 37.206(j) (hearings), proposed Sec.
37.206(l) (right to appeal), proposed Sec. 37.206(m) (final
decisions), proposed Sec. 37.206(o) (summary fines for violations
of rules regarding timely submission of records), and proposed Sec.
37.206(p) (emergency disciplinary actions).
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(4) Section 15(a) Factors (Rule Writing and Enforcement)
(i) Protection of Market Participants and the Public
Together, the rule-writing and enforcement provisions described
above ensure that SEFs adopt and enforce operational rules that protect
market participants and the public through orderly SEF-traded markets
that are better protected from manipulative and disruptive conduct than
pre-Dodd Frank OTC markets.
Rules prohibiting abusive trade practices such as wash trades and
front-running are intended to deter such disruptive practices, and will
protect market participants transacting on the SEF, as well as the
general public, who may rely on prices derived from the market and who
may be customers or shareholders of market participants.
The requirement that a SEF have the capacity to detect and
investigate rule violations, including adequate compliance staff and
resources to conduct automated trade surveillance
[[Page 33573]]
and real-time monitoring (or contract with a regulatory service
provider that has the capacity to perform these functions on its behalf
while maintaining ultimate responsibility), will improve a SEF's
ability to discover, sanction, and prevent violations and trading
practices that could harm market participants and, indirectly, the
public.
SEF-initiated investigations are a chief tool in protecting market
participants and the public because they provide the first opportunity
to respond to rule violations. Rules allowing the SEF to obtain
information and inspect books and records will not only deter potential
abusive trading practices, but will also enable the SEF to detect any
manipulative or fraudulent activity quickly and efficiently. Prompt and
thorough investigations are essential to detecting and remedying
violations and ensuring that the violations do not harm market
participants, result in price distortions, or contribute to systemic
risks that can harm the economy.
In the event of demonstrated customer harm, restitution damages are
generally required to make that customer whole again. Meaningful
sanctions will serve as a general deterrent by discouraging others from
engaging in violative conduct.
Impartial access requirements protect market participants from
discriminatory treatment by prohibiting similarly situated market
participants from receiving different access terms and fee structures.
The requirement that SEFs establish and enforce rules for its
employees will protect market participants and the public by helping to
ensure that employees operate in conformance with the Act and the rules
of the Commission.
(ii) Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of the
Markets
The requirement that a SEF have the capacity to detect and mitigate
rule and trade practice violations, including the ability to collect
relevant information and examine books and records, and the requirement
to establish and enforce rules for its employees will increase
confidence in the financial integrity of the market by confirming to
market participants that their orders and trades are handled pursuant
to the posted rules of the SEF.
In addition, impartial access requirements will eliminate a
potential impediment to participation, resulting in a more competitive
market. At a minimum, as required by section 2(e) of the Act, market
participants must meet the definition of an ECP, which ensures that
only those participants with a sufficient level of sophistication and
financial resources are able to participate. Similarly, requiring a SEF
to maintain minimum level of enforcement resources will promote
financial integrity by ensuring that a SEF has sufficient resources to
investigate wrongdoing and make aggrieved market participants whole
again. Moreover, markets where wrongdoing is detected and deterred will
operate more efficiently.
(iii) Price Discovery
Many of the same rule provisions previously discussed that serve to
increase efficiency, liquidity, and competitiveness will, by extension,
improve price discovery, because the combination of increases in
liquidity and competition will help create a marketplace in which the
forces of supply and demand reflect more accurate pricing.
Timely investigations will increase the likelihood that
manipulation is detected early-on and quickly remedied so that price
discovery is not impaired. Additionally, a system of meaningful
sanctions will deter disruptive and manipulative trade practices,
providing a stable and competitive trading environment more likely to
foster price discovery.
(iv) Sound Risk Management Practices
The requirement that SEF participants confirm to the SEF that they
meet the definition of an ECP helps assure the market that participants
in SEF-traded markets have the skill, knowledge, and/or financial
resources necessary to enter into financially-sound transactions and
understand sound risk management practices.
(v) Other Public Interest Considerations
The Commission has not identified any effects that these rules will
have on other public interest considerations other than those
enumerated above.
(b) Chief Compliance Officer
Section 37.1501 implements Core Principle 15 and requires each SEF
to designate an individual to serve as Chief Compliance Officer
(``CCO'') and to provide its CCO with the authority and resources to
develop and enforce such policies and procedures as are necessary for
the CCO to fulfill its statutory and regulatory duties.\1111\ While the
proposed rule prohibited the CCO from serving as a member of the SEF's
legal department or as the SEF's general counsel, the Commission has
eliminated this restriction from the final rule.
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\1111\ There are no costs associated with Sec. 37.1501(a),
which simply defines ``board of directors.''
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The final rule also outlines the procedures for oversight authority
over the CCO and for appointing and removing the CCO. The CCO must meet
with the board of directors at least annually and the Regulatory
Oversight Committee (``ROC'') at least quarterly. The CCO must also
prepare an annual compliance report containing a detailed account of
the SEF's compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, as well
as a detailed account of the SEF's self-regulatory program, and submit
it to the SEF's board of directors for review and to the Commission.
SEFs must maintain records pertaining to, among other things, code of
ethics and conflict of interest policies, copies of all materials
created in furtherance of the CCO's duties, and any records relevant to
the SEF's annual compliance report.
(1) Costs
Several commenters stated that the proposed requirement that the
CCO may not be a member of the SEF's legal department and may not serve
as its general counsel is prescriptive and unnecessary.\1112\ In
response to these comments, the Commission has eliminated the proposed
prohibition on who may serve as CCO. Accordingly, a SEF may use its
general counsel or a member of its legal department to serve as CCO.
This change to the final rule should significantly reduce the expense
imposed by the proposed rule, which would have necessitated the hiring
of an individual specifically to serve as CCO at an estimated annual
cost of $181,394.\1113\ The cost of assigning the role of CCO to an
existing employee will be significantly less.
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\1112\ ICE Comment Letter at 6-7 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA Comment
Letter at 6-7 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment Letter at 27 (Mar.
8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at 12-13 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\1113\ This estimate is derived from the 2010 edition of SIFMA's
annual report on Management and Professional Earnings in the
Securities Industry (hereinafter ``SIFMA Report''). This figure
reflects the median total annual compensation (including base salary
and bonus) for a CCO in the securities industry. The Commission
notes that this estimate only includes the cost of hiring a CCO.
Although not required by statute or rule, SEFs may also choose to
hire additional staff at additional cost in order to support the
CCO.
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Several commenters requested that the Commission grant SEFs more
flexibility in determining how a CCO is appointed, compensated,
supervised, and removed.\1114\ In response to these comments, the
Commission has removed the requirement in proposed
[[Page 33574]]
Sec. 37.1501(c)(1) that a CCO's appointment and compensation requires
a majority vote of directors, as well as the requirements in proposed
Sec. 37.1501(c)(3) that the SEF explain to the Commission the reason
for the CCO's removal upon departure and that the SEF immediately
appoint an interim CCO and permanent CCO as soon as reasonably
practicable thereafter. The Commission notes that these revisions will
provide the board of directors or senior officer of the SEF with a
degree of flexibility to appoint, compensate, and remove the CCO in the
manner that the SEF deems most appropriate.
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\1114\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 12 (Mar. 8, 2011); WMBAA
Comment Letter II at 7 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment Letter at
26 (Mar. 8, 2011).
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Several commenters also stated that the proposed requirement that
CCOs ensure ``compliance with the Act and Commission regulations'' is
impracticable and overly burdensome, as one individual cannot ensure
compliance of an entire organization.\1115\ In response, the Commission
is modifying Sec. 37.1501(d)(4) to state that one of the CCO's duties
shall include ``taking reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the
Act and Commission regulations.'' This modification should also reduce
potential costs resulting from this rule without diminishing its
benefits.
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\1115\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 6-7 (Jun. 3, 2011); WMBAA
Comment Letter II at 5-6 (Mar. 8, 2011); MarketAxess Comment Letter
at 26 (Mar. 8, 2011); Tradeweb Comment Letter at 12 (Mar. 8, 2011);
CME Comment Letter at 4 (Feb. 7, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Benefits
The rule ensures that each SEF has a central figure responsible for
overseeing major areas of compliance with the CEA and Commission
regulations. The annual compliance report will enable a SEF and the
Commission to evaluate the effectiveness of the SEF's self-regulatory
programs and compliance with core principles, and to take remedial
actions and make recommendations to improve the SEF's self-regulatory
programs in order to ensure that the SEF remains in compliance with the
core principles.
(3) Consideration of Alternatives
With respect to the annual compliance report requirement in
proposed Sec. 37.1501(e), FXall stated that compiling the required
information and preparing the report in a timely manner annually will
consume considerable resources.\1116\ FXall proposed an alternative
report that would request fewer pieces of information.\1117\ Similarly,
CME stated that the Commission should specify key areas that should be
discussed in the annual report, rather than requiring the report to
describe in detail the registrant's compliance with respect to each of
the numerous components of the CEA and Commission regulations.\1118\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1116\ FXall Comment Letter at 16 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\1117\ Id. at 17.
\1118\ CME Comment Letter at 7 (Feb. 7, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After weighing the comments and alternative proposals from FXall
and CME, the Commission has determined to adopt the rules as proposed,
subject to certain revisions detailed in the preamble.\1119\ The
Commission declines to adopt commenters' proposed alternatives because
without the detailed information required by statute in the annual
compliance report (including a self-assessment of policies and
procedures designed to ensure compliance with each core principle, a
discussion of areas for improvement, and a description of the SEF's
self-regulatory program's staffing, structure, and cataloguing of
disciplinary actions), the Commission would not have access to the
information it needs to ensure that each SEF is in compliance with the
CEA and Commission regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1119\ See discussion above under Sec. 37.1501(e)--Annual
Compliance Report Prepared by Chief Compliance Officer in the
preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) Section 15(a) Factors (Chief Compliance Officer)
(i) Protection of Market Participants and the Public
The requirements that a CCO oversee the SEF's compliance with the
Act and Commission regulations and supervise the SEF's self-regulatory
program will ensure that the SEF monitors compliance with key
provisions of the CEA designed to protect market participants and the
public (including provisions governing trade practice and market
surveillance, real-time market monitoring, and financial reporting). To
the extent that the Commission's regulations impose more specific or
supplemental requirements when compared to those requirements
explicitly imposed by section 5h(f)(15) of the CEA, those incremental
costs are not likely to be significant. While it is possible that those
incremental costs will be passed along to market participants, the size
of those costs is likely to be negligible.
The Commission believes the CCO rules will protect market
participants and the public by promoting compliance with the core
principles and Commission regulations through the designation and
effective functioning of the CCO, and the establishment of a framework
for preparation of a meaningful annual review of a SEF's compliance
program. The annual compliance report will allow the SEF and the
Commission to periodically assess, and evaluate where necessary, the
SEF's ability to comply with the core principles. Upon review of the
compliance report, the SEF and the Commission will be better able to
determine whether the SEF has appropriate programs in place to protect
market participants and the public from market abuses.
Maintaining records as required under Sec. 37.1501 regarding a
CCO's efforts toward ensuring that the SEF complies with core
principles provides a check against what is reported in the annual
compliance report. Access to these records will assist the Commission
in its determination of whether a SEF's self-regulatory program
complies with the core principles and the Commission's regulations. If
the Commission determines the self-regulatory program is not
sufficient, the Commission will be able to use information required by
the rule to take steps to remedy the shortcomings and to prevent
disruptions that could harm market participants and the public.
(ii) Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of the
Markets
An effective CCO will implement measures that enhance the stability
and efficiency of SEFs. Reliable and financially-sound SEFs are
essential for the stability of the derivatives markets they serve. The
CCO's oversight of self-regulatory programs and the annual compliance
report will provide both the SEF and the Commission with an opportunity
to assess the effectiveness of the SEF's self-regulatory programs and
will help to detect and deter rule violations, increasing participation
and competition in the markets.
Likewise, compliance reports will allow the Commission to review
the effectiveness of and order changes to self-regulatory programs,
thus enabling the market to function more efficiently while promoting
confidence and attracting competition. A board that makes proactive
changes to a SEF's self-regulatory programs based on the CCO's
compliance report will build confidence in the market and increase
competition.
(iii) Price Discovery
The Commission has not identified any effects that this rule will
have on price discovery.
(iv) Sound Risk Management Policies
The CCO rules and the required annual compliance report will
enhance a SEF's risk management policies by enhancing the standards for
a SEF's compliance program. This in turn will emphasize risk management
compliance
[[Page 33575]]
because of its significance to the overall purpose and functioning of
the SEF. Compliance with the SEF core principles and related
regulations encompasses, among other things, procedures for ensuring
the financial integrity of swaps entered on or through the facilities
of the SEF, including the clearance and settlement of swaps,
determination of resource adequacy, and system safeguards to establish
and maintain a program of risk analysis and oversight. It is the
responsibility of the CCO to ensure that the SEF is compliant with the
core principles and the regulations thereunder, and is otherwise
engaged in appropriate risk management activities in accordance with
the SEF's own rules, policies, and procedures.
(v) Other Public Interest Considerations
The Commission has not identified any effects that these rules will
have on other public interest considerations other than those
enumerated above.
6. Monitoring and Surveillance
Core Principle 2 requires, among other things, that each SEF
establish and enforce trading, trade processing, and participation
rules that will deter abuses, and have the capacity to detect,
investigate, and enforce those rules, including means to provide market
participants with impartial access to the market and to capture
information that may be used in establishing whether rule violations
have occurred. Additionally, Core Principle 4, in part, requires each
SEF to monitor trading in swaps to prevent manipulation and price
distortion through surveillance, including methods of conducting real-
time monitoring of trading and comprehensive and accurate trade
reconstructions.
(a) Monitoring of Trading
The rules that implement Core Principles 2 and 4 will require a SEF
to, among other things: (1) Maintain an automated trade surveillance
system (Sec. 37.203(d)); (2) conduct real-time market monitoring of
all trading activity on its platform and have the authority to cancel
trades and adjust trade prices when necessary (Sec. 37.203(e)); (3)
maintain an acceptable audit trail program that enables the SEF to
identify entities that are routinely non-compliant and to levy
meaningful sanctions (Sec. 37.205); \1120\ (4) monitor trading in
real-time and accurately reconstruct trading activity in order to
detect manipulation, price distortions, and other disruptions (Sec.
37.401); (5) and establish risk control mechanisms (including pauses
and halts) to prevent and reduce the potential risk of market
disruptions (Sec. 37.405).
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\1120\ The Commission received no comments discussing the
specific costs or benefits of Sec. 37.406, which requires SEFs to
make audit trail data available to the Commission and is an explicit
requirement of the statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Costs
As discussed above, potential SEFs are likely to outsource these
obligations to a regulatory service provider at significantly less cost
than performing them in-house.\1121\ Accordingly, the ongoing costs
associated with these rules would already be included in the total
annual cost of contracting with a regulatory service provider (plus the
cost of overseeing the service provider's compliance).
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\1121\ The Commission notes, as described in the preamble, that
a SEF that elects to use the services of a regulatory service
provider must retain certain decision-making authority and cannot
outsource this authority to the regulatory service provider. See,
e.g., Sec. 37.204(c)--Regulatory Decisions Required from the Swap
Execution Facility in the preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Should a potential SEF that is a new entity choose to develop its
own automated trade surveillance, real-time market monitoring, and
audit trail systems, it is likely to incur the costs of developing and
maintaining these systems, as well as the cost of hiring and
maintaining adequate staff to administer them. The staff necessary to
carry out a SEF's obligations under these rules would likely include
analysts, investigators, and systems and/or IT specialists. However,
existing entities may already receive the requisite data, and may also
have some infrastructure in place to perform automated trade
surveillance and real-time market monitoring. Accordingly, the
incremental cost for existing entities would be limited to investing in
enhancements to existing electronic systems to ensure that data is
captured in compliance with the rules and that the systems themselves
comply with the rules.\1122\ The Commission notes that a SEF may use a
unified monitoring system to jointly satisfy the requirements of Sec.
37.401 (monitoring of trading and trade processing) and Sec. 37.205
(audit trail).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1122\ For example, SEFs are required to comply with a unified
set of audit trail requirements for all methods of execution. The
Commission notes that a SEF, for example, that utilizes the
telephone as a means of interstate commerce in providing the
execution methods in Sec. 37.9(a)(2)(i)(A) or (B) may comply with
certain of the audit trail requirements by recording all such
communications that relate to or result in swap transactions. Such
recordings must allow for reconstruction of all relevant
communications between the SEF and its customers or involving SEF
employees. While it is common industry practice to make and retain
electronic time-stamped recordings of conversations, SEFs may incur
costs to upgrade their recording systems to ensure that they comply
with all of the audit trail requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, in response to comments that the standards set forth
in the proposed requirements for real-time market monitoring are
unreasonably high,\1123\ the Commission is modifying the final rule to
require a SEF to conduct real-time market monitoring designed to
``identify'' disorderly trading, instead of to ``ensure'' orderly
trading. The Commission believes that requiring SEFs to identify
disorderly trading when it occurs, rather than to ensure orderly
trading at all times, will likely mitigate the overall burden of the
rule. Furthermore, in response to CME's comment,\1124\ the Commission
is deleting the word ``investigating'' from proposed Sec. 37.203(d),
thus clarifying that a SEF's automated trade surveillance system will
not be expected to conduct the actual investigation of potential trade
practice violations. This deletion should further reduce costs for
SEFs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1123\ CME Comment Letter at 20 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\1124\ Id. at 19-20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tradeweb and MarketAxess commented that annual audits for member
and market participant compliance with the audit trail requirements
pursuant to Sec. 37.205(c)(1) are burdensome and unwarranted.\1125\ In
the Commission staff's follow-up conversation regarding costs, one
commenter asserted that this requirement will cost SEFs at least
$300,000 annually.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1125\ Tradeweb Comment Letter at 6 (Jun. 3, 2011); MarketAxess
Comment Letter at 22 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To mitigate the costs associated with this provision, the
Commission is modifying the language in final Sec. 37.205(c) so that
it applies only to members and persons and firms subject to the SEF's
recordkeeping rules, rather than to members and ``market
participants.'' With this change, the Commission limits the number of
entities that a SEF must audit, which should reduce the cost noted
above without any meaningful reduction in benefits because auditing
those market participants subject to recordkeeping rules will ensure
complete coverage of all activity pertinent to transactions on any
given SEF.
Finally, SEFs may also incur the one-time cost of programming risk
controls such as pauses and halts, as well as on-going costs to
maintain and adjust such controls. For some SEFs, the costs of adding
pause and halt functionality to swap contracts should be reduced since
much of that technology is already commercially available and would not
necessarily have to be developed in-
[[Page 33576]]
house.\1126\ As noted in the Pre-Trade Functionality Subcommittee of
the CFTC Technology Advisory Committee report, the costs would largely
be borne by the exchanges and would center around intellectual
property, as many exchanges develop, own, and manage their own
technology.\1127\ However, the costs associated with implementing risk
controls were not described in detail in the Pre-Trade Functionality
Subcommittee report and will likely vary greatly from one SEF to
another depending on the type of risk controls that will be implemented
and the nature of the SEF's trading platform. The Commission received
no comments stating that risk controls cannot be implemented in a cost-
effective manner using commercially available technology. As further
noted in the Pre-Trade Functionality Subcommittee report, ``[s]ome
measure of standardization of pre-trade risk controls at the exchange
level is the cheapest, most effective and most robust path to
addressing the Commission's concern [for preserving market
integrity].'' \1128\
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\1126\ In a separate Dodd-Frank rulemaking, DCMs are now
required to have the same types of risk controls. See Core
Principles and Other Requirements for Designated Contract Markets,
77 FR 36612 (Jun. 19, 2012).
\1127\ See ``Recommendations on Pre-Trade Practices for Trading
Firms, Clearing Firms and Exchanges involved in Direct Market
Access,'' Pre-Trade Functionality Subcommittee of the CFTC
Technology Advisory Committee (``TAC Subcommittee
Recommendations''), at 4 (Mar. 1, 2011), available at http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/tacpresentation030111_ptfs2.pdf. The Commission notes that the
subcommittee report was submitted to the Technology Advisory
Committee and made available for public comment, but no final action
has been taken by the full committee.
\1128\ See TAC Subcommittee Recommendations at 4 (Mar. 1, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission notes that while it is requiring pauses and halts in
the rule, it is also enumerating in guidance other types of automated
risk controls that may be implemented by SEFs in order to give SEFs
greater discretion to select among the enumerated risk controls or to
create new risk controls. The Commission believes that this combination
of rules and guidance will facilitate orderly markets while maintaining
a flexible environment that facilitates cost-effective innovation and
development.
(2) Benefits
The automated trade surveillance system, real-time monitoring,
audit-trail, and trade reconstruction requirements will promote orderly
trading and will ensure that SEFs have the capability to promptly
identify and correct market or system anomalies that could harm market
participants and the public. These tools will improve SEF compliance
staff's ability to record, recover, sort, and query voluminous amounts
of data in order to better detect potential rule violations and abusive
trading practices that harm market participants and market integrity.
By having the tools and data to identify these potential rule
violations, a SEF can quickly respond, mitigating their effects and
helping to prevent them from generating systemic risk or other severe
problems. SEFs will also have the tools and information needed to
prosecute rule violations supported by evidence from audit trail data
and order and trade information. These tools will not only allow SEFs
to more effectively respond to rule violations and trading abuses, but
will also deter market participants from engaging in such conduct in
the first place since market participants will be aware that rule
violations are likely to be detected.
While the provisions described above will increase the likelihood
that SEFs will promptly identify market or system anomalies, SEFs must
also have systems in place to respond to such anomalies after they
occur. Risk controls such as automated trading pauses and halts can,
among other things, allow time for market participants to analyze the
market impact of new information that may have caused a sudden market
move, allow new orders to come into a market that has moved
dramatically, and allow traders to assess and secure their capital
needs in the face of potential margin calls. Pauses and halts are
intended to apply in the event of extraordinary price movements that
may trigger or propagate systemic disruptions. Accordingly, a SEF's
ability to pause or halt trading in certain circumstances and,
importantly, to re-start trading through the appropriate re-opening
procedures, will allow SEFs to mitigate the propagation of shocks that
are of a systemic nature.
(3) Consideration of Alternatives
While commenters requested additional flexibility to determine the
risk controls that should be implemented within their market,\1129\ the
Commission views pauses and halts as effective risk management tools
that must be implemented to facilitate orderly markets. Moreover, in
recognition that such risk controls should be adapted to the unique
characteristics of the markets to which they apply, and that any
controls should consider the balance between avoiding a market
disruption while facilitating a market's price discovery function, the
Commission enumerated the other types of risk controls in guidance.
Accordingly, a SEF will have discretion to select and create risk
controls to meet the unique characteristics of its market and cost
structure.
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\1129\ See, e.g., ICE Comment Letter at 5 (Mar. 8, 2011);
Tradeweb Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011); CME Comment Letter at
27 (Feb. 22, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, in response to concerns about a lack of flexibility in the
proposed requirement to coordinate risk controls among other markets or
exchanges,\1130\ the Commission is moving the language in proposed
Sec. 37.405 to guidance.\1131\ The combination of rules and guidance
pertaining to risk controls will ensure that, at a minimum, SEFs
implement pauses and halts, while also granting SEFs the discretion to
coordinate and adopt additional risk controls in a manner they find
most cost effective and appropriate for their markets.
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\1130\ CME Comment Letter at 26 (Feb. 22, 2011).
\1131\ The guidance provides that a SEF with a swap that is
linked to, or a substitute for, other products, either on its market
or on other trading venues, must, to the extent practicable,
coordinate its risk controls with any similar controls placed on
those other products. If a SEF's swap is based on the level of an
equity index, such risk controls must, to the extent practicable, be
coordinated with any similar controls placed on national security
exchanges. See guidance to Core Principle 4 in appendix B to part
37.
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(4) Section 15(a) Factors (Monitoring of Trading)
(i) Protection of Market Participants and the Public
These rules will help ensure fair and equitable markets that are
protected from abusive trading practices or manipulative conditions,
and will ensure that rule violations and market disruptions that could
harm market participants and the public may be prevented or detected,
reconstructed, investigated, and prosecuted. The absence of these
regulations would result in an increased potential for violations to go
undetected and for market disruptions to create distorted prices or
systemic risks that could harm the economy and the public. These
requirements will strengthen SEFs' oversight of their trading
platforms, increase the likelihood of early detection and prompt
responses to rule violations and market disruptions, and result in
stronger protection of market participants and the general public from
rule violations, trading abuses, and other market disruptions that
could harm market participants and, directly or indirectly, the public
and the economy as a whole.
[[Page 33577]]
(ii) Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of the
Markets
These rules ensure that violations and market anomalies are
detected and promptly addressed and do not generate systemic risk or
other problems that could interfere with efficient and competitive
markets. The requirements also help ensure that market prices are not
distorted by prohibited activities. The rules strengthen market
confidence and enable the market to operate more efficiently by
deterring rule violations and by establishing conditions under which
trading will be paused or halted, thereby promoting efficient pricing
and competitive trading.
(iii) Price Discovery
Requiring SEFs to conduct effective monitoring and surveillance of
their markets and to have the capacity to detect rule violations will
help ensure that legitimate trades and fundamental supply and demand
information are accurately reflected in market prices. The mitigation
of rule violations, which detract from the price discovery process in
SEF markets, will promote confidence in the prices market participants
use to hedge risk and provide confidence in the price discovery
process.
(iv) Sound Risk Management Practices
The rules are designed to allow SEFs to better deter, detect, and
address operational risks posed by trading practices or trading
activities. To the extent they deter overly risky actions by market
participants, the rules will lower potential losses and costs to SEFs
and market participants and promote sound risk management practices.
(v) Other Public Interest Considerations
The Commission has not identified any effects that these rules will
have on other public interest considerations other than those
enumerated above.
(b) Monitoring of Contracts
The Commission is adopting rules that will require a SEF to: (1)
Submit new swap contracts to the Commission in advance of listing and
trading and demonstrate that the contracts are not readily susceptible
to manipulation (Sec. 37.301); \1132\ (2) monitor physical delivery
swaps' terms and conditions and availability of the deliverable
commodity (Sec. 37.402); (3) monitor the reference price of cash-
settled swaps used to determine cash flow or settlement, the continued
appropriateness of the methodology for the reference price for SEFs
that derive that price, and the continued appropriateness of the third-
party index or instrument for reference prices that rely on such index
or instrument (Sec. 37.403); and (4) adopt position limitation or
position accountability in accordance with Commission regulations
(Sec. 37.601).\1133\
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\1132\ SEFs must make this demonstration by providing the
information set forth in appendix C to part 38. See Core Principles
and Other Requirements for Designated Contract Markets, 77 FR at
36722.
\1133\ Core Principle 6 requires that SEFs, for each contract
and as necessary and appropriate, adopt position limitation or
position accountability, and that, for any contract that is subject
to a position limitation established by the Commission pursuant to
CEA section 4a(a), SEFs must set the position limit at a level not
higher than the position limitation established by the Commission.
See Position Limits for Derivatives, 76 FR 4752 (proposed Jan. 26,
2011).
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(1) Swaps Not Readily Susceptible to Manipulation
(i) Costs
Compliance with these regulations will impose costs equally on
startups and entities with existing trading platforms seeking SEF
registration because all SEFs must monitor their contracts in
accordance with the rules on an ongoing basis. However, SEFs have
incentives to review their contracts to ensure they are not susceptible
to manipulation even in the absence of the core principle or these
rules. For example, SEFs have a business need to develop products that
provide market participants with reliable instruments that can be used
for hedging and risk management. In order to do so, new and existing
entities will need staff to research the underlying markets (at times
using data from private sources) and to certify that the contract rules
comply with Core Principle 3. SEFs likely will already have staff to
ensure compliance with the applicable core principles and should plan
on legal staff devoting approximately four hours per contract at a cost
of approximately $400 to review a swap's compliance with Core Principle
3 as part of a sound business practice. The scale of these costs
largely depends on how novel or complex a contract is, how many
contracts the SEF plans to list at any given time, and whether listed
swaps are similar to each other.
The Commission notes that this guidance will likely reduce the time
and costs that regulated markets will incur in providing the
appropriate information and will likely reduce the amount of time it
takes the Commission staff to analyze whether a new product or rule
amendment is in compliance with the CEA.
(ii) Benefits
When SEFs list contracts that are not readily susceptible to
manipulation, they contribute to the integrity and stability of the
marketplace by giving traders confidence that the prices associated
with swaps reflect the true supply of and demand for the underlying
commodities or financial instruments. Section 37.301, which implements
the Core Principle 3 requirement that SEFs permit trading only in swaps
that are not readily susceptible to manipulation, will promote an
environment where swap prices are less likely to be subject to
distortion and extreme volatility, allowing market participants to buy
and sell physical and financial products at fair prices and to hedge
price risk appropriately.
The guidance outlined in appendix C to part 38 provides a reference
for existing and new regulated markets for information that should be
provided to the Commission for new products and rule amendments based
on best practices developed over the past three decades by the
Commission and other regulators. This guidance will likely reduce the
time and costs that regulated markets will incur in providing the
appropriate information and should mitigate the need for extensive
follow-up discussions with the Commission. The guidance also reduces
the amount of time it takes the Commission staff to analyze whether a
new product or rule amendment is in compliance with the CEA.
(2) Monitoring of Physical-Delivery Swaps
(i) Costs
While the Commission did not receive comments discussing the costs
of this provision, the Commission is revising the requirement in
proposed Sec. 37.402(a)(2) \1134\ so that SEFs only have to monitor
the availability of the commodity supply, instead of monitoring whether
the supply is adequate. This reduced monitoring obligation should lower
ongoing costs for SEFs since they will not have to make determinations
regarding adequacy of deliverable supply as frequently as under the
proposed rule, while achieving comparable benefit for market
participants and the public. Costs will be further reduced by the
Commission's decision to remove from proposed Sec. 37.402 the
requirements that SEFs monitor specific details of the supply,
marketing, and ownership of the
[[Page 33578]]
commodity to be physically delivered. Instead, final appendix B to part
37 lists guidance for monitoring conditions that may cause a physical-
delivery swap to become susceptible to price manipulation or
distortion. Listing these details in guidance will provide SEFs with
flexibility in meeting their monitoring obligations associated with
physical-delivery swaps, which will likely further mitigate any burden
associated with compliance. The Commission notes that a SEF may
contract with a regulatory service provider to perform these duties at
potentially a lower cost.
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\1134\ Proposed Sec. 37.402(a)(2) is now final Sec. 37.402(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) Benefits
Section 37.402 requires that SEFs monitor physical-delivery swaps'
terms and conditions as they relate to the underlying commodity market
and monitor the availability of the supply of the commodity specified
by the delivery requirements of the swap. Such monitoring will allow
SEFs to take appropriate steps to relieve the potential for market
congestion or manipulation in situations where participants' ability to
make good on their delivery obligations is threatened due to supply
shortages, disruptions or shortages of transportation, or disruptions
due to weather or labor strikes. Any interference with the physical-
delivery process will likely lead to disruptions in fair and orderly
trading and participants' ability to properly manage commercial risk.
Moreover, close monitoring of physical-delivery contracts helps prevent
the manipulation of prices, and the public benefits from prices that
reflect actual market conditions.
(3) Monitoring of Cash-Settled Swaps
(i) Costs
Argus commented that monitoring of trading in underlying price
indexes will be costly, and that if SEFs are required to monitor the
availability and pricing of the commodity that forms the basis of a
price index (particularly where an index price is published based upon
transactions that are executed off the DCM or SEF), the SEF may choose
not to list the contract and thus traders will lose a hedging
instrument.\1135\
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\1135\ Argus Comment Letter at 6-7 (Feb. 22, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to this comment, the Commission is amending the
requirement in proposed Sec. 37.403(a)(1) that a SEF monitor the
availability and pricing of the commodity making up the index to which
the swap will be settled, to only require the SEF to monitor the
pricing. The Commission is also moving the other requirements for
monitoring and obtaining information on traders' activities in proposed
Sec. 37.403(a) and (b) to guidance. The combination of rules and
guidance implementing Core Principle 4 will help ensure that the cash
settlement process is not susceptible to manipulation by providing
rules and guidance on how to meet the requirements of the core
principle, while providing SEFs with the flexibility to adopt the most
appropriate method of compliance in light of the nature of their
contracts and market structure.
As discussed above, the Commission notes that compliance with these
provisions can likely be outsourced to a regulatory service provider at
lower cost, and that on-going monitoring of pricing could be handled by
the regulatory service provider.
(ii) Benefits
The Sec. 37.403 requirement that a SEF monitor cash-settled swaps
as they relate to the reference price, instrument, or index to which
the swap is settled will reduce the potential for market disruptions or
manipulations and ensure that they are discovered and promptly
addressed. The interconnected nature of swap and underlying cash
markets may create incentives for traders to disrupt or manipulate
prices in the cash market in order to influence the prices in the swap
market (potentially to benefit the trader's position in the swap).
Detecting and preventing this sort of manipulation requires information
on traders' activities in the cash-settled contract and in, or related
to, the underlying instrument or index to which it is settled. This
rule ensures that SEFs have the information and tools they need to
accomplish their statutory duty to prevent manipulation and disruptions
to the cash-settlement process.
(4) Section 15(a) Factors (Monitoring of Contracts)
(i) Protection of Market Participants and the Public
The demonstration required by Sec. 37.301 and the monitoring
requirements in Sec. Sec. 37.402 and 37.403 allow for a timely review
by the Commission staff of the SEF's supporting analysis and data to
determine whether a contract is not readily susceptible to
manipulation, and to ensure that SEFs are able to adequately collect
information on market activity, including special considerations for
physical-delivery contracts and cash-settled contracts. As a group,
these rules protect market participants by helping to prevent price
manipulation and protect the public by creating an environment that
fosters prices that reflect actual market conditions.
(ii) Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of the
Markets
By providing guidance based on best practices regarding what a SEF
should consider when developing a swap or amending the terms and
conditions of an existing swap, the contracts listed by SEFs, as a
whole, should be more reflective of the underlying cash market, thus
providing for efficient hedging of commercial risk. Sections 37.402 and
37.403 protect against disruptions and market manipulation, promote
competition, and promote the efficiency and financial integrity of
transactions in SEF markets because market mispricing that is due to
disruptions or manipulation interferes with a market's efficiency by
limiting its ability to reflect the value of the underlying product.
Markets that are prone to disruption or manipulation have a severe
competitive disadvantage to those without such problems. These rules
are designed to address and mitigate such problems for swap
transactions.
(iii) Price Discovery
Manipulation or other market disruptions interfere with the price
discovery process by artificially distorting prices and preventing
those prices from properly reflecting the fundamental forces of supply
and demand. These rules are designed to detect and, where possible,
prevent such market mispricing, and to detect disconnects between swaps
and their related market prices (e.g., between cash market prices and
the prices of related futures and swaps).
(iv) Sound Risk Management Practices
By following the best practices outlined in the guidance in
appendix C to part 38 and the requirements of Sec. Sec. 37.402 and
37.403, a SEF should minimize the susceptibility of a swap to
manipulation or price distortion at the time it is developing the
contract's terms and conditions. By performing this work early-on, a
SEF should minimize risks to its clearing house and to market
participants. Sound risk management practices rely upon execution of
hedge strategies at market prices that are free of manipulation or
other disruptions. These rules are designed to facilitate hedging at
prices free of distortions that may be preventable by adequate
controls.
[[Page 33579]]
(v) Other Public Interest Considerations
The Commission has not identified any effects that these rules will
have on other public interest considerations other than those
enumerated above.
7. Financial Resources and Integrity
(a) Background
Section 37.1301 codifies the Core Principle 13 requirement that a
SEF must maintain sufficient financial resources to cover operating
costs for at least one year, calculated on a rolling basis. The rules
implementing Core Principle 13 also clarify the types of financial
resources available to SEFs to satisfy the financial resources
requirements (Sec. 37.1302) and require that each SEF, no less
frequently than each fiscal quarter, calculate the financial resources
it needs to meet the financial resource requirements, as well as the
current market value of each financial resource (Sec. Sec. 37.1303,
37.1304). The rules also require SEFs to maintain unencumbered liquid
financial assets, such as cash or highly liquid securities, equal to at
least six months' operating costs, or a committed line of credit or
similar facility (Sec. 37.1305), and to report certain information
regarding their financial resources to the Commission quarterly or upon
request (Sec. 37.1306).
Sections 37.701, 37.702, and 37.703 implement Core Principle 7
regarding the financial integrity of transactions. Section 37.701
requires transactions executed on or through a SEF that are mandatorily
or voluntarily cleared to be cleared through a Commission-registered
DCO, or a DCO that the Commission has determined is exempt from
registration. Section 37.702 requires a SEF to establish minimum
financial standards for its members, which at a minimum, requires that
members qualify as ECPs. Section 37.703 requires a SEF to monitor its
members to ensure that they continue to qualify as ECPs.
(b) Costs
ISDA estimated that it would cost each SEF $1.4 million per year to
comply with the financial resource requirement.\1136\ The Commission
notes that the requirement that a SEF maintain sufficient financial
resources to cover its operating expenses for one year appears in the
statute itself, and that the Commission does not have the discretion to
lower the financial resource requirement. Accordingly, Sec. 37.1301
imposes no additional costs on SEFs or market participants beyond those
imposed by statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1136\ ISDA Discussion Paper at 32 (Nov. 2011). The Commission
notes that the components of this cost estimate are unclear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the reporting requirements in Sec. 37.1306,
MarketAxess stated that the proposed requirements are unnecessary and
burdensome.\1137\ The Commission expects that most, if not all, SEFs
would calculate and prepare financial statements regularly.
Accordingly, the Commission does not believe that requiring SEFs to
meet the quarterly reporting requirements imposes a significant burden
on SEFs. Extrapolation from the prepared financial statements should be
relatively straightforward, but will require staff and technology
resources to calculate, monitor, and report financial resources. In
follow-up conversations with the Commission staff, one commenter
indicated that the reporting requirements would costs SEFs about
$100,000 per year. Given the staffing and operational differences among
SEFs, this cost will vary, perhaps significantly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1137\ MarketAxess Comment Letter at 40 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Benefits
The financial resources provisions ensure the financial stability
of SEFs, which promotes the integrity of the markets and confidence of
market participants trading on SEFs. The requirement that SEFs maintain
six months' worth of unencumbered liquid financial assets (i.e., cash
and/or highly liquid securities) will also promote market integrity by
ensuring that SEFs will have sufficient financial resources to continue
to operate and wind-down in an orderly fashion, if necessary. In
addition, the reporting requirements will ensure that the Commission
can monitor the SEF's compliance with Core Principle 13.
Sections 37.702 and 37.703 promote financial integrity by requiring
SEFs to establish minimum financial standards for its members and to
ensure that they continue to qualify as ECPs.
(d) Consideration of Alternatives
Phoenix recommended only requiring SEFs to maintain financial
resources necessary to operate for six months.\1138\ As described
above, the statute mandates that a SEF maintain sufficient financial
resources to cover its operating expenses for one year. Accordingly,
the Commission does not have the discretion to consider alternative
financial resource requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1138\ Phoenix Comment Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 7, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CME and Phoenix proposed an alternative liquidity requirement,
arguing that a wind-down typically takes three months and that the
proposed requirement of six months of liquid assets should be reduced
accordingly.\1139\ The Commission believes that three months' worth of
liquid financial assets is an insufficient buffer to protect against
events which may threaten a SEF's viability, and believes that six
months of liquid assets will provide enough time for a SEF to liquidate
its other assets so that it may have adequate resources to operate for
up to one year, as required by the statute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1139\ CME Comment Letter at 37 (Feb. 22, 2011); Phoenix Comment
Letter at 4-5 (Mar. 7, 2011). SDMA, however, recommended that the
Commission require that SEFs have at least 12 months of unencumbered
capital. SDMA Comment Letter at 12 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CME stated that it would not be feasible for SEFs to comply with
the proposed 17-business-day filing deadline for submission of the
financial resources report and recommended an alternative reporting
deadline of 40 calendar days after the end of each fiscal quarter and
60 calendar days after the end of each fiscal year.\1140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1140\ CME Comment Letter at 38 (Feb. 22, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is adopting the alternative recommended by CME and
is extending the proposed 17-business-day filing deadline to 40
calendar days for the first three quarters. The Commission's adoption
of this alternative will mitigate the costs of preparing and submitting
these reports as the new extended timeline will harmonize the
Commission's regulations with the SEC's timelines for submission of
Form 10-Q. Similarly, the Commission has extended the filing deadline
to 60 days for the fourth quarter report to harmonize the Commission's
deadline with the SEC's deadline for Form 10-K.
With respect to proposed Sec. 37.703, FXall stated that SEFs would
be burdened by the ``onerous financial surveillance obligations'' and
recommended that a SEF, like a DCM, be able to delegate its financial
surveillance functions to the NFA Joint Audit Committee.\1141\ ABC/
CIEBA stated that the rule would create significant barriers to entry,
stifle competition, and lead to higher prices.\1142\ In response to
these comments, the Commission has revised Sec. 37.703 to remove a
SEF's financial surveillance obligations and to only require that a SEF
monitor its members to ensure that they continue to qualify as ECPs.
This amendment obviates the
[[Page 33580]]
need to delegate any financial surveillance functions and minimizes the
costs imposed by the rule. As a SEF may rely on representations from
its members that they continue to qualify as ECPs, the costs of the
rule should be de minimis and administrative in nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1141\ FXall Comment Letter at 13 (Mar. 8, 2011).
\1142\ ABC/CIEBA Comment Letter at 11 (Mar. 8, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(e) Section 15(a) Factors
(1) Protection of Market Participants and the Public
The financial resources rules will protect market participants and
the public by establishing uniform standards and a system of Commission
oversight that ensures that trading occurs on a financially stable
facility, which in turn, will mitigate the risk of market disruptions,
financial losses, and systemic problems that could arise from a SEF's
failure to maintain adequate financial resources. These requirements
will enable a SEF to fulfill its responsibilities of ensuring that
trading occurs on a liquid, fair, and financially secure platform by
maintaining appropriate minimum financial resources on hand and on an
ongoing basis to sustain operations for a reasonable period of time.
Additionally, in the event that a SEF does have to wind down its
operations, SEFs that have sufficient amounts of liquid financial
resources will be better positioned to close out trading in a manner
not disruptive to market participants or to members of the public who
rely on SEF prices or who are customers or shareholders of market
participants.
(2) Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of the Markets
The financial resources rules promote the financial integrity of
the markets by requiring SEFs to have adequate operating resources
(i.e., operating resources sufficient to fund both current operations
and ensure operations for a sufficient length of time in the future),
and preventing those SEFs that lack these resources from expanding in
ways that may ultimately harm the broader financial market (i.e.,
confining the operations of SEFs to levels their financial resources
can support).
Sections 37.702 and 37.703 will promote financial integrity by
ensuring that SEFs establish minimum financial standards for their
members and monitor those members to ensure that they continue to
qualify as ECPs.
(3) Price Discovery
The Commission has not identified any effects that these rules will
have on price discovery.
(4) Sound Risk Management Practices
By setting specific standards with respect to how SEFs should
assess and monitor the adequacy of their financial resources, the
financial resources rules promote sound risk management practices by
SEFs and further the goal of minimizing systemic risk.
Sections 37.702 and 37.703 will promote sound risk management
practices by ensuring that SEF members have the financial resources
necessary for proper management of the risk associated with their swap
positions. These rules will also further the goal of minimizing
systemic risk.
(5) Other Public Interest Considerations
The Commission has not identified any effects that these rules will
have on other public interest considerations other than those
enumerated above.
8. Emergency Operations and System Safeguards
(a) Background
The Commission's guidance for Core Principle 8 addresses procedures
for handling emergency situations. Specifically, the guidance
referenced in Sec. 37.801 provides that a SEF can comply with Core
Principle 8 by having rules that allow it to intervene as necessary to
maintain markets with fair and orderly trading and to prevent or
address manipulation or disruptive trading practices by, among other
things, imposing or modifying position limits, intraday market
restrictions, or special margin requirements.
Section 37.1401 codifies Core Principle 14 by requiring a SEF to
establish and maintain a program of risk analysis and oversight to
identify and minimize sources of operational risk (Sec. 37.1401(a))
and to maintain a business continuity-disaster recovery (``BC DR'')
plan and resources, emergency procedures, and backup facilities
sufficient to enable timely recovery and resumption of its operations
(Sec. 37.1401(b)). Under Sec. Sec. 37.1401(d)-(e), a SEF must notify
the Commission promptly of certain significant systems malfunctions,
including the activation of the SEF's BC-DR plan, and must provide
advance notice of any material planned changes to automated systems or
risk analysis and oversight programs.
(b) Costs
ISDA estimated that SEFs will spend an average of $1,116,000
initially and $866,000 annually on disaster recovery procedures covered
by the regulations implementing Core Principle 14.\1143\ The Commission
recognizes that the costs of establishing and maintaining backup
facilities could be substantial if the applicant does not already have
these facilities in place to support another business area. The
Commission also notes that the requirement that a SEF establish and
maintain emergency procedures, backup facilities, and a plan for
disaster recovery appears in the statute and is not the product of
Commission discretion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1143\ ISDA Discussion Paper at 32 (Nov. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CME commented that the requirement under proposed Sec. 37.1401(g)
that SEFs provide the Commission with timely advance notice of all
planned changes to automated systems that may impact the reliability of
such systems is burdensome and not cost-effective.\1144\ In response to
this comment, the Commission is reducing the burden and cost associated
with the proposed rule by requiring a SEF to promptly advise the
Commission only of all ``significant'' system malfunctions, and to
provide timely advance notification of only ``material'' changes to
automated systems or risk analysis and oversight programs (the proposed
rule required notice of all system malfunctions and all changes to
programs of risk analysis and oversight).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1144\ CME Comment Letter at 36-37 (Feb. 22, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While no comments addressed the subject directly, the Commission is
also moving several proposed provisions to guidance.\1145\ The
Commission believes that the combination of rules and guidance
governing a SEF's emergency operations will provide SEFs with
sufficient flexibility to develop optimal emergency systems and
procedures, while ensuring that SEFs will also take specific measures
to maintain markets with fair and orderly trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1145\ The Commission is moving the following provisions to
guidance: (1) Proposed Sec. 37.1401(c) suggesting that a SEF follow
generally accepted standards and best practices in addressing the
categories of its risk analysis and oversight program; (2) the
portion of proposed Sec. 37.1401(d) discussing the SEFs obligation
to resume the trading and clearing of swaps on the next business day
following a disruption; (3) the portion of proposed Sec. 37.1401(i)
suggesting that a SEF's testing of its automated systems and
business continuity-disaster recovery capabilities be conducted by
qualified, independent professionals; (4) proposed Sec. 37.1401(j)
discussing a SEF's coordination of its business continuity-disaster
recovery plan with those of others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Benefits
The guidance in appendix B to Core Principle 8 governing emergency
operations ensures that SEFs have flexible authority to take prompt,
decisive action to restore orderly trading
[[Page 33581]]
and respond to market behavior that could cause significant financial
losses and widespread systemic failures that could harm market
participants and the public.
In addition, the rules implementing Core Principle 14 reflect
generally accepted standards and best practices with respect to the
development, operation, reliability, security, and capacity of
automated systems, which will reduce the frequency and severity of
automated system security breaches or functional failures, thereby
augmenting efforts to mitigate systemic risk and ensure market
continuity in the event of system failures. Ensuring the resilience of
the automated systems of a SEF and the ability of a SEF to recover and
resume trading promptly in the event of a disruption of its operations
will be crucial to the robust and transparent systemic risk management
framework established by the Dodd-Frank Act.
Based on the Commission's experience, these requirements reflect
best practices in the futures markets, where DCM compliance with
generally accepted standards and best practices with respect to the
development, operation, reliability, security, and capacity of
automated systems can reduce the frequency and severity of automated
system security breaches or functional failures, thereby augmenting
efforts to mitigate systemic risk. These practices will be well-served
in the swaps markets as well.
Finally, notice to the Commission concerning systems malfunctions,
security incidents, or any events leading to the activation of a SEF's
BC-DR plan will assist the Commission's oversight and its ability to
assess systemic risk levels and intervene when needed to protect market
participants and the public.
(d) Consideration of Alternatives
CME stated that the regulations pursuant to Core Principle 8 should
clarify that a SEF has flexibility and independence to address market
emergencies.\1146\ As discussed in further detail in the preamble, the
Commission did not issue rules for compliance with Core Principle 8.
However, the Commission clarified its guidance to the core principle
and is adopting this cost-mitigating alternative by revising the
guidance to make clear that SEFs retain the authority to respond
independently to emergencies in an effective and timely manner
consistent with the nature of the emergency. Accordingly, a SEF will
have flexibility to address market emergencies using the methods that
it deems to be most appropriate, provided that its actions are taken in
good faith and the Commission is notified of such actions in a
certified rule submission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1146\ CME Comment Letter at 28 (Feb. 22, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(e) Section 15(a) Factors
(1) Protection of Market Participants and the Public
The rules and guidance outlining emergency procedures pursuant to
Core Principles 8 and 14 protect market participants and the public
through both discretionary actions taken by a SEF's management as well
as through automated risk analysis systems that trigger specific
responses. Because automated systems play a central and critical role
in today's electronic financial market environment, oversight of core
principle compliance by SEFs with respect to automated systems is an
essential part of effective oversight of both futures and swaps
markets.
Emergency rules and procedures provide SEFs with the authority and
an established process by which to intervene in markets during times of
crisis so that trading can continue in an orderly manner to the extent
possible and so that potential harm to market participants and the
public can be avoided.
Timely reporting to the Commission of significant system
malfunctions, material planned changes to automated systems, and
material planned changes to programs of risk analysis and oversight is
necessary for the Commission to fulfill its responsibility to oversee
the swaps markets. Timely reporting will also augment the Commission's
efforts to monitor systemic risk (which protects the public), and
ultimately further the protection of market participants and,
indirectly, the public by ensuring that automated systems are
available, reliable, secure, have adequate scalable capacity, and are
effectively overseen.
(2) Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of the Markets
A SEF that has policies and procedures in place addressing its
emergency authority will be better positioned to promptly intervene in
markets to respond to or eliminate conditions that may deter
participation and detract from overall market confidence, which could
lead to diminished market efficiency, competitiveness, and perceptions
of financial integrity. Sophisticated computer systems capable of
automatically predicting operational risks will enhance the efficiency
and financial integrity of the markets by ensuring that in emergency
situations, trading remains uninterrupted and transactional data and
positions are not lost. Active and periodic testing of emergency
systems and procedures promotes confidence in the markets, encouraging
liquidity and stability.
Safeguarding the reliability, security, and capacity of a SEF's
computer systems is also essential to the mitigation of system risk for
the financial system as a whole. The global OTC market is estimated to
have in excess of $600 trillion in outstanding contracts.\1147\ The
ability of SEFs to recover and resume trading promptly in the event of
a disruption in their operations is important to the U.S. economy.
Notice to the Commission concerning systems malfunctions, systems
security incidents, or events leading to the activation of a SEF's BC-
DR plan will assist the Commission's oversight and its ability to
assess systemic risk levels. It would present unacceptable risks to the
U.S. financial system if swaps markets that comprise critical
components of the world financial system were to become unavailable for
an extended period of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1147\ See Statistical release: OTC derivatives statistics at
end-December 2011, The Bank for International Settlements (May
2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1205.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Price Discovery
Any interruption in trading in a swap on a SEF can distort the
price discovery process on other related swaps.\1148\ The Commission
views the emergency operations rules adopted herein as likely to
facilitate the price discovery process by mitigating the risk of
operational market interruptions from disjoining the forces of supply
and demand. The presence of emergency authority procedures signals to
the market that a SEF is a financially sound place to trade, thus
attracting greater liquidity which leads to more accurate price
discovery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1148\ For example, one swap may base its prices on the prices
of one or more other swaps traded on other SEFs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) Sound Risk Management Practices
Participants who use SEF-traded swaps to manage commercial price
risks should benefit from markets that behave in an orderly and
controlled fashion in the face of emergency situations. If prices move
in an uncontrolled fashion due to a market emergency, those who are
managing risk may be forced to exit the market as a result of
unwarranted margin calls or the deterioration of their capital. Those
who want to enter the
[[Page 33582]]
market to manage risk may be able to do so only at prices that do not
reflect the actual supply and demand fundamentals, but have moved due
to an uncontrolled emergency situation.
Reliably functioning computer systems and networks are crucial to
comprehensive risk management, and prompt notice to the Commission
concerning systems malfunctions, systems security incidents, or any
events leading to the activation of a SEF's BC-DR plan will assist the
Commission in its oversight role and bolster its ability to assess
systemic risk levels. Adequate system safeguards and timely notice to
the Commission regarding the status of those safeguards are crucial to
mitigation of potential systemic risks. Should an emergency render a
SEF temporarily inoperable, market participants will continue to be
able to mitigate their risk through open positions transferred from the
inoperable SEF to a functioning one with little to no gap in exposure.
In the event of a longer period of down-time, market participants could
establish functionally equivalent open positions to mimic the intended
result of the swap.
(5) Other Public Interest Considerations
The Commission has not identified any effects that these rules will
have on other public interest considerations other than those
enumerated above.
IV. List of Commenters
1. Alice Corporation (``Alice'')
2. Allston Holdings LLC, on behalf of certain trading firms
(``Allston et al.'')
3. Alternative Investment Management Association (``AIMA'')
4. American Benefits Council/Committee on the Investment of Employee
Benefit Assets (``ABC/CIEBA'')
5. Americans for Financial Reform (``AFR'')
6. Argus Media (``Argus'')
7. Asset Management Group, Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (``SIFMA AMG'')
8. Association of Institutional Investors (``AII'')
9. Better Markets
10. Barclays
11. BlackRock
12. Bloomberg
13. CanDeal.ca Inc. (``CanDeal'')
14. CBOE Futures Exchange (``CBOE'')
15. Chris Barnard
16. CME Group (``CME'')
17. Coalition for Derivatives End-Users (``Coalition'')
18. Commissioner Jill Sommers (``Commissioner Sommers'')
19. David Neal
20. Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (``DTCC'')
21. Deutsche Bank (``Deutsche'')
22. Eaton Vance Management (``Eaton Vance'')
23. Edward Rosen, on behalf of certain dealers (``Rosen et al.'')
24. Edward Rosen, on behalf of certain trade associations (``Rosen
et al. II'')
25. Eris Exchange (``Eris'')
26. Evolution Markets (``Evolution'')
27. Farm Credit Council (``FCC'')
28. Federal Home Loan Banks (``FHLB'')
29. Financial Services Roundtable (``FSR'')
30. Freddie Mac
31. FX Alliance (``FXall'')
32. Geneva Energy Markets, LLC (``Geneva'')
33. GFI Group (``GFI'')
34. Global FX Division AFME, SIFMA and ASIFMA (``Global FX'')
35. Goldman, Sachs & Co. (``Goldman'')
36. ICAP
37. Industrial Energy Consumers of America (``IECA'')
38. Intercontinental Exchange (``ICE'')
39. International Swaps and Derivatives Association (``ISDA'')
40. Joanna Mallers, on behalf of certain trading firms (``Mallers et
al.'')
41. Joint CFTC-SEC Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues
42. JP Morgan
43. LCH.Clearnet Group Limited (``LCH'')
44. Managed Funds Association (``MFA'')
45. MarketAxess Holdings (``MarketAxess'')
46. Markit
47. MarkitSERV
48. MetLife
49. Morgan Stanley
50. National Futures Association (``NFA'')
51. Natural Gas Supply Association (``NGSA'')
52. Nodal Exchange (``Nodal'')
53. NYSE Liffe U.S. (``NYSE Liffe'')
54. Parity Energy
55. Phoenix Partners Group (``Phoenix'')
56. Representative Scott Garrett
57. Representatives Scott Garrett, Gregory Meeks, Robert Hurt, and
Gwen Moore (``Representative Garrett et al.'')
58. State Street Corporation (``State Street'')
59. Swap Execution Facilities Hearing Statements
60. Swaps & Derivatives Market Association (``SDMA'')
61. Thomson Reuters (``Reuters'')
62. Traccr Limited
63. Tradeweb Markets (``Tradeweb'')
64. TriOptima
65. TruMarx Data Partners (``TruMarx'')
66. UBS Securities LLC (``UBS'')
67. Wholesale Markets Brokers' Association, Americas (``WMBAA'')
68. Working Group of Commercial Energy Firms (``Energy Working
Group'')
List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 37
Registered entities, Registration application, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Swaps, Swap execution facilities.
For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Commission revises
17 CFR part 37 to read as follows:
PART 37--SWAP EXECUTION FACILITIES
Subpart A--General Provisions
Sec.
37.1 Scope.
37.2 Applicable provisions.
37.3 Requirements and procedures for registration.
37.4 Procedures for listing products and implementing rules.
37.5 Information relating to swap execution facility compliance.
37.6 Enforceability.
37.7 Prohibited use of data collected for regulatory purposes.
37.8 Boards of trade operating both a designated contract market and
a swap execution facility.
37.9 Methods of execution for required and permitted transactions.
37.10 [Reserved]
Subpart B--Compliance with Core Principles
37.100 Core Principle 1--Compliance with core principles.
Subpart C--Compliance with Rules
37.200 Core Principle 2--Compliance with rules.
37.201 Operation of swap execution facility and compliance with
rules.
37.202 Access requirements.
37.203 Rule enforcement program.
37.204 Regulatory services provided by a third party.
37.205 Audit trail.
37.206 Disciplinary procedures and sanctions.
Subpart D--Swaps Not Readily Susceptible to Manipulation
37.300 Core Principle 3--Swaps not readily susceptible to
manipulation.
37.301 General requirements.
Subpart E--Monitoring of Trading and Trade Processing
37.400 Core Principle 4--Monitoring of trading and trade processing.
37.401 General requirements.
37.402 Additional requirements for physical-delivery swaps.
37.403 Additional requirements for cash-settled swaps.
37.404 Ability to obtain information.
37.405 Risk controls for trading.
37.406 Trade reconstruction.
37.407 Regulatory service provider.
37.408 Additional sources for compliance.
Subpart F--Ability to Obtain Information
37.500 Core Principle 5--Ability to obtain information.
37.501 Establish and enforce rules.
37.502 Collection of information.
37.503 Provide information to the Commission.
37.504 Information-sharing agreements.
Subpart G--Position Limits or Accountability
37.600 Core Principle 6--Position limits or accountability.
37.601 Additional sources for compliance.
Subpart H--Financial Integrity of Transactions
37.700 Core Principle 7--Financial integrity of transactions.
37.701 Required clearing.
[[Page 33583]]
37.702 General financial integrity.
37.703 Monitoring for financial soundness.
Subpart I--Emergency Authority
37.800 Core Principle 8--Emergency authority.
37.801 Additional sources for compliance.
Subpart J--Timely Publication of Trading Information
37.900 Core Principle 9--Timely publication of trading information.
37.901 General requirements.
Subpart K--Recordkeeping and Reporting
37.1000 Core Principle 10--Recordkeeping and reporting.
37.1001 Recordkeeping.
Subpart L--Antitrust Considerations
37.1100 Core Principle 11--Antitrust considerations.
37.1101 Additional sources for compliance.
Subpart M--Conflicts of Interest
37.1200 Core Principle 12--Conflicts of interest.
Subpart N--Financial Resources
37.1300 Core Principle 13--Financial resources.
37.1301 General requirements.
37.1302 Types of financial resources.
37.1303 Computation of projected operating costs to meet financial
resource requirement.
37.1304 Valuation of financial resources.
37.1305 Liquidity of financial resources.
37.1306 Reporting to the Commission.
37.1307 Delegation of authority.
Subpart O--System Safeguards
37.1400 Core Principle 14--System safeguards.
37.1401 Requirements.
Subpart P--Designation of Chief Compliance Officer
37.1500 Core Principle 15--Designation of chief compliance officer.
37.1501 Chief compliance officer.
Appendix A to Part 37--Form SEF
Appendix B to Part 37--Guidance on, and Acceptable Practices in,
Compliance with Core Principles
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 5, 6, 6c, 7, 7a-2, 7b-3, and 12a, as
amended by Titles VII and VIII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
Subpart A--General Provisions
Sec. 37.1 Scope.
The provisions of this part shall apply to every swap execution
facility that is registered or is applying to become registered as a
swap execution facility under section 5h of the Commodity Exchange Act
(``the Act''); provided, however, nothing in this provision affects the
eligibility of swap execution facilities to operate under the
provisions of parts 38 or 49 of this chapter.
Sec. 37.2 Applicable provisions.
A swap execution facility shall comply with the requirements of
this part and all other applicable Commission regulations, including
Sec. 1.60 and part 9 of this chapter, and including any related
definitions and cross-referenced sections.
Sec. 37.3 Requirements and procedures for registration.
(a) Requirements for registration. (1) Any person operating a
facility that offers a trading system or platform in which more than
one market participant has the ability to execute or trade swaps with
more than one other market participant on the system or platform shall
register the facility as a swap execution facility under this part or
as a designated contract market under part 38 of this chapter.
(2) Minimum trading functionality. A swap execution facility shall,
at a minimum, offer an Order Book as defined in paragraph (a)(3) of
this section.
(3) Order book means:
(i) An electronic trading facility, as that term is defined in
section 1a(16) of the Act;
(ii) A trading facility, as that term is defined in section 1a(51)
of the Act; or
(iii) A trading system or platform in which all market participants
in the trading system or platform have the ability to enter multiple
bids and offers, observe or receive bids and offers entered by other
market participants, and transact on such bids and offers.
(b) Procedures for full registration. (1) An applicant requesting
registration as a swap execution facility shall:
(i) File electronically a complete Form SEF as set forth in
appendix A to this part, or any successor forms, and all information
and documentation described in such forms with the Secretary of the
Commission in the form and manner specified by the Commission;
(ii) Provide to the Commission, upon the Commission's request, any
additional information and documentation necessary to review an
application; and
(iii) Request from the Commission a unique, extensible,
alphanumeric code for the purpose of identifying the swap execution
facility pursuant to part 45 of this chapter.
(2) Request for confidential treatment. (i) An applicant requesting
registration as a swap execution facility shall identify with
particularity any information in the application that will be subject
to a request for confidential treatment pursuant to Sec. 145.9 of this
chapter.
(ii) Section 40.8 of this chapter sets forth those sections of the
application that will be made publicly available, notwithstanding a
request for confidential treatment pursuant to Sec. 145.9 of this
chapter.
(3) Amendment of application prior or subsequent to full
registration. An applicant amending a pending application for
registration as a swap execution facility or requesting an amendment to
an order of registration shall file an amended application
electronically with the Secretary of the Commission in the manner
specified by the Commission. A swap execution facility shall file any
amendment to an application subsequent to registration as a submission
under part 40 of this chapter or as specified by the Commission.
(4) Effect of incomplete application. If an application is
incomplete pursuant to paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the Commission
shall notify the applicant that its application will not be deemed to
have been submitted for purposes of the Commission's review.
(5) Commission review period. For an applicant who submits its
application for registration as a swap execution facility on or after
August 5, 2015 the Commission shall review such application pursuant to
the 180-day timeframe and procedures specified in section 6(a) of the
Act.
(6) Commission determination. (i) The Commission shall issue an
order granting registration upon a Commission determination, in its own
discretion, that the applicant has demonstrated compliance with the Act
and the Commission's regulations applicable to swap execution
facilities. If deemed appropriate, the Commission may issue an order
granting registration subject to conditions.
(ii) The Commission may issue an order denying registration upon a
Commission determination, in its own discretion, that the applicant has
not demonstrated compliance with the Act and the Commission's
regulations applicable to swap execution facilities.
(c) Temporary registration. An applicant seeking registration as a
swap execution facility may request that the Commission grant the
applicant temporary registration by complying with the requirements in
paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
(1) Requirements for temporary registration. The Commission shall
grant a request for temporary registration upon a Commission
determination that the applicant has:
(i) Completed all of the requirements under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of
this section; and
[[Page 33584]]
(ii) Submitted a notice to the Commission, concurrent with the
filing of the application under paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section,
requesting that the Commission grant the applicant temporary
registration. An applicant that is currently operating a swaps-trading
platform in reliance upon either an exemption granted by the Commission
or some form of no-action relief granted by the Commission staff shall
include in such notice a certification that the applicant is operating
pursuant to such exemption or no-action relief.
(iii) The Commission may deny a request for temporary registration
upon a Commission determination that the applicant has not met the
requirements under paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and (c)(1)(ii) of this section.
(2) Operation pursuant to a grant of temporary registration. An
applicant may operate as a swap execution facility under temporary
registration upon receipt of a notice from the Commission granting such
temporary registration, but in no case may begin operating as a
temporarily registered swap execution facility before August 5, 2013.
(3) Expiration of temporary registration. The temporary
registration for a swap execution facility shall expire on the earlier
of the date that:
(i) The Commission grants or denies registration of the swap
execution facility as provided under paragraph (b) of this section;
(ii) The swap execution facility withdraws its application for
registration pursuant to paragraph (f) of this section; or
(iii) Temporary registration terminates pursuant to paragraph
(c)(5) of this section.
(4) Effect of temporary registration. A grant of temporary
registration by the Commission does not affect the right of the
Commission to grant or deny registration as provided under paragraph
(b) of this section.
(5) Termination of temporary registration. Paragraph (c) of this
section shall terminate two years from the effective date of this
regulation except as provided for under paragraph (c)(6) of this
section and except for an applicant who requested that the Commission
grant the applicant temporary registration by complying with the
requirements in paragraph (c)(1) of this section before the termination
of paragraph (c) of this section and has not been granted or denied
registration under paragraph (b)(6) of this section by the time of the
termination of paragraph (c) of this section. Such an applicant may
operate as a swap execution facility under temporary registration upon
receipt of a notice from the Commission granting such temporary
registration until the Commission grants or denies registration
pursuant to paragraph (b)(6) of this section. On the termination date
of paragraph (c) of this section, the Commission shall review such
applicant's application pursuant to the time period and procedures in
paragraph (b)(5) of this section.
(6) Temporary registration for applicants that are operational
designated contract markets. An applicant that is an operational
designated contract market and is also seeking to register as a swap
execution facility in order to transfer one or more of its contracts
may request that the Commission grant the applicant temporary
registration by complying with the requirements in paragraph (c)(1) of
this section. The termination of temporary registration provision in
paragraph (c)(5) of this section shall not apply to an applicant that
is a non-dormant designated contract market as described in this
paragraph.
(d) Reinstatement of dormant registration. A dormant swap execution
facility as defined in section 40.1 of this chapter may reinstate its
registration under the procedures of paragraph (b) of this section. The
applicant may rely upon previously submitted materials if such
materials accurately describe the dormant swap execution facility's
conditions at the time that it applies for reinstatement of its
registration.
(e) Request for transfer of registration. (1) A swap execution
facility seeking to transfer its registration from its current legal
entity to a new legal entity as a result of a corporate change shall
file a request for approval to transfer such registration with the
Secretary of the Commission in the form and manner specified by the
Commission.
(2) Timeline for filing a request for transfer of registration. A
request for transfer of registration shall be filed no later than three
months prior to the anticipated corporate change; or in the event that
the swap execution facility could not have known of the anticipated
change three months prior to the anticipated change, as soon as it
knows of such change.
(3) Required information. The request for transfer of registration
shall include the following:
(i) The underlying agreement that governs the corporate change;
(ii) A description of the corporate change, including the reason
for the change and its impact on the swap execution facility, including
its governance and operations, and its impact on the rights and
obligations of market participants;
(iii) A discussion of the transferee's ability to comply with the
Act, including the core principles applicable to swap execution
facilities, and the Commission's regulations thereunder;
(iv) The governing documents of the transferee, including, but not
limited to, articles of incorporation and bylaws;
(v) The transferee's rules marked to show changes from the current
rules of the swap execution facility;
(vi) A representation by the transferee that it:
(A) Will be the surviving entity and successor-in-interest to the
transferor swap execution facility and will retain and assume, without
limitation, all of the assets and liabilities of the transferor;
(B) Will assume responsibility for complying with all applicable
provisions of the Act and the Commission's regulations promulgated
thereunder, including this part and appendices thereto;
(C) Will assume, maintain, and enforce all rules implementing and
complying with the core principles applicable to swap execution
facilities, including the adoption of the transferor's rulebook, as
amended in the request, and that any such amendments will be submitted
to the Commission pursuant to section 5c(c) of the Act and part 40 of
this chapter;
(D) Will comply with all self-regulatory responsibilities except if
otherwise indicated in the request, and will maintain and enforce all
self-regulatory programs; and
(E) Will notify market participants of all changes to the
transferor's rulebook prior to the transfer and will further notify
market participants of the concurrent transfer of the registration to
the transferee upon Commission approval and issuance of an order
permitting this transfer.
(vii) A representation by the transferee that upon the transfer:
(A) It will assume responsibility for and maintain compliance with
core principles for all swaps previously made available for trading
through the transferor, whether by certification or approval; and
(B) None of the proposed rule changes will affect the rights and
obligations of any market participant.
(4) Commission determination. Upon review of a request for transfer
of registration, the Commission, as soon as practicable, shall issue an
order either approving or denying the request.
(f) Request for withdrawal of application for registration. An
applicant for registration as a swap execution facility may withdraw
its application submitted pursuant to
[[Page 33585]]
paragraph (b) of this section by filing a withdrawal request
electronically with the Secretary of the Commission. Withdrawal of an
application for registration shall not affect any action taken or to be
taken by the Commission based upon actions, activities, or events
occurring during the time that the application was pending with the
Commission.
(g) Request for vacation of registration. A swap execution facility
may request that its registration be vacated under section 7 of the Act
by filing a vacation request electronically with the Secretary of the
Commission. Vacation of registration shall not affect any action taken
or to be taken by the Commission based upon actions, activities, or
events occurring during the time that the swap execution facility was
registered by the Commission.
(h) Delegation of authority. The Commission hereby delegates, until
it orders otherwise, to the Director of the Division of Market
Oversight or such other employee or employees as the Director may
designate from time to time, upon consultation with the General Counsel
or the General Counsel's delegate, authority to notify an applicant
seeking registration that its application is incomplete and that it
will not be deemed to have been submitted for purposes of the
Commission's review, to notify an applicant seeking registration under
section 6(a) of the Act that its application is materially incomplete
and the running of the 180-day period is stayed, and to notify an
applicant seeking temporary registration that its request is granted or
denied. The Director may submit to the Commission for its consideration
any matter that has been delegated in this paragraph. Nothing in this
paragraph prohibits the Commission, at its election, from exercising
the authority delegated in this paragraph.
Sec. 37.4 Procedures for listing products and implementing rules.
(a) An applicant for registration as a swap execution facility may
submit a swap's terms and conditions prior to listing the product as
part of its application for registration.
(b) Any swap terms and conditions or rules submitted as part of a
swap execution facility's application for registration shall be
considered for approval by the Commission at the time the Commission
issues the swap execution facility's order of registration.
(c) After the Commission issues the order of registration, a swap
execution facility shall submit a swap's terms and conditions,
including amendments to such terms and conditions, new rules, or rule
amendments pursuant to the procedures under part 40 of this chapter.
(d) Any swap terms and conditions or rules submitted as part of an
application to reinstate the registration of a dormant swap execution
facility, as defined in Sec. 40.1 of this chapter, shall be considered
for approval by the Commission at the time the Commission approves the
dormant swap execution facility's reinstatement of registration.
Sec. 37.5 Information relating to swap execution facility compliance.
(a) Request for information. Upon the Commission's request, a swap
execution facility shall file with the Commission information related
to its business as a swap execution facility in the form and manner and
within the time period as the Commission specifies in its request.
(b) Demonstration of compliance. Upon the Commission's request, a
swap execution facility shall file with the Commission a written
demonstration, containing supporting data, information, and documents
that it is in compliance with one or more core principles or with its
other obligations under the Act or the Commission's regulations as the
Commission specifies in its request. The swap execution facility shall
file such written demonstration in the form and manner and within the
time period as the Commission specifies in its request.
(c) Equity interest transfer--(1) Equity interest transfer
notification. A swap execution facility shall file with the Commission
a notification of each transaction that the swap execution facility
enters into involving the transfer of fifty percent or more of the
equity interest in the swap execution facility. The Commission may,
upon receiving such notification, request supporting documentation of
the transaction.
(2) Timing of notification. The equity interest transfer notice
described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section shall be filed
electronically with the Secretary of the Commission at its Washington,
DC headquarters at [email protected] and the Division of Market
Oversight at [email protected], at the earliest possible time but
in no event later than the open of business ten business days following
the date upon which the swap execution facility enters into a firm
obligation to transfer the equity interest.
(3) Rule filing. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if any aspect of an
equity interest transfer described in paragraph (c)(1) of this section
requires a swap execution facility to file a rule as defined in part 40
of this chapter, then the swap execution facility shall comply with the
requirements of section 5c(c) of the Act and part 40 of this chapter,
and all other applicable Commission regulations.
(4) Certification. Upon a transfer of an equity interest of fifty
percent or more in a swap execution facility, the swap execution
facility shall file electronically with the Secretary of the Commission
at its Washington, DC headquarters at [email protected] and the
Division of Market Oversight at [email protected], a
certification that the swap execution facility meets all of the
requirements of section 5h of the Act and the Commission regulations
adopted thereunder, no later than two business days following the date
on which the equity interest of fifty percent or more was acquired.
(d) Delegation of authority. The Commission hereby delegates, until
it orders otherwise, the authority set forth in this section to the
Director of the Division of Market Oversight or such other employee or
employees as the Director may designate from time to time. The Director
may submit to the Commission for its consideration any matter that has
been delegated in this paragraph. Nothing in this paragraph prohibits
the Commission, at its election, from exercising the authority
delegated in this paragraph.
Sec. 37.6 Enforceability.
(a) A transaction entered into on or pursuant to the rules of a
swap execution facility shall not be void, voidable, subject to
rescission, otherwise invalidated, or rendered unenforceable as a
result of:
(1) A violation by the swap execution facility of the provisions of
section 5h of the Act or this part;
(2) Any Commission proceeding to alter or supplement a rule, term,
or condition under section 8a(7) of the Act or to declare an emergency
under section 8a(9) of the Act; or
(3) Any other proceeding the effect of which is to:
(i) Alter or supplement a specific term or condition or trading
rule or procedure; or
(ii) Require a swap execution facility to adopt a specific term or
condition, trading rule or procedure, or to take or refrain from taking
a specific action.
(b) A swap execution facility shall provide each counterparty to a
transaction that is entered into on or pursuant to the rules of the
swap execution facility with a written record of all of the terms of
the transaction which shall legally supersede any previous agreement
and serve as a confirmation of the transaction. The
[[Page 33586]]
confirmation of all terms of the transaction shall take place at the
same time as execution; provided that specific customer identifiers for
accounts included in bunched orders involving swaps need not be
included in confirmations provided by a swap execution facility if the
applicable requirements of Sec. 1.35(b)(5) of this chapter are met.
Sec. 37.7 Prohibited use of data collected for regulatory purposes.
A swap execution facility shall not use for business or marketing
purposes any proprietary data or personal information it collects or
receives, from or on behalf of any person, for the purpose of
fulfilling its regulatory obligations; provided, however, that a swap
execution facility may use such data or information for business or
marketing purposes if the person from whom it collects or receives such
data or information clearly consents to the swap execution facility's
use of such data or information in such manner. A swap execution
facility shall not condition access to its market(s) or market services
on a person's consent to the swap execution facility's use of
proprietary data or personal information for business or marketing
purposes. A swap execution facility, where necessary for regulatory
purposes, may share such data or information with one or more swap
execution facilities or designated contract markets registered with the
Commission.
Sec. 37.8 Boards of trade operating both a designated contract market
and a swap execution facility.
(a) An entity that intends to operate both a designated contract
market and a swap execution facility shall separately register the two
entities pursuant to the designated contract market designation
procedures set forth in part 38 of this chapter and the swap execution
facility registration procedures set forth in this part. On an ongoing
basis, the entity shall comply with the core principles for designated
contract markets under section 5(d) of the Act and the regulations
under part 38 of this chapter and the core principles for swap
execution facilities under section 5h of the Act and the regulations
under this part.
(b) A board of trade, as defined in section 1a(6) of the Act, that
operates both a designated contract market and a swap execution
facility and that uses the same electronic trade execution system for
executing and trading swaps on the designated contract market and on
the swap execution facility shall clearly identify to market
participants for each swap whether the execution or trading of such
swaps is taking place on the designated contract market or on the swap
execution facility.
Sec. 37.9 Methods of execution for required and permitted
transactions.
(a) Execution methods for required transactions. (1) Required
transaction means any transaction involving a swap that is subject to
the trade execution requirement in section 2(h)(8) of the Act.
(2) Execution methods. (i) Each Required Transaction that is not a
block trade as defined in Sec. 43.2 of this chapter shall be executed
on a swap execution facility in accordance with one of the following
methods of execution:
(A) An Order Book as defined in Sec. 37.3(a)(3); or
(B) A Request for Quote System, as defined in paragraph (a)(3) of
this section, that operates in conjunction with an Order Book as
defined in Sec. 37.3(a)(3).
(ii) In providing either one of the execution methods set forth in
paragraph (a)(2)(i)(A) or (B) of this section, a swap execution
facility may for purposes of execution and communication use any means
of interstate commerce, including, but not limited to, the mail,
internet, email, and telephone, provided that the chosen execution
method satisfies the requirements provided in Sec. 37.3(a)(3) for
Order Books or in paragraph (a)(3) of this section for Request for
Quote Systems.
(3) Request for quote system means a trading system or platform in
which a market participant transmits a request for a quote to buy or
sell a specific instrument to no less than three market participants in
the trading system or platform, to which all such market participants
may respond. The three market participants shall not be affiliates of
or controlled by the requester and shall not be affiliates of or
controlled by each other. A swap execution facility that offers a
request for quote system in connection with Required Transactions shall
provide the following functionality:
(i) At the same time that the requester receives the first
responsive bid or offer, the swap execution facility shall communicate
to the requester any firm bid or offer pertaining to the same
instrument resting on any of the swap execution facility's Order Books,
as defined in Sec. 37.3(a)(3);
(ii) The swap execution facility shall provide the requester with
the ability to execute against such firm resting bids or offers along
with any responsive orders; and
(iii) The swap execution facility shall ensure that its trading
protocols provide each of its market participants with equal priority
in receiving requests for quotes and in transmitting and displaying for
execution responsive orders.
(b) Time delay requirement for required transactions on an order
book--(1) Time delay requirement. A swap execution facility shall
require that a broker or dealer who seeks to either execute against its
customer's order or execute two of its customers' orders against each
other through the swap execution facility's Order Book, following some
form of pre-arrangement or pre-negotiation of such orders, be subject
to at least a 15 second time delay between the entry of those two
orders into the Order Book, such that one side of the potential
transaction is disclosed and made available to other market
participants before the second side of the potential transaction,
whether for the broker's or dealer's own account or for a second
customer, is submitted for execution.
(2) Adjustment of time delay requirement. A swap execution facility
may adjust the time period of the 15 second time delay requirement
described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, based upon a swap's
liquidity or other product-specific considerations; however, the time
delay shall be set for a sufficient period of time so that an order is
exposed to the market and other market participants have a meaningful
opportunity to execute against such order.
(c) Execution methods for permitted transactions. (1) Permitted
transaction means any transaction not involving a swap that is subject
to the trade execution requirement in section 2(h)(8) of the Act.
(2) Execution methods. A swap execution facility may offer any
method of execution for each Permitted Transaction.
Sec. 37.10 [Reserved]
Subpart B--Compliance With Core Principles
Sec. 37.100 Core Principle 1--Compliance with core principles.
(a) In general. To be registered, and maintain registration, as a
swap execution facility, the swap execution facility shall comply
with--
(1) The core principles described in section 5h of the Act; and
(2) Any requirement that the Commission may impose by rule or
regulation pursuant to section 8a(5) of the Act.
[[Page 33587]]
(b) Reasonable discretion of a swap execution facility. Unless
otherwise determined by the Commission by rule or regulation, a swap
execution facility described in paragraph (a) of this section shall
have reasonable discretion in establishing the manner in which the swap
execution facility complies with the core principles described in
section 5h of the Act.
Subpart C--Compliance With Rules
Sec. 37.200 Core Principle 2--Compliance with rules.
A swap execution facility shall:
(a) Establish and enforce compliance with any rule of the swap
execution facility, including the terms and conditions of the swaps
traded or processed on or through the swap execution facility and any
limitation on access to the swap execution facility;
(b) Establish and enforce trading, trade processing, and
participation rules that will deter abuses and have the capacity to
detect, investigate, and enforce those rules, including means to
provide market participants with impartial access to the market and to
capture information that may be used in establishing whether rule
violations have occurred;
(c) Establish rules governing the operation of the facility,
including rules specifying trading procedures to be used in entering
and executing orders traded or posted on the facility, including block
trades; and
(d) Provide by its rules that when a swap dealer or major swap
participant enters into or facilitates a swap that is subject to the
mandatory clearing requirement of section 2(h) of the Act, the swap
dealer or major swap participant shall be responsible for compliance
with the mandatory trading requirement under section 2(h)(8) of the
Act.
Sec. 37.201 Operation of swap execution facility and compliance with
rules.
(a) A swap execution facility shall establish rules governing the
operation of the swap execution facility, including, but not limited
to, rules specifying trading procedures to be followed by members and
market participants when entering and executing orders traded or posted
on the swap execution facility, including block trades, as defined in
part 43 of this chapter, if offered.
(b) A swap execution facility shall establish and impartially
enforce compliance with the rules of the swap execution facility,
including, but not limited to--
(1) The terms and conditions of any swaps traded or processed on or
through the swap execution facility;
(2) Access to the swap execution facility;
(3) Trade practice rules;
(4) Audit trail requirements;
(5) Disciplinary rules; and
(6) Mandatory trading requirements.
Sec. 37.202 Access requirements.
(a) Impartial access to markets and market services. A swap
execution facility shall provide any eligible contract participant and
any independent software vendor with impartial access to its market(s)
and market services, including any indicative quote screens or any
similar pricing data displays, provided that the facility has:
(1) Criteria governing such access that are impartial, transparent,
and applied in a fair and nondiscriminatory manner;
(2) Procedures whereby eligible contract participants provide the
swap execution facility with written or electronic confirmation of
their status as eligible contract participants, as defined by the Act
and Commission regulations, prior to obtaining access; and
(3) Comparable fee structures for eligible contract participants
and independent software vendors receiving comparable access to, or
services from, the swap execution facility.
(b) Jurisdiction. Prior to granting any eligible contract
participant access to its facilities, a swap execution facility shall
require that the eligible contract participant consent to its
jurisdiction.
(c) Limitations on access. A swap execution facility shall
establish and impartially enforce rules governing any decision to
allow, deny, suspend, or permanently bar eligible contract
participants' access to the swap execution facility, including when
such decisions are made as part of a disciplinary or emergency action
taken by the swap execution facility.
Sec. 37.203 Rule enforcement program.
A swap execution facility shall establish and enforce trading,
trade processing, and participation rules that will deter abuses and it
shall have the capacity to detect, investigate, and enforce those
rules.
(a) Abusive trading practices prohibited. A swap execution facility
shall prohibit abusive trading practices on its markets by members and
market participants. Swap execution facilities that permit
intermediation shall prohibit customer-related abuses including, but
not limited to, trading ahead of customer orders, trading against
customer orders, accommodation trading, and improper cross trading.
Specific trading practices that shall be prohibited include front-
running, wash trading, pre-arranged trading (except for block trades
permitted by part 43 of this chapter or other types of transactions
certified to or approved by the Commission pursuant to the procedures
under part 40 of this chapter), fraudulent trading, money passes, and
any other trading practices that a swap execution facility deems to be
abusive. A swap execution facility shall also prohibit any other
manipulative or disruptive trading practices prohibited by the Act or
by the Commission pursuant to Commission regulation.
(b) Capacity to detect and investigate rule violations. A swap
execution facility shall have arrangements and resources for effective
enforcement of its rules. Such arrangements shall include the authority
to collect information and documents on both a routine and non-routine
basis, including the authority to examine books and records kept by the
swap execution facility's members and by persons under investigation. A
swap execution facility's arrangements and resources shall also
facilitate the direct supervision of the market and the analysis of
data collected to determine whether a rule violation has occurred.
(c) Compliance staff and resources. A swap execution facility shall
establish and maintain sufficient compliance staff and resources to
ensure that it can conduct effective audit trail reviews, trade
practice surveillance, market surveillance, and real-time market
monitoring. The swap execution facility's compliance staff shall also
be sufficient to address unusual market or trading events as they
arise, and to conduct and complete investigations in a timely manner,
as set forth in Sec. 37.203(f).
(d) Automated trade surveillance system. A swap execution facility
shall maintain an automated trade surveillance system capable of
detecting potential trade practice violations. The automated trade
surveillance system shall load and process daily orders and trades no
later than 24 hours after the completion of the trading day. The
automated trade surveillance system shall have the capability to detect
and flag specific trade execution patterns and trade anomalies;
compute, retain, and compare trading statistics; compute trade gains,
losses, and swap-equivalent positions; reconstruct the sequence of
market activity; perform market analyses; and support system users to
perform in-depth analyses and ad hoc queries of trade-related data.
[[Page 33588]]
(e) Real-time market monitoring. A swap execution facility shall
conduct real-time market monitoring of all trading activity on its
system(s) or platform(s) to identify disorderly trading and any market
or system anomalies. A swap execution facility shall have the authority
to adjust trade prices or cancel trades when necessary to mitigate
market disrupting events caused by malfunctions in its system(s) or
platform(s) or errors in orders submitted by members and market
participants. Any trade price adjustments or trade cancellations shall
be transparent to the market and subject to standards that are clear,
fair, and publicly available.
(f) Investigations and investigation reports--(1) Procedures. A
swap execution facility shall establish and maintain procedures that
require its compliance staff to conduct investigations of possible rule
violations. An investigation shall be commenced upon the receipt of a
request from Commission staff or upon the discovery or receipt of
information by the swap execution facility that indicates a reasonable
basis for finding that a violation may have occurred or will occur.
(2) Timeliness. Each compliance staff investigation shall be
completed in a timely manner. Absent mitigating factors, a timely
manner is no later than 12 months after the date that an investigation
is opened. Mitigating factors that may reasonably justify an
investigation taking longer than 12 months to complete include the
complexity of the investigation, the number of firms or individuals
involved as potential wrongdoers, the number of potential violations to
be investigated, and the volume of documents and data to be examined
and analyzed by compliance staff.
(3) Investigation reports when a reasonable basis exists for
finding a violation. Compliance staff shall submit a written
investigation report for disciplinary action in every instance in which
compliance staff determines from surveillance or from an investigation
that a reasonable basis exists for finding a rule violation. The
investigation report shall include the reason the investigation was
initiated; a summary of the complaint, if any; the relevant facts;
compliance staff's analysis and conclusions; and a recommendation as to
whether disciplinary action should be pursued.
(4) Investigation reports when no reasonable basis exists for
finding a violation. If after conducting an investigation, compliance
staff determines that no reasonable basis exists for finding a rule
violation, it shall prepare a written report including the reason the
investigation was initiated; a summary of the complaint, if any; the
relevant facts; and compliance staff's analysis and conclusions.
(5) Warning letters. No more than one warning letter may be issued
to the same person or entity found to have committed the same rule
violation within a rolling twelve month period.
(g) Additional sources for compliance. A swap execution facility
may refer to the guidance and/or acceptable practices in Appendix B of
this part to demonstrate to the Commission compliance with the
requirements of Sec. 37.203.
Sec. 37.204 Regulatory services provided by a third party.
(a) Use of regulatory service provider permitted. A swap execution
facility may choose to contract with a registered futures association
or another registered entity, as such terms are defined under the Act,
or the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (collectively,
``regulatory service providers''), for the provision of services to
assist in complying with the Act and Commission regulations thereunder,
as approved by the Commission. Any swap execution facility that chooses
to contract with a regulatory service provider shall ensure that such
provider has the capacity and resources necessary to provide timely and
effective regulatory services, including adequate staff and automated
surveillance systems. A swap execution facility shall at all times
remain responsible for the performance of any regulatory services
received, for compliance with the swap execution facility's obligations
under the Act and Commission regulations, and for the regulatory
service provider's performance on its behalf.
(b) Duty to supervise regulatory service provider. A swap execution
facility that elects to use the service of a regulatory service
provider shall retain sufficient compliance staff to supervise the
quality and effectiveness of the regulatory services provided on its
behalf. Compliance staff of the swap execution facility shall hold
regular meetings with the regulatory service provider to discuss
ongoing investigations, trading patterns, market participants, and any
other matters of regulatory concern. A swap execution facility shall
also conduct periodic reviews of the adequacy and effectiveness of
services provided on its behalf. Such reviews shall be documented
carefully and made available to the Commission upon request.
(c) Regulatory decisions required from the swap execution facility.
A swap execution facility that elects to use the service of a
regulatory service provider shall retain exclusive authority in all
substantive decisions made by its regulatory service provider,
including, but not limited to, decisions involving the cancellation of
trades, the issuance of disciplinary charges against members or market
participants, and denials of access to the trading platform for
disciplinary reasons. A swap execution facility shall document any
instances where its actions differ from those recommended by its
regulatory service provider, including the reasons for the course of
action recommended by the regulatory service provider and the reasons
why the swap execution facility chose a different course of action.
Sec. 37.205 Audit trail.
A swap execution facility shall establish procedures to capture and
retain information that may be used in establishing whether rule
violations have occurred.
(a) Audit trail required. A swap execution facility shall capture
and retain all audit trail data necessary to detect, investigate, and
prevent customer and market abuses. Such data shall be sufficient to
reconstruct all indications of interest, requests for quotes, orders,
and trades within a reasonable period of time and to provide evidence
of any violations of the rules of the swap execution facility. An
acceptable audit trail shall also permit the swap execution facility to
track a customer order from the time of receipt through fill,
allocation, or other disposition, and shall include both order and
trade data.
(b) Elements of an acceptable audit trail program--(1) Original
source documents. A swap execution facility's audit trail shall include
original source documents. Original source documents include
unalterable, sequentially-identified records on which trade execution
information is originally recorded, whether recorded manually or
electronically. Records for customer orders (whether filled, unfilled,
or cancelled, each of which shall be retained or electronically
captured) shall reflect the terms of the order, an account identifier
that relates back to the account(s) owner(s), the time of order entry,
and the time of trade execution. Swap execution facilities shall
require that all orders, indications of interest, and requests for
quotes be immediately captured in the audit trail.
[[Page 33589]]
(2) Transaction history database. A swap execution facility's audit
trail program shall include an electronic transaction history database.
An adequate transaction history database includes a history of all
indications of interest, requests for quotes, orders, and trades
entered into a swap execution facility's trading system or platform,
including all order modifications and cancellations. An adequate
transaction history database also includes:
(i) All data that are input into the trade entry or matching system
for the transaction to match and clear;
(ii) The customer type indicator code;
(iii) Timing and sequencing data adequate to reconstruct trading;
and
(iv) Identification of each account to which fills are allocated.
(3) Electronic analysis capability. A swap execution facility's
audit trail program shall include electronic analysis capability with
respect to all audit trail data in the transaction history database.
Such electronic analysis capability shall ensure that the swap
execution facility has the ability to reconstruct indications of
interest, requests for quotes, orders, and trades, and identify
possible trading violations with respect to both customer and market
abuse.
(4) Safe storage capability. A swap execution facility's audit
trail program shall include the capability to safely store all audit
trail data retained in its transaction history database. Such safe
storage capability shall include the capability to store all data in
the database in a manner that protects it from unauthorized alteration,
as well as from accidental erasure or other loss. Data shall be
retained in accordance with the recordkeeping requirements of Core
Principle 10 for swap execution facilities and the associated
regulations in subpart K of this part.
(c) Enforcement of audit trail requirements--(1) Annual audit trail
and recordkeeping reviews. A swap execution facility shall enforce its
audit trail and recordkeeping requirements through at least annual
reviews of all members and persons and firms subject to the swap
execution facility's recordkeeping rules to verify their compliance
with the swap execution facility's audit trail and recordkeeping
requirements. Such reviews shall include, but are not limited to,
reviews of randomly selected samples of front-end audit trail data for
order routing systems; a review of the process by which user
identifications are assigned and user identification records are
maintained; a review of usage patterns associated with user
identifications to monitor for violations of user identification rules;
and reviews of account numbers and customer type indicator codes in
trade records to test for accuracy and improper use.
(2) Enforcement program required. A swap execution facility shall
establish a program for effective enforcement of its audit trail and
recordkeeping requirements. An effective program shall identify members
and persons and firms subject to the swap execution facility's
recordkeeping rules that have failed to maintain high levels of
compliance with such requirements, and impose meaningful sanctions when
deficiencies are found. Sanctions shall be sufficient to deter
recidivist behavior. No more than one warning letter shall be issued to
the same person or entity found to have committed the same violation of
audit trail or recordkeeping requirements within a rolling twelve month
period.
Sec. 37.206 Disciplinary procedures and sanctions.
A swap execution facility shall establish trading, trade
processing, and participation rules that will deter abuses and have the
capacity to enforce such rules through prompt and effective
disciplinary action, including suspension or expulsion of members or
market participants that violate the rules of the swap execution
facility.
(a) Enforcement staff. A swap execution facility shall establish
and maintain sufficient enforcement staff and resources to effectively
and promptly prosecute possible rule violations within the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the swap execution facility.
(b) Disciplinary panels. A swap execution facility shall establish
one or more disciplinary panels that are authorized to fulfill their
obligations under the rules of this subpart. Disciplinary panels shall
meet the composition requirements of part 40 of this chapter, and shall
not include any members of the swap execution facility's compliance
staff or any person involved in adjudicating any other stage of the
same proceeding.
(c) Hearings. A swap execution facility shall adopt rules that
provide for the following minimum requirements for any hearing:
(1) The hearing shall be fair, shall be conducted before members of
the disciplinary panel, and shall be promptly convened after reasonable
notice to the respondent; and
(2) If the respondent has requested a hearing, a copy of the
hearing shall be made and shall become a part of the record of the
proceeding. The record shall not be required to be transcribed unless:
(i) The transcript is requested by Commission staff or the
respondent;
(ii) The decision is appealed pursuant to the rules of the swap
execution facility; or
(iii) The decision is reviewed by the Commission pursuant to
section 8c of the Act or part 9 of this chapter. In all other
instances, a summary record of a hearing is permitted.
(d) Decisions. Promptly following a hearing conducted in accordance
with the rules of the swap execution facility, the disciplinary panel
shall render a written decision based upon the weight of the evidence
contained in the record of the proceeding and shall provide a copy to
the respondent. The decision shall include:
(1) The notice of charges or a summary of the charges;
(2) The answer, if any, or a summary of the answer;
(3) A summary of the evidence produced at the hearing or, where
appropriate, incorporation by reference of the investigation report;
(4) A statement of findings and conclusions with respect to each
charge, and a complete explanation of the evidentiary and other basis
for such findings and conclusions with respect to each charge;
(5) An indication of each specific rule that the respondent was
found to have violated; and
(6) A declaration of all sanctions imposed against the respondent,
including the basis for such sanctions and the effective date of such
sanctions.
(e) Disciplinary sanctions. All disciplinary sanctions imposed by a
swap execution facility or its disciplinary panels shall be
commensurate with the violations committed and shall be clearly
sufficient to deter recidivism or similar violations by other market
participants. All disciplinary sanctions, including sanctions imposed
pursuant to an accepted settlement offer, shall take into account the
respondent's disciplinary history. In the event of demonstrated
customer harm, any disciplinary sanction shall also include full
customer restitution, except where the amount of restitution or to whom
it should be provided cannot be reasonably determined.
(f) Warning letters. Where a rule violation is found to have
occurred, no more than one warning letter may be issued per rolling
twelve month period for the same violation.
(g) Additional sources for compliance. A swap execution facility
may refer to the guidance and/or acceptable
[[Page 33590]]
practices in Appendix B of this part to demonstrate to the Commission
compliance with the requirements of Sec. 37.206.
Subpart D--Swaps Not Readily Susceptible to Manipulation
Sec. 37.300 Core Principle 3--Swaps not readily susceptible to
manipulation.
The swap execution facility shall permit trading only in swaps that
are not readily susceptible to manipulation.
Sec. 37.301 General requirements.
To demonstrate to the Commission compliance with the requirements
of Sec. 37.300, a swap execution facility shall, at the time it
submits a new swap contract in advance to the Commission pursuant to
part 40 of this chapter, provide the applicable information as set
forth in Appendix C to part 38 of this chapter--Demonstration of
Compliance That a Contract is not Readily Susceptible to Manipulation.
A swap execution facility may also refer to the guidance and/or
acceptable practices in Appendix B of this part.
Subpart E--Monitoring of Trading and Trade Processing
Sec. 37.400 Core Principle 4--Monitoring of trading and trade
processing.
The swap execution facility shall:
(a) Establish and enforce rules or terms and conditions defining,
or specifications detailing:
(1) Trading procedures to be used in entering and executing orders
traded on or through the facilities of the swap execution facility; and
(2) Procedures for trade processing of swaps on or through the
facilities of the swap execution facility; and
(b) Monitor trading in swaps to prevent manipulation, price
distortion, and disruptions of the delivery or cash settlement process
through surveillance, compliance, and disciplinary practices and
procedures, including methods for conducting real-time monitoring of
trading and comprehensive and accurate trade reconstructions.
Sec. 37.401 General requirements.
A swap execution facility shall:
(a) Collect and evaluate data on its market participants' market
activity on an ongoing basis in order to detect and prevent
manipulation, price distortions, and, where possible, disruptions of
the physical-delivery or cash-settlement process;
(b) Monitor and evaluate general market data in order to detect and
prevent manipulative activity that would result in the failure of the
market price to reflect the normal forces of supply and demand;
(c) Demonstrate an effective program for conducting real-time
monitoring of trading for the purpose of detecting and resolving
abnormalities; and
(d) Demonstrate the ability to comprehensively and accurately
reconstruct daily trading activity for the purpose of detecting
instances or threats of manipulation, price distortion, and
disruptions.
Sec. 37.402 Additional requirements for physical-delivery swaps.
For physical-delivery swaps, the swap execution facility shall
demonstrate that it:
(a) Monitors a swap's terms and conditions as they relate to the
underlying commodity market; and
(b) Monitors the availability of the supply of the commodity
specified by the delivery requirements of the swap.
Sec. 37.403 Additional requirements for cash-settled swaps.
(a) For cash-settled swaps, the swap execution facility shall
demonstrate that it monitors the pricing of the reference price used to
determine cash flows or settlement;
(b) For cash-settled swaps listed on the swap execution facility
where the reference price is formulated and computed by the swap
execution facility, the swap execution facility shall demonstrate that
it monitors the continued appropriateness of its methodology for
deriving that price; and
(c) For cash-settled swaps listed on the swap execution facility
where the reference price relies on a third-party index or instrument,
including an index or instrument traded on another venue, the swap
execution facility shall demonstrate that it monitors the continued
appropriateness of the index or instrument.
Sec. 37.404 Ability to obtain information.
(a) A swap execution facility shall demonstrate that it has access
to sufficient information to assess whether trading in swaps listed on
its market, in the index or instrument used as a reference price, or in
the underlying commodity for its listed swaps is being used to affect
prices on its market.
(b) A swap execution facility shall have rules that require its
market participants to keep records of their trading, including records
of their activity in the index or instrument used as a reference price,
the underlying commodity, and related derivatives markets, and make
such records available, upon request, to the swap execution facility
or, if applicable, to its regulatory service provider, and the
Commission.
Sec. 37.405 Risk controls for trading.
The swap execution facility shall establish and maintain risk
control mechanisms to prevent and reduce the potential risk of market
disruptions, including, but not limited to, market restrictions that
pause or halt trading under market conditions prescribed by the swap
execution facility.
Sec. 37.406 Trade reconstruction.
The swap execution facility shall have the ability to
comprehensively and accurately reconstruct all trading on its facility.
All audit-trail data and reconstructions shall be made available to the
Commission in a form, manner, and time that is acceptable to the
Commission.
Sec. 37.407 Regulatory service provider.
A swap execution facility shall comply with the regulations in this
subpart through a dedicated regulatory department or by contracting
with a regulatory service provider pursuant to Sec. 37.204.
Sec. 37.408 Additional sources for compliance.
A swap execution facility may refer to the guidance and/or
acceptable practices in Appendix B of this part to demonstrate to the
Commission compliance with the requirements of Sec. 37.400.
Subpart F--Ability to Obtain Information
Sec. 37.500 Core Principle 5--Ability to obtain information.
The swap execution facility shall:
(a) Establish and enforce rules that will allow the facility to
obtain any necessary information to perform any of the functions
described in section 5h of the Act;
(b) Provide the information to the Commission on request; and
(c) Have the capacity to carry out such international information-
sharing agreements as the Commission may require.
Sec. 37.501 Establish and enforce rules.
A swap execution facility shall establish and enforce rules that
will allow the swap execution facility to have the ability and
authority to obtain sufficient information to allow it to fully perform
its operational, risk management, governance, and regulatory functions
and any requirements under this part, including the capacity to carry
out international information-sharing agreements as the Commission may
require.
[[Page 33591]]
Sec. 37.502 Collection of information.
A swap execution facility shall have rules that allow it to collect
information on a routine basis, allow for the collection of non-routine
data from its market participants, and allow for its examination of
books and records kept by the market participants on its facility.
Sec. 37.503 Provide information to the Commission.
A swap execution facility shall provide information in its
possession to the Commission upon request, in a form and manner that
the Commission approves.
Sec. 37.504 Information-sharing agreements.
A swap execution facility shall share information with other
regulatory organizations, data repositories, and third-party data
reporting services as required by the Commission or as otherwise
necessary and appropriate to fulfill its self-regulatory and reporting
responsibilities. Appropriate information-sharing agreements can be
established with such entities or the Commission can act in conjunction
with the swap execution facility to carry out such information sharing.
Subpart G--Position Limits or Accountability
Sec. 37.600 Core Principle 6--Position limits or accountability.
(a) In general. To reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or congestion, especially during trading in the delivery
month, a swap execution facility that is a trading facility shall adopt
for each of the contracts of the facility, as is necessary and
appropriate, position limitations or position accountability for
speculators.
(b) Position limits. For any contract that is subject to a position
limitation established by the Commission pursuant to section 4a(a) of
the Act, the swap execution facility shall:
(1) Set its position limitation at a level no higher than the
Commission limitation; and
(2) Monitor positions established on or through the swap execution
facility for compliance with the limit set by the Commission and the
limit, if any, set by the swap execution facility.
Sec. 37.601 Additional sources for compliance.
Until such time that compliance is required under part 151 of this
chapter, a swap execution facility may refer to the guidance and/or
acceptable practices in Appendix B of this part to demonstrate to the
Commission compliance with the requirements of Sec. 37.600.
Subpart H--Financial Integrity of Transactions
Sec. 37.700 Core Principle 7--Financial integrity of transactions.
The swap execution facility shall establish and enforce rules and
procedures for ensuring the financial integrity of swaps entered on or
through the facilities of the swap execution facility, including the
clearance and settlement of the swaps pursuant to section 2(h)(1) of
the Act.
Sec. 37.701 Required clearing.
Transactions executed on or through the swap execution facility
that are required to be cleared under section 2(h)(1)(A) of the Act or
are voluntarily cleared by the counterparties shall be cleared through
a Commission-registered derivatives clearing organization, or a
derivatives clearing organization that the Commission has determined is
exempt from registration.
Sec. 37.702 General financial integrity.
A swap execution facility shall provide for the financial integrity
of its transactions:
(a) By establishing minimum financial standards for its members,
which shall, at a minimum, require that members qualify as an eligible
contract participant as defined in section 1a(18) of the Act;
(b) [Reserved]
Sec. 37.703 Monitoring for financial soundness.
A swap execution facility shall monitor its members to ensure that
they continue to qualify as eligible contract participants as defined
in section 1a(18) of the Act.
Subpart I--Emergency Authority
Sec. 37.800 Core Principle 8--Emergency authority.
The swap execution facility shall adopt rules to provide for the
exercise of emergency authority, in consultation or cooperation with
the Commission, as is necessary and appropriate, including the
authority to liquidate or transfer open positions in any swap or to
suspend or curtail trading in a swap.
Sec. 37.801 Additional sources for compliance.
A swap execution facility may refer to the guidance and/or
acceptable practices in Appendix B of this part to demonstrate to the
Commission compliance with the requirements of Sec. 37.800.
Subpart J--Timely Publication of Trading Information
Sec. 37.900 Core Principle 9--Timely publication of trading
information.
(a) In general. The swap execution facility shall make public
timely information on price, trading volume, and other trading data on
swaps to the extent prescribed by the Commission.
(b) Capacity of swap execution facility. The swap execution
facility shall be required to have the capacity to electronically
capture and transmit trade information with respect to transactions
executed on the facility.
Sec. 37.901 General requirements.
With respect to swaps traded on or through a swap execution
facility, each swap execution facility shall:
(a) Report specified swap data as provided under part 43 and part
45 of this chapter; and
(b) Meet the requirements of part 16 of this chapter.
Subpart K--Recordkeeping and Reporting
Sec. 37.1000 Core Principle 10--Recordkeeping and reporting.
(a) In general. A swap execution facility shall:
(1) Maintain records of all activities relating to the business of
the facility, including a complete audit trail, in a form and manner
acceptable to the Commission for a period of five years;
(2) Report to the Commission, in a form and manner acceptable to
the Commission, such information as the Commission determines to be
necessary or appropriate for the Commission to perform the duties of
the Commission under the Act; and
(3) Keep any such records relating to swaps defined in section
1a(47)(A)(v) of the Act open to inspection and examination by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
(b) Requirements. The Commission shall adopt data collection and
reporting requirements for swap execution facilities that are
comparable to corresponding requirements for derivatives clearing
organizations and swap data repositories.
Sec. 37.1001 Recordkeeping.
A swap execution facility shall maintain records of all activities
relating to the business of the facility, in a form and manner
acceptable to the Commission, for a period of at least five years. A
swap execution facility shall maintain such records, including a
complete audit trail for all swaps executed on or subject to the rules
of the swap execution facility, investigatory
[[Page 33592]]
files, and disciplinary files, in accordance with the requirements of
Sec. 1.31 and part 45 of this chapter.
Subpart L--Antitrust Considerations
Sec. 37.1100 Core Principle 11--Antitrust considerations.
Unless necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of the Act,
the swap execution facility shall not:
(a) Adopt any rules or take any actions that result in any
unreasonable restraint of trade; or
(b) Impose any material anticompetitive burden on trading or
clearing.
Sec. 37.1101 Additional sources for compliance.
A swap execution facility may refer to the guidance and/or
acceptable practices in Appendix B of this part to demonstrate to the
Commission compliance with the requirements of Sec. 37.1100.
Subpart M--Conflicts of Interest
Sec. 37.1200 Core Principle 12--Conflicts of interest.
The swap execution facility shall:
(a) Establish and enforce rules to minimize conflicts of interest
in its decision-making process; and
(b) Establish a process for resolving the conflicts of interest.
Subpart N--Financial Resources
Sec. 37.1300 Core Principle 13--Financial resources.
(a) In general. The swap execution facility shall have adequate
financial, operational, and managerial resources to discharge each
responsibility of the swap execution facility.
(b) Determination of resource adequacy. The financial resources of
a swap execution facility shall be considered to be adequate if the
value of the financial resources exceeds the total amount that would
enable the swap execution facility to cover the operating costs of the
swap execution facility for a one-year period, as calculated on a
rolling basis.
Sec. 37.1301 General requirements.
(a) A swap execution facility shall maintain financial resources
sufficient to enable it to perform its functions in compliance with the
core principles set forth in section 5h of the Act.
(b) An entity that operates as both a swap execution facility and a
derivatives clearing organization shall also comply with the financial
resource requirements of Sec. 39.11 of this chapter.
(c) Financial resources shall be considered sufficient if their
value is at least equal to a total amount that would enable the swap
execution facility to cover its operating costs for a period of at
least one year, calculated on a rolling basis.
Sec. 37.1302 Types of financial resources.
Financial resources available to satisfy the requirements of Sec.
37.1301 may include:
(a) The swap execution facility's own capital, meaning its assets
minus its liabilities calculated in accordance with U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles; and
(b) Any other financial resource deemed acceptable by the
Commission.
Sec. 37.1303 Computation of projected operating costs to meet
financial resource requirement.
A swap execution facility shall, each fiscal quarter, make a
reasonable calculation of its projected operating costs over a twelve-
month period in order to determine the amount needed to meet the
requirements of Sec. 37.1301. The swap execution facility shall have
reasonable discretion in determining the methodology used to compute
such projected operating costs. The Commission may review the
methodology and require changes as appropriate.
Sec. 37.1304 Valuation of financial resources.
No less than each fiscal quarter, a swap execution facility shall
compute the current market value of each financial resource used to
meet its obligations under Sec. 37.1301. Reductions in value to
reflect market and credit risk (``haircuts'') shall be applied as
appropriate.
Sec. 37.1305 Liquidity of financial resources.
The financial resources allocated by the swap execution facility to
meet the requirements of Sec. 37.1301 shall include unencumbered,
liquid financial assets (i.e., cash and/or highly liquid securities)
equal to at least six months' operating costs. If any portion of such
financial resources is not sufficiently liquid, the swap execution
facility may take into account a committed line of credit or similar
facility for the purpose of meeting this requirement.
Sec. 37.1306 Reporting to the Commission.
(a) Each fiscal quarter, or at any time upon Commission request, a
swap execution facility shall:
(1) Report to the Commission:
(i) The amount of financial resources necessary to meet the
requirements of Sec. 37.1301; and
(ii) The value of each financial resource available, computed in
accordance with the requirements of Sec. 37.1304;
(2) Provide the Commission with a financial statement, including
the balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flows of the
swap execution facility or of its parent company;
(b) The calculations required by paragraph (a) of this section
shall be made as of the last business day of the swap execution
facility's fiscal quarter.
(c) The swap execution facility shall provide the Commission with:
(1) Sufficient documentation explaining the methodology used to
compute its financial requirements under Sec. 37.1301;
(2) Sufficient documentation explaining the basis for its
determinations regarding the valuation and liquidity requirements set
forth in Sec. Sec. 37.1304 and 37.1305; and
(3) Copies of any agreements establishing or amending a credit
facility, insurance coverage, or other arrangement evidencing or
otherwise supporting the swap execution facility's conclusions.
(d) The reports required by this section shall be filed not later
than 40 calendar days after the end of the swap execution facility's
first three fiscal quarters, and not later than 60 calendar days after
the end of the swap execution facility's fourth fiscal quarter, or at
such later time as the Commission may permit, in its discretion, upon
request by the swap execution facility.
Sec. 37.1307 Delegation of authority.
(a) The Commission hereby delegates, until it orders otherwise, to
the Director of the Division of Market Oversight or such other employee
or employees as the Director may designate from time to time, authority
to:
(1) Determine whether a particular financial resource under Sec.
37.1302 may be used to satisfy the requirements of Sec. 37.1301;
(2) Review and make changes to the methodology used to compute
projected operating costs under Sec. 37.1303;
(3) Request reports, in addition to fiscal quarter reports, under
Sec. 37.1306(a); and
(4) Grant an extension of time to file fiscal quarter reports under
Sec. 37.1306(d).
(b) The Director may submit to the Commission for its consideration
any matter that has been delegated in this section. Nothing in this
section prohibits the Commission, at its election, from exercising the
authority delegated in this section.
[[Page 33593]]
Subpart O--System Safeguards
Sec. 37.1400 Core Principle 14--System safeguards.
The swap execution facility shall:
(a) Establish and maintain a program of risk analysis and oversight
to identify and minimize sources of operational risk, through the
development of appropriate controls and procedures, and automated
systems, that:
(1) Are reliable and secure; and
(2) Have adequate scalable capacity;
(b) Establish and maintain emergency procedures, backup facilities,
and a plan for disaster recovery that allow for:
(1) The timely recovery and resumption of operations; and
(2) The fulfillment of the responsibilities and obligations of the
swap execution facility; and
(c) Periodically conduct tests to verify that the backup resources
of the swap execution facility are sufficient to ensure continued:
(1) Order processing and trade matching;
(2) Price reporting;
(3) Market surveillance; and
(4) Maintenance of a comprehensive and accurate audit trail.
Sec. 37.1401 Requirements.
(a) A swap execution facility's program of risk analysis and
oversight with respect to its operations and automated systems shall
address each of the following categories of risk analysis and
oversight:
(1) Information security;
(2) Business continuity-disaster recovery planning and resources;
(3) Capacity and performance planning;
(4) Systems operations;
(5) Systems development and quality assurance; and
(6) Physical security and environmental controls.
(b) A swap execution facility shall maintain a business continuity-
disaster recovery plan and resources, emergency procedures, and backup
facilities sufficient to enable timely recovery and resumption of its
operations and resumption of its ongoing fulfillment of its
responsibilities and obligations as a swap execution facility following
any disruption of its operations. Such responsibilities and obligations
include, without limitation, order processing and trade matching;
transmission of matched orders to a designated clearing organization
for clearing, where appropriate; price reporting; market surveillance;
and maintenance of a comprehensive audit trail. The swap execution
facility's business continuity-disaster recovery plan and resources
generally should enable resumption of trading and clearing of swaps
executed on the swap execution facility during the next business day
following the disruption. Swap execution facilities determined by the
Commission to be critical financial markets pursuant to Appendix E to
part 40 of this chapter are subject to more stringent requirements in
this regard, set forth in Sec. 40.9 of this chapter.
(c) A swap execution facility that is not determined by the
Commission to be a critical financial market satisfies the requirement
to be able to resume its operations and resume its ongoing fulfillment
of its responsibilities and obligations during the next business day
following any disruption of its operations by maintaining either:
(1) Infrastructure and personnel resources of its own that are
sufficient to ensure timely recovery and resumption of its operations
and resumption of its ongoing fulfillment of its responsibilities and
obligations as a swap execution facility following any disruption of
its operations; or
(2) Contractual arrangements with other swap execution facilities
or disaster recovery service providers, as appropriate, that are
sufficient to ensure continued trading and clearing of swaps executed
on the swap execution facility, and ongoing fulfillment of all of the
swap execution facility's responsibilities and obligations with respect
to such swaps, in the event that a disruption renders the swap
execution facility temporarily or permanently unable to satisfy this
requirement on its own behalf.
(d) A swap execution facility shall notify Commission staff
promptly of all:
(1) Electronic trading halts and material system malfunctions;
(2) Cyber security incidents or targeted threats that actually or
potentially jeopardize automated system operation, reliability,
security, or capacity; and
(3) Activations of the swap execution facility's business
continuity-disaster recovery plan.
(e) A swap execution facility shall provide Commission staff timely
advance notice of all material:
(1) Planned changes to automated systems that may impact the
reliability, security, or adequate scalable capacity of such systems;
and
(2) Planned changes to the swap execution facility's program of
risk analysis and oversight.
(f) A swap execution facility shall provide to the Commission, upon
request, current copies of its business continuity-disaster recovery
plan and other emergency procedures, its assessments of its operational
risks, and other documents requested by Commission staff for the
purpose of maintaining a current profile of the swap execution
facility's automated systems.
(g) A swap execution facility shall conduct regular, periodic,
objective testing and review of its automated systems to ensure that
they are reliable, secure, and have adequate scalable capacity. A swap
execution facility shall also conduct regular, periodic testing and
review of its business continuity-disaster recovery capabilities.
Pursuant to Core Principle 10 under section 5h of the Act
(Recordkeeping and Reporting) and Sec. Sec. 37.1000 through 37.1001,
the swap execution facility shall keep records of all such tests, and
make all test results available to the Commission upon request.
(h) Part 40 of this chapter governs the obligations of those
registered entities that the Commission has determined to be critical
financial markets, with respect to maintenance and geographic dispersal
of disaster recovery resources sufficient to meet a same-day recovery
time objective in the event of a wide-scale disruption. Section 40.9
establishes the requirements for core principle compliance in that
respect.
Subpart P--Designation of Chief Compliance Officer
Sec. 37.1500 Core Principle 15--Designation of chief compliance
officer.
(a) In general. Each swap execution facility shall designate an
individual to serve as a chief compliance officer.
(b) Duties. The chief compliance officer shall:
(1) Report directly to the board or to the senior officer of the
facility;
(2) Review compliance with the core principles in this subsection;
(3) In consultation with the board of the facility, a body
performing a function similar to that of a board, or the senior officer
of the facility, resolve any conflicts of interest that may arise;
(4) Be responsible for establishing and administering the policies
and procedures required to be established pursuant to this section;
(5) Ensure compliance with the Act and the rules and regulations
issued under the Act, including rules prescribed by the Commission
pursuant to section 5h of the Act; and
(6) Establish procedures for the remediation of noncompliance
issues found during compliance office reviews, look backs, internal or
external audit findings, self-reported errors, or through validated
complaints.
(c) Requirements for procedures. In establishing procedures under
[[Page 33594]]
paragraph (b)(6) of this section, the chief compliance officer shall
design the procedures to establish the handling, management response,
remediation, retesting, and closing of noncompliance issues.
(d) Annual reports--(1) In general. In accordance with rules
prescribed by the Commission, the chief compliance officer shall
annually prepare and sign a report that contains a description of:
(i) The compliance of the swap execution facility with the Act; and
(ii) The policies and procedures, including the code of ethics and
conflict of interest policies, of the swap execution facility.
(2) Requirements. The chief compliance officer shall:
(i) Submit each report described in paragraph (d)(1) of this
section with the appropriate financial report of the swap execution
facility that is required to be submitted to the Commission pursuant to
section 5h of the Act; and
(ii) Include in the report a certification that, under penalty of
law, the report is accurate and complete.
Sec. 37.1501 Chief compliance officer.
(a) Definition of board of directors. For purposes of this part,
the term ``board of directors'' means the board of directors of a swap
execution facility, or for those swap execution facilities whose
organizational structure does not include a board of directors, a body
performing a function similar to a board of directors.
(b) Designation and qualifications of chief compliance officer--(1)
Chief compliance officer required. Each swap execution facility shall
establish the position of chief compliance officer and designate an
individual to serve in that capacity.
(i) The position of chief compliance officer shall carry with it
the authority and resources to develop and enforce policies and
procedures necessary to fulfill the duties set forth for chief
compliance officers in the Act and Commission regulations.
(ii) The chief compliance officer shall have supervisory authority
over all staff acting at the direction of the chief compliance officer.
(2) Qualifications of chief compliance officer. The individual
designated to serve as chief compliance officer shall have the
background and skills appropriate for fulfilling the responsibilities
of the position. No individual disqualified from registration pursuant
to sections 8a(2) or 8a(3) of the Act may serve as a chief compliance
officer.
(c) Appointment, supervision, and removal of chief compliance
office--(1) Appointment and compensation of chief compliance officer.
(i) A swap execution facility's chief compliance officer shall be
appointed by its board of directors or senior officer. A swap execution
facility shall notify the Commission within two business days of
appointing any new chief compliance officer, whether interim or
permanent.
(ii) The board of directors or the senior officer shall approve the
compensation of the chief compliance officer.
(iii) The chief compliance officer shall meet with the board of
directors at least annually and the regulatory oversight committee at
least quarterly.
(iv) The chief compliance officer shall provide any information
regarding the swap execution facility's self-regulatory program that is
requested by the board of directors or the regulatory oversight
committee.
(2) Supervision of chief compliance officer. A swap execution
facility's chief compliance officer shall report directly to the board
of directors or to the senior officer of the swap execution facility,
at the swap execution facility's discretion.
(3) Removal of chief compliance officer. (i) Removal of a swap
execution facility's chief compliance officer shall require the
approval of a majority of the swap execution facility's board of
directors. If the swap execution facility does not have a board of
directors, then the chief compliance officer may be removed by the
senior officer of the swap execution facility.
(ii) The swap execution facility shall notify the Commission of
such removal within two business days.
(d) Duties of chief compliance officer. The chief compliance
officer's duties shall include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Overseeing and reviewing the swap execution facility's
compliance with section 5h of the Act and any related rules adopted by
the Commission;
(2) In consultation with the board of directors, a body performing
a function similar to the board of directors, or the senior officer of
the swap execution facility, resolving any conflicts of interest that
may arise, including:
(i) Conflicts between business considerations and compliance
requirements;
(ii) Conflicts between business considerations and the requirement
that the swap execution facility provide fair, open, and impartial
access as set forth in Sec. 37.202; and;
(iii) Conflicts between a swap execution facility's management and
members of the board of directors;
(3) Establishing and administering written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Act and the rules of
the Commission;
(4) Taking reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the Act and
the rules of the Commission;
(5) Establishing procedures for the remediation of noncompliance
issues identified by the chief compliance officer through a compliance
office review, look-back, internal or external audit finding, self-
reported error, or validated complaint;
(6) Establishing and following appropriate procedures for the
handling, management response, remediation, retesting, and closing of
noncompliance issues;
(7) Establishing and administering a compliance manual designed to
promote compliance with the applicable laws, rules, and regulations and
a written code of ethics designed to prevent ethical violations and to
promote honesty and ethical conduct;
(8) Supervising the swap execution facility's self-regulatory
program with respect to trade practice surveillance; market
surveillance; real-time market monitoring; compliance with audit trail
requirements; enforcement and disciplinary proceedings; audits,
examinations, and other regulatory responsibilities with respect to
members and market participants (including ensuring compliance with, if
applicable, financial integrity, financial reporting, sales practice,
recordkeeping, and other requirements); and
(9) Supervising the effectiveness and sufficiency of any regulatory
services provided to the swap execution facility by a regulatory
service provider in accordance with Sec. 37.204.
(e) Preparation of annual compliance report. The chief compliance
officer shall, not less than annually, prepare and sign an annual
compliance report that, at a minimum, contains the following
information covering the time period since the date on which the swap
execution facility became registered with the Commission or since the
end of the period covered by a previously filed annual compliance
report, as applicable:
(1) A description of the swap execution facility's written policies
and procedures, including the code of ethics and conflict of interest
policies;
(2) A review of applicable Commission regulations and each
subsection and core principle of section 5h of the Act, that, with
respect to each:
(i) Identifies the policies and procedures that are designed to
ensure compliance with each subsection and
[[Page 33595]]
core principle, including each duty specified in section 5h(f)(15)(B)
of the Act;
(ii) Provides a self-assessment as to the effectiveness of these
policies and procedures; and
(iii) Discusses areas for improvement and recommends potential or
prospective changes or improvements to its compliance program and
resources;
(3) A list of any material changes to compliance policies and
procedures since the last annual compliance report;
(4) A description of the financial, managerial, and operational
resources set aside for compliance with respect to the Act and
Commission regulations, including a description of the swap execution
facility's self-regulatory program's staffing and structure, a
catalogue of investigations and disciplinary actions taken since the
last annual compliance report, and a review of the performance of
disciplinary committees and panels;
(5) A description of any material compliance matters, including
noncompliance issues identified through a compliance office review,
look-back, internal or external audit finding, self-reported error, or
validated complaint, and an explanation of how they were resolved; and
(6) A certification by the chief compliance officer that, to the
best of his or her knowledge and reasonable belief, and under penalty
of law, the annual compliance report is accurate and complete.
(f) Submission of annual compliance report. (1) Prior to submission
to the Commission, the chief compliance officer shall provide the
annual compliance report to the board of directors of the swap
execution facility for its review. If the swap execution facility does
not have a board of directors, then the annual compliance report shall
be provided to the senior officer for his or her review. Members of the
board of directors and the senior officer shall not require the chief
compliance officer to make any changes to the report. Submission of the
report to the board of directors or the senior officer, and any
subsequent discussion of the report, shall be recorded in board minutes
or a similar written record, as evidence of compliance with this
requirement.
(2) The annual compliance report shall be submitted electronically
to the Commission not later than 60 calendar days after the end of the
swap execution facility's fiscal year, concurrently with the filing of
the fourth fiscal quarter financial report pursuant to Sec. 37.1306.
(3) Promptly upon discovery of any material error or omission made
in a previously filed annual compliance report, the chief compliance
officer shall file an amendment with the Commission to correct the
material error or omission. An amendment shall contain the
certification required under paragraph (e)(6) of this section.
(4) A swap execution facility may request from the Commission an
extension of time to file its annual compliance report based on
substantial, undue hardship. Extensions of the filing deadline may be
granted at the discretion of the Commission.
(g) Recordkeeping. (1) The swap execution facility shall maintain:
(i) A copy of the written policies and procedures, including the
code of ethics and conflicts of interest policies adopted in
furtherance of compliance with the Act and Commission regulations;
(ii) Copies of all materials created in furtherance of the chief
compliance officer's duties listed in paragraphs (d)(8) and (d)(9) of
this section, including records of any investigations or disciplinary
actions taken by the swap execution facility;
(iii) Copies of all materials, including written reports provided
to the board of directors or senior officer in connection with the
review of the annual compliance report under paragraph (f)(1) of this
section and the board minutes or a similar written record that
documents the review of the annual compliance report by the board of
directors or senior officer; and
(iv) Any records relevant to the swap execution facility's annual
compliance report, including, but not limited to, work papers and other
documents that form the basis of the report, and memoranda,
correspondence, other documents, and records that are
(A) Created, sent, or received in connection with the annual
compliance report and
(B) Contain conclusions, opinions, analyses, or financial data
related to the annual compliance report.
(2) The swap execution facility shall maintain records in
accordance with Sec. 1.31 and part 45 of this chapter.
(h) Delegation of authority. The Commission hereby delegates, until
it orders otherwise, to the Director of the Division of Market
Oversight or such other employee or employees as the Director may
designate from time to time, authority to grant or deny a swap
execution facility's request for an extension of time to file its
annual compliance report under paragraph (f)(4) of this section.
Appendix A to Part 37--Form SEF
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
FORM SEF
SWAP EXECUTION FACILITY APPLICATION OR AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION
Registration Instructions
Intentional misstatements or omissions of material fact may
constitute federal criminal violations (7 U.S.C. Sec. 13 and 18
U.S.C. Sec. 1001) or grounds for disqualification from
registration.
DEFINITIONS
Unless the context requires otherwise, all terms used in this
Form SEF have the same meaning as in the Commodity Exchange Act, as
amended (``Act''), and in the General Rules and Regulations of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``Commission'') thereunder.
For the purposes of this Form SEF, the term ``Applicant'' shall
include any applicant for registration as a swap execution facility,
any applicant amending a pending application, or any registered swap
execution facility that is applying for an amendment to its order of
registration.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
1. This Form SEF, which includes instructions, a Cover Sheet,
and required Exhibits (together, ``Form SEF''), is to be filed with
the Commission by all Applicants, pursuant to section 5h of the Act
and the Commission's regulations thereunder. Applicants may prepare
their own Form SEF but must follow the format prescribed herein.
Upon the filing of an application for registration or a registration
amendment in accordance with the instructions provided herein, the
Commission will publish notice of the filing and afford interested
persons an opportunity to submit written data, views, and arguments
concerning such application. No application for registration or
registration amendment shall be effective unless the Commission, by
order, grants such registration or amended registration.
2. Individuals' names, except the executing signature, shall be
given in full (Last Name, First Name, Middle Name).
3. Signatures on all copies of the Form SEF filed with the
Commission can be executed electronically. If this Form SEF is filed
by a corporation, it shall be signed in the name of the corporation
by a principal officer duly authorized; if filed by a limited
liability company, it shall be signed in the name of the limited
liability company by a manager or member duly authorized to sign on
the limited liability company's behalf; if filed by a partnership,
it shall be signed in the name of the partnership by a general
partner duly authorized; if filed by an unincorporated organization
or association which is not a partnership, it shall be signed in the
name of such organization or association by the managing agent,
i.e., a duly authorized person who directs or manages or who
participates in the directing or managing of its affairs.
4. If this Form SEF is being filed as an application for
registration, all applicable
[[Page 33596]]
items must be answered in full. If any item is inapplicable,
indicate by ``none,'' ``not applicable,'' or ``N/A,'' as
appropriate.
5. Under section 5h of the Act and the Commission's regulations
thereunder, the Commission is authorized to solicit the information
required to be supplied by this Form SEF from any Applicant seeking
registration as a swap execution facility and from any registered
swap execution facility. Disclosure by the Applicant of the
information specified on this Form SEF is mandatory prior to the
start of the processing of an application for, or an amendment to,
registration as a swap execution facility. The information provided
in this Form SEF will be used for the principal purpose of
determining whether the Commission should grant or deny registration
to an Applicant. The Commission may determine that additional
information is required from the Applicant in order to process its
application. A Form SEF which is not prepared and executed in
compliance with applicable requirements and instructions may be
returned as not acceptable for filing. Acceptance of this Form SEF,
however, shall not constitute a finding that the Form SEF has been
filed as required or that the information submitted is true,
current, or complete.
6. Except in cases where confidential treatment is requested by
the Applicant and granted by the Commission pursuant to the Freedom
of Information Act and the rules of the Commission thereunder,
information supplied on this Form SEF will be included routinely in
the public files of the Commission and will be available for
inspection by any interested person.
APPLICATION AMENDMENTS
1. An Applicant amending a pending application for registration
as a swap execution facility or requesting an amendment to an order
of registration shall file an amended Form SEF electronically with
the Secretary of the Commission in the manner specified by the
Commission. Otherwise, a swap execution facility shall file any
amendment to this Form SEF as a submission under part 40 of the
Commission's regulations or as specified by the Commission.
2. When filing this Form SEF for purposes of amending a pending
application or requesting an amendment to an order of registration,
Applicants must re-file the Cover Sheet, amended if necessary and
including an executing signature, and attach thereto revised
Exhibits or other materials marked to show changes, as applicable.
The submission of an amendment represents that the remaining items
and Exhibits that are not amended remain true, current, and complete
as previously filed.
WHERE TO FILE
This Form SEF must be filed electronically with the Secretary of
the Commission in the manner specified by the Commission.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
FORM SEF
SWAP EXECUTION FACILITY APPLICATION OR AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION
Cover Sheet
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Exact name of Applicant as specified in charter
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Address of principal executive offices
[square] If this is an APPLICATION for registration, complete in
full and check here.
[square] If this is an AMENDMENT to an application, or to an
existing order of registration, list all items that are amended and
check here.
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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GENERAL INFORMATION
1. Name under which the business of the swap execution facility is
or will be conducted, if different than name specified above (include
acronyms, if any):
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2. If name of swap execution facility is being amended, state
previous swap execution facility name:
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3. Contact information, including mailing address if different than
address specified above:
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Number and Street
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
City State Country Zip Code
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Main Phone Number Fax
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Web site URL Email Address
4. List of principal office(s) and address(es) where swap execution
facility activities are/will be conducted:
Office
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Address
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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5. If the Applicant is a successor to a previously registered swap
execution facility, please complete the following:
a. Date of succession
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b. Full name and address of predecessor registrant
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Name
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Number and Street
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
City State Country Zip Code
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Main Phone Number Web site URL
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
6. Applicant is a:
[square] Corporation
[square] Partnership
[square] Limited Liability Company
[square] Other form of organization (specify)
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7. Date of incorporation or formation:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
8. State of incorporation or jurisdiction of organization:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
9. The Applicant agrees and consents that the notice of any
proceeding before the Commission in connection with this application
may be given by sending such notice by certified mail to the person
named below at the address given.
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Print Name and Title
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Name of Applicant
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Number and Street
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
City State Zip Code
SIGNATURES
10. The Applicant has duly caused this application or amendment to
be signed on its behalf by the undersigned, hereunto duly authorized,
this ------ day of ------------, 20----. The Applicant and the
undersigned represent hereby that all information contained herein is
true, current, and complete. It is understood that all required items
and Exhibits are considered integral parts of this Form SEF and that
the submission of any amendment represents that all unamended items and
Exhibits remain true, current, and complete as previously filed.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Name of Applicant
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Signature of Duly Authorized Person
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Print Name and Title of Signatory
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
FORM SEF
SWAP EXECUTION FACILITY APPLICATION OR AMENDMENT TO APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION
Exhibits Instructions
The following Exhibits must be filed with the Commission by each
Applicant applying for registration as a swap execution facility, or by
a registered
[[Page 33597]]
swap execution facility amending its registration, pursuant to section
5h of the Act and the Commission's regulations thereunder. The Exhibits
must be labeled according to the items specified in this Form SEF.
The application must include a Table of Contents listing each
Exhibit required by this Form SEF and indicating which, if any,
Exhibits are inapplicable. For any Exhibit that is inapplicable, next
to the Exhibit letter specify ``none,'' ``not applicable,'' or ``N/A,''
as appropriate.
If the Applicant is a newly formed enterprise and does not have the
financial statements required pursuant to Items 9 and 10 (Exhibits I
and J) of this Form SEF, the Applicant should provide pro forma
financial statements for the most recent six months or since inception,
whichever is less.
List of Exhibits
EXHIBITS--BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
1. Attach as Exhibit A, the name of any person who owns ten percent
(10%) or more of the Applicant's stock or who, either directly or
indirectly, through agreement or otherwise, in any other manner, may
control or direct the management or policies of the Applicant.
Provide as part of Exhibit A the full name and address of each such
person and attach a copy of the agreement or, if there is none written,
describe the agreement or basis upon which such person exercises or may
exercise such control or direction.
2. Attach as Exhibit B, a list of the present officers, directors,
governors (and, in the case of an Applicant that is not a corporation,
the members of all standing committees, grouped by committee), or
persons performing functions similar to any of the foregoing, of the
swap execution facility or of any entity that performs the regulatory
activities of the Applicant, indicating for each:
a. Name
b. Title
c. Dates of commencement and termination of present term of office
or position
d. Length of time each present officer, director, or governor has
held the same office or position
e. Brief account of the business experience of each officer and
director over the last five (5) years
f. Any other business affiliations in the derivatives and securities
industry
g. For directors, list any committees on which they serve and any
compensation received by virtue of their directorship
h. A description of:
(1) Any order of the Commission with respect to such person
pursuant to section 5e of the Act;
(2) Any conviction or injunction against such person within the
past ten (10) years;
(3) Any disciplinary action with respect to such person within
the last five (5) years;
(4) Any disqualification under sections 8b and 8d of the Act;
(5) Any disciplinary action under section 8c of the Act; and
(6) Any violation pursuant to section 9 of the Act.
3. Attach as Exhibit C, a narrative that sets forth the fitness
standards for the Board of Directors and its composition including
the number and percentage of public directors.
4. Attach as Exhibit D, a narrative or graphic description of
the organizational structure of the Applicant. Include a list of all
affiliates of the Applicant and indicate the general nature of the
affiliation. Note: If the swap execution facility activities of the
Applicant are or will be conducted primarily by a division,
subdivision, or other separate entity within the Applicant,
corporation, or organization, describe the relationship of such
entity within the overall organizational structure and attach as
Exhibit D a description only as it applies to the division,
subdivision, or separate entity, as applicable. Additionally,
provide any relevant jurisdictional information, including any and
all jurisdictions in which the Applicant or any affiliated entity
are doing business, and registration status, including pending
applications (e.g., country, regulator, registration category, date
of registration). Provide the address for legal service of process
for each jurisdiction, which cannot be a post office box.
5. Attach as Exhibit E, a description of the personnel
qualifications for each category of professional employees employed
by the Applicant or the division, subdivision, or other separate
entity within the Applicant as described in Item 4.
6. Attach as Exhibit F, an analysis of staffing requirements
necessary to carry out the operations of the Applicant as a swap
execution facility and the name and qualifications of each key staff
person.
7. Attach as Exhibit G, a copy of the constitution, articles of
incorporation, formation, or association with all amendments
thereto, partnership or limited liability agreements, and existing
by-laws, operating agreement, rules or instruments corresponding
thereto, of the Applicant. Include any additional governance fitness
information not included in Exhibit C. Provide a certificate of good
standing dated within one week of the date of this Form SEF.
8. Attach as Exhibit H, a brief description of any material
pending legal proceeding(s), other than ordinary and routine
litigation incidental to the business, to which the Applicant or any
of its affiliates is a party or to which any of its or their
property is the subject. Include the name of the court or agency
where the proceeding(s) are pending, the date(s) instituted, the
principal parties involved, a description of the factual basis
alleged to underlie the proceeding(s), and the relief sought.
Include similar information as to any proceeding(s) known to be
contemplated by the governmental agencies.
EXHIBITS--FINANCIAL INFORMATION
9. Attach as Exhibit I:
a. (i) Balance sheet, (ii) Statement of income and expenses,
(iii) Statement of cash flows, and (iv) Statement of sources and
application of revenues and all notes or schedules thereto, as of
the most recent fiscal year of the Applicant, or of its parent
company, if applicable. If a balance sheet and any statement(s)
certified by an independent public accountant are available, that
balance sheet and statement(s) should be submitted as Exhibit I.
b. Provide a narrative of how the value of the financial
resources of the Applicant is at least equal to a total amount that
would enable the Applicant to cover its operating costs for a period
of at least one year, calculated on a rolling basis, and whether
such financial resources include unencumbered, liquid financial
assets (i.e., cash and/or highly liquid securities) equal to at
least six months' operating costs.
c. Attach copies of any agreements establishing or amending a
credit facility, insurance coverage, or other arrangement evidencing
or otherwise supporting the Applicant's conclusions regarding the
liquidity of its financial assets.
d. Representations regarding sources and estimates for future
ongoing operational resources.
10. Attach as Exhibit J, a balance sheet and an income and
expense statement for each affiliate of the swap execution facility
that also engages in swap execution facility activities or that
engages in designated contract market activities as of the end of
the most recent fiscal year of each such affiliate.
11. Attach as Exhibit K, the following:
a. A complete list of all dues, fees, and other charges imposed,
or to be imposed, by or on behalf of the Applicant for its swap
execution facility services that are provided on an exclusive basis
and identify the service or services provided for each such due,
fee, or other charge.
b. A description of the basis and methods used in determining
the level and structure of the dues, fees, and other charges listed
in paragraph (a) of this item.
c. If the Applicant differentiates, or proposes to
differentiate, among its customers or classes of customers in the
amount of any dues, fees, or other charges imposed for the same or
similar exclusive services, describe and indicate the amount of each
differential. In addition, identify and describe any differences in
the cost of providing such services and any other factors that
account for such differentiations.
EXHIBITS--COMPLIANCE
12. Attach as Exhibit L, a narrative and any other form of
documentation that may be provided under other Exhibits herein, that
describes the manner in which the Applicant is able to comply with
each core principle. Such documentation must include a regulatory
compliance chart setting forth each core principle and providing
citations to the Applicant's relevant rules, policies, and
procedures that address each core principle. To the extent that the
application raises issues that are novel or for which compliance
with a core principle is not self-evident,
[[Page 33598]]
include an explanation of how that item and the application satisfy
the core principles.
13. Attach as Exhibit M, a copy of the Applicant's rules (as
defined in Sec. 40.1 of the Commission's regulations) and any
technical manuals, other guides, or instructions for users of, or
participants in, the market, including minimum financial standards
for members or market participants. Include rules citing applicable
federal position limits and aggregation standards in part 151 of the
Commission's regulations and any facility set position limit rules.
Include rules on publication of daily trading information with
regards to the requirements of part 16 of the Commission's
regulations. The Applicant should include an explanation and any
other form of documentation that the Applicant thinks will be
helpful to its explanation, demonstrating how its rules, technical
manuals, other guides, or instructions for users of, or participants
in, the market, or minimum financial standards for members or market
participants as provided in this Exhibit M help support the swap
execution facility's compliance with the core principles.
14. Attach as Exhibit N, executed or executable copies of any
agreements or contracts entered into or to be entered into by the
Applicant, including third party regulatory service provider or
member or user agreements that enable or empower the Applicant to
comply with applicable core principles. Identify: (1) the services
that will be provided; and (2) the core principles addressed by such
agreement.
15. Attach as Exhibit O, a copy of any compliance manual and any
other documents that describe with specificity the manner in which
the Applicant will conduct trade practice, market, and financial
surveillance.
16. Attach as Exhibit P, a description of the Applicant's
disciplinary and enforcement protocols, tools, and procedures and,
if applicable, the arrangements for alternative dispute resolution.
17. Attach as Exhibit Q, an explanation regarding the operation
of the Applicant's trading system(s) or platform(s) and the manner
in which the system(s) or platform(s) satisfy any Commission rules,
interpretations, or guidelines regarding a swap execution facility's
execution methods, including the minimum trading functionality
requirement in Sec. 37.3(a)(2) of the Commission's regulations.
This explanation should include, as applicable, the following:
a. For trading systems or platforms that enable market
participants to engage in transactions through an order book:
(1) How the trading system or platform displays all orders and
trades in an electronic or other form, and the timeliness in which
the trading system or platform does so;
(2) How all market participants have the ability to see and have
the ability to transact on all bids and offers; and
(3) An explanation of the trade matching algorithm, if
applicable, and examples of how that algorithm works in various
trading scenarios involving various types of orders.
b. For trading systems or platforms that enable market
participants to engage in transactions through a request for quote
system:
(1) How a market participant transmits a request for a quote to
buy or sell a specific instrument to no less than three market
participants in the trading system or platform, to which all such
market participants may respond;
(2) How resting bids or offers from the Applicant's Order Book
are communicated to the requester; and
(3) How a requester may transact on resting bids or offers along
with the responsive orders.
c. How the timing delay described under Sec. 37.9 of the
Commission's regulations is incorporated into the trading system or
platform.
18. Attach as Exhibit R, a list of rules prohibiting specific
trade practice violations.
19. Attach as Exhibit S, a discussion of how trading data will
be maintained by the swap execution facility.
20. Attach as Exhibit T, a list of the name of the clearing
organization(s) that will be clearing the Applicant's trades, and a
representation that clearing members of that organization will be
guaranteeing such trades.
21. Attach as Exhibit U, any information (described with
particularity) included in the application that will be subject to a
request for confidential treatment pursuant to Sec. 145.9 of the
Commission's regulations.
EXHIBITS--OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY
22. Attach as Exhibit V, information responsive to the
Technology Questionnaire. This questionnaire focuses on information
pertaining to the Applicant's program of risk analysis and
oversight. Main topic areas include: information security; business
continuity-disaster recovery planning and resources; capacity and
performance planning; systems operations; systems development and
quality assurance; and physical security and environmental controls.
The questionnaire will be provided to Applicants on the Commission's
Web site.
Appendix B to Part 37--Guidance on, and Acceptable Practices in,
Compliance with Core Principles
1. This appendix provides guidance on complying with core
principles, both initially and on an ongoing basis, to maintain
registration under section 5h of the Act and this part 37. Where
provided, guidance is set forth in paragraph (a) following the
relevant heading and can be used to demonstrate to the Commission
compliance with the selected requirements of a core principle of
this part 37. The guidance for the core principle is illustrative
only of the types of matters a swap execution facility may address,
as applicable, and is not intended to be used as a mandatory
checklist. Addressing the issues set forth in this appendix would
help the Commission in its consideration of whether the swap
execution facility is in compliance with the selected requirements
of a core principle; provided however, that the guidance is not
intended to diminish or replace, in any event, the obligations and
requirements of applicants and swap execution facilities to comply
with the regulations provided under this part 37.
2. Where provided, acceptable practices meeting selected
requirements of core principles are set forth in paragraph (b)
following the guidance. Swap execution facilities that follow
specific practices outlined in the acceptable practices for a core
principle in this appendix will meet the selected requirements of
the applicable core principle; provided however, that the acceptable
practice is not intended to diminish or replace, in any event, the
obligations and requirements of applicants and swap execution
facilities to comply with the regulations provided under this part
37. The acceptable practices are for illustrative purposes only and
do not state the exclusive means for satisfying a core principle.
Core Principle 1 of Section 5h of the Act--Compliance With Core
Principles
(A) In general. To be registered, and maintain registration, as
a swap execution facility, the swap execution facility shall comply
with--the core principles described in section 5h of the Act; and
any requirement that the Commission may impose by rule or regulation
pursuant to section 8a(5) of the Act.
(B) Reasonable discretion of swap execution facility. Unless
otherwise determined by the Commission by rule or regulation, a swap
execution facility described in paragraph (A) shall have reasonable
discretion in establishing the manner in which the swap execution
facility complies with the core principles described in section 5h
of the Act.
(a) Guidance. [Reserved]
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 2 of Section 5h of the Act--Compliance With Rules
A swap execution facility shall:
(A) Establish and enforce compliance with any rule of the swap
execution facility, including the terms and conditions of the swaps
traded or processed on or through the swap execution facility and
any limitation on access to the swap execution facility;
(B) Establish and enforce trading, trade processing, and
participation rules that will deter abuses and have the capacity to
detect, investigate, and enforce those rules, including means to
provide market participants with impartial access to the market and
to capture information that may be used in establishing whether rule
violations have occurred;
(C) Establish rules governing the operation of the facility,
including rules specifying trading procedures to be used in entering
and executing orders traded or posted on the facility, including
block trades; and
(D) Provide by its rules that when a swap dealer or major swap
participant enters into or facilitates a swap that is subject to the
mandatory clearing requirement of section 2(h) of the Act, the swap
dealer or major swap participant shall be responsible for compliance
with the mandatory trading requirement under section 2(h)(8) of the
Act.
(a) Guidance.
(1) Investigations and investigation reports--Warning letters.
The rules of a swap execution facility may authorize its compliance
staff to issue a warning letter to a person or entity under
investigation or to recommend that a disciplinary panel take such an
action.
[[Page 33599]]
(2) Additional rules required. A swap execution facility should
adopt and enforce any additional rules that it believes are
necessary to comply with the requirements of Sec. 37.203.
(3) Enforcement staff. A swap execution facility's enforcement
staff should not include either members of the swap execution
facility or persons whose interests conflict with their enforcement
duties. A member of the enforcement staff should not operate under
the direction or control of any person or persons with trading
privileges at the swap execution facility. A swap execution
facility's enforcement staff may operate as part of the swap
execution facility's compliance department.
(4) Notice of charges. If compliance staff authorized by a swap
execution facility or a swap execution facility disciplinary panel
determines, based upon reviewing an investigation report pursuant to
Sec. 37.203(f)(3), that a reasonable basis exists for finding a
violation and adjudication is warranted, it should direct that the
person or entity alleged to have committed the violation be served
with a notice of charges and should proceed in accordance with this
guidance. A notice of charges should adequately state the acts,
conduct, or practices in which the respondent is alleged to have
engaged; state the rule, or rules, alleged to have been violated (or
about to be violated); advise the respondent that it is entitled,
upon request, to a hearing on the charges; and prescribe the period
within which a hearing on the charges may be requested. If the rules
of the swap execution facility so provide, a notice may also advise:
(i) That failure to request a hearing within the period
prescribed in the notice, except for good cause, may be deemed a
waiver of the right to a hearing; and
(ii) That failure to answer or to deny expressly a charge may be
deemed to be an admission of such charge.
(5) Right to representation. Upon being served with a notice of
charges, a respondent should have the right to be represented by
legal counsel or any other representative of its choosing in all
succeeding stages of the disciplinary process, except by any member
of the swap execution facility's board of directors or disciplinary
panel, any employee of the swap execution facility, or any person
substantially related to the underlying investigations, such as a
material witness or respondent.
(6) Answer to charges. A respondent should be given a reasonable
period of time to file an answer to a notice of charges. The rules
of a swap execution facility governing the requirements and
timeliness of a respondent's answer to a notice of charges should be
fair, equitable, and publicly available.
(7) Admission or failure to deny charges. The rules of a swap
execution facility may provide that if a respondent admits or fails
to deny any of the charges, a disciplinary panel may find that the
violations alleged in the notice of charges for which the respondent
admitted or failed to deny any of the charges have been committed.
If the swap execution facility's rules so provide, then:
(i) The disciplinary panel should impose a sanction for each
violation found to have been committed;
(ii) The disciplinary panel should promptly notify the
respondent in writing of any sanction to be imposed pursuant to
paragraph (7)(i) of this guidance and shall advise the respondent
that it may request a hearing on such sanction within the period of
time, which shall be stated in the notice;
(iii) The rules of a swap execution facility may provide that if
a respondent fails to request a hearing within the period of time
stated in the notice, the respondent will be deemed to have accepted
the sanction.
(8) Denial of charges and right to hearing. In every instance
where a respondent has requested a hearing on a charge that is
denied, or on a sanction set by the disciplinary panel, the
respondent should be given an opportunity for a hearing in
accordance with the rules of the swap execution facility.
(9) Settlement offers. (i) The rules of a swap execution
facility may permit a respondent to submit a written offer of
settlement at any time after an investigation report is completed.
The disciplinary panel presiding over the matter may accept the
offer of settlement, but may not alter the terms of a settlement
offer unless the respondent agrees.
(ii) The rules of a swap execution facility may provide that, in
its discretion, a disciplinary panel may permit the respondent to
accept a sanction without either admitting or denying the rule
violations upon which the sanction is based.
(iii) If an offer of settlement is accepted, the panel accepting
the offer should issue a written decision specifying the rule
violations it has reason to believe were committed, including the
basis or reasons for the panel's conclusions, and any sanction to be
imposed, which should include full customer restitution where
customer harm is demonstrated, except where the amount of
restitution or to whom it should be provided cannot be reasonably
determined. If an offer of settlement is accepted without the
agreement of the enforcement staff, the decision should adequately
support the disciplinary panel's acceptance of the settlement. Where
applicable, the decision should also include a statement that the
respondent has accepted the sanctions imposed without either
admitting or denying the rule violations.
(iv) The respondent may withdraw his or her offer of settlement
at any time before final acceptance by a disciplinary panel. If an
offer is withdrawn after submission, or is rejected by a
disciplinary panel, the respondent should not be deemed to have made
any admissions by reason of the offer of settlement and should not
be otherwise prejudiced by having submitted the offer of settlement.
(10) Hearings. (i) The swap execution facility need not apply
the formal rules of evidence for a hearing; nevertheless, the
procedures for the hearing may not be so informal as to deny a fair
hearing. No member of the disciplinary panel for the matter may have
a financial, personal, or other direct interest in the matter under
consideration.
(ii) In advance of the hearing, the respondent should be
entitled to examine all books, documents, or other evidence in the
possession or under the control of the swap execution facility. The
swap execution facility may withhold documents that: Are privileged
or constitute attorney work product; were prepared by an employee of
the swap execution facility but will not be offered in evidence in
the disciplinary proceedings; may disclose a technique or guideline
used in examinations, investigations, or enforcement proceedings; or
disclose the identity of a confidential source.
(iii) The swap execution facility's enforcement and compliance
staffs should be parties to the hearing, and the enforcement staff
should present their case on those charges and sanctions that are
the subject of the hearing.
(iv) The respondent should be entitled to appear personally at
the hearing, should be entitled to cross-examine any persons
appearing as witnesses at the hearing, and should be entitled to
call witnesses and to present such evidence as may be relevant to
the charges.
(v) The swap execution facility should require persons within
its jurisdiction who are called as witnesses to participate in the
hearing and produce evidence. The swap execution facility should
make reasonable efforts to secure the presence of all other persons
called as witnesses whose testimony would be relevant.
(vi) The rules of a swap execution facility may provide that a
sanction may be summarily imposed upon any person within its
jurisdiction whose actions impede the progress of a hearing.
(11) Right to appeal. The rules of a swap execution facility may
permit the parties to a proceeding to appeal promptly an adverse
decision of a disciplinary panel in all or in certain classes of
cases. Such rules may require a party's notice of appeal to be in
writing and to specify the findings, conclusions, or sanctions to
which objection are taken. If the rules of a swap execution facility
permit appeals, then both the respondent and the enforcement staff
should have the opportunity to appeal and the swap execution
facility should provide for the following:
(i) The swap execution facility should establish an appellate
panel that should be authorized to hear appeals of respondents. In
addition, the rules of a swap execution facility may provide that
the appellate panel may, on its own initiative, order review of a
decision by a disciplinary panel within a reasonable period of time
after the decision has been rendered.
(ii) The composition of the appellate panel should be consistent
with part 40 of this chapter, and should not include any members of
the swap execution facility's compliance staff or any person
involved in adjudicating any other stage of the same proceeding. The
rules of a swap execution facility should provide for the appeal
proceeding to be conducted before all of the members of the
appellate panel or a panel thereof.
(iii) Except for good cause shown, the appeal or review should
be conducted solely
[[Page 33600]]
on the record before the disciplinary panel, the written exceptions
filed by the parties, and the oral or written arguments of the
parties.
(iv) Promptly following the appeal or review proceeding, the
appellate panel should issue a written decision and should provide a
copy to the respondent. The decision issued by the appellate panel
should adhere to all the requirements of Sec. 37.206(d) to the
extent that a different conclusion is reached from that issued by
the disciplinary panel.
(12) Final decisions. Each swap execution facility should
establish rules setting forth when a decision rendered pursuant to
its rules will become the final decision of such swap execution
facility.
(13) Summary fines for violations of rules regarding timely
submission of records. A swap execution facility may adopt a summary
fine schedule for violations of rules relating to the failure to
timely submit accurate records required for clearing or verifying
each day's transactions. A swap execution facility may permit its
compliance staff, or a designated panel of swap execution facility
officials, to summarily impose minor sanctions against persons
within the swap execution facility's jurisdiction for violating such
rules. A swap execution facility's summary fine schedule may allow
for warning letters to be issued for first-time violations or
violators. If adopted, a summary fine schedule should provide for
progressively larger fines for recurring violations.
(14) Emergency disciplinary actions. (i) A swap execution
facility may impose a sanction, including suspension, or take other
summary action against a person or entity subject to its
jurisdiction upon a reasonable belief that such immediate action is
necessary to protect the best interest of the marketplace.
(ii) Any emergency disciplinary action should be taken in
accordance with a swap execution facility's procedures that provide
for the following:
(A) If practicable, a respondent should be served with a notice
before the action is taken, or otherwise at the earliest possible
opportunity. The notice should state the action, briefly state the
reasons for the action, and state the effective time and date, and
the duration of the action.
(B) The respondent should have the right to be represented by
legal counsel or any other representative of its choosing in all
proceedings subsequent to the emergency action taken. The respondent
should be given the opportunity for a hearing as soon as reasonably
practicable and the hearing should be conducted before the
disciplinary panel pursuant to the rules of the swap execution
facility.
(C) Promptly following the hearing provided for in paragraph
(14)(ii)(B) of this guidance, the swap execution facility should
render a written decision based upon the weight of the evidence
contained in the record of the proceeding and should provide a copy
to the respondent. The decision should include a description of the
summary action taken; the reasons for the summary action; a summary
of the evidence produced at the hearing; a statement of findings and
conclusions; a determination that the summary action should be
affirmed, modified, or reversed; and a declaration of any action to
be taken pursuant to the determination, and the effective date and
duration of such action.
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 3 of Section 5h of the Act--Swaps Not Readily
Susceptible to Manipulation
The swap execution facility shall permit trading only in swaps
that are not readily susceptible to manipulation.
(a) Guidance.
(1) In general, a swap contract is an agreement to exchange a
series of cash flows over a period of time based on some reference
price, which could be a single price, such as an absolute level or a
differential, or a price index calculated based on multiple
observations. Moreover, such a reference price may be reported by
the swap execution facility itself or by an independent third party.
When listing a swap for trading, a swap execution facility shall
ensure a swap's compliance with Core Principle 3, paying special
attention to the reference price used to determine the cash flow
exchanges. Specifically, Core Principle 3 requires that the
reference price used by a swap not be readily susceptible to
manipulation. As a result, when identifying a reference price, a
swap execution facility should either: Calculate its own reference
price using suitable and well-established acceptable methods or
carefully select a reliable third-party index.
(2) The importance of the reference price's suitability for a
given swap is similar to that of the final settlement price for a
cash-settled futures contract. If the final settlement price is
manipulated, then the futures contract does not serve its intended
price discovery and risk management functions. Similarly,
inappropriate reference prices cause the cash flows between the
buyer and seller to differ from the proper amounts, thus benefitting
one party and disadvantaging the other. Thus, careful consideration
should be given to the potential for manipulation or distortion of
the reference price.
(3) For swaps that are settled by physical delivery or by cash
settlement refer to the guidance in appendix C to part 38 of this
chapter--Demonstration of Compliance That a Contract is not Readily
Susceptible to Manipulation, section b(2) and section c(5),
respectively.
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 4 of Section 5h of the Act--Monitoring of Trading and
Trade Processing
The swap execution facility shall:
(A) Establish and enforce rules or terms and conditions
defining, or specifications detailing:
(1) Trading procedures to be used in entering and executing
orders traded on or through the facilities of the swap execution
facility; and
(2) Procedures for trade processing of swaps on or through the
facilities of the swap execution facility; and
(B) Monitor trading in swaps to prevent manipulation, price
distortion, and disruptions of the delivery or cash settlement
process through surveillance, compliance, and disciplinary practices
and procedures, including methods for conducting real-time
monitoring of trading and comprehensive and accurate trade
reconstructions.
(a) Guidance. The monitoring of trading activity in listed swaps
should be designed to prevent manipulation, price distortion, and
disruptions of the physical-delivery and cash settlement processes.
The swap execution facility should have rules in place that allow it
to intervene to prevent or reduce such market disruptions. Once a
threatened or actual disruption is detected, the swap execution
facility should take steps to prevent the market disruption or
reduce its severity.
(1) General requirements. Real-time monitoring for market
anomalies is the most effective, but the swap execution facility may
also demonstrate that it has an acceptable program if some of the
monitoring is accomplished on a T+1 basis. The monitoring of trading
should use automated alerts to detect abnormal price movements and
unusual trading volumes in real-time and instances or threats of
manipulation, price distortion, and disruptions on at least a T+1
basis. The T+1 detection and analysis should incorporate any
additional data that becomes available on a T+1 basis, including the
trade reconstruction data. In some cases, a swap execution facility
may demonstrate that its manual processes are effective. The swap
execution facility should continually monitor the appropriateness of
its swaps' terms and conditions, including the physical-delivery
requirements or reference prices used to determine cash flows or
settlement. The swap execution facility should act promptly to
address the conditions that are causing price distortions or market
disruptions, including, when appropriate, changes to contract terms.
The swap execution facility should be mindful that changes to
contract terms may affect whether a product is subject to the trade
execution and clearing requirements of the Act.
(2) Physical-delivery swaps. For physical-delivery swaps, the
swap execution facility should monitor for conditions that may cause
the swap to become susceptible to price manipulation or distortion,
including: The general availability of the commodity specified by
the swap, the commodity's characteristics, and the delivery
locations; and if available, information related to the size and
ownership of deliverable supplies.
(3) Cash-settled swaps. For cash-settled swaps, the swap
execution facility should monitor for pricing abnormalities in the
index or instrument used to calculate the reference price. If the
swap execution facility computes its own reference price used for
cash flows or settlement, it should promptly amend any methodologies
that result, or are likely to result, in manipulation, price
distortions, or market disruptions, or impose new methodologies to
resolve the threat of disruptions or distortions. If the swap
execution facility relies upon a third-party index or instrument,
including an index or instrument traded on another venue for the
swap reference price, it should conduct due diligence to ensure that
the reference price is
[[Page 33601]]
not susceptible to manipulation and that the terms and conditions of
the swap continue to comply with Sec. 37.300.
(4) Ability to obtain information. The swap execution facility
shall demonstrate that it has access to sufficient information to
assess whether trading in swaps listed on its market, in the index
or instrument used as a reference price, or the underlying commodity
for its listed swaps is being used to affect prices on its market.
The swap execution facility should demonstrate that it can obtain
position and trading information directly from the market
participants that conduct substantial trading on its facility or
through an information sharing agreement with other venues or a
third-party regulatory service provider. If the position and trading
information is not available directly from the market participants
in its markets, but is available through information sharing
agreements with other trading venues or a third-party regulatory
service provider, the swap execution facility should cooperate in
such information sharing agreements. The swap execution facility may
limit the application of the requirement for market participants to
keep and provide records of their activity in the index or
instrument used as a reference price, the underlying commodity, and
related derivatives markets, to only those market participants that
conduct substantial trading on its facility.
(5) Risk controls for trading. An acceptable program for
preventing market disruptions shall demonstrate appropriate trading
risk controls, in addition to pauses and halts. Risk controls should
be adapted to the unique characteristics of the trading platform and
of the markets to which they apply and should be designed to avoid
market disruptions without unduly interfering with that market's
price discovery function. The swap execution facility may choose
from among controls that include: pre-trade limits on order size,
price collars or bands around the current price, message throttles,
daily price limits, and intraday position limits related to
financial risk to the clearing member, or design other types of
controls, as well as clear error-trade and order-cancellation
policies. Within the specific array of controls that are selected,
the swap execution facility should set the parameters for those
controls, so that the specific parameters are reasonably likely to
serve the purpose of preventing market disruptions and price
distortions. If a swap is fungible with, linked to, or a substitute
for other swaps on the swap execution facility or on other trading
venues, such risk controls should, to the extent practicable, be
coordinated with any similar controls placed on those other swaps.
If a swap is based on the level of an equity index, such risk
controls should, to the extent practicable, be coordinated with any
similar controls placed on national security exchanges.
(b) Acceptable practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 5 of Section 5h of the Act--Ability To Obtain
Information
The swap execution facility shall:
(A) Establish and enforce rules that will allow the facility to
obtain any necessary information to perform any of the functions
described in section 5h of the Act;
(B) Provide the information to the Commission on request; and
(C) Have the capacity to carry out such international
information-sharing agreements as the Commission may require.
(a) Guidance. [Reserved]
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 6 of Section 5h of the Act--Position Limits or
Accountability
(A) In general. To reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or congestion, especially during trading in the
delivery month, a swap execution facility that is a trading facility
shall adopt for each of the contracts of the facility, as is
necessary and appropriate, position limitations or position
accountability for speculators.
(B) Position limits. For any contract that is subject to a
position limitation established by the Commission pursuant to
section 4a(a) of the Act, the swap execution facility shall:
(1) Set its position limitation at a level no higher than the
Commission limitation; and
(2) Monitor positions established on or through the swap
execution facility for compliance with the limit set by the
Commission and the limit, if any, set by the swap execution
facility.
(a) Guidance. Until such time that compliance is required under
part 151 of this chapter, a swap execution facility should have
reasonable discretion to comply with Sec. 37.600, including
considering part 150 of this chapter. For Required Transactions as
defined in Sec. 37.9, a swap execution facility may demonstrate
compliance with Sec. 37.600 by setting and enforcing position
limitations or position accountability levels only with respect to
trading on the swap execution facility's own market. For Permitted
Transactions as defined in Sec. 37.9, a swap execution facility may
demonstrate compliance with Sec. 37.600 by setting and enforcing
position accountability levels or sending the Commission a list of
Permitted Transactions traded on the swap execution facility.
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 7 of Section 5h of the Act--Financial Integrity of
Transactions
The swap execution facility shall establish and enforce rules
and procedures for ensuring the financial integrity of swaps entered
on or through the facilities of the swap execution facility,
including the clearance and settlement of the swaps pursuant to
section 2(h)(1) of the Act.
(a) Guidance. [Reserved]
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 8 of Section 5h of the Act--Emergency Authority
The swap execution facility shall adopt rules to provide for the
exercise of emergency authority, in consultation or cooperation with
the Commission, as is necessary and appropriate, including the
authority to liquidate or transfer open positions in any swap or to
suspend or curtail trading in a swap.
(a) Guidance.
(1) A swap execution facility should have rules that authorize
it to take certain actions in the event of an emergency, as defined
in Sec. 40.1(h) of this chapter. A swap execution facility should
have the authority to intervene as necessary to maintain markets
with fair and orderly trading and to prevent or address manipulation
or disruptive trading practices, whether the need for intervention
arises exclusively from the swap execution facility's market or as
part of a coordinated, cross-market intervention. A swap execution
facility should have the flexibility and independence to address
market emergencies in an effective and timely manner consistent with
the nature of the emergency, as long as all such actions taken by
the swap execution facility are made in good faith to protect the
integrity of the markets. However, the swap execution facility
should also have rules that allow it to take market actions as may
be directed by the Commission. Additionally, in situations where a
swap is traded on more than one platform, emergency action to
liquidate or transfer open interest shall be as directed, or agreed
to, by the Commission or the Commission's staff. Swap execution
facility rules should include procedures and guidelines for
decision-making and implementation of emergency intervention that
avoid conflicts of interest in accordance with the provisions of
section 40.9 of this chapter, and include alternate lines of
communication and approval procedures to address emergencies
associated with real time events. To address perceived market
threats, the swap execution facility should have rules that allow it
to take emergency actions, including imposing or modifying position
limits, imposing or modifying price limits, imposing or modifying
intraday market restrictions, imposing special margin requirements,
ordering the liquidation or transfer of open positions in any
contract, ordering the fixing of a settlement price, extending or
shortening the expiration date or the trading hours, suspending or
curtailing trading in any contract, transferring customer contracts
and the margin, or altering any contract's settlement terms or
conditions, or, if applicable, providing for the carrying out of
such actions through its agreements with its third-party provider of
clearing or regulatory services.
(2) A swap execution facility should promptly notify the
Commission of its exercise of emergency action, explaining its
decision-making process, the reasons for using its emergency
authority, and how conflicts of interest were minimized, including
the extent to which the swap execution facility considered the
effect of its emergency action on the underlying markets and on
markets that are linked or referenced to the contracts traded on its
facility, including similar markets on other trading venues.
Information on all regulatory actions carried out pursuant to a swap
execution facility's emergency authority should be included in a
timely submission of a certified rule pursuant to part 40 of this
chapter.
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 9 of Section 5h of the Act--Timely Publication of
Trading Information
(A) In general. The swap execution facility shall make public
timely information on price, trading volume, and other trading data
on swaps to the extent prescribed by the Commission.
[[Page 33602]]
(B) Capacity of swap execution facility. The swap execution
facility shall be required to have the capacity to electronically
capture and transmit trade information with respect to transactions
executed on the facility.
(a) Guidance. [Reserved]
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 10 of Section 5h of the Act--Recordkeeping and Reporting
(A) In general. A swap execution facility shall:
(1) Maintain records of all activities relating to the business
of the facility, including a complete audit trail, in a form and
manner acceptable to the Commission for a period of five years;
(2) Report to the Commission, in a form and manner acceptable to
the Commission, such information as the Commission determines to be
necessary or appropriate for the Commission to perform the duties of
the Commission under the Act; and
(3) Keep any such records relating to swaps defined in section
1a(47)(A)(v) of the Act open to inspection and examination by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
(B) Requirements. The Commission shall adopt data collection and
reporting requirements for swap execution facilities that are
comparable to corresponding requirements for derivatives clearing
organizations and swap data repositories.
(a) Guidance. [Reserved]
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 11 of Section 5h of the Act--Antitrust Considerations
Unless necessary or appropriate to achieve the purposes of the
Act, the swap execution facility shall not:
(A) Adopt any rules or take any actions that result in any
unreasonable restraint of trade; or
(B) Impose any material anticompetitive burden on trading or
clearing.
(a) Guidance. An entity seeking registration as a swap execution
facility may request that the Commission consider under the
provisions of section 15(b) of the Act, any of the entity's rules,
including trading protocols or policies, and including both
operational rules and the terms or conditions of products listed for
trading, at the time of registration or thereafter. The Commission
intends to apply section 15(b) of the Act to its consideration of
issues under this core principle in a manner consistent with that
previously applied to contract markets.
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 12 of Section 5h of the Act--Conflicts of Interest:
The swap execution facility shall:
(A) Establish and enforce rules to minimize conflicts of
interest in its decision-making process; and
(B) Establish a process for resolving the conflicts of interest.
(a) Guidance. [Reserved]
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 13 of Section 5h of the Act--Financial Resources
(A) In general. The swap execution facility shall have adequate
financial, operational, and managerial resources to discharge each
responsibility of the swap execution facility.
(B) Determination of resource adequacy. The financial resources
of a swap execution facility shall be considered to be adequate if
the value of the financial resources exceeds the total amount that
would enable the swap execution facility to cover the operating
costs of the swap execution facility for a one-year period, as
calculated on a rolling basis.
(a) Guidance. [Reserved]
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 14 of Section 5h of the Act--System Safeguards
The swap execution facility shall:
(A) Establish and maintain a program of risk analysis and
oversight to identify and minimize sources of operational risk,
through the development of appropriate controls and procedures, and
automated systems, that:
(1) Are reliable and secure; and
(2) Have adequate scalable capacity;
(B) Establish and maintain emergency procedures, backup
facilities, and a plan for disaster recovery that allow for:
(1) The timely recovery and resumption of operations; and
(2) The fulfillment of the responsibilities and obligations of
the swap execution facility; and
(C) Periodically conduct tests to verify that the backup
resources of the swap execution facility are sufficient to ensure
continued:
(1) Order processing and trade matching;
(2) Price reporting;
(3) Market surveillance; and
(4) Maintenance of a comprehensive and accurate audit trail.
(a) Guidance.
(1) Risk analysis and oversight program. In addressing the
categories of its risk analysis and oversight program, a swap
execution facility should follow generally accepted standards and
best practices with respect to the development, operation,
reliability, security, and capacity of automated systems.
(2) Testing. A swap execution facility's testing of its
automated systems and business continuity-disaster recovery
capabilities should be conducted by qualified, independent
professionals. Such qualified independent professionals may be
independent contractors or employees of the swap execution facility,
but should not be persons responsible for development or operation
of the systems or capabilities being tested.
(3) Coordination. To the extent practicable, a swap execution
facility should:
(i) Coordinate its business continuity-disaster recovery plan
with those of the market participants it depends upon to provide
liquidity, in a manner adequate to enable effective resumption of
activity in its markets following a disruption causing activation of
the swap execution facility's business continuity-disaster recovery
plan;
(ii) Initiate and coordinate periodic, synchronized testing of
its business continuity-disaster recovery plan with those of the
market participants it depends upon to provide liquidity; and
(iii) Ensure that its business continuity-disaster recovery plan
takes into account such plans of its telecommunications, power,
water, and other essential service providers.
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Core Principle 15 of Section 5h of the Act--Designation of Chief
Compliance Officer
(A) In general. Each swap execution facility shall designate an
individual to serve as a chief compliance officer.
(B) Duties. The chief compliance officer shall:
(1) Report directly to the board or to the senior officer of the
facility;
(2) Review compliance with the core principles in this
subsection;
(3) In consultation with the board of the facility, a body
performing a function similar to that of a board, or the senior
officer of the facility, resolve any conflicts of interest that may
arise;
(4) Be responsible for establishing and administering the
policies and procedures required to be established pursuant to this
section;
(5) Ensure compliance with the Act and the rules and regulations
issued under the Act, including rules prescribed by the Commission
pursuant to section 5h of the Act; and
(6) Establish procedures for the remediation of noncompliance
issues found during compliance office reviews, look backs, internal
or external audit findings, self-reported errors, or through
validated complaints.
(C) Requirements for procedures. In establishing procedures
under paragraph (B)(6) of this section, the chief compliance officer
shall design the procedures to establish the handling, management
response, remediation, retesting, and closing of noncompliance
issues.
(D) Annual reports.
(1) In general. In accordance with rules prescribed by the
Commission, the chief compliance officer shall annually prepare and
sign a report that contains a description of:
(i) The compliance of the swap execution facility with the Act;
and
(ii) The policies and procedures, including the code of ethics
and conflict of interest policies, of the swap execution facility.
(2) Requirements. The chief compliance officer shall:
(i) Submit each report described in clause (1) with the
appropriate financial report of the swap execution facility that is
required to be submitted to the Commission pursuant to section 5h of
the Act; and
(ii) Include in the report a certification that, under penalty
of law, the report is accurate and complete.
(a) Guidance. [Reserved]
(b) Acceptable Practices. [Reserved]
Issued in Washington, DC, on May 17, 2013, by the Commission.
Melissa D. Jurgens,
Secretary of the Commission.
Appendices to Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution
Facilities
NOTE: The following appendices will not appear in the Code of
Federal Regulations.
[[Page 33603]]
Appendix 1--Commission Voting Summary
On this matter, Chairman Gensler and Commissioners Chilton,
O'Malia and Wetjen voted in the affirmative; Commissioner Sommers
voted in the negative.
Appendix 2--Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler
I support the final rulemaking on swap execution facilities
(SEFs). This rule is key to fulfilling transparency reforms that
Congress mandated in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.
Congress included a trade execution requirement in the law. This
means that swaps subject to mandatory clearing and made available to
trade would move to transparent trading platforms. Market
participants would benefit from the price competition that comes
from trading platforms where multiple participants have the ability
to trade swaps by accepting bids and offers made by multiple
participants. Congress also said that the market participants must
have impartial access to these platforms.
Farmers, ranchers, producers and commercial companies that want
to hedge a risk by locking in a future price or rate would get the
benefit of the competition and transparency that trading platforms,
both SEFs and designated contract markets (DCMs), will provide.
These transparent platforms will give everyone looking to
compete in the marketplace the ability to see the prices of
available bids and offers prior to making a decision on a
transaction. By the end of this year, a significant portion of
interest rate and credit derivative index swaps would be in full
view to the marketplace before transactions occur. This is a
significant shift toward market transparency from the status quo.
Such common-sense transparency has existed in the securities and
futures markets since the historic reforms of the 1930s.
Transparency lowers costs for investors, businesses and consumers,
as it shifts information from dealers to the broader public. It
promotes competition and increases liquidity.
As Congress made clear in the law, trading on SEFs and DCMs
would be required only when financial institutions transact with
financial institutions. End-users would benefit from access to the
information on these platforms, but would not be required to use
them.
Further, companies would be able to continue relying on
customized transactions--those not required to be cleared--to meet
their particular needs, as well as to enter into large block trades.
Consistent with Congress' directive that multiple parties have
the ability to trade with multiple parties on these transparent
platforms, these reforms require that market participants trade
through an order book, and provide the flexibility as well to seek
requests for quotes.
To be a registered SEF, the trading platform will be required to
provide an order book to all its market participants. This is
significant, as for the first time, the broad public will be able to
gain access and compete in this market with the assurance that their
bids or offers will be communicated to the rest of the market. This
provision alone will significantly enhance transparency and
competition in the market.
SEFs also will have the flexibility to offer trading through
requests for quotes. The rule provides that such requests would have
to go out to a minimum of three unaffiliated market participants
before a swap that is cleared, made available to trade and less than
a block could be executed. There will be an initial phase-in period
with a minimum of two participants to smooth the transition.
As long as the minimum functionality is met, as detailed in the
rule, and the SEF complies with these rules and the core principles,
the SEF can conduct business through any means of interstate
commerce, such as the Internet, telephone or even the mail. Thus,
today's rule is technology neutral.
Under these transparency reforms coupled with the Commission's
rule on making swaps available for trading, the trade execution
requirement will be phased in for market participants, giving them
time to comply.
These reforms benefited from extensive public comments. Moving
forward, the CFTC will work with SEF applicants on implementation.
Appendix 3--Concurring Statement of Commissioner Scott D. O'Malia
Today, the Commission votes to establish a new trading venue, a
Swap Execution Facility (SEF) that will allow market participants to
access a more transparent market and offer innovative trading
opportunities. Unlike the futures exchanges which are tied to a
single clearinghouse, trades executed on SEFs can be cleared at
different clearinghouses, which will provide a new competitive
execution space. For these reasons, I have always had high hopes for
SEFs.
I am pleased that the final rule has been revised to soften many
of the proposed rough edges and should allow for a smooth transition
to this new trading environment.
The final rule allows for a streamlined temporary registration
process to ensure that SEF platforms are not disadvantaged by
regulatory delays that could stifle competition or provide a first-
mover advantage. However, instead of ``rubberstamping'' SEFs'
applications, a better approach would have been to conduct a more
substantive, but limited review of applications by coming up with a
Checklist that contains specific requirements and that takes into
account work already done by the National Futures Association in
reviewing the SEFs' systems and rulebooks.
I am also cautiously optimistic about the Commission's
commitment to revisit the SEF rule and other Commission's rules to
address regulatory conflicts with foreign jurisdictions. Such
regulatory disparities will discourage U.S. and foreign traders from
doing business in the United States and prompt them to move their
businesses to foreign jurisdictions with a less restrictive trading
environment. I am pleased to have the commitment of Chairman Gensler
who stated his intention to revisit the SEF rule if it proves to
conflict with international regulatory requirements making U.S.
platforms uncompetitive or disadvantaged as a result of this
rulemaking.
For SEFs to be successful, the Commission must be faithful to
the express directives of Dodd-Frank and implement rules that are
clear and promote efficient and fair trading.
As I explain below, the Commission's rules have fallen short of
these objectives.
The Rule's Requirement To Send a Request for Quote to Three Market
Participants Is Not Supported by Law
Dodd-Frank seeks to ``promote the trading on SEFs and to promote
pre-trade price transparency in the swaps market.'' \1\ To advance
these objectives, the rule must permit SEFs to offer flexible
execution platforms that ensure pre-trade price transparency, but at
the same time, allow participants (buy-side, sell-side, commercial
firms) to execute various products with different levels of trading
liquidity at the price acceptable to them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ CEA section 5h(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, the success of a SEF is determined by whether it will be
able to meet the liquidity needs of various market participants.
Although the rules allow a Request for Quote (RFQ) to accommodate
transactions in less liquid products to the extent that such
products are determined to be made available to trade as provided in
the Made Available to Trade rule,\2\ I am concerned that the
requirement to broadcast a quote to at least three market
participants is not supported by the statute and is not based on
data analysis.\3\
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\2\ Commissioner Scott D. O'Malia Dissenting Statement, Process
for a Designated Contract Market or Swap Execution Facility to Make
a Swap Available to Trade under Section 2(h)(8) of the Commodity
Exchange Act; Swap Transaction Compliance and Implementation
Schedule; Trade Execution Requirement Under Section 2(h) of the
Commodity Exchange Act (May 16, 2013).
\3\ A SEF is defined as a ``trading system . . . in which
multiple participants have the ability to . . . trade swaps by
accepting bids and offers made by multiple participants in the . . .
system, through any means of interstate commerce.'' CEA section
1(a)(50).
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One way for the Commission to assess trading liquidity on a SEF
and make necessary adjustments to the RFQ requirement is to analyze
transaction data that the Commission now receives from Swap Data
Repositories (SDRs). Over time, as liquidity increases and the
market feels more confident about SEFs, there will be a natural
progression for market participants to migrate to more centralized
execution platforms and the role of the RFQ may be significantly
reduced. But again, the Commission should not come up with an
unsubstantiated number and declare it to be the law. Instead, the
Commission must make such determination based on an evaluation of
the SDR transaction data.
[[Page 33604]]
The Rule Should Have Provided Further Clarity Regarding Voice
Execution.
SEFs, by definition, may execute swaps ``through any means of
interstate commerce.'' \4\ As I mentioned before, I strongly support
the use of various methods of execution, including voice, to foster
a competitive trading environment on a SEF. I am pleased that the
final rule acknowledges the ``any means of interstate commerce''
clause and provides for a role of voice and other means of
execution. However, I remain concerned that although the preamble to
the rule provides an example of a voice-based method of execution,
the rule text does not expressly allow for voice and other execution
methods.\5\ A better approach would have been to add voice to the
rule text as the third method of execution on a SEF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ CEA section 1(a) (50).
\5\ Commission Regulation Sec. 37.9.
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The Rule Should Have Provided Clarity Regarding Exchange of Swaps for
Related Position Transactions
For some unknown reason, the draft rule prohibited trades
involving an Exchange of Swaps for Related Positions (ESRPs). Yet
again, such ban would have caused the pendulum of the Commission's
regulations to continue its swing toward futures trading as the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) expressly allows for bone fide Exchange
of Futures for Related Positions transactions.
The Commission sought to ban ESRPs transactions because they
were not expressly allowed by the CEA. Just because these
transactions are not mentioned in the statute, they don't have to be
banned by the Commission's rules.
I am glad that in the final rule, the Commission took a more
reasonable approach and now has committed to entertaining requests
from market participants to permit off-exchange trades where swaps
are components of exchanges of swaps for physicals transactions.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, I reluctantly concur with the
decision of the Commission to approve this final rule.
[FR Doc. 2013-12242 Filed 6-3-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
Last Updated: June 4, 2013